NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2
COMPANY Contract No.: LTC/C/NFP/5128/20
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033734
Document Title
:
TECHNICAL SAFETY & LOSS PREVENTION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR CP6S AND CP7S COMPLEXES
COMPANY Document No.
: 200-20-SH-DEC-00005
Saipem Document No.
: 033734-B-D-30-SPM-LP-S-10037
Discipline
: HSE&Q
Document Type
: DESIGN CRITERIA
Document Category/Class
: 1
Document Classification
: INTERNAL
A
04-Apr-2023
Issued for Review
Choy Kok Chuan
Francis Minah
Luminita Oprescu
REV.
DATE
DESCRIPTION OF REVISION
PREPARED BY
CHECKED BY
APPROVED BY
Saipem S.p.A.
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REVISION HISTORY
Revision
Date of Revision
Revision Description
A1
A
06-Mar-2023
Issued for Inter-Discipline Check
04-Apr-2023
Issued for Review
HOLDS LIST
Hold No
Hold Description
1
Company Document Number
Company No._Rev. 200-20-SH-DEC-00005_A
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
3
4
INTRODUCTION … 5
1.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVE … 5 1.2 PROJECT SCOPE … 5
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS … 7
2.1 DEFINITIONS … 7 2.2 ABBREVIATIONS … 8
PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK … 13
3.1 PURPOSE … 13 3.2 SCOPE OF WORK … 13
REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS … 14
4.1 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE … 14 4.2 QATARI GOVERNMENT AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS … 14 4.3 COMPANY DOCUMENTS … 14 4.4 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (FEED) … 15 4.5 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (DETAILED DESIGN) … 18 INTERNATIONAL CODES & STANDARDS … 23 4.6
5
GENERAL … 26
5.1 STANDARDS, CODES AND REFERENCES… 26 5.2 RISK MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY … 26 5.3 RISK ACCEPTANCE, ALARP AND VULNERABILITY … 26
5.3.1
Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) … 27
5.3.2
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) … 27
5.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL) … 27
5.3.4 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) … 27
5.3.5 Group Risk … 27
5.3.6 Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF) … 27
INHERENT SAFETY AND LAYOUT REQUIREMENTS … 29
6.1 INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN … 29 6.2 MAIN DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR LAYOUT DESIGN … 29
TECHNICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENTS … 31
7.1 SAFETY IN DESIGN WORKSHOPS … 31 7.2 TECHNICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENTS … 35 7.3 ENVIRONMENT DESIGN STUDIES … 45 7.4 OTHER STUDIES / ASSESSMENT … 46
7.4.1 Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Analysis Study … 46
7.4.2 Technical Integrity Verification Plan … 47
6
7
8
LOSS PREVENTION DETAIL DESIGN … 49
8.1 OVERVIEW … 49 8.2 SPACING AND LAYOUT DESIGN … 49 8.3 EXPLOSION PREVENTION, CONTROL AND MITIGATION … 51
8.3.1 Minimization & Protection of Potential Leak Sources … 51
8.3.2 Explosion Prevention and Mitigation … 52 8.4 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION / BLOWDOWN … 52
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8.4.1 Pressure Relief, Venting and Flaring … 53 8.5 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN (ESD) SYSTEM … 55
8.5.1 ESD Levels … 55 8.6 DRAINAGE SYSTEM … 56
8.6.1 Open Drain System … 56
8.6.2 Closed Drain System… 57 8.7 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT (LOC) … 57 8.8 FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEM … 58
8.8.1 Fire & Gas 3D Mapping Study … 59 8.9 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION… 59
8.9.1
Ignition Control … 60 8.10 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION … 61 8.11 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION… 61 8.12 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE … 63
8.12.1 Escape … 63
8.12.2 Evacuation … 64
8.12.3 Temporary Refuge … 66
8.12.4 Rescue … 67
8.12.5 Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout … 67
8.12.6 Safety and Lifesaving Equipment … 67
8.12.7 Muster Areas … 68 8.13 MARINE AND HELICOPTER COLLISIONS … 68 8.14 MECHANICAL HANDLING … 69
9
HYDROGEN SULFIDE (H2S) SAFETY … 70
9.1 PURPOSE … 70 9.2 H2S PROPERTIES … 70
9.2.1 H2S Characteristics … 70
9.2.2 Toxic Effects of H2S … 71 9.3 H2S RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM … 73
9.3.1 Prevention … 73
9.3.2 H2S Gas Detection System … 75
9.3.3 Breathing Air Systems … 76
9.3.4 Maintenance Operations … 77
9.3.5 Mitigation … 77
9.3.6 Recovery … 78
9.3.7 H2S Area Classification Layouts … 78
10
BLAST PROTECTION … 79
10.1 STRUCTURES … 79 10.2 BUILDINGS… 80
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1
INTRODUCTION
The North Field is the world’s largest natural gas field and accounts for nearly all of the state of Qatar’s gas production. The reservoir pressure in the North Field has been declining due to continuous production since the early 1990s. The principal objective of the NFPS Project is to sustain the plateau from existing QG South Operation (RL Dry Gas, RGE Wet gas) and existing QG North Operation (QG1 & QG2) production areas by implementing an integrated and optimum investment program consisting of subsurface development, pressure drop reduction steps and compression. Refer to the figure below for a schematic of the North Field.
Qatargas Operating Company Limited is leading the development of the North Field Production Sustainability (NFPS) Project.
1.1 Project Objective
The objective of this COMP2 Project includes:
• Achieve standards of global excellence in Safety, Health, Environment, Security and Quality
performance.
• Sustain the Qatargas North Field Production Plateau by installing new Compression Complex facilities CP6S & CP7S in QG south with integration to the existing facilities under Investment #3 program.
• Facility development shall be safe, high quality, reliable, maintainable, accessible, operable,
and efficient throughout their required life.
1.2 Project Scope
The COMP2 Project Scope includes detailed engineering, procurement, construction, transportation & installation, hook-up and commissioning, tie-in to EXISTING PROPERTY and provide support for start-up activities of the following facilities and provisions for future development. The WORK shall be following the specified regulations, codes, specifications and standards, achieves the specified performance, and is safe and fit‐for‐purpose in all respects.
Offshore
CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes that are part of QG-S RGE facilities as follows:
• CP6S Compression Complex
• Compression Platform CP6S, Living Quarters LQ6S, Flare FL6S
• Bridges BR6S-2, BR6S-3, BR6S-4, BR6S-5
• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP6S
Production from existing wellheads (WHP6S & WHP10S) and new wellhead (WHP14S) are routed via riser platform RP6S to compression platform CP6S to boost pressure and export to onshore via two export lines through the existing WHP6S pipeline and a new 38” carbon steel looping trunkline from RP6S (installed by EPCOL). CP6S is bridge-linked to RP6S.
• CP7S Compression Complex
• Compression Platform CP7S, Living Quarters LQ7S, Flare FL7S
• Bridges BR7S-2, BR7S-3, BR7S-4, BR7S-5
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• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP7S
CP7S shall receive production from existing wellheads (WHP5S & WHP7S) and new wellhead (WHP13S). There is only one export line for CP7S through the existing export pipeline from WHP7S. CP7S is bridge-linked to RP7S.
RGA Complex Destressing
Migration of the Electrical power source, Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control systems from WHPs and RHPs hosted by RGA to the respective Compression Complexes listed below:
• WHP6S, WHP10S, WHP14S, RP6S and RP10S to CP6S Compression Complex
• WHP5S, WHP7S, WHP13S and RP7S to CP7S Compression Complex
Destressing of Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control system in RGA Complex Control Room, which would include decommissioning and removal of telecom system devices and equipment that would no longer be required post migration and destressing activity.
Onshore
An Onshore Collaborative Center (OCC) will be built under EPC-9, which will enable onshore based engineering teams to conduct full engineering surveillance of all the offshore facilities. The OCC Building will be located in Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC) within the Qatar Gas South Plot. MICC & Telecommunication, ELICS related scope will be performed in the OCC building.
Figure 1.2.1: NFPS Compression Project COMP2 Scope
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2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
2.1 Definitions
Definition
Description
COMPANY
Qatargas Operating Company Limited.
CONTRACTOR
Saipem S.p.A.
DELIVERABLES
FACILITIES
All products (drawings, equipment, services) which must be submitted by CONTRACTOR to COMPANY at times specified in the contract. All machinery, apparatus, materials, articles, components, systems and items of all kinds to be designed, engineered, procured, manufactured, constructed, supplied, tested and permanently installed by CONTRACTOR at SITE in connection with the NFPS Project as further described in Exhibit 6.
fabricated,
MILESTONE
A reference event splitting a PROJECT activity for progress measurement purpose.
PROJECT
NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2
SITE
(i) any area where Engineering, Procurement, Fabrication of the FACILITIES related to the CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes are being carried out and (ii) the area offshore required for installation of the FACILITIES in the State of Qatar.
SUBCONTRACT
Contract signed by SUBCONTRACTOR and CONTRACTOR for the performance of a certain portion of the WORK within the Project.
SUBCONTRACTOR
Any organization selected and awarded by CONTRACTOR to supply a certain Project materials or equipment or whom a part of the WORK has been Subcontracted.
WORK
Scope of Work defined in the CONTRACT.
WORK PACKAGE
The lowest manageable and convenient level in each WBS subdivision.
VENDOR
The person, group, or organization responsible for the design, manufacture, testing, and load-out/shipping of the Equipment/ Material.
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2.2 Abbreviations
Code
Definition
AFC
AFP
AIV
ALARP
BA
BR6S-2
BR6S-3
BR6S-4
BR6S-5
BR7S-2
BR7S-3
BR7S-4
BR7S-5
CFD
CHB
CO2
CP6S
CP7S
CUI
CRA
CS
D1BM
DRA
Approved for Construction
Active Fire Protection
Acoustically Induced Vibration
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
Breathing Air
Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Computational Fluid Dynamics
Chemical Hazards Bulleting
Carbon Dioxide
Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Corrosion Under Insulation
Corrosion Resistant Alloy
Carbon Steel
Design One Build Many
Design Risk Assessment
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Code
Definition
Design Safety Case
Emergency Diesel Generator
Engineering Procurement & Construction
Engineering Procurement Construction and Installation
Emergency Response Plan
Emergency Shutdown
Fatal Accident Rate
Fire and Gas
Front End Engineering Design
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
Flare Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Flare Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
Hydrogen Sulphide
Hazardous Area Classification
Hazard Identification
Hazard and Operability
Hydrocarbon
Human Factors Engineering
Heat Material Balances
High Pressure
Health, Safety, Environment & Quality
Hookup and Commissioning
DSC
EDG
EPC
EPCI
ERP
ESD
FAR
F&G
FEED
FERA
FL6S
FL7S
FERA
H2S
HAC
HAZID
HAZOP
HC
HFE
HMB
HP
HSE&Q
HUC
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Code
Definition
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
Issued for Approval
Issued for Review
Input/Output
Individual Risk Per Annum
Instruction To Proceed
Knockout
Level Alarm Low Low
Leak Detection and Repair
Local Equipment Room
Lower Flammability Limit
Loss of Containment
Loss of Process Containment
Low Pressure
Living Quarters Platform at WHP 6 Complex
Living Quarters Platform at WHP 7 Complex
Long Term Exposure Limit
Manual Alarm Call Point
Major Accident Event
Major Accident Hazard
Main Control Room
Matrix of Permitted Operations
HVAC
IDLH
IFA
IFR
I/O
IRPA
ITP
KO
LALL
LDAR
LER
LFL
LOC
LOPC
LP
LQ6S
LQ7S
LTEL
MACP
MAE
MAH
MCR
MOPO
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Code
Definition
NFPS
North Field Production Sustainability
NNF
OCC
OCR
OEL
PA
Not Normally Flowing
Onshore Collaborative Centre
Onshore Control Room
Occupational Exposure Limits
Public Address
P&IDs
Process and Instrumentation Diagrams
PCS
PFD
PFP
PHA
PLL
POB
PPE
PPM
QG
QRA
RP6S
RP7S
RP10S
SCBA
SCE
SDS
Process Control System
Process Flow Diagram
Passive Fire Protection
Process Hazard Analysis
Potential Loss of Life
Personnel on Board
Personal Protective Equipment
Parts Per Million
Qatargas
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Riser Platform 6S
Riser Platform 7S
Riser Platform 10S
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
Safety Critical Elements
Shutdown System
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Code
Definition
SGIA
SHE
SIL
Smoke and Gas Ingress Assessment
Safety Health & Environment
Safety Integrity Level
SIMOPS
Simultaneous Operations
SOW
SO2
SO3
STEL
TR
TRIA
TRIF
TWA
UFL
WHP5S
WHP6S
WHP7S
WHP10S
WHP13S
WHP14S
Scope of Work
Sulphur Dioxide
Sulphur Trioxide
Short Term Exposure Limit
Temporary Refuge
Temporary Refuge Impairment Assessment
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency
Time Weighted Average
Upper Flammability Limit
Wellhead Platform 5S
Wellhead Platform 6S
Wellhead Platform 7S
Wellhead Platform 10S
Wellhead Platform 13S
Wellhead Platform 14S
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3 PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK
3.1 Purpose
This Technical Safety & Loss Prevention Design Philosophy describes the loss prevention requirements relating to the prevention, control and mitigation of Major Accident Hazards for the new Qatargas Operating Company Ltd offshore assets developed in COMP2 Compression Project:
• Compression Platforms (CP6S and CP7S) • Living Quarters • Flare Towers • Bridges • Tie-ins at Riser Platforms (RP6S and RP7S)
This design philosophy is developed based on the QG Loss Prevention Philosophy [5] and Technical Safety Basis of Design [85].
For the detailed design engineering of the CP6S and CP7S Complexes the following philosophy documents are developed:
-
Active Fire Protection Design Philosophy [86]
-
Passive Fire Protection Design Philosophy [133].
-
Fire and Gas Detection System Design Philosophy [114]
-
Escape Evacuation & Rescue Design Philosophy [113].
-
Environmental Design Philosophy [111]
-
Noise And Vibration Design Philosophy [149].
These philosophies cover specific aspects of the Loss Prevention system design and should be read in conjunction with this Technical Safety & Loss Prevention Design Philosophy.
3.2 Scope of Work
The COMP2 Facilities to be addressed under this scope of work are the offshore facilities identified in Section 1.2 above with due cognizance of the Design One Build Many (D1BM) philosophy. These comprise the Greenfield and associated Brownfield facilities at CP6S and CP7S compression complexes.
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4 REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS
4.1 Order of Precedence
The following codes, standards and specification are referenced within the document shall be considered as part of this specification. Conflict among applicable specification and / or codes shall be brought to the attention of the COMPANY for resolution COMPANY decision shall be final and shall be implemented. The latest editions of codes and specification effective as on date of contract shall be followed.
