NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2

COMPANY Contract No.: LTC/C/NFP/5128/20

CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033734

Document Title

:

ESCAPE EVACUATION & RESCUE DESIGN PHILOSOHPY FOR CP6S AND CP7S COMPLEXES

COMPANY Document No.

: 200-20-SH-DEC-00008

Saipem Document No.

: 033734-B-D-30-SPM-LP-S-10018

Discipline

: HSE&Q

Document Type

: DESIGN CRITERIA

Document Category/Class

: 1

Document Classification

: Internal

A

17-Apr-2023

Issued for Review

Erwana Rahayu

Francis C Minah

Luminita Oprescu

REV.

DATE

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION

PREPARED BY

CHECKED BY

APPROVED BY

Saipem S.p.A.

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REVISION HISTORY

Revision

Date of Revision

Revision Description

A1

A

28-Feb-2023

Issued for Inter-Discipline Check

17-Apr-2023

Issued for Review

HOLDS LIST

Hold No

Hold Description

1

Company Document number in Section 3.3.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

2

INTRODUCTION … 5

1.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVE … 5 1.2 PROJECT SCOPE … 5

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS … 7

2.1 DEFINITIONS … 7

2.1.1 General Definition … 7

2.1.2 Technical Definition … 8 2.2 ABBREVIATIONS … 10

3

REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS … 12

3.1 COMPANY DOCUMENTS … 12 3.2 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (FEED) … 12 3.3 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (DETAILED DESIGN) … 13 INTERNATIONAL CODES AND STANDARDS … 15 3.4

PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK … 16

4.1 PURPOSE … 16 4.2 SCOPE OF WORK … 16

MANNING PHILOSOPHY… 17

ESCAPE & EVACUATION AND RESCUE PHILOSOPHY … 18

6.1 ESCAPE … 18

6.1.1 Escape Route Markers … 19 6.2 MUSTER AREA … 20

4

5

6

6.2.1

Living Quarters (LQ6S/ LQ7S) … 20

6.2.2 Compressor Platform (CP6S/CP7S) … 20

6.2.3 Requirement for Temporary Refuge (TR) … 20 6.3 EVACUATION … 21 6.4 RESCUE … 21 6.5 MEDIVAC … 22 6.6 LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES (LQ & CP) … 22

6.6.1

Lifeboats … 22

6.6.2

Liferafts … 23

6.6.3 Scramble Nets … 23

6.6.4

Lifejackets … 23

6.6.5 Breathing Air Systems … 23

6.6.6

Lifebuoys … 24

6.6.7 Fireman’s Equipment … 24

6.6.8 Smoke Hoods … 25

6.6.9 First Aid Kits … 25

6.6.10 Stretchers … 25

6.6.11 Eyewash Station … 25

6.6.12 Emergency Safety Shower and Eyewash … 25 6.7 MEDICAL PROVISION … 25

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6.8 SAFETY SIGN … 25

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1

INTRODUCTION

The North Field is the world’s largest natural gas field and accounts for nearly all of the state of Qatar’s gas production. The reservoir pressure in the North Field has been declining due to continuous production since the early 1990s. The principal objective of the NFPS Project is to sustain the plateau from existing QG South Operation (RL Dry Gas, RGE Wet gas) and existing QG North Operation (QG1 & QG2) production areas by implementing an integrated and optimum investment program consisting of subsurface development, pressure drop reduction steps and compression. Refer to the figure below for a schematic of the North Field.

Qatargas Operating Company Limited is leading the development of the North Field Production Sustainability (NFPS) Project.

1.1 Project Objective

The objective of this Project includes:

• Achieve standards of global excellence in Safety, Health, Environment, Security and Quality

performance.

• Sustain the Qatargas North Field Production Plateau by installing new Compression Complex facilities CP6S & CP7S in QG south with integration to the existing facilities under Investment #3 program.

• Facility development shall be safe, high quality, reliable, maintainable, accessible, operable,

and efficient throughout their required life.

1.2 Project Scope

The COMP2 Project Scope includes detailed engineering, procurement, construction, transportation & installation, hook-up and commissioning, tie-in to EXISTING PROPERTY and provide support for start- up activities of the following facilities and provisions for future development. The WORK shall be following the specified regulations, codes, specifications and standards, achieves the specified performance, and is safe and fit

purpose in all respects.

for

Offshore

‐

‐

CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes that are part of QG-S RGE facilities as follows:

• CP6S Compression Complex

• Compression Platform CP6S, Living Quarters LQ6S, Flare FL6S

• Bridges BR6S-2, BR6S-3, BR6S-4, BR6S-5

• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP6S

Production from existing wellheads (WHP6S & WHP10S) and new wellhead (WHP14S) are routed via riser platform RP6S to compression platform CP6S to boost pressure and export to onshore via two export lines through the existing WHP6S pipeline and a new 38” carbon steel looping trunkline from RP6S (installed by EPCOL). CP6S is bridge-linked to RP6S.

