NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2

COMPANY Contract No.: LTC/C/NFP/5128/20

CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033734

Document Title

:

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR CP6S AND CP7S COMPLEXES

COMPANY Document No.

: 200-83-SH-DEC-00002

Saipem Document No.

: 033734-B-D-30-SPM-LP-S-10027

Discipline

: HSE&Q

Document Type

: DESIGN CRITERIA

Document Category/Class

: 2

Document Classification

: INTERNAL

B

A

05-May-2023

Issued for Approval

Choy Kok Chuan

15-Mar-2023

Issued for Review

Choy Kok Chuan

Francis Minah / Maria Fransisca Francis Minah / Maria Fransisca

Luminita Oprescu

Luminita Oprescu

REV.

DATE

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION

PREPARED BY

CHECKED BY

APPROVED BY

Saipem S.p.A.

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REVISION HISTORY

Revision

Date of Revision

Revision Description

A1

A

B

07-Feb-2023

Issued for Inter-Discipline Check

15-Mar-2023

05-May-2023

Issued for Review

Issued for Approval

HOLDS LIST

Hold No

Hold Description

1

Detailed Design Studies Document Number

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

2

INTRODUCTION … 4

1.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVE … 4 1.2 PROJECT SCOPE … 4

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS … 6

2.1 DEFINITIONS … 6

2.1.1 General Definitions … 6

2.1.2 Technical Definitions… 7 2.2 ABBREVIATIONS … 9

3

REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS … 11

4

5

3.1 COMPANY DOCUMENTS … 11 3.2 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (FEED) … 12 3.3 PROJECT DOCUMENTS (DETAILED DESIGN) … 12 INTERNATIONAL CODES AND STANDARDS … 14 3.4

PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK … 15

4.1 PURPOSE … 15 4.2 SCOPE OF WORK … 15

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION … 16

5.1 OVERVIEW… 16 5.2 FIRE POTENTIAL EQUIPMENT AND FIRE PROOFING AREA … 17 5.3 DESIGN ACCIDENTAL LOAD (DAL)… 18 5.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS … 18

5.4.1 Equipment And Piping … 18

5.4.2 Structures … 19

5.4.3 Electrical and Instrument Cables and Cable Trays … 20

5.4.4 ESD Valve … 20

5.4.5 Safety Systems and Safety Critical Elements … 21

5.4.6 Firewalls & Decks … 21

5.4.7 Helideck … 22

5.4.8 Room and Buildings … 22 5.5 OTHER REQUIREMENTS … 24

5.5.1 Penetrations … 24

5.5.2 Ventilation … 24 5.6 DOCUMENTATION … 24

6

FIREPROOFING MATERIALS AND SYSTEMS … 25

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1

INTRODUCTION

The North Field is the world’s largest natural gas field and accounts for nearly all of the state of Qatar’s gas production. The reservoir pressure in the North Field has been declining due to continuous production since the early 1990s. The principal objective of the NFPS Project is to sustain the plateau from existing QG South Operation (RL Dry Gas, RGE Wet gas) and existing QG North Operation (QG1 & QG2) production areas by implementing an integrated and optimum investment program consisting of subsurface development, pressure drop reduction steps and compression. Refer to the figure below for a schematic of the North Field.

Qatargas Operating Company Limited is leading the development of the North Field Production Sustainability (NFPS) Project.

1.1 Project Objective

The objective of this Project includes:

• Achieve standards of global excellence in Safety, Health, Environment, Security and Quality

performance.

• Sustain the Qatargas North Field Production Plateau by installing new Compression Complex facilities CP6S & CP7S in QG south with integration to the existing facilities under Investment #3 program.

• Facility development shall be safe, high quality, reliable, maintainable, accessible, operable, and

efficient throughout their required life.

1.2 Project Scope

The Project Scope includes detailed engineering, procurement, construction, transportation & installation, hook-up and commissioning, tie-in to EXISTING PROPERTY and provide support for start- up activities of the following facilities and provisions for future development. The WORK shall be following the specified regulations, codes, specifications and standards, achieves the specified performance, and is safe and fit‐for‐purpose in all respects.

Offshore

CP6S and CP7S Compression Complexes that are part of QG-S RGE facilities as follows:

• CP6S Compression Complex

• Compression Platform CP6S, Living Quarters LQ6S, Flare FL6S

• Bridges BR6S-2, BR6S-3, BR6S-4, BR6S-5

• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP6S

Production from existing wellheads (WHP6S & WHP10S) and new wellhead (WHP14S) are routed via riser platform RP6S to compression platform CP6S to boost pressure and export to onshore via two export lines through the existing WHP6S pipeline and a new 38” carbon steel looping trunkline from RP6S (installed by EPCOL). CP6S is bridge-linked to RP6S.