In general, the order of precedence shall be followed:
a) Qatari Governmental and Regulatory Requirements
b) COMPANY Procedures, Policies and Standards (Exhibit 5 Appendix I)
c) Project Specifications.
d) Industry Codes and Standards
e) COMPANY and CONTRACTOR’s Lessons Learned
4.2 Qatari Government and Regulatory Requirements
S. No
Document Number
Title
Law No. 30 of 2002
The Law of the Environment Protection 30/2002
Executive By-Law for Law No. 30 for 2002
Executive By-Law for the Environment Protection Law, Issued vide the Decree Law No. 30 for the Year 2002
Law 21/2007
Control of the Ozone-Depleting Substances
- Executive Regulation No. 4 of 2005
Resolution No. 4 of 2005 for the Executive By- Law for the Environment Protection Law, Issued vide the Decree Law No. 30 for the Year 2002
4.3 Company Documents
S. No
Document Number
Title
PRT-PRS-PRC-002
Loss Prevention Philosophy
PRT-000-PRC-009
SHE Risk Acceptance Criteria Procedure
PRT-000-PRC-016
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment
PRT-MOR-PRC-002
Formal Risk Assessment Procedure
PRT-MOR-PRC-003
Formal Risk Assessment Application Guide
PRT-PRS-PRC-008
Process Safety & Risk Guide
01.15.02.04
Hydrogen Sulfide
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S. No
Document Number
Title
PRT-ERP-POL-001
Fire Protection Policy
PRT-PRS-PRC-009
Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations
PRT-000-PRC-008
Safety Case Requirements
PRT-PRS-PRC-010
Guidelines For Standard For Safety Critical Elements
the Development Of Performance
PRT-PRS-PRC-012
Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study Guide
RSK-IMR-SI-001
Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM), 24 February 2020
PRT-PRS-PRC-008
Process Safety and Risk (PS&R) Project Assurance Guide
GP-02-01
Noise Standard
PRT-HLT-PRC-018
Health Risk Assessment Methodology
200-20-PI-SPC-00013
Piping Material Specification
200-20-CE-DEC-00001
Material Selection Philosophy
PRT-PSF-PRC-024
QG Hydrogen Sulfide Safety Procedure
PRT-HLT-PRC-018
Qatargas Health Risk Assessment Methodology
4.4 Project Documents (FEED)
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-00029
200-20-SH-REP-03014
Technical Note On Incremental Risk Related Fire And Gas Executive Action
Integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Report (Offshore) (EPC-2 Package)
200-20-SH-REP-03011
Assumption Register For Integrated QRA
200-20-SH-REP-03009
Assumption Register
200-20-SH-SOW-00001
200-20-SH-SOW-00011
Scope Of Work (SOW) For Noise And Vibration, AIV And FIV Study
Scope Of Work (SOW) For Integrated Offshore QRA
200-20-SH-SOW-00021
Scope Of Work (SOW) For HRA
200-20-SH-SOW-00031
Scope Of Work (SOW) For Safety Studies
200-20-SH-REP-01001
Noise And Vibration Study - Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-01021
AIV Study - Greenfield
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S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-01041
FIV Study - Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-01051
FIV Study - Brownfield RP And WHP
200-20-SH-REP-02001
Health Risk Assessment (HRA) Study Report
200-20-SH-REP-00025
200-20-SH-REP-00026
Safety, Health, Environment Action Management (SHEAM) Register
Safety Critical Elements Identification And Performance Standards Verification Reports
200-20-SH-REP-00027
Design Safety Case
200-20-SH-REP-09001
HAZID Terms Of Reference (TOR) (Common)
200-20-SH-REP-00001
HAZID Study Report (Common)
200-20-SH-REP-09002
HAZOP Terms Of Reference (TOR), Including Heating, Ventilation, And Air Conditioning (HVAC) Process Hazard Analysis
200-20-SH-REP-02002
Health Risk Assessment - Terms Of Reference
200-20-SH-REP-00002
HAZOP Study Report
200-20-SH-REP-00003
Heating, Ventilation And Air Conditioning (HVAC) Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report
200-20-SH-REP-00020
Manning Study Report
200-20-SH-REP-09004
DRA Terms Of Reference (TOR)
200-20-SH-REP-00004
DRA Study Report
200-83-SH-REP-08001
Technical Note To Review The FW Ring Main On RP (Deluge Valve/Hydrant)
200-20-SH-REP-00021
Vessel Survivability Study
200-20-SH-REP-09005
ALARP Demonstration Study Terms Of Reference (TOR)
200-20-SH-REP-00005
ALARP Demonstration Study
200-20-SH-REP-03001
200-20-SH-REP-03002
200-20-SH-REP-03003
200-20-SH-REP-03004
Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) - Compression Complex
Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA) - Compression Complex
Non Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment (NHHA) - Greenfield
Escape, Evacuation And Rescue Analysis (EERA) - Compression Complex
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S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-03005
Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) And Smoke And Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) - Compression Complex
200-20-SH-REP-03006
Ship Collision Study - Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-03007
Dropped Object Study - Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-03008
Dropped Object Study - Brownfield Rp And WHP
200-20-SH-REP-00022
Gas Dispersion And Hot Plume Study - Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-00023
Technical Integrity Verification Plan
200-20-SH-REP-09006
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) Terms of Reference
200-20-SH-REP-00006
Matrix Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) Report
200-20-SH-REP-09007
Bow-Tie Workshop Terms Of Reference (TOR)
200-83-SH-REP-08002
Technical Note On Fuel Gas Crossover Comparison And Assessment For Rp6s
560-20-SH-REP-03001
H2s Area Classification Schedule - Greenfield
200-20-SH-LIS-00001
Safety Equipment List Report (Offshore)
560-83-SH-CAL-00001
Firewater Demand Calculation
560-83-SH-LIS-00001
Firewater System Line List - CP And LQ
560-83-SH-REP-00001
Steady State Firewater System Hydraulic Study
560-83-SH-CAL-00002
Deluge Nozzle Arrangement Calculation
560-83-SH-CAL-00003
200-20-SH-REP-00028
Technical Note On Clean Agent Fire Suppression Calculation
Flare Radiation & Dispersion Study Including 3D CFD Modelling For H2S - Greenfield
560-83-SH-REP-00002
Firewater Transient Analysis Report
200-20-SH-REP-00012
Environmental Regulatory Compliance Register
200-20-SH-REP-06002
Source Of Release Schedule (Greenfield)
200-20-SH-REP-06005
ENVID Report
200-20-SH-REP-06006
Environmental Management Plan (Greenfield)
201-30-SH-REP-06007
Environmental Management Plan (Brownfield)
200-20-SH-REP-06008
Emission, Discharge And Waste Quantification And Management Study (Greenfield)
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S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-06010
Spill Prevention Design Requirement Report (Greenfield)
200-20-SH-SPC-00009
Specification for Temporary Refuge
200-20-SH-DEC-00002
Technical Safety Basis of Design
4.5 Project Documents (Detailed Design)
S. No
Document Number
200-83-SH-DEC-00001
200-83-SH-SPC-00007
-
HOLD1
-
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00004
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
200-20-SH-REP-00038
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
-
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
Title Active Fire Protection Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Data Sheet for Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) for LQ6S AND LQ7S Ergonomic Study Report for CCR of LQ6S and LQ7S ALARP Demonstration Study Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for Dropped Object Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes ALARP Demonstration Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Bow-Tie Workshop Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes CHAZOP Review (Control Hazard and Operability) Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for FERA for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for Fire and Gas 3D Mapping Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Design Risk Assessment Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for QRA for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Safety Equipment List Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Design Safety Case for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for RAM Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
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S. No
Document Number
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00005
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00006
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00007
200-20-SH-DEC-00004
200-20-SH-PRC-00004
200-20-SH-DEC-00008
200-20-SH-DEC-00006
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00008
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00002
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00009
HOLD1
200-20-SH-SPC-00011
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00010
Title Assumption Register for Ship Collision Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Dropped Object Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Emission, Discharge and Waste Quantification and Management Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Assumption Register for EERA for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Bow-Tie Workshop Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes CHAZOP Review (Control Hazard and Operability) Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Design Risk Assessment (DRA) Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Environmental Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Environmental Management Plan for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Escape Evacuation & Rescue Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Fire and Gas Detection System Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes HAZID & ENVID Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes HAZOP Study Report Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Environmental Regulatory Compliance Register for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Health Risk Assessment - Terms of Reference (TOR) Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Human Factor Engineering Workplace Design Specification for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Deluge Nozzle Arrangement Calculation for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Workshop - Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
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S. No
Document Number
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
200-20-SH-DEC-00007
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00001
HOLD1
200-83-SH-REP-00003
200-83-SH-SPC-00006
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-REQ-00003
HOLD1
HOLD1
Title Fire and Gas 3D Mapping Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Firewater Transient Analysis Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Vent Dispersion Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Noise and Vibration Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Integrity Verification Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Gas Dispersion and Hot Plume Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Firewater Demand Calculation for CP6S and CP7S Complexes HAZID & ENVID Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes HAZOP Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Passive Fire Protection Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes SIL Allocation Study Terms of Reference (TOR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
Health Risk Assessment (HRA) Study Report
Human Factors Engineering Implementation Plan for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Data Sheet for Deluge and Sprinkler Systems for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes SIMOPS Report for Operation for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Material Requisition for Deluge and Sprinkler Systems for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Material Requisition for Fire Fighting Equipment Safety & Life Saving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Material Requisition for Lifeboats for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Material Requisition for Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) for LQ6S and LQ7S Material Requisition for Safety Signs for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
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S. No
Document Number
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SOW-00001
200-83-SH-SPC-00005
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
200-20-SH-SPC-00007
200-83-SH-SPC-00008
200-20-SH-SPC-00008
200-20-SH-SPC-00010
200-20-SH-PRC-00003
200-20-SH-DEC-00005
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
Title Material Requisition for NOVEC 1230 Fire Suppression System for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Major Accident Hazard Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
Manning Study Report
Noise and Vibration Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Non Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment (NHHA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
Operate Phase Performance Standards Report
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Scope of Work (SOW) for Technical Safety & Environmental Studies for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Data Sheet for Fire Fighting Equipment Safety & Life Saving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Safety Critical Elements Identification and Design Performance Standards Verification Report Safety, Health, Environment Action Management (SHEAM) Register for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Ship Collision Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Data Sheet for Lifeboats for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Data Sheet for NOVEC 1230 Fire Suppression System for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Datasheets for Safety Signs for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Noise and Vibration Control Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification for Temporary Refuge (TR) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Safety & Loss Prevention Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes MOPO Terms of Reference TOR for CP6S and CP7S Complexes SIL Assessment Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes SIL Verification Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
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S. No
Document Number
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
COMP2-SPM-LP-SPC-00011
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
HOLD1
Title Technical Bid Evaluation for Deluge Valve System and Sprinkler Systems for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Bid Evaluation for Firefighting, Safety and Lifesaving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Bid Evaluation for Lifeboats for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Bid Evaluation for NOVEC 1230 Fire Suppression System for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Bid Evaluation for Safety Signs for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Bid Evaluation for Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) for LQ6S and LQ7S Source of Release Schedule for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Safety Execution Plan for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Spill Prevention Design Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Technical Integrity Verification Plan for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Steady State Firewater System Hydraulic Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
Ergonomic Study Report for OCC
SIMOPS for Operation Terms of Reference TOR for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
MOPO Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
Ergonomic Study Terms of Reference (TOR) for CCR, OCC Assumption Register for Gas Dispersion and Hot Plume Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Emergency Response Plan for Operation Phase for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Vessel Survivability Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
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4.6
International Codes & Standards
Standard No.
Title
ISO
ISO 13702
ISO 6385
ISO 15544
ISO 15664
ISO 17776
ISO 22899-1
ISO 5349
ISO 2631
ISO 140001
API
API 2218
API RP 2EQ
API RP 14F
API RP 17A
API RP 2 FB
API RP 500
API RP 505
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production Installations – Requirements and Guideline Ergonomics principles in the design of work systems Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Requirements and guidelines for emergency response Acoustics - Noise Control Design Procedures for Open Plant Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for identification and assessment of hazardous events Jet Fire Resistance of Passive Fire Protection Materials. Mechanical vibration — Measurement and evaluation of human exposure to hand- transmitted vibration Mechanical Vibration and Shock - Evaluation of Human Exposure to Whole-Body Vibration Environmental Management Systems
Fire proofing practices in petroleum and petrochemical process plants Seismic Design Procedures and Criteria for Offshore Structures (Addendum 1) Jan 2019 Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for Offshore Production Platforms Recommended Practice for Design and Operation of Subsea Production Systems Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading Recommended Practice for Classification of locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum
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Standard No.
API RP 521
API 752
API RP 14C
American Petroleum Institute
IEC
IEC-60079-10-1
IEC-60079-10-2
IEC 61508 /61511
NFPA
NFPA 10 NFPA 11 NFPA 12 NFPA 13 NFPA 14
NFPA 15 NFPA 16
NFPA 117A
NFPA 20 NFPA 25
NFPA 2001 NFPA 70 NFPA 750 NFPA HAZ-01
Other Standards
BS 5423
Title Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2 Pressure-Relieving and Depressurizing Systems. Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Permanent Buildings Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms API Compendium of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimation Methodologies for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, 2009
Part 10-1: Classification of areas – Explosive gas Atmospheres Part 10-2: Classification of areas – Combustible dust Atmospheres Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems Functional safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguisher
Low, medium and high expansion foam
Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
Installation of sprinkler systems
Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems Water spray fixed systems for fire protection
Installation of Deluge Foam – Water Sprinkler Systems and Foam-Water Spray Systems Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems Installation of stationary pumps for fire protection
Inspection, testing and maintenance of water- based fire protection systems Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
National Electric Code (NEC)
Water mist fire protection systems
Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials
Specification for Fire Extinguisher
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CAP 437
Standard No.
EEMUA 107
EEMUA 140 EEMUA 141
ANSI Z535.2
ISEA Z358.1
LSA
MS 1447: 1999
MS 1539 OTO 2001 068 SOLAS
OSHA 1910.95
ANSI/HFES 100
ANSI/HFES 200
N/A
N/A
ORD. 70/1952
OHSAS 18001
Title United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority ―Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas – Guidance on Standards Aug 2010 Recommendations for the protection of diesel engines for use in Zone 2 hazardous areas Noise Procedure Specification
Guide to the Use of Noise Procedure Specification American National Standard for Environmental and Facilities Safety Signs American National Standard for Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment IMO International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code Specification for Fixed Fire Fighting System- Hose Reels with Semi Rigid hose Specification for Fire Extinguishers
Noise and vibration
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 and Amendments in force Occupational Noise Exposure
Human Factors Engineering of Computer Workstations Human Factors Engineering of Software User Interfaces International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) IMO-The International Convention on Collision Prevention Regulation Merchant Shipping Ordinance Occupational Health & Safety Management System
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5 GENERAL
5.1 Standards, Codes and References
The COMP2 facilities shall be designed, and operated in accordance with the applicable laws, regulations of the State of Qatar, FEED related documentation internationally recognized codes and standards listed at section 4 in the order of precedence describe in Section 4.1.
5.2 Risk Management Philosophy
The Risk Management philosophy for the COMP2 facilities shall be a combination of measures to prevent, control and mitigate the lifecycle hazards associated with the facilities. The general approach adopted is to identify and, where practical, eliminate hazards as an integral part of the design process. Where hazards cannot be eliminated, their potential impact shall be evaluated and those considered to be potential hazards shall be reviewed to ensure that appropriate risk reduction measures are implemented either to reduce the consequence of the hazard or to reduce its likelihood of occurrence.
Risk reduction measures are primarily used to prevent a hazard from occurring. When an incident does occur, risk reduction measures are used to control the incident and to reduce the consequences by mitigation and/or recovery. In order of preference, the risk reduction measures are:
•
Inherent safety and prevention – such as sound process design/ engineering fire barriers/ spacing and layout/ area classification etc.
• Detection and control – such as process detection and control, fire and gas detection.
• Mitigation – such as shutdown, isolation, blowdown, AFP, PFP, procedures and emergency
response etc.
Define
Identify
Analyse
Evaluate
Mitigate
5.3 Risk Acceptance, ALARP and Vulnerability
The COMP2 Project shall follow the Risk Acceptance and Vulnerability criteria and ALARP Principles given in Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore [13] along with QG Risk Assessment Matrix for Safety Studies [17] and for making risk-based engineering decisions when necessary.