• CP7S Compression Complex

• Compression Platform CP7S, Living Quarters LQ7S, Flare FL7S

• Bridges BR7S-2, BR7S-3, BR7S-4, BR7S-5

• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP7S

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CP7S shall receive production from existing wellheads (WHP5S & WHP7S) and new wellhead (WHP13S). There is only one export line for CP7S through the existing export pipeline from WHP7S. CP7S is bridge-linked to RP7S.

RGA Complex Destressing

Migration of the Electrical power source, Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control systems from WHPs and RPs hosted by RGA to the respective Compression Complexes listed below:

• WHP6S, WHP10S, WHP14S, RP6S and RP10S to CP6S Compression Complex

• WHP5S, WHP7S, WHP13S and RP7S to CP7S Compression Complex

Destressing of Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control system in RGA Complex Control Room, which would include decommissioning and removal of telecom system devices and equipment that would no longer be required post migration and destressing activity.

Onshore

An Onshore Collaborative Center (OCC) will be built under EPC-9, which will enable onshore based engineering teams to conduct full engineering surveillance of all the offshore facilities. The OCC Building will be located in Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC) within the Qatar Gas South Plot. MICC & Telecommunication, ELICS related scope will be performed in the OCC building.

Figure 1.2.1: NFPS Compression Project COMP2 Scope

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2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

2.1 Definitions

2.1.1 General Definition

Definition

Description

COMPANY

Qatargas Operating Company Limited.

CONTRACTOR

Saipem S.p.A.

DELIVERABLES

FACILITIES

All products (drawings, equipment, services) which must be submitted by CONTRACTOR to COMPANY at times specified in the contract. All machinery, apparatus, materials, articles, components, systems and items of all kinds to be designed, engineered, procured, manufactured, constructed, supplied, tested and permanently installed by CONTRACTOR at SITE in connection with the NFPS Project as further described in Exhibit 6.

fabricated,

MILESTONE

A reference event splitting a PROJECT activity for progress measurement purpose.

PROJECT

NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2

SITE

(i) any area where Engineering, Procurement, Fabrication of the FACILITIES related to the CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes are being carried out and (ii) the area offshore required for installation of the FACILITIES in the State of Qatar.

SUBCONTRACT

Contract signed by SUBCONTRACTOR and CONTRACTOR for the performance of a certain portion of the WORK within the Project.

SUBCONTRACTOR

Any organization selected and awarded by CONTRACTOR to supply a certain Project materials or equipment or whom a part of the WORK has been Subcontracted.

WORK

Scope of Work defined in the CONTRACT.

WORK PACKAGE

The lowest manageable and convenient level in each WBS subdivision.

VENDOR

The person, group, or organization responsible for the design, manufacture, testing, and load-out/shipping of the Equipment/ Material.

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2.1.2 Technical Definition

Code

Acceptance Criteria

Command Structure

Command Support System

Complex

Definition

Requirements against which the fulfilment of an objective can be measured. The organisation that is provided to control an emergency.

The range of communications, monitoring and control functions that are provided for the management of potential incidents. Certain functions are critical to meeting the primary objective, while other functions might not be. In order to differentiate between them, they have been categorised as either essential functions or additional functions A series of two or more bridge-linked offshore Installations.

Control Point

Main installation control and monitoring facility.

EER Assessment

Embarkation Area

Emergency Control Point

Endurance Period

Escape

Escape Route

Essential Command Support Functions

Evacuation

Evacuation Route

MAH

Installation

Life Support System

An EER assessment systematically assesses the escape, muster, refuge, evacuation, escape to the sea, and rescue/recovery facilities against the identified major accident hazards to ensure that the facilities meet their design objectives. Place from which personnel leave the installation during evacuation.

A location providing those control, monitoring, coordination and communication functions necessary for responding to an emergency. The period of time for which the relevant conditions of integrity need to be maintained. The act of personnel moving away from a hazardous event to a place where its effects are reduced or removed (ISO 13702) A route from an area of an installation leading to a muster area, TR, embarkation area or means of escape to sea. The essential command support functions are those whose loss or impairment are deemed to constitute direct loss of integrity of the TR, escape routes, evacuation routes or points of embarkation. The planned method of leaving the installation in an emergency (ISO 13702) An escape route from the TR leading to an embarkation area used for primary or secondary evacuation from the installation. Major Accident Hazards analysis. Process that identifies and assesses major accident hazards, selects control and recovery measures, and maintains a documented demonstration that major HSE risks have been reduced to a level that is ALARP. A fixed or mobile facility engaged in offshore oil and gas exploration or production activities. The function of the life support system is to maintain an environment which is not hazardous to personnel and which maintains their ability to take rational action. The scope and extent of the life support system will vary, from little or no specific provision (where environmental conditions are