• CP7S Compression Complex

• Compression Platform CP7S, Living Quarters LQ7S, Flare FL7S

• Bridges BR7S-2, BR7S-3, BR7S-4, BR7S-5

• Bridge linked Tie-in to RP7S

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CP7S shall receive production from existing wellheads (WHP5S & WHP7S) and new wellhead (WHP13S). There is only one export line for CP7S through the existing export pipeline from WHP7S. CP7S is bridge-linked to RP7S.

RGA Complex Destressing

Migration of the Electrical power source, Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control systems from WHPs and RPs hosted by RGA to the respective Compression Complexes listed below:

• WHP6S, WHP10S, WHP14S, RP6S and RP10S to CP6S Compression Complex

• WHP5S, WHP7S, WHP13S and RP7S to CP7S Compression Complex

Destressing of Telecoms, Instrumentation and Control system in RGA Complex Control Room, which would include decommissioning and removal of telecom system devices and equipment that would no longer be required post migration and destressing activity.

Onshore

An Onshore Collaborative Center (OCC) will be built under EPC-9, which will enable onshore based engineering teams to conduct full engineering surveillance of all the offshore facilities. The OCC Building will be located in Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC) within the Qatar Gas South Plot. MICC & Telecommunication, ELICS related scope will be performed in the OCC building.

Figure 1.2.1: NFPS Compression Project COMP2 Scope

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2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

2.1 Definitions

2.1.1 General Definitions

Definition

Description

COMPANY

Qatargas Operating Company Limited.

CONTRACTOR

Saipem S.p.A.

DELIVERABLES

FACILITIES

All products (drawings, equipment, services) which must be submitted by CONTRACTOR to COMPANY at times specified in the contract.

All machinery, apparatus, materials, articles, components, systems and items of all kinds to be designed, engineered, procured, tested and manufactured, constructed, supplied, permanently installed by CONTRACTOR at SITE.

fabricated,

MILESTONE

A reference event splitting a PROJECT activity for progress measurement purpose.

PROJECT

NFPS Offshore Compression Complexes Project COMP2

SITE

(i) any area where Engineering, Procurement, Fabrication of the FACILITIES related the CPS6S and CP7S Compression Complexes are being carried out and (ii) the area offshore required for installation of the FACILITIES in the State of Qatar.

to

SUBCONTRACT

Contract signed by SUBCONTRACTOR and CONTRACTOR for the performance of a certain portion of the WORK within the Project.

SUBCONTRACTOR

Any organization selected and awarded by CONTRACTOR to supply a certain Project materials or equipment or whom a part of the WORK has been Subcontracted.

WORK

Scope of Work defined in the CONTRACT.

WORK PACKAGE

The lowest manageable and convenient level in each WBS subdivision.

VENDOR

The person, group, or organization responsible for the design, manufacture, the Equipment/Material.

load-out/shipping

testing,

and

of

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2.1.2 Technical Definitions

Definition

Description

“A” CLASS DIVISION

“C” CLASS DIVISION

“H” CLASS DIVISION

Divisions formed by bulkheads and decks that are constructed of steel or other equivalent material that has been suitably stiffened and designed to withstand and prevent the passage of smoke and flame for the duration of 60 minutes standard fire test, as specified in ASTM E 119 or equivalent.

“A” Class divisions are insulated with approved non-combustible materials such that the average temperature of the unexposed side will not rise more than 140 oC above the original temperature, nor will the temperature at any one point, including any joint, rise more than 180 oC above the original temperature, within the time listed below [Ref.46]:

• 60 minutes for Class A-60
• 30 minutes for Class A-30
• 15 minutes for Class A-15
• 0 minutes for Class A-0

This division remains intact with the main structure of the facility and maintains its structural integrity for a minimum of 1 hour. “Structural integrity” means that it will not fall under its own weight nor will it crumble or break upon normal contact after exposure to the fire. Divisions that are constructed of approved non-combustible materials. “C” Class divisions may not prevent the passage of smoke and flame or limit the temperature rise; however, they do not add to the fire. Divisions formed by bulkheads and decks that are constructed of steel or other equivalent material, suitably stiffened and designed to withstand and prevent the passage of smoke and flame for the 120- minute duration of a hydrocarbon fire test, as specified in ASTM E 1529, UL 1709 or equivalent.

“H” Class divisions are insulated so that the average temperature of the unexposed side will not rise more than 140 °C above the original temperature, nor will the temperature at any one point, including any joint, rise more than 180 °C above the original temperature, within the time listed below [Ref.46]:

• 120 minutes for Class H-120
• 60 minutes for Class H-60
• 0 minutes for Class H-0

This division remains intact with the main structure of the facility and maintains its structural integrity after 2 hours. “Structural integrity” means that it will not fall under its own weight nor will it crumble or break upon normal contact after exposure to the fire.