QG Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore [13] provides guidelines for:
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA)
• Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) • • Potential Loss of Life (PLL) • Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) • Group Risk
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• Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF)
5.3.1 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)
Location Specific Individual Risk is the individual risk of fatality that an individual would be exposed to if he spends 365 days per year x 24 hours a day in a specific location. This is useful for identifying the highest risk areas for which restricted access may be employed.
5.3.2
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA)
Individual Risk Per Annum is the measure of risk experienced by a single individual over a given time period. It reflects the severity of the hazards and the amount of time the individual is exposed to and in proximity to them. The number of people present does not affect the estimate. The maximum tolerable individual risk in QG has been defined as 5x10-4 per year for new/Greenfield Installations and 1x10-3 per year for existing/Brownfield Installations, any risk result above this limit is considered unacceptable. However, it is also necessary to demonstrate that risk has been reduced to ALARP, through a structured ALARP Assessment, if the IRPA exceeds 1x10-6 per annum. Any individual risk below 1x10-6 per annum is considered negligible and acceptable.
5.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
Potential Loss of Life is the sum of the individual risk for all personnel visiting the facilities. There is no additional tolerability criterion for PLL. However, the reduction in PLL is associated with a potential risk reduction upgrade and it can be used in cost benefit assessment to demonstrate ALARP. Also, it can be useful to risk rank design options at the design stage.
5.3.4 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)
Fatal Accident Rate is the fatality risk associated with 100 million hours offshore. Based on the maximum tolerable IRPA for someone spending 26 weeks a year offshore (4,380 hours) the maximum FAR is 0.23 for new and 2.3 for existing installations. This is useful for assessing the risk to visitors who spend less than 26 weeks a year offshore.
5.3.5 Group Risk
Group Risk is the risk experienced by the whole group of people exposed to a major accident hazard. While such low frequency high consequence events might represent a very small risk to an individual, they may be seen as unacceptable when a large number of people are exposed. Such incidents can significantly impact shareholder value.
5.3.6 Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF)
The Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency is the annual frequency with which the LQ TR becomes impaired (e.g. by smoke of gas ingress), requiring evacuation from the TR and abandonment from the facility. A maximum acceptable TR impairment frequency as per below shall be followed:
• 1x10-3 per annum for TR on CP Platform; • 1x10-4 per annum for new LQ TR.
Moreover, each MAH “group” shall contribute an impairment probability of no more than 1x10-4 per year for all existing TRs.
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QG Risk Assessment Matrix [17] shall be applied for qualitative risk assessments.
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6
INHERENT SAFETY AND LAYOUT REQUIREMENTS
6.1
Inherently Safer Design
For the COMP2 Project were developed the goals listed in Table 6-1 below. This list was generated during the FEED HAZID workshops to fully promote the goal of an inherently safer design. These goals will be updated during EPC HAZID workshop.
Table 6-1 : NFPS Compression Goals
No.
Goal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Eliminate need for additional offshore personnel during operations and maintenance
Minimize Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) leak points and volumes
No increase in operational marine risks
Eliminate lifts over live equipment
Eliminate escalation of events
Eliminate on-site ignition potentials
Minimize risks resulting from associated Brownfield facilities
Minimize the risk of vessel collision through the use of anchors and tugboats, and vessel positioning relative to the facility for north approaches.
Minimize inventory of hydrocarbons (Diesel, etc.).
Minimize personnel risk and exposure to hazards through facility layout
Maximize monitoring and control on COMP2 Compression Facilities
Simplify the detail design through reducing the number of operating states required
6.2 Main Design Principles for Layout Design
With respect to the inherent safety design, the COMP2 facility layout shall take into consideration the following main aspects:
• The facility siting will be reviewed during the HAZID Workshop to ensure safe topside
layout as well as platform layout.
• The Facility are in an area of high shipping traffic therefore layout shall take into consideration approaches by supply boats and other vessels. The Ship Collision Study
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[157] during Detailed Design Engineering shall include an assessment impact energies and collision frequencies of vessels visiting the COMP2 facilities.
• The platform shall be oriented to minimize dispersion of exhaust or accidental release of process gases towards Living Quarters, the helideck, crane cabin, monkey board, and other normally manned locations. A Hot Plume Study [129] shall be carried out to confirm that emissions do not affect normal helicopter, crane or drilling operations.
• The equipment layout shall be organized to minimize the risk of gas accumulation and fire/explosion escalation (refer to subsection: Explosion Prevention and Mitigation) where possible. To maximize the effectiveness of natural ventilation, equipment should be orientated and located to minimize obstructions to airflow on the open faces of the platform.
• Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) shall be used to predict the effect of thermal plumes, generated from all heat sources from the facility and the impacts on people and sensitive areas, considering normal operations and SIMOPS. CFD shall also be used to predict the dispersion of toxic gases such as H2S and its impact on people and sensitive areas.
• The layout shall reflect natural process flow to minimize piping lengths and flanges. It shall provide maximum practical separation and segregation of process, utilities and Living Quarters areas.
• Layout considerations with regards to escape and evacuation requirements shall be applied the design shall consider that the perimeter escape route will often be blocked by rig operations with operations of pressure testing and high-line material transfer. Alternative routes shall be provided in the event that any of these routes are unavailable. Escape and evacuation routes shall be inherently safe and shall be reviewed when significant changes in the layout afore seen.
A helideck will be provided on top of the Living Quarters LQ6S and LQ7S. The helideck design should minimize the risks of potential helicopter accidents and shall comply with CAP 437 [224] requirements.
The helideck location and design and the helicopter operating procedures shall consider the impact of flaring or unignited venting during emergencies.
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7
TECHNICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENTS
7.1 Safety in Design Workshops
The safety in design workshops to be performed during the detailed design stage for COMP2 Project by 3rd Party Consultant are presented in Table 7.1:
Table 7.1 Workshops for the COMP2 Project
No
Workshop
Objectives and Expectations
A HAZID study shall be conducted during the detailed design stage to systematically analyze the preliminary design of a project and identify major hazards / potential risks, potential operability concerns, and execution issues facilities and Brownfield modification of existing facilities, as applicable, ensuring facilities and inherent safety and operability of Identification of safeguards with mitigation.
from greenfield
Together with the HAZID study and ENVID study shall be conducted to identify potential impacts that the various activities associated with the Project may have on any environmental and social receptors and determine the controls to prevent or mitigate the impacts.
Actions from the FEED HAZID shall be carried forward to this detailed design stage study.
A DRA a workshop shall be conducted to identify hazards for project functional area such as construction, operations and maintenance during design stage. DRA considers broader design aspects that could have a project wide interface management, contracting strategies (WBS), construction issues, HSE issues and operating philosophies.
in areas such as
impact
1
HAZID / ENVID Workshop
2
Design Risk Assessment Workshop (DRA)
3
HAZOP Workshops
A Detailed HAZOP study shall be conducted for the greenfield and brownfield facilities in the COMP2 scope.
3.1
GTC HAZOP and SIL
The HAZOP generally focuses on safety in design features within the process itself. The HAZOP study from planned systematically evaluates deviations operations pressure, temperature, flow, level; misdirected, reverse flow, etc.)
increased/decreased
(e.g.
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No
3.2
Workshop
Objectives and Expectations
Process and Utilities HAZOP
on a line-by-line basis. The HAZOP study shall also cover all interface with EPC 1, 3 and 8A.
3.3
Vendor Package HAZOP
3.4
HVAC Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
HAZOP of the vendor packages shall also be considered in sessions convened based on vendor data availability. All recommendations shall be implemented.
(D&ID) and other
The objectives of the HVAC PHA workshop are to undertake a detailed REVIEW of the Ducting and Instrument Diagram relevant documentations to identify hazards and operability issues with the design, operation, potential malfunction, and maintenance associated with of the HVAC systems and to identify any additional mitigation measures that could be implemented in the design to manage risks. All buildings/HVAC systems shall be included in this HVAC PHA.
The HVAC PHA shall identify of safety critical HVAC equipment and procedures.
As a minimum, the study shall ensure that:
Potential vapor clouds are accounted for in the design and isolation of HVAC systems for personnel and equipment protection.
Relief systems are properly accounted for during design of HVAC systems (i.e. Chilled water cooling) such that personnel are not exposed to high pressures.
A SIL Allocation workshop shall be conducted to establish the risk reduction needed for each process system to protect against one or more hazards. The risk reduction is calculated as the gap between the existing risk posed by the process or equipment and the risk target. Risk reduction is provided by process and mechanical integrity and independent protection layer.
Multiple sessions based on vendor data availability shall be conducted.
SIL Allocation Workshop (incl. Layers of Protection Workshop)
4
5
Human Factor Engineering (HFE) workshop
The 3D Model review shall be conducted to check technical and personnel safety aspects, operability and
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Workshop
Objectives and Expectations
maintenance aspects and functionality of the design. The 3D model shall be conducted at the 30% 60% and 90% model development phases.
HFE 30% Model Review Workshop HFE 60% Model Review Workshop HFE 90% Model Review Workshop Safety Critical Task Analysis Workshop Valve Criticality Analysis (VCA) Workshop
No
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
6
Ergonomic Study Workshop for CCR, OCC CCR.
7
Health Risk Assessment (HRA)
8
Bow-Tie Workshop
An Ergonomic Assessment Study including workshops shall be conducted to ensure that requirements for the design, layout and navigation of control rooms (offshore and onshore OCC) including (HMI) are clear and unambiguous and delivered in such a way that it is clearly understood. These will then ensure risk of human error is reduced to ALARP.
HMI design analysis can be conducted with references to industry best practices, HFE standards and HMI design guidelines.
A HRA workshop shall be conducted during the detailed design stage to identify and deliberate on the working environment of the facilities and job tasks with respect to to occupational health hazards potential exposure (physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic, and psychological). The study shall collect data for the detection and evaluation of hazards to health; confirm the effectiveness of control measures and make recommendation of practical measures that shall be considered in the design to maintain health risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) levels.
A Bow-Tie review workshop shall be performed to review the Major Accidental Events and their associate barriers / Safety Critical Elements (SCE). For each Major Accidental Event identified during the HAZID / ENVID and HAZOP workshops, a dedicated bowtie diagram shall be developed. The objective of the Bowtie diagram is to identify applicable preventing and mitigating barriers the by development of visual representations of
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Workshop
Objectives and Expectations
relationships among each Major Scenario and its root causes and potential consequences, considering the possible escalation scenarios.
Each bowtie diagram provides a list of scenario-specific preventing and mitigating barriers whose criticality shall be assessed in order to establish whether it is to be selected as SCE.
An ALARP demonstration workshop shall be conducted to demonstrate that the risks from each identified Major Accident Hazard (MAH) is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The ALARP workshop shall be done systematically as per PRT-000-PRC-008 SHE Case Requirements Procedure [14] by challenging the barriers in terms of completeness and adequacy and identifying and addressing the gaps so that the review team is satisfied that the risks are reduced to ALARP.
The SIMOPS study shall identify the simultaneous operations in the facility during normal operations. SIMOPS is defined as any activities or operations that directly or indirectly interact or interfere with another separate activity occurring at the same time in the same vicinity, where such interactions could have the potential of interrupting the activities, create conflict and have safety-related impacts.
The objective of the SIMOPS study is to identify hazards that could occur due to non-production activities concurrent with production activities offshore and develop a SIMOPs Matrix for the installations to assist operation of the assets within acceptable safe limits.
is
to be managed during periods when
A MOPO Workshop shall be conducted to define limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions, establish how increased operating risk the effectiveness of controls (barriers/ recovery measures) is reduced; and Identify operations and activities that could compromise safe operating limits that should be included in MOPO. The workshop shall develop a Matrix of
9
ALARP Demonstration Workshop
10
SIMOPS Workshop
11
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) Workshop
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Objectives and Expectations
Permitted Operations for the operational phase of the facilities in the COMP2 scope of work.
In advance of each workshop, a Terms of Reference shall be prepared documenting the approach, methodology, required attendees and schedule for the workshop. A package of pre- read documents shall also be prepared.
HAZID / ENVID, HAZOP and DRA workshop actions will be captured in separate Close-Out Reports which include all the workshop actions and the responses to those actions.
The detailed requirements for the above workshops and studies are presented in the Technical Safety Execution Plan [174] and in the Scope of Work for Technical Safety & Environmental Studies [153].
7.2 Technical Safety Assessments
Hazards and risks for the COMP2 facilities will be identified and mitigated through relevant reviews, safety studies and loss prevention design.
The figurative summary of the road map in terms of sequence for the safety studies is shown in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 Process Flow for Formal Safety Assessment
Once risks have been quantitatively or qualitatively assessed via these reviews and studies, mitigation measures shall be proposed to minimize the risks, to ensure the overall risks to personnel on the facilities are ALARP.
Table 7.2 presents the technical safety, studies to be conducted during the detailed design stage of the COMP2 Project.
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Table 7.2 Technical Safety Studies for the NFPS COMP2 Project
No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
The purpose of SIL Verification study is to verify that the analyzed Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) meet their required SIL in terms of probability of failure on demand and hardware fault tolerance according to IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 [208]. When the calculated SIL from SIL Verification cannot meet the required SIL, then recommendations to improve the SIL shall be generated. These can include: • definition of minimum requirements to be
requested to vendors (e.g. SIL certifications, recommendations on failure rates, SFF and DC, etc.); revision of SIF configuration;
• • addition of online diagnostic testing or external
•
comparisons; increase of testing frequency or PST introduction.
SIL verification calculation shall be updated when the above requirements are implemented or information available (in accordance with the status from the implementation of SIL Assignment recommendation), until the SIF configuration meets the target SIL. The FERA study shall focus on major accident hazards (MAHs) associated with the project facilities that can give rise to fires or explosions. The objective of the FERA is to evaluate the consequences of major accident events (MAEs) in terms of fire and explosion hazards. The FERA will give input to the design of fire and explosion prevention, control and mitigation measures including the benefit of passive and active fire protection as well as layout considerations for improved inherent safety. Results of the FERA will feed into the Dispersion analysis, Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA), Identification of Safety Critical elements and performance standards, and ultimately into the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and the Design SHE Case. The Detailed Design stage QRA shall include any changes made from FEED to Detail Design stage as well as identification of risks that were unable to be covered during FEED. Any changes made from
1.0 SIL Verification Study
2.0
Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Study
3.0
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study
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previous project stages need to be captured accordingly. This analysis shall be of a level of detail such that the major contributors to the overall risk level can be clearly identified and that any required mitigation measures can be properly evaluated and implemented. An Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) assessment shall be prepared to verify the adequacy of facilities layouts, escape routes, mustering areas, and evacuation provisions in credible accident scenarios. The EERA shall include: a goal analysis on how the goals for the EER process would be satisfied to determine the adequacy and efficiency of the proposed arrangement. an escape and evacuation time analysis which assesses the time needed to execute all phases of the EER process. An Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA) shall be conducted to qualitatively assess the ability of the critical emergency systems to survive and perform their intended safety functions under major accident event (such as fire and explosion), for the required duration. The analysis shall specifically aim to: •
identify Critical Emergency Systems that are designed to reduce the risk to personnel, to prevent event escalation or to preserve the integrity of muster areas, escape routes and evacuations systems;
• assess the potential for impairment
•
•
(vulnerability) of each component in the Critical Emergency System; identify how the Critical Emergency Systems design (fail safe or redundancy) achieves the level of integrity required; and identify any component in the Critical Emergency Systems which may require better protection, during a major accident event. A combined Temporary Refuge (TR) Integrity Analysis and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) report shall be prepared for all facilities buildings, including Temporary Refuge, for the EPC Scope of work to verify the integrity of personnel and equipment protection under emergency conditions of fire or gas release. The TRIA should also cover the following:
4.0
Escape, Evacuation, And Rescue Assessment (EERA) Study
5.0
Emergency System Survivability Assessment (ESSA) Study
6.0
Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) And Smoke And Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) Study Report
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Study
Objectives and Expectations
•
Identify the credible MAEs that can cause the Temporary Refuge (TR) impairment, , e.g. thermal radiation, explosion overpressure, smoke and gas ingress and non-hydrocarbon risk.