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Code

Definition

Living Quarters

Manned Installation

Muster Area

Persons On Board

RPE

Temporary Refuge

predicted to be largely unaffected) to a purpose-designed enclosure incorporating specialist environmental control facilities Permanently enclosed spaces such as cabins, dining rooms, galleys, recreation rooms, sick-bay, offices, change rooms, ablution areas and similar spaces used for the accommodation and welfare of personnel. An installation on which people are routinely accommodated or continuously present for operation. A designated area where personnel gather in response to instructions or a change in the installation safety status. The number of permanent and temporary personnel on an installation at any one time. RPE is a general term covering both breathing apparatus (which is independent of the local atmosphere) and respirators (e.g. smoke hoods and filters that are dependent on the local atmosphere). Smoke hoods of the simple filter type are unlikely to provide sufficient respiratory protection for major incidents on large and complex installations. A place or places where personnel will be adequately protected from relevant hazards while they remain on an installation following a major incident, and from where they will have access to the communications, monitoring and control equipment necessary to ensure their personal safety, and from where, if necessary, safe and complete evacuation can be affected.

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2.2 Abbreviations

Code

Definition

ALARP

AMA

BR6S-2

BR6S-3

BR6S-4

BR6S-5

BR7S-2

BR7S-3

BR7S-4

BR7S-5

CP

EER

EERA

ESD

FEED

FL6S

FL7S

FRC

H2S

LFL

LQ6S

LQ7S

MAE

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Alternative Muster Area

Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Compressor Platform

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

Emergency Shutdown System

Front End Engineering Design

Flare Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Flare Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Fast Rescue Craft

Hydrogen Sulphide

Lower Flammable Limit

Living Quarters Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Living Quarters Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Major Accident Event

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Code

Definition

MOB

PAPA

POB

RP6S

RP7S

RP10S

SCBA

TR

WHP5S

WHP6S

WHP7S

WHP10S

WHP13S

WHP14S

Man Overboard

Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm

Personnel on Board

Riser Platform 6S

Riser Platform 7S

Riser Platform 10S

Self-contained breathing apparatus

Temporary Refuge

Wellhead Platform 5S

Wellhead Platform 6S

Wellhead Platform 7S

Wellhead Platform 10S

Wellhead Platform 13S

Wellhead Platform 14S

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3 REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS

The following codes, standards and specification are referenced within the document shall be considered as part of this specification. Conflict among applicable specification and / or codes shall be brought to the attention of the COMPANY for resolution COMPANY decision shall be final and shall be implemented. The latest editions of codes and specification effective as on date of contract shall be followed.

In general, the order of precedence shall be followed:

a) Qatari Governmental and Regulatory Requirements

b) COMPANY Procedures, Policies and Standards (Exhibit 5 Appendix I)

c) Project Specifications.

d) Industry Codes and Standards

e) COMPANY and CONTRACTOR’s Lessons Learned

3.1 Company Documents

S. No

Document Number

Title

PRT-ERP-PRC-037

Tier-1 Offshore Emergency Response Procedure

3.2 Project Documents (FEED)

S. No

Document Number

Title

200-20-SH-DEC-00002

Technical Safety Basis of Design (Offshore)

200-20-SH-REP-03004

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) - Compression Complex

200-20-SH-REP-03009

Assumption Register

200-20-SH-REP-00020

Manning Study Report

560-83-SH-PLN-00002

560-83-SH-PLN-00003

560-83-SH-PLN-00005

560-83-SH-PLN-00006

10. 560-83-SH-PLN-00007

11. 562-83-SH-PLN-00001

RGE (CP4S, CP6S, CP7S& CP8S) Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout - PSV Service Platform RGE (CP4S, CP6S, CP7S& CP8S) Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout - Discharge Cooler Platform RGE (CP4S, CP6S, CP7S& CP8S) Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout - Main Deck RGE (CP4S, CP6S, CP7S& CP8S) Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Production Deck RGE (CP4S, CP6S, CP7S& CP8S) Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Sump Deck RGE (LQ4S, LQ6S, LQ7S& LQ8S) Living Quarters Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 1

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S. No

Document Number

Title

12. 562-83-SH-PLN-00002

13. 562-83-SH-PLN-00003

14. 562-83-SH-PLN-10001

15. 562-83-SH-PLN-10002

16. 562-83-SH-PLN-10001

RGE (LQ4S, LQ6S, LQ7S& LQ8S) Living Quarters Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 2 RGE (LQ4S, LQ6S, LQ7S& LQ8S) Living Quarters Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 3 Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – LQ Roof Deck Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – LQ Cellar Deck Escape Route Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – LQ Sub Cellar Deck

17. 200-20-SH-SPC-00009

Specification for Temporary Refuge

18. 200-20-SH-REP-03001

Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

19. 200-20-SH-REP-03005

Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA)

20. 200-20-SH-SPC-00003

Specification and Datasheets for Lifeboat

21. 200-20-SH-SPC-00002

Specification and Datasheet for Safety & Life Saving Equipment

3.3 Project Documents (Detailed Design)

S. No

Document Number

Title

200-20-SH-DEC-00005

HOLD 1

200-42-HV-DEC-00002

200-42-HV-SPC-00002

Technical Safety & Loss Prevention Design Philosophy for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Impairment Temporary Refuge Temporary Refuge Analysis (TRIA) And Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) For CP6S And CP7S Complexes HVAC Design Basis – Offshore for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification For HVAC Equipment Offshore for CP6S and CP7S