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Definition

Description

“J” CLASS DIVISION

ENDURANCE TIME

FIRE RESISTANCE RATING

FIRE SCENARIO ENVELOPE

FIRE/BLAST WALL

FIREPROOFING

JET FIRE

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

POOL FIRE

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENT

TEMPORARY REFUGE

Divisions formed by bulkheads and decks that are constructed of steel or other equivalent material, suitably stiffened and designed to withstand and prevent the passage of smoke and flame for a defined duration of a jet fire test, as specified in BSI BS ISO 22899- 1 and BSI PD ISO/TR 22899-2, HSE OTI 95 634, or equivalent B80:B82 Endurance time is a duration of which an equipment or structures can withstand exposure against fire damage. Fire Resistance Rating is a measurement of the ability of the passive fire protection material to resist or withstand a standard fire resistance test. Fire scenario envelope refers to a fire scenario that could occur within a specific space where the flammable material is capable of burning long enough and cause damage. A Fire/Blast wall is a protective barrier that is built to resist against specified Design Accidental Loads to protect important structures within the facility. Fireproofing is a process of rendering materials, structures and buildings resistant to fire or limiting the spread of fire. Jet fire is a type of flame resulting from the combustion of fuel discharged with high momentum into a free space from an orifice. Passive Fire Protection are systems in place that provides protection against fire damage without human intervention. Pool fire is a type of fire resulting from the combustion of a pool of vaporizing hydrocarbon fuel. Safety critical elements are safety systems which are a part of the installation whereby failure of which could lead to major accident events. A temporary refuge is a haven or shelter that is designed to protect personnel from hazards during a major accident event.

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2.2 Abbreviations

Code

Definition

API

ASTM

BR6S-2

BR6S-3

BR6S-4

BR6S-5

BR7S-2

BR7S-3

BR7S-4

BR7S-5

CCR

CP6S

CP6S

DAE

DAL

DIFFS

EERA

ESD

FERA

FL6S

FL7S

IEC

IMO

American Petroleum Institute

American Society for Testing and Materials

Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Bridge 2 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 3 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 4 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Bridge 5 at Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Central Control Room

Compression Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Compression Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Design Accident Event

Design Accidental Load

Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

Emergency Shut Down

Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis

Flare Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Flare Platform at WHP 7 Complex

International Electrotechnical Commission

International Maritime Organization

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Code

Definition

LPG

LQ6S

LQ7S

PFP

QG

QRA

RP6S

RP7S

SGIA

TR

WHP5S

WHP6S

WHP7S

WHP10S

WHP13S

WHP14S

Liquid Petroleum Gas

Living Quarters Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Living Quarters Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Passive Fire Protection

QatarGas

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Riser Platform at WHP 6 Complex

Riser Platform at WHP 7 Complex

Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis

Temporary Refuge

Wellhead Platform 5S

Wellhead Platform 6S

Wellhead Platform 7S

Wellhead Platform 10S

Wellhead Platform 13S

Wellhead Platform 14S

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3 REFERENCE, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS

The following codes, standards and specification are referenced within the document shall be considered as part of this specification. Conflict among applicable specification and / or codes shall be brought to the attention of the COMPANY for resolution COMPANY decision shall be final and shall be implemented. The latest editions of codes and specification effective as on date of contract shall be followed.

In general, the order of precedence shall be followed:

a) Qatari Government and Regulatory Requirements

b) COMPANY Procedures, Policies and Standards (Exhibit 5 Appendix I)

c) Project Specifications.

d) Industry Codes and Standards

e) COMPANY and CONTRACTOR’s Lessons Learned

3.1 Company Documents

S. No

Document Number

Title

PRT-ERP-POL-001_03

Qatargas Fire Protection Policy

PRT-PRS-PRC-014_00

Qatargas Offshore Loss Prevention Philosophy

COMP-QG-PR-REP- 00003

PRT-PRS-PRC-009

NFPS QG-S RGE Compression Basis of Design

Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations

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3.2 Project Documents (FEED)

S. No

Document Number

Title

200-20-SH-DEC-00002

Technical Safety Basis of Design

200-20-SH-REP-03001

200-20-SH-REP-03005

560-20-SH-PLN-04002

560-20-SH-PLN-04003

560-20-SH-PLN-04005

560-20-SH-PLN-04006

560-20-SH-PLN-04007

562-20-PI-PLN-10003

Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) – Compression Complex

Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) - Compression Complex

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – PSV Service Platform

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Discharge Cooler Service Platform

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Main Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Production Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Sump Deck