• Determine the TR impairment criteria during MAE for the specified TR endurance time. • Determine the potential TR impairment due to thermal radiation and explosion overpressure. • Evaluate the potential for TR impairment due to accumulation of smoke (CO2, CO) and gas (flammable and toxic) within the TR within the specified TR endurance time.
• Determine the potential TR impairment due to
•
•
non-hydrocarbon risk. review the TR design provisions to determine if they are adequate to support life during a Major Accident Event (MAE) identify any deficiencies in TR facilities and equipment and recommend actions to the taken.
The SGIA study should: • Assess the effects of all credible Major
Accident Events (MAEs) with respect to smoke and gas exposure and ingress to the manned buildings;
• Review building locations, arrangements, type of openings, and HVAC system design as they relate to preventing smoke and gas ingress during an emergency;
• Conduct smoke and gas modelling for various
scenarios identified;
• Assess the effects to personnel from exposure
to smoke (carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide), toxic gases (H2S, NOX, SOX, etc.) and un- ignited flammable gas (e.g. Methane);
• Carry out ingress calculations for smoke and
gas;
• Determine the potential for building impairment due to accumulation of smoke (CO, CO2) and gas (flammable and toxic) within the building, accounting for the response of the HVAC system, penetration and openings, and use during escape or evacuation; and • Raise recommendations and mitigation
measures, if required.
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Study
Objectives and Expectations
7.0
Fire and Gas 3D Mapping Study
8.0 Noise & Vibration Study
9.0 Dropped Objects Study
A Fire and Gas Mapping Study shall be prepared to ensure that the detection coverage meets target levels. The F&G mapping study shall be prepared using approved industrial software equivalent to the software used in the FEED stage. The study shall be performed to optimize the number of detectors and recommend appropriate detector coverage. The coverage shall be 90% for voting 1ooN and 85% for the voting 2ooN for Greenfield facilities. A Noise & Vibration Study shall be done to predict airborne noise from the equipment located on the facilities topsides and assess the piping lines and system components where there are areas of potential concern for acoustic fatigue and flow induced turbulence in order to ensure compliance with the respective criteria. SUBCONTRACTOR shall refer to FEED stage Noise & Vibration Study Report for reference. A noise assessment shall be performed for the surface facility (inclusive of major topside and marine mechanical equipment). This study shall identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. Soundplan should be used for the modelling of Noise Mapping study. The noise assessment shall include: • • Evaluate the noise levels on various critical
Identifying major noise contributors;
receptor points during flaring;
• Conduct modeling to create noise contour
maps.
• Providing comments on Vendor Documents of
major noise contributors.
• Requirements that could be set for individual
major components.
• Providing comments on the layout in the
context of noise control.
• Provide recommendations and corrective measures for equipment or major noise contributors when the area exceeds the noise limit value.
A Dropped Object study shall be performed to identify dropped object/swinging load hazards impacting equipment on the facilities. This study
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shall be based on EPC stage Mechanical Handling Study specific to the facility. Any key assumptions made to form the basis of the analysis shall be discussed and subject to COMPANY approval prior to the start of the study. The dropped object analysis shall cover the following work scope: •
identify scenarios where dropped objects/swing loads from platform crane could result in loss of containment of equipment located on the platform.
Ship Collision Study
10.0
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
11.0
•
•
• estimate the potential impact energy associated with the dropped object scenarios during lifting. identify vulnerable zoned based on the frequency and consequence analysis with respect to the drop points identified. recommend appropriate risk reduction measures in line with ALARP principle. A Ship Collision Study shall be conducted to address the following: • Analyse vessel collision risks to the Greenfield platform jackets from vessels visiting the complex (like supply vessel, offloading tanker and other errant vessels) and the Platform exclusion zone;
• Verify the current design and highlight
additional risk reduction measures deemed necessary; and
• Review adequacy of proposed radar/
communication systems to manage errant passing vessels or make recommendations, if otherwise.
A detailed flare radiation and dispersion study using APPROVED software (e.g. FLARESIM and PHAST) shall be performed to provide input into the size and length of the flare stack design and validate that the design is adequate for safe radiation intensities and (flammable & toxic) gas concentrations on the platforms during various flare operations and flame out scenarios. The dispersion of H2S from the flare tips shall be done using 3D CFD software acceptable to COMPANY. The study should:
• Establish the flare radiation contours and evaluate the impacts of the incident radiation on personnel and facility; • Evaluate the temperature profile of flare
boom during flaring scenario;
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Vent Dispersion Study
12.0
• Establish the flammable and toxic gas
dispersion contours for the facility during flare flame-out (cold venting) and evaluate the impacts to personnel and facility (crane cabin, helideck, air intake, etc.);
• For flammable gas dispersion, the 10% LFL shall not reach the helideck as per CAP 437
• For the toxic gas dispersion, the toxic
concentration should be less than TLV-TWA (Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average) for the area where personnel might be present.
A Vent dispersion study shall be conducted to assess the extent of hazards associated with gases released from the vents with regards to flammable and toxic risks at the facilities. The study shall determine the acceptability (from a health and safety perspective) of the designed vents’ location and height to the atmosphere on the manned facilities at the NFPS Compression Complexes. The dispersion of H2S from the vent tips shall be done using 3D CFD software acceptable to COMPANY. The study shall assess combusted gas and un-combusted gas releases from the vents during scenarios to de defined and agreed with CONTRACTOR and COMPANY. The study should:
• Establish the flammable and toxic gas
dispersion contours for the facility during flare flame-out (cold venting) process venting scenarios and evaluate the impacts to personnel and facility (crane cabin, helideck, air intake, etc.);
• For flammable gas dispersion, the 10% LFL shall not reach the helideck as per CAP 437
• For the toxic gas dispersion, the toxic
concentration should be less than TLV-TWA (Threshold Limit Value – Time Weighted Average) for the area where personnel might be present.
Gas Dispersion And Hot Plume Study
A Gas Dispersion & Hot Plume study shall be conducted to:
13.0
• Assess the thermal impact from exhaust
gases to the restricted airspace above the helideck at LQ Platform.
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Vessel Survivability Study
14.0
Safety Critical Elements & Performance Standard Study
15.0
• Assess the impact of the hot gas releases and toxic components on personnel, operations and sensitive receptor locations on the facilities (i.e. crane cabin, deck working area, LQ and HVAC air intakes). If necessary, propose suitable mitigation measures and operational restrictions to reduce the risk to helicopter operations and personnel safety.
•
The gas dispersion and hot plume study shall be done with 3D CFD modelling software as approved by COMPANY. A Vessel Survivability Study shall be performed to determine the time to failure of a vessel or large pipe section impinged upon by jet or pool fire for the fire scenarios determined in the Fire & Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA). All vessels exposed to fire scenarios in the FERA shall be identified and shortlisted vessels potentially exposed for sufficient durations to cause their failure shall be carried forward for detailed assessment to determine the heat loads they are exposed to, the rate of temperature rise and the stresses induced in the vessel shell. The vessel shell stress shall be compared to the acceptance criteria. The vessel survivability assessment must be conducted with company approved software i.e. Vessfire. Safety Critical Elements (SCE) based on Major Accident Events shall be identified and Design and Operational Performance Standards (PS) developed as a key part of the safety strategy for delivery of the project. The objectives of this study are to:
•
Identify the SCEs based on the MAEs acknowledged during HAZID;
• Demonstrate the linkage between MAE
causes, controls and the SCEs;
• Demonstrate the risk reduction measures implemented to reduce the risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP); and
• Present the findings for use in SCE PS
development. PS are the criteria that the SCEs need to meet in order to effectively manage the MAEs and used to demonstrate that the SCEs have been properly designed at this EPCI stage.
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Ram Analysis Study
16.0
Technical Integrity Verification Plan
17.0
Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard Analysis (NHHA) Study
18.0
Operate Phase Performance Standards shall be developed during Detailed Design and issued at the end of the execute phase before handover to operations. The Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study developed as part of the FEED shall be updated for CP6S and CP7s in full compliance to EPC development. A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) study report shall define basic maintenance and reliability program requirements for ensuring Company practices to promote maintenance effectiveness and reliability requirements are built into the design and construction of new and modified facilities. It also shall assess the performance achievable from the facilities and identify critical systems and equipment. A Technical Integrity Verification Plan shall be developed for the COMP2 scope of work. The plan shall define how the base information from the performance standards is used to ensure the technical integrity requirements are established and confirmed through the design, procurement, fabrication, construction and commissioning of the project. It inputs to the project quality assurance plan for the SCEs. Accountable and responsible persons are specified alongside the broad timing of the activities. The advantage of this is that the critical assurance and verification activities to be executed on SCE / hardware barriers are clearly documented and managed, via the performance standards and technical integrity verification plan – thus providing a fully transparent and auditable process. A verification body who’s independent. from the parties that perform SCE-PS and other safety study shall be appointed to conduct TIV activity. A Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard Analysis (NHHA) shall be developed to assess non-hydrocarbon hazards which shall include, but are not limited to, transportation risk, occupational risk, structural failure, dropped objects, ship collision and non- process fire. The study shall assess the risk posed to personnel working on greenfield compression hubs due to non-hydrocarbon hazards during normal operations. The risks from the non-hydrocarbon hazards shall form part of the input to the integrated QRA, to
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Study
Objectives and Expectations
Design SHE Case
19.0
determine the total Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) associated with the normal operations of the Compression platform. A Design SHE Case for the COMP2 scope of work shall be prepared to demonstrate that there has been a systematic application of hazard and effect, risk management processes during the Project design phase and to provide justification that the design has considered all issues identified and has delivered a facility design that reduces risks to ALARP. The Case would be expected to meet all SHE Case Objectives, as far as these relate to controls incorporated in the design. The design SHE Case shall address the detailed design and operations, not the construction of the facility.
impact
The safety studies shall identify all critical areas of concern and propose recommendations to reduce these risks to ALARP. Areas of concern or design deficiencies especially those items that lead equipment, safety critical elements and will redundancies/passive fire protection to structural steel will be considered when addressing these risks. Prior to carrying out the related activities, an Assumption Register shall be performed including the basis, Methodology and assumptions reports considered for each study.
topside weight,
long
For related safety studies, the actions will be tracked and compiled into the Safety, Health, Environment Action Management (SHEAM) Register.
The specific requirements for the safety studies are presented in the Scope of Work for Technical Safety & Environmental Studies for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [153]. Dedicated Basis, Methodology and Assumptions Reports shall be developed and subject to COMPANY approval before the start of the safety study.
7.3 Environment Design Studies
The general principle adopted by the COMP2 Project aims to protect the environment through efficient use of consumables, natural resources, and energy sources, as well as minimizing emissions, discharges and waste. In general, the COMP2 Project shall seek to:
• Ensure Project design considers all environmental considerations. These considerations will be included in the design philosophy within the Environmental Design Philosophy [111];
•
Implement appropriate environmental management measures with the intent of reducing the potential for associated negative environmental impacts to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels;
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• Strictly adhere to relevant national environmental regulations, international agreements and guidelines, and COMPANY standards, as detailed in the Environment Basis of Design (BOD); and
•
Incorporate Best Available Techniques (BAT), Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) and GIIP, wherever possible [111].
The detailed requirements Environmental Design Philosophy[111].
for environmental protection systems are provided
in
the
The COMP2 Project will consider management of several environmental aspects including air quality, water quality, handling of solid wastes, handling of chemicals, noise level and emergency responses. Environmental studies to be conducted will enable minimization of emissions, discharges and wastes to the environment, as well as prevention of unintended loss of containment. The environment studies to be undertaken are:
-
Emissions, discharges and waste quantification study;
-
Source of release schedule;
-
Spill prevention design requirement report.
-
Noise and Vibration Study
7.4 Other Studies / Assessment
As part of the Loss Prevention Safety and Environment scope of work for the NFPS COMP2 project the following additional studies shall be conducted:
• Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Analysis Study
• Technical Integrity Verification Plan
These studies are outlined in the following sections.
7.4.1 Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Analysis Study
The overall integrated Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study model (WHPs, Riser Platforms, intra-field pipelines, Compression platforms, export trunkline and LNG trains) developed as part of the FEED shall be updated based on the EPC2 EPC2COMP2 scope of work for the Greenfield and associated brownfield facilities and other ongoing EPC Projects (EPC3 & EPC8a). The model shall be updated for CP6S and CP7s in full compliance to detailed design development. EPC development.
The objectives of this RAM study are:
• Provide an integrated RAM model to determine the Reliability and Availability for the base
case configuration;
• Determine the potential production availability and production throughput of the proposed
design;
• Validate the equipment configuration thus ensuring design intent with required
redundancy;
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• Demonstrate that the proposed design of the offshore facilities meets or surpasses the
project’s production availability objectives;
• Determine the impact of compression facilities on the RAM value;
• Utilize the study results to identify the key critical elements and required redundancy
(additional topside equipment/facilities) in case of shortfall from RAM target;
• Quantify and rank which systems and equipment are the principal contributor to production
losses;
• Verify the adequacy of sparing provisions to meet the RAM target and perform sensitivity analyses on changes in the major equipment sparing philosophy (include numbers and percentage throughputs of major process equipment, etc.); and
• To provide an optimised planned maintenance schedule for the CP6S and CP7S facilities
that considers alignment with the Onshore LNG Trains maintenance.
The RAM study will be carried out to compare the RAM impact due to compression. Hence, the model will be run to determine the results with and without compression. The model without compression will be carried out based on the profiles assuming that the reservoir has adequate pressure to operate and use the results to compare the case with compression.
A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) study report shall define basic maintenance and reliability program requirements for ensuring Company practices to promote maintenance effectiveness and reliability requirements are built into the design and construction of new and modified facilities. It also shall assess the performance achievable from the facilities and identify critical systems and equipment.
Details of the basis, methodology, assumption and software to be used will be presented in the Assumption Register for Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study [101].
7.4.2 Technical Integrity Verification Plan
A Technical Integrity Verification Plan for the COMP2 scope of work which defines how the base information from the performance standards is used to ensure the technical integrity requirements are established and confirmed through the design, procurement, fabrication, construction and commissioning of the project. It inputs to the project quality assurance plan for the SCEs.
Accountable and responsible persons are specified alongside the broad timing of the activities. The advantage of this is that the critical assurance and verification activities to be executed on SCE / hardware barriers are clearly documented and managed, via the performance standards and technical integrity verification plan – thus providing a fully transparent and auditable process.
A verification body who’s independent from the parties that perform SCE-PS and other safety study shall be appointed to conduct TIV activity.
The aim of the Independent Verification Body is to establish that safety critical systems at offshore facilities have been designed, constructed, and installed to protect the health and safety of people in or near the facility. Verification by an Independent Verification Body (IVB) confirms a facility’s equipment and systems minimize risks to health and safety throughout their lifecycle, that the
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appropriate assurance processes are in place and that the design complies with the defined performance standards and verification tasks.