200-52-TC-DEC-00002

Telecommunication System Philosophy

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – PSV Service Platform for Compression Platform CP6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Discharge Cooler Platform for Compression Platform CP6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Main Deck for Compression Platform CP6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Production Deck for Compression Platform CP6S

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S. No

Document Number

Title

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Sump Deck for Compression Platform CP6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 1 for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 2 for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 3 for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Roof Deck for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Cellar Deck for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Sub Cellar Deck for LQ6S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – Flare Platform FL6S (CP6S Complex) Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – CP – LQ Bridge (CP6S Complex) Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – CP –FP Bridge (CP6S Complex) Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – PSV Service Platform for Compression Platform CP7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Discharge Cooler Platform for Compression Platform CP7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Main Deck for Compression Platform CP7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Production Deck for Compression Platform CP7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Sump Deck for Compression Platform CP7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 1 for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 2 for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Level 3 for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Roof Deck for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Cellar Deck for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Sub Cellar Deck for LQ7S Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – Flare Platform FL6S (CP7S Complex) Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – CP – LQ Bridge (CP7S Complex)

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S. No

Document Number

Title

Hold 1

Escape Route, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Drawing – CP – FP Bridge (CP7S Complex)

Hold 1

Manning Study Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Hold 1

200-83-SH-SPC-00005

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Specification and Datasheet for Safety Signs for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Specification and Datasheet for Fire Fighting, Safety & Life Saving Equipment for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) for CP6S and CP7S Complexes

3.4

International Codes and Standards

S. No

Document Number

Title

NORSOK standard S-001

Technical Safety

The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT)

SOLAS

A guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installation, John Spouge, 1999 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 and Amendments in Force

NFPA 101

Life Safety Code

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4 PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK

4.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Design Philosophy is to describe the philosophy that will apply to the NFPS Compression COMP2 Project Greenfield and associated Brownfield facilities at the CP6S and CP7S compression complexes. Generally, the overall objective of the EER philosophy is to ensure that personnel can leave affected areas in case of an incident by at least one safe route to reach the designated Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Point) or the Secondary Muster Point from any location of the installation. Specifically, the objectives of the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Systems for the COMP2 Project are [Ref. 2]:

• To provide routes, which will be useable under emergency conditions, from all work locations

to the place where people muster;

• To provide a place, or places, where people can muster while an emergency is being

investigated and, if appropriate, while evacuation preparations are being made.;

• To provide arrangements suitable to allow all people on the installation to leave in a controlled

manner under emergency conditions; and

• To make arrangements to recover people, remove them from the installation in an emergency

and transport them to a place of safety.

Since CP6S and CP7S compression facilities are complex facilities bridge linked to their respective RPs, FLs and LQ platforms, the escape approach for mustering will be via bridge connecting Compression Platform with the Riser Platform to Primary Muster Area (Temporary Refuge) located on the LQ / Accommodation Platform, and the Secondary Muster Area will be located at Compression Platform, Riser Platform.

4.2 Scope of Work

The facilities to be addressed by this document are the offshore facilities identified in Section 1.2 above with due cognizance of the design one build many (D1BM) philosophy. These facilities comprise of the Greenfield and associated Brownfield facilities at CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes.

The details of Escape, Emergency and Evacuation for COMP2 Project scope will be presented in the following:

• Escape Routes, Life Saving and Fire Fighting Equipment Layouts - Listing and illustrating

escape routes and personnel lifesaving equipment drawings.

• Human Factor Evaluation Activities- Evaluate the facilities installations and their inherent design can accommodate for safe and reliable operational and maintenance activities and minimize the potential for human error.

• EERA Study - Evaluate the adequacy and performance of the escape, evacuation, and

rescue facilities.

• ESSA Study - Evaluating Platform’s Main Emergency System Survivability under emergency circumstances and incidental scenarios which may occur on the platform.

• TRIA Study - Evaluating the risk of impairment of the TR during a major accident event on an offshore installation. Impairments of a TR on an offshore installation can result from one of the Major Accidents Events (MAEs) which are Fire Impairment to support

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structure of TR or TR boundary, Smoke Ingress Impairment, Gas Impairment, and Explosion Overpressure.

5 MANNING PHILOSOPHY

The Compression Platform (CP6S/ CP7S) and Living Quarters Platform (LQ6S /LQ7S) are normally manned [5] with the operators working on a 28 / 28 shift rotation basis [4] and Flare Platform ( FL is normally unmanned [3]. All the personnel working on the Compression platform (CP6S/ CP7S) will be accommodated in the Living Quarters Platform (LQ6S /LQ7S) during off-duty hours.

There will be two shifts of personnel working on the CP6S and CP7S complexes, i.e., Day and night shifts. The normal working hours for each person is 12 hours per day.

The maximum personnel on board (POB) for the Compression Complex is 105 including contractors and the maximum POB for the Compression platform (CP6S/ CP7S) is fifty (50) personnel during normal operations. The maximum POB on the Riser Platform (RP6S / RP7S) is twenty-four (24). No change in manning level on the Riser Platform (RP6S / RP7S) are anticipated due to the new brownfield modifications associated with the COMP2 project. The Living Quarters Platform (LQ6S /LQ7S) EER facilities are designed for maximum POB of 105 [3,4& 5].

The maximum POB for each platform for the COMP2 are presented in Table 5.1 below. Detail manning distribution shall be discussed in Manning Philosophy study [5 and 55].

Table 5.1: Maximum POB at Compression Complexes CP6S and CP7S

PLATFORM

NUMBER OF POB

LQ

CP

RP

105

50

24

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6 ESCAPE & EVACUATION AND RESCUE PHILOSOPHY

Emergency Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) facilities are essential for egress and escape of personnel from an offshore installation in the event of a Major Accident Event (MAE). Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the EER facilities are adequate, safe and capable of protecting the POB as intended during the EER process.

6.1 Escape

The purpose of the escape routes is to ensure that personnel are able to leave platform areas in case of a hazardous incident by at least one safe route and to enable personnel to reach the designated muster area from any position on the installation [61]. SOLAS [63], requires that means of escape are provided so that persons on board can safely and swiftly escape to the lifeboat and liferaft embarkation deck.

Escape routes must comply with the following:

• The width of the escape routes in an area shall be at least 1.12 m for primary escape routes

and 0.760 m for secondary escape routes [2];

• The height of the escape routes in an area shall be at least 2.28 m [2];

• For buildings, in accordance with NFPA 101 [64], dead ends (i.e. areas with a single means of egress) shall not be longer than 15 m. For areas with a length greater than 15m, a second means of egress shall be provided;

• A minimum of 2 (two) exit doors are to be provided for a room if the travel distance is more

than 15 m;

• All emergency doors, hatches and kick panels shall be clearly labelled such that they can be

readily located in an emergency;

• For closed rooms, exit doors shall be hinged to swing to the outside. Where two (2) means of egress are required they shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that both may be rendered impassable by the same emergency condition;

• There shall be at least two (2) independent escape routes around the facility leading to each muster area and two independent escape routes leading from each muster area to an embarkation area (when a muster area is not also an embarkation area);

• At least four stairways / ladders shall be provided between each platform level, including full- size Cellar Decks, and the Main Deck of manned platforms. Stairways and ladders are to be separated, to allow alternative escape routes, taking into account prevailing wind, major facility risks (fires, explosion, toxic vapors, etc.), escape and evacuation options;

• The stairs should be located so that it would be very unlikely for a single event to impair both

stairways;

• Corners of stairways shall allow a clear width of 1.4m to accommodate stretchers;

• All the escape routes shall be clearly marked on the deck (see 6.1.1 below). Escape signs shall be provided on all escape routes to guide personnel to the primary means of evacuation, the primary muster area and lifeboats via the nearest perimeter walkway [2]. Facilities to facilitate the escape such as emergency lighting, emergency power shall be provided; and

• Escape route shall be maintained in a safe condition, clear of obstacles [3].

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Escape routes are considered to be impaired if [2]:

• The heat flux exceeds 6.3 kW/m2 ;

• Blast overpressure exceeding expected structural design;

• Gas at 50% LFL concentration;

• The concentration of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) exceeds 200 ppm;

• Smoke (CO) exceeding 1200 ppm; and

• Smoke visibility of 4m equivalent to 800 ppm.

Walking and working surfaces shall:

• Be designed to avoid slippery conditions and tripping hazards;

• Avoid grade separation on same deck level;

• Provide ramps at grade separation (subjected to COMPANY’s approval) to minimize tripping

hazards and to facilitate use of wheeled equipment;

• Provide access to equipment to avoid stepping on piping or other appurtenances; and

• Provide sufficient clearance to permit use of mobile equipment and power tools for equipment

service, maintenance and turnaround activities.

6.1.1 Escape Route Markers

To ensure a safe and rapid evacuation, escape routes shall be provided with the following [2] :

• Escape routes between exit points shall be clearly defined by lines painted on the floor in oil

resistant photoluminescent paint.

•

Illuminated and certified direction arrow markers will be strategically positioned along escape routes where it is necessary to guide personnel to the platform’s perimeter walkway or to the safe areas.

• At points along the platform perimeter walkway, signs shall be erected to indicate the direction

to the muster points.

• Escape routes shall be clearly marked and shall have arrows indicating the preferred direction

of travel.

• Directional signs shall be provided to help personnel find their way. Signs shall be posted on

walls, above doors, on walls near floor level and on the floor itself.