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8
LOSS PREVENTION DETAIL DESIGN
8.1 Overview
The loss prevention systems provided for the COMP2 CP6S and CP7S complexes shall be an engineered combination of measures selected to prevent, control and mitigate the life cycle risks associated with facilities.
The engineering design approach to reducing operating and maintenance‐related risks associated with the identified hazards is to use the following systems in a cost-effective manner:
• Spacing and Layout;
• Leak Minimization;
• Pressure relief venting and flaring;
• Overpressure protection;
• Explosion Protection & Area Classification and Ventilation;
• Drainage & Spill Control; and
• Fire & gas detection;
• Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown system;
• Flaring radiation and cold flaring;
• Passive Fire Protection;
• Active Fire Protection;
• Escape and Evacuation & Rescue.
8.2 Spacing and Layout Design
The spacing and layout due to detail design development shall minimize escalation potential for hazardous events. Besides the safety considerations, the facility layout configuration shall also consider specific project requirements and constraints, including operation/maintenance, construction and SIPROD as well as economics.
The layout considerations during detailed design shall:
• Review & validate the favourable location for equipment and occupied building;
• Enhance safety through strategic location of topside equipment and occupied building in
terms of hazardous and non-hazardous areas;
• Assess and validate the platform layout while considering safety in terms of, prevailing winds and currents, helicopter approach, hot plume impacting helicopter approach, GTG and HVAC intakes and drilling derrick, pipeline(s) approach, risers, well bay, radiation from flare boom, etc.;
• Preventing or minimizing the potential for escalation through strategic location of
equipment and occupied building in terms of escape routes and evacuation;
• Assess the layout to reduce the risk to ALARP;
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• Assess the completeness and robustness of the layout against the COMP2 Project
requirements.
Gas Turbines / Generators
• Gas turbines and generators should be located in a non-hazardous area.
• Air intake should be sited the maximum possible distance from hazardous areas.
• Air intake should be sited no less than 3 m (10 ft.) above 100-year storm wave level in
order to avoid water ingress.
• The air intakes should be located so that powder and dust do not become ingested.
• Re-circulation from the exhaust back to the inlet should be prevented for gas
turbines/generators.
• Gas turbine exhausts should be pointed vertically upwards and discharge above the
helideck.
• Exhaust flue emissions should be such that it does not interfere with helicopter, production,
drilling and crane operations.
• Exhaust flue emissions should be directed so they do not become ingested in the HVAC
or engine intakes.
• Location of gas turbine/generator equipment should allow for removal and handling of critical components for maintenance, such as gas generators or hot path components.
• Gas turbine/generator equipment should be located adjacent to high voltage switchgear.
ESD Valves
Closure of ESD valves minimizes the hydrocarbon inventory available to feed a leak in an isolatable section of the process system Key isolation concepts include the following:
• All SDVs shall be of fail-safe design and certified fire safe.
• ESD isolations shall in principle not be compromised by any start-up bypass arrangement. If an ESD bypass cannot be avoided, then inclusion into the design shall be subject to justification and approval. In case of pressurization is needed for the ESD valve to prevent seat damage, this shall be achieved by providing bypass pressurization line with small diameter ESD valve with pressure differential permissive. Manual bypass valve shall not be provided for ESD valves as it compromises the ESD purpose.
• ESDVs shall shut at the rate determined by the dynamic simulation.
• SDVs shall be provided on the inlet and export lines to/from the RP at a location that is protected from fire, explosion and dropped objects hazards where reasonably practical.
Crane coverage and lay down areas should be arranged to promote safe operations of the cranes and to minimize the risk of dropped objects.
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Layout and 3D model reviews shall be performed throughout the various detail design stages. Any issues or concerns raised during these reviews shall be formally documented in action track and closed-out as model review action.
The Primary Muster Area shall be in a safe area on LQ Platform. The Alternative Muster Area on the CP shall be designed for maximum POB for the CP platform. The exterior walls of the LQ Module are to be rated for A-60 fire walls, and platform shall remain structurally intact to allow Personnel on Board (POB) safely shelter in place until the event brought under control and safely evacuate from the installation.
Safety critical equipment such as fire water pumps shall be in safe area such that:
• Fire water pumps shall not be in areas where they may be involved in a fire or explosion.
• Fire water pump areas shall be located only in unclassified areas.
Helideck design on NFPS Compression COMP2 Project shall meet requirements stipulated in CAP 437[224].
The helideck design will be the Enhanced Safety Type in combination with Deck Integrated Fire Fighting system (DIFFS) as an effective fire suppression system.
Access shall be such that all activities required to operate or maintain equipment and systems safely can be completed by personnel wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), including chemical suits and/or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and carrying (or using) all necessary tools and/or test equipment. Consideration shall be given to the body position of the worker while performing the task(s) as well as the equipment required to perform the task(s). A Human Factor Workshop will be performed in Detailed Design Phase. Refer to HFE Workplace Design Specification [120].
The buildings located on platforms handling hydrocarbons, shall be behind firewall. The fire rating and blast value for the firewall shall refer to Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) [124]
8.3 Explosion Prevention, Control and Mitigation
8.3.1 Minimization & Protection of Potential Leak Sources
The number of potential hydrocarbon leak sources including valves, instrument fittings and flanges shall be reduced as far as practicable whilst still allowing for the safe operation and maintenance of the facilities. Pipework containing hazardous fluids shall not be routed through non-hazardous areas. If this is inevitable, then pipework shall be all welded (no flanges) and not located in a vulnerable position where mechanical damage is possible.
Potential ignition sources shall be identified and minimized through the following:
• Minimise the number of ignition sources (e.g. engines and cranes);
• Specify equipment to be suitable for operations in the hazardous areas of the platform as
required by the Hazardous area classification drawings;
• All equipment that is required to be energized during an incident where flammable
atmospheres may be present shall be rated for use in a Zone 1 area;
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• Locate all intakes and exhaust outlets for all combustion machines to/from safe areas;
•
Insulation of hot surfaces in hazardous areas;
• Static and Earth bonding.
8.3.2 Explosion Prevention and Mitigation
Critical equipment and structures on the CP6S and CP7S compression complex platforms shall be designed to withstand accidental explosion events as per contractual requirements. During the Detailed Design Engineering, an Explosion Analysis using 3D FLACS software shall be performed followed by Blast Load Mapping Layouts.
The design for blast protection shall be according to the principle of ALARP for cases where it is not practical to design for worst case scenarios. As a minimum, the design shall meet explosion overpressures and impulses corresponding to 1 x 10-4 per annum exceedance frequency. Blast wind/drag load effects shall also be included in the design. The blast overpressure will be verified by the Explosion Analysis with proposed mitigation measures. SCEs required for emergency escape, evacuation and rescue shall be designed to withstand credible blast overpressures as mentioned. Primary and secondary structures, as well as the process systems shall be designed to withstand an explosion.
The design of topsides facilities against fire and blast loading shall include the following considerations:
a) The structure shall be able to withstand the loads elastically. However, local damage may
be allowed when the overall integrity is not affected.
b) The structure may plastically deform but shall not collapse.
c) Blast walls, and their supporting steel work, shall be able to resist the loads without failing
and able to function as a fire wall, if required, after such an event.
d) The integrity of escape routes, muster areas and temporary refuge (TR) and their supporting structures shall remain intact during and/or after the event. The structure shall not collapse, be able to support TR and escape routes, for calculated endurance time.
e) Supports of SCE equipment required to function after the event, shall be able to resist the
loads on the equipment and enable the equipment to function.
f) Connections of the firewall at the top and bottom to steel members shall be designed such
that these have the same rating as the wall itself.
g) Penetrations (such as doors, windows and pipe penetrations) in rated firewalls should be avoided as much as possible. In case these are required, they shall not compromise the overall fire rating and integrity of the wall. The design and performance of all firewalls used, including penetrations and connections, shall be fully certified by a qualified authority.
8.4 Emergency Depressurization / Blowdown
Emergency depressurization/ blowdown aims to reduce the magnitude and duration of hazardous events by disposing of the hydrocarbon inventory in a safe and controlled manner. This is to
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minimize the amount of inventory available to feed a leak in an isolatable section of the process system. The production facilities shall be depressurized to 6.9 barg (100 psig) or 50% of the design pressure, whichever is lower, within 15 minutes (Flare System Sizing Report Doc No. 560-20-PR- REP-00010). Considering the bridge between CP and RP platforms are long, emergency depressurization will be initiated for CP or RP depending on location of confirmed F&G detection. CP and RP are in separate fire zones. Staggered blowdown between CP and RP will be implemented.
The maximum flow through the depressuring valve is limited by the maximum upstream pressure at the moment it is first opened. Sequencing of the equipment depressurization is done to reduce the peak flowrate and to limit the maximum peak flow rate to the flare tip.
Apart from the target blowdown duration, the emergency depressurization system shall be designed in accordance with the requirements of the Flare System Sizing Report (Doc No. 560- 20-PR-REP-00010). Blowdown valves shall be designed to fail open. The system, including blowdown valves, headers, header supports, flare tower, and knock out drum shall be protected from fire exposure by location, or by active/ passive fire protection.
Process overpressure protection including relief valves and the emergency depressurizing system shall be designed in accordance with API RP 521, Pressure-Relieving and Depressurizing Systems [202].
8.4.1 Pressure Relief, Venting and Flaring
The Pressure Relief System collects the vapor and gas discharges from the pressure relief valves, vapor depressurising valves and routes the relief to the flare system. There are High Pressure (HP) and Low Pressure (LP) flaring systems for COMP2 Project. For more details on the HP and LP flaring design basis, refer to Flaring System Sizing Report (Doc No. 560-20-PR-REP-00010).
Relief protection for fire and thermal contingencies must be considered as applicable from codes and/or standards i.e. API RP 521, Pressure-Relieving and Depressurizing Systems [202].
For a fire condition, pressure safety valves are provided as per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Automatic depressurization facilities at the affected platform and bridge-linked piping section (and manually/ automatically initiated with time delay for non-affected area) are provided on NFPS compression topsides in the event of emergency.
For more details of relief systems, refer to Relief Valve Sizing Calculation Report (doc.no.. 560- 20-PR-REP-00006).
The location and elevation of the flare shall meet the thermal radiation and gas (Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), H2S, SO2) dispersion criteria defined in below table [28]. The flare gas dispersion must be assessed for flameout conditions at peak relief rates. The flare boom location shall also meet the requirements of CAP437 [224] on obstacle free zone and temperature limit on helideck.
Table 8.1 presents the Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Emergency Flaring (excluding solar radiation).
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Table 8.1: Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Emergency Flaring in W/m2 (Btu/Hr/Ft2) (Excluding Solar Radiation)
Receptor Type
Personnel
Equipment
liquid Volatile API separator
tanks,
Notes:
Travel time to shelter:
1 min 3 min
Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Emergency Flaring in W/m2 (Btu/Hr/Ft2)
Appropriate Clothing (1) 6300 (2000) 4730 (1500)
Without Appropriate Clothing (1) 3150 (1000) 1580 (500)
15,770 (5000)
2365 (750)
(1) Appropriate clothing such as coveralls, long sleeved shirts, pants, hard hat, etc., which can shield
all body areas except for the face and hands from exposure to flare radiant heat.
The limits for radiant heat flux (excluding solar radiation) during periodic long duration flaring is presented in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 : Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Periodic Long Duration Flaring (Excluding Solar Radiation)
Area/Region
Hot/Tropical
Radiation intensity (kW/m2)
0.780
A Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study Including 3D CFD Modelling for H2S [75] shall be performed for flares (assuming flame-out) to ensure that concentrations shall be below hazardous limits (e.g. 25% lower flammable limit for flammable fluids and threshold limit value for toxic fluids as per Table 8.3) anywhere in the COMP2 facility during expected releases. The Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study Including 3D CFD Modelling for H2S [75] shall also ensure that concentrations in areas where gas detectors are present shall be below the alarm set point of the detectors.
Table 8.3 : Allowable H2S and SO2 Limits
Limit Type
Parameter
Limit
Threshold Limit Value
(TLV)
Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL)
(15 minutes)
H2S SO2
H2S SO2
5 ppm during 8 hr. period 2 ppm during 8 hr. period
10 ppm 3 ppm
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Flare tip access platform shall be designed to withstand anticipated heat intensity, hence heat shield is not required as the flare platform access is restricted.
8.5 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System
The ESD system provides the means of bringing the whole facility or parts of it into a pre- determined safe shutdown condition.
A safe shutdown condition requires that:
• The feed to the concerned unit is blocked.
• Energy input to the unit is taken off.
• Pipes, that might release large amounts of hydrocarbons in case of rupture, are isolated
from large inventories.
• Systems that might act as an ignition source are shut down (i.e. by removing supply to
the system).
to
Integrated Control and Safety System
Refer (Document No. 200-51-IN-DEC-00001) for the details compression hub process control, interlocking and safeguarding in the ICSS design.
(ICSS) Philosophy
8.5.1 ESD Levels
The ESD levels below are applied to whole Compression Complex:-
• ESD Level 0 – Total Complex Shutdown (Abandon Platform)
• ESD Level 1 – Emergency Shutdown with automatic blowdown (blowdown at confirmed
fire/gas affected platform, not total complex blowdown).
Refer to Fire and Gas Detection Design Philosophy [114] for details of gas detection system.
• ESD Level 2 – Individual Platform Process Shutdown (PSD) with no automatic blowdown
GTG and Fuel Gas System shutdown will not be initiated upon ESD Level 2.
• ESD Level 3 – Unit/Train Shutdown with no automatic blowdown
The above ESD levels are to be integrated to the existing RGE bridge-linked wellhead platforms (WHP) ESD level, which are defined below:-
• ESD – Equivalent to ESD Level 1 as described above
• PSD – Equivalent to ESD Level 2 as described above
No ESD Level 0 for the ESD/PSD level wellhead platforms as push buttons are not provided on these platforms.
The ESD system shall act independently from all other systems to:
• Detect upset conditions of equipment and generate an alarm to alert the operators;
• Automatically react to such conditions with shutdown or isolation of equipment;
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•
Initiate appropriate manual or automatic emergency shutdown in response to a fire or gas detection;
• Automatically depressurize the equipment via flare when necessary.
8.6 Drainage system
The drain systems are intended to collect and transport drained liquids to an appropriate treating and/or disposal system in such a way to protect personnel and equipment, and to prevent environmental pollution. All equipment and areas of an offshore installation should be provided with drainage facilities.
Types of drainage are as follow:
•
Insignificant (minor) operating process liquid discharge, such as control valve drains, liquid inventory from piping and valve isolations (double block isolation and cavity bleed valves, etc.).
•
Instrument drains during maintenance/inspection/testing operation.
• Equipment drain prior to maintenance - process vessel, pumps, filter etc.
• Overflow, wash down, rain or deluge water from deck of a platform, i.e. deck drains.
• Fluids collected in bounded areas in case of loss of containment incidents.
• Draining during sampling.
• Draining of topside piping to allow any future tie-in.
There are two types of drainage systems:
• Open Drain System
• Closed Drain System
8.6.1 Open Drain System
The Open Drain System collects contaminated water such as deck Washdown water, fire water, rainwater, minor spills, rinses of equipment/piping for treatment and safe disposal to the environment.