• Self-illuminating or photo-luminescent signs shall be easily seen under emergency lighting conditions. The illumination levels on the face of the photo-luminescent signs shall be in accordance with appropriate standards.

All personnel doors leading out of a room shall have an exit sign positioned in a clearly visible location.

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6.2 Muster Area

A Muster area shall be provided to protect personnel while efforts are made to control an emergency situation or until a decision is made to abandon the installation.

The Primary muster area (PMA) for the COMP2 Facilities complex shall be a designated enclosed room located at the LQ platform (i.e., Dining area, Contractor’s lounge.and the CCR as the Incident Command Centre). The room shall be provided with pressurization and air-conditioning.

The muster areas and escape strategy shall take into consideration personnel protection from fire, smoke and blast hazards. A minimum area of 0.6 m2 per person shall be provided at each muster area [2]. Additional space shall be considered to house life safety equipment such as life preserver (SCBA, Life Jacket, etc.).

The muster areas on all platforms shall be sized to accommodate the full POB of that platform as follows:

• Compression Complex LQ platform – 105 pax (inclusive of 5 visitors) + 20% spare capacity

for safety equipment [2].

• Gas Compression Platform – 50 pax + 20% spare capacities for safety equipment [2].

6.2.1 Living Quarters (LQ6S/ LQ7S)

All personnel at the LQ shall escape to muster at:

• Primary Muster Area – Primary TR (The Dining Area and Contractor’s Lounge at Level 2 and the Central Control Room (CCR) inside LQ level 1. Note that CCR shall function as the Incident Command Centre for the Emergency Response Team (ERT), thus it is not considered on the adequacy assessment for Primary Muster Area.

• Secondary Muster Area – LQ lifeboat embarkation area at Level 1.

6.2.2 Compressor Platform (CP6S/CP7S)

The personnel on compression platform will escape to the following muster areas depending on the location of the hazardous event:

• Primary Muster Area at the LQ – Primary TR at LQ Platform. The LQ platform can be accessed from the CP platform via two bridges; the first from the CP platform Production deck to the RP platform and the second from the RP platform to the LQ platform ;

• Secondary Muster Area – LQ lifeboat embarkation areas at Level 1; and

• Alternative Muster Area– Secondary TR located on Compression Platform Production Deck (if

escape via CP-LQ bridge link is not feasible).

6.2.3 Requirement for Temporary Refuge (TR)

The Temporary refuge (TR) building must be able to survive the fire and blast loads stated in Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA), [18 & 58 ]. The TR is considered impaired if the concentration of the flammable gas exceeds 50% of the LFL of the gas. For thermal radiation level, the TR must experience lower than 4.7Kw/m2 of radiation limit.

The following are the essential requirements for Temporary Refuge (TR):

• The TR shall be located as far from drilling and process hazards as practicable.

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• Shall be capable of accommodating 100% of POB with the minimum area of 0.6m2 per person.

• Additional space may be required to enable personnel to undertake any required activities e.g. (donning survival/immersion suits, life jackets, breathing apparatus etc.). Space shall also be provided to accommodate stretcher cases.

• The TR shall provide space for the storage of, and access to, adequate quantities of

emergency/medical equipment.

• There shall be at least two independent means of communicating from TR to an emergency

control centre away from the installation.

• The TR shall have at least two independent exits to the evacuation stations (i.e. helideck,

lifeboats, etc.)

• The TR Central Control Room (CCR) shall contain means to monitor facility alarms, to communicate externally with an emergency control centre and rescue party, and to communicate internally, including the use of public address system. The CCR shall be provided with Operator Workstations (OWS) and Engineering Workstations (EWS) for centralized control and monitoring functions.

• The TR shall be designed for internal environmental factors such as temperature increase and air quality following HVAC shutdown in an emergency, together with any other local environmental factors that could persist for the duration that the TR is specified to be required.

• The TR shall be designed to offer personnel protection from fire (e.g. radiant heat and smoke), blast and other hazards as necessary, consistent with EER analysis, for sufficient time to allow for organized controlled evacuation. The TR should also provide protection from environmental hazards, as applicable (i.e. sun, wind, cold and heat).

The LQ TR shall protect occupants for a minimum duration of 60 minutes while the CP TR shall be maintained for a minimum endurance period of 30 minutes [3,19 & 60].

6.3 Evacuation

In the event of a major incident and subsequent Public Alarm (PA) initiated due to ESD, all personnel shall muster in the Primary Muster Area (Temporary Refuge), Secondary Muster Area or Alternative muster area. Upon receiving instruction to evacuate the platform, all personnel shall evacuate by one or more of the following means [3]:

• Primary means of evacuation: Helicopter. If helicopter is unavailable, the preferred method of

evacuation is via the LQ Lifeboat.

• Secondary means of evacuation - Use of infield supply boat at LQ Sub Cellar Deck;

•

If all bridges are impaired – Liferafts / donning life jackets and descending to sea via descending device (scramble nets) at CP Platform.

The total capacity of the lifeboats shall be sufficient for 150% of the living quarter POB and 100% of the total POB.

6.4 Rescue

Following complex abandonment, infield supply vessels and Fast Rescue Crafts (FRC), provided on each supply vessel, are available to perform search and rescue operations [Ref. 2] including rescue of personnel who have entered the water. The FRC will be launched and directed to the incident area for rescue activity within 30 minutes [Ref. 2].

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Lifebuoys are provided and equally distributed and readily available on the Compression Complex for Man Overboard (MOB) incidents.

6.5 Medivac

Means of Medical Evacuation (Medivac) considered for this facility are as follows [Ref.2] ]:

• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Temporary Refuge if there is an ongoing Fire / Explosion /

gas impairment on platform.

• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Helideck for Helicopter Medivac.

6.6 Life Saving Appliances (LQ & CP)

The following safety and lifesaving equipment shall be provided for the facilities to be used during emergency events. All lifesaving appliances shall comply to SAES-B-009, IMO and SOLAS requirements: Reference to Specification and Datasheets for Safety and Life Saving Equipment [Ref.57].

• Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (Life Boat) at LQ.

•

•

Life Rafts.

Scramble net near each life raft to descend to sea level to embark life rafts.

• Life Jackets in each LQ bed space, lifeboat embarkation area and near each Life Raft for

emergency evacuation.

• Life Buoys for rescuing man overboard.

• Cascade Breathing Air System in TR and CP process areas

• Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus inside TR and EIT rooms.

• Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD) inside TR.

• First Aid in EIT rooms and TR.

• Firemen Equipment Cabinet in TR.

• Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash near chemical injection pumps.

• Eye wash unit inside Battery Room.

• Stretchers inside TR and Infirmary.

• Smoke Hood in each LQ bed space.

6.6.1 Lifeboats

Three (3) davit-launched lifeboats shall be provided for the LQ to serve personnel during emergencies and evacuation. Each lifeboat shall provide a capacity of 55 personnel., the total capacity of the three life boats shall be sufficient for 150% of the living quarters POB and 100% of the total POB in case one lifeboat is out of service [2&20].

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6.6.2 Liferafts

Two (2) roll over liferafts shall be provided at each CP liferaft stations (i.e. 2 stations at the CP Production Deck). Each liferaft shall have the capacity to carry 25 men. Each liferaft shall be capable of single man launch and have automatic inflation action following launch. Each canister shall be mounted at handrail level and clearly marked to show its method of operation. Life-rafts shall comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the LSA Code [2,21 and 57].

6.6.3 Scramble Nets

Scramble nets shall be provided at liferaft stations as a last resort for evacuating personnel. Details can be referred to Specification and Datasheet for Safety & Life Saving Equipment, [2,21 and 57].

6.6.4 Lifejackets

Inherently buoyant lifejackets shall be provided. Lifejackets shall be stowed one per bed space, suitable numbers stowed in containers at each lifeboat / liferaft embarkation area on the CP and LQ Platforms, sufficient for the full complement of each boat / raft. Lifejacket quantities are as follows [2,21 and 57]:

• At each bed space 105 units.

• At lifeboat stations 126 units (stored in 2 x 56 units container and 1 x 16 units container adjacent

to the lifeboats).

• At the CP TR / CP alternate liferaft station 54 units (stored in 4 x 25 units container; 2 units in

TR and 2 units at the liferaft station).

Lifejackets for offshore installations shall comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the LSA Code [2].

6.6.5 Breathing Air Systems

Due to high H2S toxicity levels of process fluids, breathing air supply is required on CP and LQ Platform. Use of breathing air supply is required during certain maintenance activities, accidental leaks, or rescue activities. Therefore, all personnel on the CP and LQ Platform shall have quick access to breathing air supplies at all times while on board platform [2&21].

Following two types of breathing air supplies will be available on COMP2 Facilities:

a) Supplied Air Breathing System

Supplied air breathing system (or cascade breathing air system) shall be located near to the Muster Area on CP Production Deck, process areas of CP on various deck levels, and LQ Platform areas (TR / Muster area - Dining area, Contractor’s Lounge at LQ Level 2; CCR ) and Lifeboat embarkation area at LQ Level 1.

This system shall have continuous air supply via cascade breathing air manifolds for which breathing will be supplied from compressed air cylinders. Cascade breathing air system shall have a capacity to supply breathing air for 50 persons at CP and 105 persons at LQ for TR Endurance Time of 2 hour or more as decided by Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) And Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA), [19].

This system shall provide connection/ outlet points (via 12 - outlet and 6 - outlet breathing air manifolds) to hook-up emergency escape breathing device (EEBD) / SCBA face mask and hose assembly so that user could plug-in and plug-out the EEBD / SCBA face mask as required.

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b) Portable Self - Contained Breathing air sets

There will be two types of portable self-contained breathing air sets (Quantity of EEBD sets will be based on 100% POB) [2&21]:

• Emergency Escape Breathing Device - EEBD (15 minutes capacity).

• Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus - SCBA (45 minutes capacity).