The Open Drain System comprises mainly of:
• Open Drain Tank with Tilted Plate Interceptor (corrugated) (located on CP)
• Open Drain Oil Pump (located on CP)
• Open Drain Caisson (located on CP)
• Open Drain Caisson Pump (located on CP)
• Open Drain Hazardous and Non- Hazardous Headers and Sub-headers
• Open Drain Tank (located on LQ)
• Open Drain Pump (located on LQ)
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8.6.2 Closed Drain System
The Closed Drain System is provided to collect maintenance drains from pressurized process and utility systems. The Closed Drain System collects:
• Drains from level instruments used in high pressure/sour hydrocarbon service.
• Minor operating process liquid discharge in sour service, such as liquid between two
isolation valves.
• Maintenance drains (from equipment) after depressurized to HP Flare or LP Flare, and
liquid level alarm low-low (LALL).
• Toxic and corrosive fluids.
• Vents and drains from online analyzers, which will be routed to the LP flare KO/Closed
Drain Drum.
• Liquid from the HP Flare KO Drum will be collected at Closed drain drum.
It also serves as the LP Flare KO Drum to receive low pressure flare gas. Flash gas from Closed Drain Drum is connected to the LP flare header. The Closed Drain Drum is not intended to collect continuous process drains from the topsides facilities during normal operation. However, liquid from the following sources are routed to Closed Drain Drum:
• Process liquid from Fuel Gas Scrubber is routed to the Closed Drain Drum as no liquid is
expected during normal operation (NNF).
• Process liquid from Compressor Suction Scrubber is routed to the Closed Drain Drum. The liquid from the Compressor Suction Scrubber is normally pumped to Inlet Separator, but in case of Compressor Suction Scrubber Pump not available, the liquid will be sent to Closed Drain Drum.
Details of the Drain system requirements are provided in the Draining, Purging and Venting Philosophy [Doc. No. 200-20-PR-DEC-00025].
8.7 Loss of Containment (LOC)
The following lists the potential LOC related to the Project, and the methods to minimize the potential of LOC:
• Potential LOC could occur as result of future corrosion, flange and seal leaks during
operations. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC are the use of double seals, LDAR, preventative maintenance, inspection, appropriate material selection and minimizing the numbers of flanges;
• Potential LOC could occur if pigging procedures are not followed or if pig ejects from receiver due to improper latching during pigging operations. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC are using interlocks, orienting it away from the process area/equipment;
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• Potential LOC could occur due to the overpressure leading to a vessel rupture. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC is through using SIS/ESD, rupture disc and relief valves;
•
In general, kerb & drain for containing and channeling of spilled or leaked hydrocarbons/ chemicals shall be provided around the process areas;
• Design shall take into cognizance anticipated extreme operating and upset pressure, temperatures and external conditions considered for life cycle of the platform / facility Equipment, Piping and supporting structures design to withstand accidental loads to minimize loss integrity during a major accident event.
• Piping Layout design shall avoid dead legs.
• Pipe pressure rating to be designed as fully rated against the pump shut-in pressure, as
extensive as possible
• For hydrocarbon piping across bridges, fully welded joints (including interface with
valves) to be implemented.
The potential Loss of Containment shall be identified during the HAZOP Study [132].
8.8 Fire & Gas Detection System
The overall philosophy for Fire and Gas Detection is to:
• Monitor spaces where fire or accumulations of flammable gas may occur;
• To detect these events, and to alert personnel of their occurrence and initiate timely
actions to minimize the consequences of the event.
An integrated fire and gas detection system shall be installed throughout the facility with the fire and gas control system located in the Central Control Room (safe area).
The automatic fire and gas detection system shall be supported by manual call points and ESD push buttons distributed around the platform to communicate to the control room a confirmed fire/gas release event.
The Fire & Gas Detection System shall be interfaced with PAGA, PAPA systems applied for COMP 2 Project.
A Fire and Gas 3D Mapping Study shall be carried out in order to confirm adequacy of the proposed fire and gas detectors. The initial fire and gas detector layout will be proposed by CONTRACTOR loss prevention team whereas the Fire and Gas Mapping Study will be conducted by the appointed specialist 3rd party SUBCONTRACTOR. Recommendations from the mapping study will be used to update the initial layouts in order to optimize the detector coverage.
Details about criteria to be applied for the Fire & Gas detection system will be indicated in the Fire & Gas Detection System Design Philosophy [114].
Fire & Gas Detection system layouts will be produced based on the above criteria to identify the location and type of detectors to be provided in COMP2 Project.
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8.8.1 Fire & Gas 3D Mapping Study
A Fire and Gas Mapping Study shall be performed for the COMP2 scope of work Greenfield and associated Brownfield facilities to ensure that the flame and gas detection coverage meets target levels.
The risk zones identified on the platform shall be reviewed and the following shall be considered in the assessment:
-
Gas composition;
-
Gas release sources;
-
Gas dispersions.
The study shall be performed to optimize the number of flame and gas detectors and recommend appropriate detector coverage. The target coverage both for flame detector and gas detectors shall be 90% for voting 1ooN and 85% for the voting 2ooN.
Details of the basis, methodology, assumption and software to be used shall be presented in the Assumption Register for Fire and Gas Mapping Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [95].
8.9 Hazardous Area Classification
The purpose of this section is to provide guidelines to determine hazardous area classifications and respective hazardous zones for all hazardous gases & materials in NFPS Compression COMP2 project using API RP-505 to determine the hazardous area This philosophy shall be followed in development of Hazardous Area Classification Schedule and Hazardous Area Classification Drawings.
Hazardous areas are classified for the purpose of ensuring safe and proper specification and installation of electrical/ electronic equipment located within them. Effective controls should be placed on all potential sources of ignition within hazardous areas by a combination of design measures and systems of work. It minimizes the risk of fires or explosions that could result from arcing, sparking and heat dissipation in the facility.
All electrical equipment located in hazardous area shall be suitable for Zone 2, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3 as minimum. Classification of electrical equipment located at external area required to function during emergency condition shall be rated to Zone 1, Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T3 with the exception of battery enclosures. Equipment operating inside pressurized room can be unclassified.
All lighting fixtures installed outdoors shall be suitable for minimum Zone 1, Gas Group IIB, temperature class T3 hazardous area.
All lighting fixtures installed inside battery room shall be classified for Zone 1, gas group IIC, temperature class T3 area.
Hazardous area classification drawing shall be developed based on Hazardous Area Classification schedule. The schedule shall list as a minimum:
• Process equipment
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• Process materials and conditions
• Notes on likelihood of release
• The grade of release (continuous, primary or secondary)
• The type of zone
Electrical, Instrumentation and Telecommunication (EIT) rooms shall be designed as non- hazardous areas and shall be pressurized in accordance with API RP 505 [201]. The air intake for a pressurized building shall be from a non-hazardous area.
Electrical equipment selection and installation for classified areas shall be in accordance with NFPA 70 Article 501 [220].
Areas above Zone 2 locations, in order to be designated as “unclassified,” shall be either of the following:
An outdoor location without restricted ventilation, or within a closed building (such as substation or control house) or outdoor switchgear or control centre, in which floor level is above the Zone 2 area and with the space beneath the floor either solid filled. If lighter-than-air gas is involved, then the floor shall be without openings and non-skirted.
8.9.1
Ignition Control
The facility shall be designed and configured to reduce the probability of a flammable gas cloud forming, and further, if such an event does occur, to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of ignition of a flammable gas cloud by electrical equipment, static discharge, hot surfaces or sparking produced by mechanical impacts.
Ignition control is accomplished by:
•
Inherently safe design - locating arcing and sparking devices away from high risk process equipment with the means to isolate / segregate electrical equipment; electrical earthing, control of static charge build-up, control of hot surfaces and elimination of mechanical impacts likely to produce sparking, the design of equipment to prevent mechanical sparking, exhaust systems for internal combustion engines, vent arrangements for tanks containing flammables.
• Detail-oriented methodology - capturing hazardous area data in both tabular and layout form allows for better identification of hazardous areas. Utilization of both the hazard area report and hazardous area equipment register allows for verification that electrical equipment is matched to the corresponding process conditions.
Consistent approach - all outdoor equipment will be specified for minimum Zone 2, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3 and all outdoor instruments are certified for Zone 1, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3. This accounts for uncertainty in developing the hazardous area drawings, potential for future process equipment near existing ignition sources, and provides additional ignition mitigation for catastrophic events.
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8.10 Passive Fire Protection
Passive fire protection (PF) is the preferred method for limiting the escalation potential from fires. Passive Fire Protection shall be considered for but not limited to the following cases:
-
Process vessels and other hydrocarbon containing equipment that contain significant inventories that may fail from fire effects. Extent of the PFP coverage shall also include the associated piping and supporting cradles/ skirts.
-
Critical ESDVs which may be at risk of being impaired by fire.
-
Depressurising system including knock out drum and the associated piping.
-
Equipment and deck supports of vertical vessels which could cause substantial damage
upon collapse.
- Occupied buildings with appropriate ratings.
- Primary and secondary non-redundant structural members supporting decks supporting
critical facilities.
- Asset protection where fire damage to long lead items where repair / replacement could
result in significant operational downtime.
The provision of PFP shall be in accordance with findings from the formal safety assessments such as FERA (against escalation effects from jet fire, pool fire as well as explosion) and API 2218 [195]- Fireproofing Practices in the Petroleum Industry standard. The Specification for Passive Fire Protection (PFP) developed during FEED will be reviewed and updated during Detailed Design Engineering. PFP layouts and PFP Optimization Study were also produced during FEED and shall be updated during Detailed Design Engineering. Where conflicts arise, the implementation of PFP systems on the facility, it shall be subjected to ALARP process.
Structural Progressive Collapse Analysis shall be carried out in detailed design to conclude the PFP provision for structural members.
The suitability of the PFP specified shall be assessed in the FERA to confirm that the required duration of protection is provided.
The requirements for the Passive Fire Protection System are detailed in the Passive Fire Protection Design Philosophy [133].
8.11 Active Fire Protection
The goal of the active fire protection systems on CP6S & CP7S Compression complexes is to delay and limit the extent of damage by providing a degree of fire control and protection, recognizing that water-based systems in particular are not effective for protecting impinged objects against high pressure jet fires, but are more effective against pool fires.
The philosophy for personnel protection primarily relies on surviving fire events for a sufficient time to allow safe muster and evacuation (time to be determined in EERA studies). This means a higher reliance is placed on rapid isolation and blowdown (to remove the hydrocarbon feeding the fire) and on passive fire protection (to ensure survival times are met prior to blowdown) rather than active fire protection.
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The active fire protection system shall comply with contractual standard and specification requirements and shall also take into consideration findings of the Safety Layout Assessment, Fire & Gas Mapping and FERA studies.
Generally, for the COMP2 Project:
-
The firefighting equipment in the LQ shall consist of firewater hose reels, hydrants and hand-held fire extinguishers supplemented with automatic sprinkler system. Non- flammable and low smoke producing materials will be used.
-
The firefighting equipment in the process area shall consist of firewater monitors,
hydrants, deluge, portable & mobile extinguishers (e.g. chemical/CO2/foam) and fire suppression packages (e.g. water mist) as applicable. Fixed CO2 systems shall not be used in occupied buildings/ rooms. Extinguishing systems for rooms and enclosures shall be designed to minimize potential of impairment of the systems due to the fire. Clean Agent fire suppression system shall be provided for Electrical and Instrumentation buildings/rooms
- Foam application shall be provided where significant amount of liquid hydrocarbon could
form.
- Helideck shall be provided with firewater Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS)
in tandem with passive fire retarding system and shall comply with CAP 437 requirements.
- Firewater ring main, deluge valves and firewater pumps should be protected as far as
practicable by location or other means of protection. The firewater ring main shall be provided with isolation valves at certain intervals such that sections of the ring main can be isolated without affecting the function of the other sections, either during maintenance or in the event that one section of the ring main is impaired. Firewater ring main and headers shall be designed against specified blast overpressures by layout considerations and may extend to selection of piping material. The firewater pumps shall be located with sufficient separation distance such that both pumps are not likely to be impaired by a single MAE.
The requirements for the Active Fire Protection System are detailed in the Active Fire Protection Philosophy [86].
Activities during Detailed Design Engineering include development of:
• Active Fire Protection Design Philosophy
• Firewater Demand Calculation
• Firewater Hydraulic Analysis
• Firewater Transient Analysis
• Firewater Pump and Fire Equipment Datasheet and Specifications
• Deluge Nozzle Arrangement Calculation;
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• Firewater System Utility Flow Diagram;
• P&IDs for firewater system, helideck firefighting system;
• Sprinkler layouts for Living Quarter;
• Firewater System Line List; and
• Helideck firefighting DIFFs Specification.
8.12 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
The objectives of the escape, evacuation, and rescue strategy shall meet the following criteria:
• To provide at least minimum of 2 routes, which will be useable under emergency
conditions, from all work locations to the place where people muster;
• To provide a place or places where people can muster while an emergency is being
assessed and while evacuation preparations are being made;
• To provide arrangements that are suitable to allow all people on the COMP2 platforms to
leave in a controlled manner under emergency conditions;
• To provide alternative muster areas, and evacuation facilities for controlled evacuation of
personnel who may be isolated / trapped in restricted access areas (e.g. legs);
• To provide arrangements to recover people who leave the COMP2 platforms in an
emergency and transport them to a place of safety.
The EER arrangements will be qualitatively evaluated against a set of standard goals commonly used for the evaluation of EER facilities on offshore assets internationally. These goals are not specific to a country or set of regulations; rather, they provide a reasonable indication that an installation’s EER provision will satisfy the overall intent of the emergency response requirements of any country or set of regulations.
The goals shall be assessed against the emergency scenarios for all major accident events such as unignited and ignited releases on the facilities during normal operation period e.g. blowout, major loss of containment, collisions, etc.
Escape, Evacuation, Temporary Refuge and Rescue facilities shall be design in compliance with the requirements in the Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue Philosophy [113].
The adequacy of the facilities provided shall be assessed in the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) [119]. Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis, and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis [183] will be carried out in DDE to ensure sufficient safeguards are allowed in the design.
8.12.1 Escape
Escape Route layouts will be developed in Detailed Design Engineering. Typical requirements of the escape routes shall include:
• All potentially manned areas shall be within a reasonable distance (typically 5m) from a
designated escape route providing at least two diverse escape routes.
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• Under any foreseeable emergency scenarios at least one escape route shall remain
unimpaired.
• Alternative route(s) shall be provided during SIMOPS (drilling, hook-up and
commissioning, major maintenance and well workover) period where the existing escape routes are potentially impaired by temporary equipment.
• Changes of direction along escape routes shall be minimized as far as practicable.
• The minimum obstruction free width (excluding handrail, wall mounted equipment, etc.) and headroom (excluding ceiling mounted devices, etc.) of escape routes shall not be less than 1.12m and 2.28m, respectively.
• Designated escape routes shall not run over hatches or laydown areas.
• Escape routes shall comprise only proper walkways, stairs and vertical ladders that are
used on a regular basis by personnel. No projections shall penetrate the defined Routes.
• Maximum angle inclination for walking surface must not be more than 7 degrees.
• All areas greater than 12 m2 to require two or more escape/egress routes.
• Dead ends (i.e. areas with a single means of egress) shall not be longer than 13m. For areas with a length greater than 13 m, a second means of egress shall be provided.
• All escape routes shall be clearly marked and illuminated.
• Stairways and corners shall allow a clear width of 1.4 m to accommodate stretchers.
•
In the event that escape routes to/from the primary muster area could be simultaneously impaired by fire or other major accident events, mitigation measures, e.g., secondary means of escape, secondary muster area, additional secondary and tertiary evacuation facilities, radiation shielding, descent devices etc. shall be considered.
• Escape routes are considered to be impaired if:
o The heat flux exceeds 6.3kW/m2.
o The concentration of Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) exceeds 200 ppm.
8.12.2 Evacuation
The primary means of evacuation from the facility will be via helicopters i.e. normal mode of transport, if available or possible.
The secondary means of emergency evacuation from the facility will be via TEMPSCs located at the TEMPSC embarkation areas. TEMPSCs are selected due to the potential heat radiation and smoke effects resulting from fire, particularly for the platform being a gas production facility.
The TEMPSCs shall be provided at the primary embarkation area, adjacent to the TR/ primary muster area. In the event the primary muster area is impaired (e.g. due to smoke ingress), the primary embarkation area may be used as a muster point.
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The TR, muster areas and embarkation areas shall be protected against major accident event. The primary muster area shall be in a safe area, typically within the temporary refuge and shall be sized to accommodate the maximum POB of 105 with the minimum area of 0.6 m2/person. There shall be sufficient space for personnel to muster, don life jackets and await decision to undertake evacuation procedures. The external embarkation areas (including the secondary muster area) shall be sized to accommodate the maximum POB of 105 with the minimum area of 0.6 m2/person. There shall be sufficient space for personnel to conduct roll call procedures. The embarkation areas shall not be used as laydown areas or for storage/placement of temporary or permanent equipment.
Tertiary means of evacuation shall include life rafts and associated equipment such as lifejackets and descending devices to facilitate evacuation of personnel who are unable to muster at the designated muster/embarkation areas. The location of the tertiary evacuation facilities shall take into consideration the height of the facility and external impacts (e.g. weather, MAEs, etc.). Life Saving Equipment layouts and Specification will be developed in FEED that will indicate locations of all the lifesaving appliances and their suitability for this project.
Helicopters will be used for medical evacuation and potentially for precautionary evacuation, where immediate evacuation is not required.
Impairment criteria for the evacuation facilities (lifeboat/TEMPSC and life raft stations) are defined as follows:
• There is damage to the facilities as a result of an explosion. (An overpressure in excess
of 0.1bar, typically, is adopted as that required to cause damage to lifeboats.)
• The heat flux at the embarkation point exceeds 4.7kW/m2.
• The concentration of Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) exceeds 200ppm.
Communication Requirements
Internal and external emergency communication facilities shall be provided at the primary and secondary muster areas, which will be used during mustering and evacuation processes. Emergency communication should have redundancy and components including antennas shall be protected from MAE by location. Components such as antennas shall be classified for use in hazardous area if there is a possibility of the antennas being exposed to flammable gas.
All personnel on the NFPS platform shall carry handheld radios at all times, as a means of emergency communication, should they be unable to muster at the muster stations during an MAE.
Life rafts and TEMPSC shall be equipped with SARTs and EPIRBs.
PA/GA system consisting of beacons and sounders shall be installed on the NFPS platform, such that an emergency alarm will be heard from any open or enclosed area in the NFPS platform. In high noise areas, additional visual alarms shall be installed. PA/GA cabling to dual redundant PA/GA systems shall be diversely routed to avoid as far as possible simultaneous impairment of PA/GA cabling. MACs and ESD buttons shall be strategically located around the NFPS platform
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for manual activation of the general platform alarm. Details of the requirements for PA/GA systems shall be referenced to Telecommunication Design Basis.
8.12.3 Temporary Refuge
During emergency situations, where a general platform alarm is initiated, all personnel on board the NFPS platform shall proceed to the primary muster area located in the Living Quarters. The Living Quarters shall function as the temporary refuge in the event of an emergency. The TR provides safe access to the communications, monitoring, control equipment necessary to ensure personnel safety and from where, if necessary, safe and complete evacuation can be affected from the NFPS platform. The temporary refuge is required to provide a habitable environment for the full complement of the POB on the NFPS platform for the anticipated duration required to muster and evacuate completely.
The TR shall be designed to be gas tight, with minimum ingress through doors and dampers. The HVAC air intake dampers shall be designed to be fire rated, fail safe and able to withstand credible blast overpressure predicted at the dampers.
The TR is considered to be impaired if either the habitability of the TR or its structural integrity is compromised. The TR endurance time will be set at is 30 minutes for ignited releases and 60 minutes for unignited releases. The TR is considered to be impaired if any of the following conditions occur inside the TR within the specified endurance times:
• The heat flux exceeds 4.7kW/m2 .
• There is damage to the facilities as a result of an explosion. The walls of the TR are assumed to be blast-rated to 0.5bar, and capable of withstanding 1bar (the wall may display significant signs of damage for overpressures between 0.5bar and 1bar, but its overall integrity is assumed to be maintained).
• The concentration of a flammable gas exceeds 50% of the lower flammable limit (LFL) of
the gas.
• The Toxic Gas Temporary Refuge impairment effects will be assessed including all the
toxic release scenarios associated to an average H2S concentration of 604 ppm for a duration of 15 min (in consistency with UK HSE SLOT values).
• Severe damage to the structure supporting the TR.
The design of the TR shall be in accordance with the Specification for Temporary Refuge for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [162]. The ability of the TR to fulfil this requirement shall be assessed in Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) [183]. Whilst the TR is expected to be a safe refuge for personnel in the event of a major accident event, there may be catastrophic scenarios in which the TR could be breached. The TRIA shall identify scenarios which could potentially impair the TR and estimate the frequency of TR impairment. The TR impairment risk should be ALARP and shall comply to Qatargas Risk Tolerability Criteria.
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8.12.4 Rescue
The dedicated standby vessel (SBV) for the NFPS Compression Platform will be the primary means of rescue. There will be a fast rescue craft (FRC) on the standby vessel which can be launched to rescue personnel from life rafts or personnel in the water including for man overboard incident.
For man overboard incidences, and dependent on the consciousness of the injured personnel, the injured personnel shall be transferred to the platform for medical attention. Means of transfer to platform shall be via company approved personnel transfer equipment, FROG/ EVASGT basket, and or stretcher, utilizing the man-rated crane(s) on the platform.
8.12.5 Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout
Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout shall be developed based on the platform layout drawings. These layouts shall clearly identify the primary and secondary escape routes, the location of all lifesaving and firefighting equipment. Datasheets to accompany these layouts shall also be developed.
8.12.6 Safety and Lifesaving Equipment
Provisions for safety and lifesaving equipment shall be made in accordance with the Technical Safety and Loss Prevention Design Philosophy [163], related equipment specifications and Safety Critical Element (SCE) requirements. The locations of Safety and Lifesaving Equipment will be indicated in the Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment layouts. A Safety Equipment List will be generated in Detailed Design Engineering to capture the equipment type, quantities and locations. This shall include but not be limited to the following:
• Lifeboats – TEMPSCs shall be provided at the Facility in accordance with SOLAS
requirements as a minimum.
• Life rafts, Lifejackets and descent devices (where applicable) – Provision of life rafts, as means of escape via sea, shall be located at designated points on the facility , this is to be verified during EPC phase.
• Emergency and Escape Lighting – The emergency lighting arrangements shall be
ensured to have minimum acceptable illumination levels along escape routes and in working areas. Zoning in accordance with Hazardous Area Classification shall be carried out for the emergency lighting. Emergency lighting shall have integral battery packs such that they can continue to function even if the cables to the lights are impaired. This item will be stewardship by Electrical discipline.
• Safety Showers and Eyewash stations – The layout of safety showers and eyewash
stations on the CP, LQ platforms shall be provided based on ISEA Z358.1 standard.
• Safety Signage – Safety signage shall be provided at critical work areas and all main
work areas on the platform. All escape routes, hazards, life-saving equipment and fire protection equipment should be clearly identified by photo-luminescent signs. Escape routes on deck shall be painted.
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• Helideck crash rescue kit shall be provided near Helideck as per CAP 437 [224]
requirements.
• Lifebuoys shall be provided around the perimeter of the facility decks for rescue of man
overboard.
• Appropriate life-saving equipment shall be provided at accommodation modules, the
muster areas (including primary and secondary), embarkation areas (including primary and secondary) and tertiary embarkation areas as required.
• Miscellaneous equipment as required - Stretchers, first aid kits, fire blankets, smoke hood, breathing air stations, self-contained breathing apparatus for rescue and emergency usage, etc.
Safety sign layouts shall be developed based on the platform layout drawings. These layouts shall clearly identify the locations of all safety signs indicating areas hazards to personnel i.e. high noise, chemicals, explosion.
8.12.7 Muster Areas
Muster areas shall be provided to protect personnel while efforts are made to control an emergency situation or until a decision is made to abandon the installation.
Primary muster areas for the CP6S and CP7S Compression complexes shall be a designed enclosed rooms located at the LQ platform (at Dining area, Contractor’s lounge and MCR as the Incident Command Centre). The rooms shall be provided with pressurization and air-conditioning. Secondary muster locations shall be provided on each platform at indoor muster area. For the LQ platform, the alternative muster location (in case of fire inside the LQ) is provided at the escape lifeboat embarkation areas.
The muster areas and escape strategy shall offer personnel protection from fire, smoke and blast hazards. The muster areas shall be large enough to accommodate max POB of 105 based on a minimum size of 0.6 m2 person. Additional space shall be considered to house life safety equipment such as life preserver (SCBA, Life Jacket, etc.). The muster area for all the platforms shall be sized as per below:
•
•
LQ – 105 pax + 20% spare capacity for safety equipment [113]
Gas Compression Platform – 50 pax + 20% spare capacity for safety equipment [113]
The requirements for the Escape Evacuation and Rescue System including Safety equipment and Life Saving Appliances are detailed in the Escape Evacuation and Rescue Design Philosophy [113].
8.13 Marine and Helicopter Collisions
The two key concerns with respect to collisions are marine collisions (such as supply vessels, commercial vessels, and fishing boats) and helicopter collisions. In order to minimize the potential collision risks, the following practices shall be adopted in the design of the platform:
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Marine navigation aids and Radar Beacon (RACON)shall be in compliance with the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) [238], IMO-The International Convention on Collision Prevention Regulation [239], Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 [240] and Qatar maritime regulations;
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The design of the helideck shall comply with CAP 437 [224];
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The helideck design shall include nighttime flying requirements.
Collision monitoring system or Automatic Radar Plotting System (ARPA) shall be provided. This system shall be able to detect vessels on a collision course with the platforms, 60 min before collision. The radar shall be able to register the course and speed of the object.
During Detailed Design Engineering, a Ship Collision Study for the Greenfield and associated Brownfield facilities and Helicopter Crash study (part of Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment for Greenfield) will be performed.
8.14 Mechanical Handling
Crane operations shall be analysed so as to minimize the risk of dropped objects on to the deck of the platform or/, on to workboats, and on to subsea pipeline and equipment. For cranes that may be impacted by fire, layout optimization or PFP shall be applied to ensure the cranes do not collapse onto the LQ.
The basic requirement shall be that lifts over live hydrocarbon containing equipment are not allowed. If this cannot be avoided, then adequate barrier protection and operating procedures shall be provided, and risk-based drop object analysis shall be carried out to define the requirement for drop object protection.
Lifting operation shall comply with the Material Handling Philosophy (Document No. 200-20-ME- DEC-00003) and Material Handling studies. The Dropped Objects Study (DOS) [103] shall identify the loads to be lifted, the laydown areas that they are lifted to/from and the impact energies impacted should they be dropped from the crane.
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9 HYDROGEN SULFIDE (H2S) SAFETY
9.1 Purpose
Purpose of this section is to define the H2S hazards prevention and mitigation philosophy to be considered during detail design of COMP2 Project facilities.
9.2 H2S Properties
In the Process Design Basis for CP6S and CP7S Complexes (Document No. 200-20-PR-DEC- 00019), the H2S concentration in full well stream fluids (variation as a function of location / time) is 0.26 to 1.24 mole%. The Compression Platform shall be design for a H2S concentration of 3.0 mole% which includes some margin to account for reservoir uncertainties. Therefore, an uncontrolled release of process fluid to the atmosphere would pose a major hazard to personnel due to highly toxic H2S gas (the toxic effects of H2S are presented in Section 9.2.2 below). This is in addition to inherent fire and explosion hazards caused by released Hydrocarbon gases.
As for all risks, a range of measures are considered in order to reduce risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Risk to personnel on the COMP2 Compression Complexes due to H2S gas could arise from:
• accidental loss of containment; • Unignited release from the flare; • Loss of containment during normal maintenance operations, for example, from
opening/dismantling of instrumentation or valve etc.
• Confined space entry i.e. entry in to vessels, pits, pig launcher etc.; and • Venting from open drain tanks, instrument or any other equipment/system.
If H2S gas is present in the vicinity of equipment/ facilities, the level to which personnel could be exposed depends upon the concentration of H2S in the process fluid and the dispersion under local topographic and atmospheric conditions.
All facilities that are exposed to H2S must be designed to resist the harmful effects of H2S at anticipated operating temperatures and pressures.
9.2.1 H2S Characteristics
• Highly toxic & flammable gas. • Colourless. • At low concentrations (0.01 - 5 ppm), it is detectable by its characteristic of rotten-egg odour. At higher concentrations (above 100 ppm), H2S will cause rapid paralysis of sense of smell. Odour shall not therefore be used as a warning measure. In normal ambient conditions H2S is in the gaseous phase.
• • Pure H2S is heavier than air. Hydrocarbon gas containing H2S can settle in low-lying areas, especially pits and sumps which are closed-in and have poor ventilation. However, mixture of dispersing H2S in open area will depend on the molecular weight of the gas, H2S content in the gas, topography and weather conditions.
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• Besides being toxic, H2S is flammable and gas/air mixtures can be explosive in concentrations between 4% LFL and 44% Upper Flammability Limit (UFL). If ignited, the gas burns to produce toxic vapours and gases, such as Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) and Sulphur Trioxide (SO3) which also cause health hazards.
• Gas or liquids containing H2S in contact with metal surfaces and equipment may develop a layer of pyrophoric scale (Iron Sulphide) on their internal surfaces. When these lines or equipment are opened to the atmosphere, oxygen from the atmosphere can react with the pyrophoric scale to produce spontaneous combustion.
• H2S is soluble in both water and hydrocarbon liquids. Pools of water or sludge at the bottom of a tank may thus contain concentrations of H2S and if agitated or heated the tank bottom content will release the H2S gas. It causes cracking and embrittlement of metals under certain conditions but steel of the suitable composition/ quality, which are resistant to these forms of attack can be used without any adverse effect.
•
9.2.2 Toxic Effects of H2S
H2S concentrations and the respective effects are provided in Table 9-1 in accordance with QG Hydrogen Sulfide Safety Procedure [23].
Table 9-1 : Effects of H2S to Humans at Different Concentrations
Concentration
(ppm, % by Volume)
Effect
0.00011-0.00033 ppm
Typical background concentrations.
0.01 - 1.5 ppm
0.000001 - 0.00015 %
Odour threshold (when rotten egg smell is first noticeable to some). Odour becomes more offensive at 3-5 ppm.
2 - 5 ppm
0.0002 - 0.0005 %
Prolonged exposure may cause nausea, tearing of the eyes, headaches or loss of sleep. Airway problems (bronchial constriction) in some asthma patients.
5 ppm QG accepted level for LTEL (8 hours TWA)
10 - 20 ppm
0.001 – 0.002 %
Possible fatigue, loss of appetite, headache, irritability, poor memory, dizziness.