EEBD shall be used for escape or evacuation purposes only. Each EEBD face mask and hose assembly should be able to plug into any of the hook-up points (cascade manifolds) distributed in the LQ Temporary Refuge and LQ Lifeboat embarkation area, and at CP where secondary TR provided and also various location on CP process area.

In the event of H2S gas release, every person on board will don EEBD or SCBA and shall plug the hoses to the cascade manifolds and breathe the air during stand by.

SCBA (45 minutes capacity) can be used for any operation, maintenance, escape/ evacuation or rescue activity that require respiratory protection.

Every person visiting CPs shall wear a personal H2S monitor and carry an H2S escape hood as a part of prescribed PPE. The visiting person shall keep the H2S escape hood with him /her all times while staying on the platform to wear it immediately during any gas leak.

During a gas leak and/or fire emergency, all personnel on the platform shall immediately wear escape hoods and proceed to TR. While in the TR, personnel have to don escape set BA connected to the Breathing Air cascade system.

If the decision is made to evacuate the platform, personnel should disconnect their EEBD from cascade breathing air system and proceed to the lifeboat while using only the EEBD Sets.

6.6.6 Lifebuoys

Lifebuoys shall be provided at strategic locations around the perimeter of the platform at each deck level. The lifebuoys shall be handrail mounted and fitted with light marking devices and 40-meter (min) lanyards, secured to the hand railing and shall be sized accordingly to the elevation above LAT. All lifebuoys shall be of standard units. Lifebuoys shall comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the LSA Code.

6.6.7 Fireman’s Equipment

The NFPS Compression complex LQs shall be provided with two (2) firemen equipment cabinet and each cabinet contain 2 sets of fireman’s equipment. Each set of equipment provided shall comprise of the following:

•

Protective outfit, including gloves, boots, a face mask or hood and a helmet;

• Self-contained breathing apparatus;

• Portable battery-operated lamp capable of functioning efficiently for a period not less than 3

hours;

• A fireman’s axe;

•

A safety harness and lifeline.

Each fireman’s outfit shall be stowed in a cabinet with suitable instructions prominently displayed on the lid/ door. The cabinet shall be of ample size to preclude the possibility of damage to the equipment on restoring after use. Cabinets shall be suitable for the storage of two fireman’s kits.

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6.6.8 Smoke Hoods

Smoke hoods shall be provided for 100% of all personnel on board. One set shall be provided for each bed space.

6.6.9 First Aid Kits

First aid kits with instructions shall be positioned in all levels of the LQ as appropriate. First aid kit will be also located adjacent to the stretcher at TR, EIT rooms and UPS room.

6.6.10 Stretchers

Stretchers shall be provided in LQ and CP TR, and Infirmary. These stretchers will be packed in a carrying valise and will be used to transport casualties from the area of an accident to the Infirmary.

Galvanized stokes stretchers with flotation collars shall be provided with a pick-up bridle and straps for each stretcher.

A movement study shall be carried out to ensure that at least one route is available by which stretchers can be moved to/ from the Infirmary, Helideck and boat/ W2W vessel evacuation stations.

6.6.11 Eyewash Station

Two eyewash stations will be provided on the LQ Platform:

• A portable, gravity-fed, self-contained eye wash station inside the Battery Room;

• A plumbed type on the Roof Deck.

One eyewash station will be provided on CP:

• A portable, gravity-fed, self-contained eye wash station inside the Battery Room

6.6.12 Emergency Safety Shower and Eyewash

Two emergency safety shower and eyewash station will be provided on CP near chemical injection pumps.

6.7 Medical Provision

COMP2 new Living Quarter (LQs) shall be provided with a infirmary/ clinic.

Washing and toilet facilities shall be available within the infirmary with hot and cold water supplied. The infirmary shall not be used for any purpose other than medical care. Isolation ward shall also be provided inside the infirmary, with own entrance and toilet facility.

6.8 Safety Sign

Safety signs shall be provided to indicate escape routes, to warn of hazards and to show the location of fire and safety equipment Reference Specification and Datasheets for Safety Signs [Ref.56 ].

Escape signs shall be installed so that wherever someone is standing in an occupied area a directional sign to the escape path shall be visible. Details can be referred to Section 6.1.1.

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Signs shall be pictorial as far as is practicable and if text is required this shall be in English. Internal signs will be photo luminescent, other signs will be either light reflective or photo luminescent as appropriate.

Safety signs are categorized under the following heading [Ref.56 ]:

• Mandatory (White on Blue);

• Prohibition (Red on White);

• Warning (Black on Yellow);

• Fire Equipment (White on Red);

• Safe Condition/Emergency and Safety equipment (White on Green).

All controls on fire and safety equipment, alarm and shutdown pushbuttons, etc. shall be clearly labelled with their function.

Safety signs layouts, showing, type, position and number of all signs will be developed during the detail design engineering development.

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Project: Q-21699 - Saipem COMP2 Folder: RFQ Files