10 ppm QG accepted level for STEL (15 min)
50 ppm
0.005%
Decreasing sense of smell. Associated variable signs of coughing, eye irritation, altered respiration, pain in eyes, drowsiness and throat irritation, depending upon exposure time, concentration and individual sensitivity.
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Concentration
(ppm, % by Volume)
Effect
100 ppm
0.01%
Classed as Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentration.
Exposures of 30 min or more could prevent a person from evacuating area safely.
100 - 150 ppm
0.01– 0.015 %
200 - 300 ppm
0.02 – 0.03 %
500 - 700 ppm
0.05 – 0.07%
700 - 1000 ppm
0.07 – 0.1 %
Loss of smell (olfactory fatigue or paralysis). May burn eyes and throat.
Marked conjunctivitis and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour. Pulmonary edema may occur from prolonged exposure.
Loss of sense of reasoning and balance. Staggering, collapse in 5 minutes. Serious damage to the eyes in 30 minutes. Death after 30-60 minutes.
Rapid unconsciousness, “knockdown” or immediate collapse within 1 to 2 breaths, breathing stops; death within minutes.
≥ 1000 ppm
Nearly instant death.
≥ 0.1 %
QG uses the following defined Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL) for H2S:
• Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) – 10 ppm for a 15 minutes exposure. • Long Term Exposure Limit (LTEL) – 5 ppm for an 8 hours average.
Moreover, the following H2S concentration level is defined as the IDLH:
•
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) – 100 ppm
The IDLH concentration of H2S is considered capable of causing death or having immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects (or prevent escape from such an environment).
H2S gas detectors shall have a minimum of 2 level alarm set points:
• Level-1 (Toxic Gas High – 10 ppm H2S) - This will initiate Gas Alarm (both visual and
audible).
• Level-2 (Toxic Gas High-High – 45 ppm H2S) - This will send a signal to the panel operator (i.e. Priority 1 alarm) for operator to respond. For detection at HVAC air intake, to close HVAC air intake dampers and revert HVAC to re-circulation mode.
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9.3 H2S Risk Management System
The H2S Risk Management System shall include consideration of H2S throughout the detailed design development and facility life cycle.
For hazard identification and quantification of risks associated with high H2S facility, structured safety reviews shall be conducted.
To control the H2S risks, the following four levels of controls shall be implemented:
Prevention
Minimise the potential for the hazard to occur or to effect personnel.
Detection
Mitigation
If the hazard occurs alert personnel and safety systems so that measures can be initiated, and emergency response plans can be put into effect.
Minimise the impact of the event by passive (e.g. blast walls, fire proofing) and/or active (e.g. emergency shutdown, blowdown, deluge) means.
Recovery
Rescue and medical treatment of personnel, making the facility safe for re-entry and re-start.
The main aspects to be considered in the design stage are:
• Minimizing process stream with high H2S levels. Process selection should seek inherent safe design concepts to minimise H2S levels and avoid generation of process streams with very high levels of H2S;
• Minimizing leak sources; • Appropriate material selection; • Minimizing exposure of operational and maintenance personnel to H2S risk, e.g. by designing for unattended facility operation and minimum maintenance requirements; • Ensuring that the detailed design minimizes the risk of H2S release, e.g. by selecting CRA materials or CRA cladding for equipment and piping and thereby reducing the potential corrosion damage and consequent H2S releases;
• Ensuring that adequate personnel protection is provided. This includes consideration of training, access control, gas detection, personal protective equipment, and escape means; and
• Ensuring that risks associated with H2S are quantified and recorded.
9.3.1 Prevention
The primary means of minimizing H2S risk resides in the prevention of uncontrolled H2S releases to the atmosphere. This is achieved through the application of inherent safety design principles, material selection, fabrication/construction integrity and compliance with operating procedures.
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a.
Inherently Safe Design
The adoption of an inherent safety approach requires the identification and removal of hazards at an early stage of the design process. This often also has the added benefit of reducing complexity and manual intervention requirement. Inherently safe design requires application of sound engineering judgement together with the right blend of experience and knowledge of operating and maintenance requirements. An inherently safe approach also adds value and reduces lifecycle costs through minimising equipment, management and maintenance requirements.
b. Material Selection
Process equipment shall be NACE compliant for H2S and CO2. The Alloy 625 material (solid CRA or CRA cladded CS) should be used for the piping and equipment according to the Material Selection Philosophy [22].
c.
Piping and Fittings
The following detail design approach shall be applied:
• Minimize spare nozzles on equipment; • Minimize flange connections in piping; • Minimise drain connections, vent valves and other fittings; • Where possible, minimise small-bore fitting diameter of less than 50 mm; • Gasket selection shall comply with Piping Material Specification [21]; • Specification of caps, plugs or blind flanges for open-ended valves and nozzles; • Prohibition of the use of screwed and socket welded fittings; • Avoid dead legs as far as possible and avoid pockets in dead sections of line; • All hydrocarbon maintenance drains / periodic drains (instruments, filters and pig traps) from pipework / equipment shall be routed to closed drain system after depressurization; • An atmospheric vent/relief system is provided on the compression platform and it collects normal and emergency venting sources discharging into a collection piping system with minimal piping directed to the nearest safe location for discharge and disposition. Refer to Depressurization, Blowdown and Low Temperature Study [HOLD1].
d. Design Pressure
The design pressure of the process equipment shall be maintained within the limits mentioned in Process Design Basis for CP6S and CP7S Complexes (Document No. 200-20-PR-DEC-00019).
e. Mechanical Joints Minimization
All Joints shall be welded except as permitted for Flanges & Flanged Joints, Threaded Joints or “Proprietary and Other Joints”.
f.
Instrumentation
The use of non-intrusive instrumentation, e.g. pig alerts, shall be used wherever practical. Instrument isolation bleeds shall be routed to closed system.
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g. Venting & Draining
Vents/ drains/ bleeds from isolation facilities shall not terminate in local to atmosphere and shall be piped to a closed system. Vents and drains installed on piping, equipment and instruments shall be valved and shall be either capped or blinded. All liquid in sour service shall be piped into a closed drain system appropriate for the fluid properties. Any vent gas shall be disposed through lit flare only. Vents from Hazardous Open Drains Tank, Gas Turbine Generators and Compressors, Hypochlorite Generator shall be routed to safe locations. Gas dispersion calculation can be performed provided flowrates, compositions and vent sizes are available. The design criteria for dispersion is 50% LFL.
h. Sampling Systems
Closed loop circuit bomb purging loops shall be used for gas sampling, with spring-closing valves provided on gas supply and non-return valves on outlet connections.
i.
Pump Seals
Double mechanical seals with H2S-free flushing medium shall be provided on centrifugal pumps and double seals with H2S-free flushing medium provided on reciprocating pumps. Alternatively, seal-less pumps shall be used.
j.
Natural Ventilation
The process areas are open and uncongested and as such, take maximum advantage of natural ventilation to assist with the dispersion of any gas.
k.
Fabrication / Construction Integrity
To assure soundness of joints, all pipe welds shall be 100% radiographed and all mechanical joints helium leak tested. Special attention to materials control systems will be required during fabrication, to ensure that the specified materials are used in the correct applications. Moreover, leak testing should also be done after installation of topside.
9.3.2 H2S Gas Detection System
The response time of toxic gas detectors shall be T90% < 30 secs. Zero drift shall be less than 5% per year. H2S gas Detector measuring range shall be of 0 – 50 ppm.
H2S detectors shall be provided in all areas where the fluid stream exceeds 250 ppm concentration of H2S.
H2S gas detectors shall be provided for the following areas on COMP2 CPs:
• Process areas • Areas near to gas turbine compressor suction and discharge nozzles • HVAC air intakes
H2S gas detector shall be located close to potential leak sources but not less than 1.5 m from release point, between the centerline and 0.6 m to 0.9 m from the ground. Possible mechanical
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damage shall also be considered while locating these detectors [114]. For Details of H2S Detection refer to Fire and Gas Detection System Design Philosophy [114].
9.3.3 Breathing Air Systems
Due to the high H2S concentration of the process fluids, a breathing air supply is required on the NFPS CPs. Use of breathing air supply is required during certain maintenance activities, accidental leaks or rescue activities. Therefore, all personnel on the CPs shall have quick access to the breathing air supplies at all times while on board platform.
The following types of breathing air supplies will be available on the NFPS CPs:
• Supplied air breathing Cascade system; and • Portable self-contained breathing air sets.
a) Supplied Air Breathing System
The Supplied air breathing system (or cascade breathing air system) shall be located near to the Muster Area on the CP Production Deck, process areas of CP on various deck levels, and in the following areas on the LQ Platform:
• Dining area, • Contractor’s Lounge at LQ Level 2; • MCR; • Lifeboat embarkation area at LQ Level 1.
This system shall have continuous air supply via cascade breathing air manifolds for which will be supplied from the compressed air cylinders. The cascade breathing air system shall have a capacity to supply breathing air for 50 persons at the CP and 126 persons at the LQ for the entire TR Endurance Time of 2 hour or more as decided by the Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA), [58]. This system shall provide connection/ outlet points (via 12-outlet and 6-outlet breathing air manifolds) to hook-up Breathing Apparatus (BA) Escape set/ SCBA face mask and hose assembly so that user could plug-in and plug-out the BA Escape set/ SCBA face mask as required.
b) Portable Self-contained Breathing Air Sets
Two types of portable self-contained breathing air sets are to be installed (Quantity of BA sets will be based on 100% POB):
• Escape Set Breathing Apparatus (15 minutes capacity). • Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. Specification and Datasheets for Fire Fighting Equipment Safety & Life Saving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [154] (45 minutes capacity).
Escape sets BA shall be used for escape or evacuation purposes only. Each escape set BA face mask and hose assembly should be able to plug into any of the hook-up points (cascade manifolds) distributed in the LQ Temporary Refuge and LQ Lifeboat embarkation area, and at the CP where a secondary TR is provided. In the event of H2S gas release, every person on board
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will don escape sets BA or SCBA and shall plug the hoses to the cascade manifolds, and breathe the air during stand by.
SCBA (45 minutes capacity) can be used for any operation, maintenance, escape/ evacuation or rescue activity that require respiratory protection.
Self-contained breathing air sets shall be located in following area in CPs as specified by the Specification and Datasheets for Fire Fighting Equipment Safety & Life Saving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [154]:
• Main Deck • Production Deck • Temporary Refuge (Production Deck)
Every person visiting the CP shall wear a personal H2S monitor and carry an H2S escape hood as a part of prescribed PPE. The visiting person shall keep the H2S escape hood with him/ her all times while staying on the platform to wear it immediately during any gas leak.
During a gas leak and/or fire emergency, all personnel on the platform shall immediately wear escape hoods and proceed to the TR. While in the TR, personnel must don escape set BAs connected to the Breathing Air cascade system.
If the decision is made to evacuate the platform personnel should disconnect the BA Escape Sets from the cascade breathing air system and proceed to the lifeboat while using only the BA Escape Sets.
9.3.4 Maintenance Operations
When breaking of containment is required for maintenance activities the piping or equipment involved must be isolated, depressurised and purged before exposing open parts of the equipment to atmosphere.
Despite isolation, depressurisation and purging some activities (e.g. sampling) may results in minor releases to atmosphere. When there is a possibility of toxic (H2S) gas emission during maintenance, personnel involved in such activities shall wear Self Contained Breathing Apparatus provided inside CPs decks and TR area. Cascade manifolds has been distributed at different locations across CP deck levels to be utilized for maintenance. Additional precautions required by Permit to Work System shall also be deployed, for example the use of blower fan, provision of safety watch, gas testing etc.
9.3.5 Mitigation
Upon detection of H2S at a concentration of 10 ppm or greater in the process area, the detection system shall sound a unique alarm (both aurally and visually) and register a visual alarm in the MCR.
Upon detection of H2S at a concentration of 45 ppm or greater the HVAC air intakes and airlock on the CPs and LQs the air intake and the outlet dampers shall close and the HVAC controls shall be switched to internal recirculation mode. MACPs are located every 30 meters around the platform area.
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In addition to the above measures, each person on the platform shall carry an escape mask and wear it immediately upon sounding of gas/ H2S alarm and/or personal H2S monitor alarm.
9.3.6 Recovery
Contingency plans shall be developed during the detailed design for the effective rescue and medical treatment of personnel who may be exposed to H2S Toxic gas release.
Locations where H2S can be present in the air above 5 ppm shall follow the QG Hydrogen Sulfide Safety Procedure [23].
All personnel who visit, work or carry out emergency duties on platform in an area where H2S is a potential hazard will need to have a level of competence compatible with the tasks they are expected to carry out and must have appropriate training.
All portable H2S gas detectors used on the facility shall be suitable to use in classified hazardous areas.
9.3.7 H2S Area Classification Layouts
H2S Area Classification layouts shall be developed based on dispersion modelling using PHAST Software. Hazardous area classification drawings will be developed based on equipment arrangement drawings and the possible sources of release identified therein. The extent of the hazardous areas will be indicated on dedicated plan and elevation drawings.
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10 BLAST PROTECTION
Blast design should be considered as another load case in addition to those that are applied for the fire loading, transportation loading and environmental loading i.e. seismic and wave loadings, etc. In the structural evaluation of a defined fire and/or blast event, the structure should be designed to meet specific performance criteria.
The purpose of this philosophy is to:
• Provide the basis for establishing the applicable blast loading; • Provide a basis for the blast requirements. • Provide a basis where to apply the blast loads and drag loads.
Where areas exist that may produce an explosion/blast hazard, these areas are to be evaluated and protected as per safety study recommendations as applicable.
The explosion risk analysis will be conducted as part of Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) [124] shall be performed using CFD software (FLACS) to analyse potential explosion scenarios.
The FERA shall be updated based on the 3D model inputs which consider the complexity of the facility.
Based on the generated exceedance curves a set of explosions loads with a reoccurrence frequency, as per the Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for CP6S and CP7S Complexes[139] shall be confirmed in the Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [124].
According to QG QRA Guideline:
• The frequency of 1 x 10-4 per year for each type of accidental load is the limit of acceptability for the impairment of safety functions (e.g. escape routes, riser ESDV, flare boom supports, critical piping).
• 5 x 10-5 per year frequency DAL values are applicable where the system or structure is required to survive to protect evacuation systems. 5 x 10-5 per year frequency DAL values will be applicable to primary members required to prevent collapse of platform thus protecting the evacuation systems.
• The Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [124] will
be updated based on detail design development.
10.1 Structures
The critical platform structures shall be designed to resist blast overpressures determined by Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [124].
Structures that are essential for controlled evacuation of the platform are considered critical and must survive the accidental event. Structures that needs to survive any blast event are:
• At least One primary escape route from each deck towards LQ and secondary TR at CP • At least One Staircase (connected with above survived escape route) • Temporary Refuge on LQ Platform
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• Supports of Lifeboats on LQ Platform • At least one life raft on CP Platform • Fire/Blast walls on CP Main Deck and Production Deck and associated structural beams • Flare tower supports (to permit blowdown) • Structural supports for critical piping such as ESDVs, flare piping, structural members and
HC vessels.
• Flare knock out drum and separators. • Bridge support structural beams.
10.2 Buildings
Permanent buildings shall be designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA 101 Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and API RP 752 [203].
Buildings shall be of non- combustible construction, containing, as far as possible, non- combustible fittings and furnishings. For more details, refer to project Living Quarters Architectural Material Specification (Doc. No. 200-20-ST-SPC-00011).
The Temporary refuge (TR) building must be able to survive the fire and blast loads stated in Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes [124].
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Project: Q-21699 - Saipem COMP2 Folder: RFQ Files