RGE (LQ4S_LQ6S_LQ7S & LQ8S) Equipment Layout Drawing – Cellar Deck

200-20-ST-SPC-00009

Aluminium Helideck Specification

200-83-SH-SPC-00011

Specification for Passive Fire Protection (PFP)

200-20-ST-SPC-00019

Design of Deck Structures for Offshore Platforms Specification

3.3 Project Documents (Detailed Design)

S. No

Document Number

Title

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

200-20-CE-SPC-00013

Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) For CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) For CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Temporary Refuge Integrity Analysis (TRIA) & Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) (EERA) For CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Report for CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Intumescent Passive Fire Proofing Specification for CP6S and CP7S Complexes

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S. No

Document Number

Title

200-20-ST-SPC-00008

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Hold 1

Aluminium Helideck Specification for CP6S and CP7S Complexes

Safety Critical Element Identification and Design Performance Standards Verification Report

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – PSV Service Platform for Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – for Discharge Cooler Service Platform Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Main Deck for Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Production Deck for Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Sump Deck for Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout - RP6S Drain Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout - RP6S Main Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout - RP6S Top Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – PSV Service Platform for Compression Platform CP7S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Discharge Cooler Service Platform for Compression Platform CP7S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Main Deck for Compression Platform CP7S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Production Deck for Compression Platform CP7S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – Sump Deck for Compression Platform CP6S

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – RP7S Drain Deck

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – RP7S Main Deck

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S. No

Document Number

Title

Hold 1

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Area Layout – RP7S Top Deck

3.4

International Codes and Standards

S. No

Document Number

Title

API RP 2218

UL 1709

Fire Proofing Practices Petrochemical Plants

in Petroleum and

UL Standard for Safety Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for Structural Steel

CAP 437

Standards for offshore helicopter landing areas

ASTM E119

IEC 60331

IMO 754

API RP 2FB

Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials

Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity - Part 1: Test method for fire with shock at a temperature of at least 830 °C for cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV and with an overall diameter exceeding 20 mm

Recommendation On Fire Resistance Tests For “A”, “B”, and “F” Class Divisions

Recommended Practice the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading

for

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4 PURPOSE & SCOPE OF WORK

4.1 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to define the design philosophy of Passive Fire Protection for the NFPS Compression Project COMP2 EPC scope. The primary objective of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) system is to prevent the fire escalation involving critical process equipment and valve failure or structural failure of topsides prior to personnel evacuation of the platform.

In general, the requirements are set forth by the following documents:

1. QG Fire Protection Policy, PRT-ERP-POL-001 [Ref.1],

2. QG Offshore Loss Prevention Philosophy Procedure PRT-PRS-PRC-014 [Ref.2],

3. NFPS QG-S RGE Compression Basis of Design, COMP-QG-PR-REP-00003 [Ref.3],

4. Fire Proofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Plants, API RP 2218 [Ref.40], and

5. FEED Passive Fire Protection Specification [Ref.15]

4.2 Scope of Work

This philosophy is applicable to the Greenfield at CP6S and CP7S compression complexes and associated Brownfield facilities as mentioned in Section 1.2. It covers the topsides areas, technical rooms and the living quarters.

For Brownfield facilities, the existing specification shall be applicable unless modifications / new systems impact the fire potential and protection in the area.

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5 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

5.1 Overview

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) or fireproofing is a barrier, coating, or other safeguard against the heat from a fire without activation or initiation. PFP reduces the rate of heat transfer from fire to the protected surface and, when required, prevents the passage of flame through wall or partition for a defined duration.

The provision of PFP on offshore facilities aims to

i) prevent collapse of portions of the structure necessary for safe evacuation or for control of fire;

ii) prevent fire escalation from one area to adjacent area; and

iii) protect system and equipment that are critical to safety.

The need for Passive Fire Protection shall be determined based on credible fire scenarios identified in Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) to be carried out as part of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Where it is required, Passive Fire Protection shall be such as to ensure that relevant structures or equipment and components have adequate fire resistance, with regard to load-bearing properties, integrity, and insulation properties, and thus the consequences of fire are reduced as far as possible [Ref. 2].

Penetration of the firewall or blast wall shall be avoided as far as practicable. Where penetration is required fire/blast seals with the same fire/blast rating as the original fire/blast wall shall be installed.

The FERA study shall identify critical targets that will be exposed to jet fire and pool fire with a sufficient duration to cause loss of structural integrity with a frequency higher than specified in PRT-PRS-PRC- 009 Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.4].

The following critical targets shall be assessed for PFP while performing FERA:

• Critical equipment handling hydrocarbon, i.e. process vessels and critical piping (flare header &

fire water header).

• Primary load-bearing structures for topside modules including secondary beam supporting critical

equipment and TR building.

• Electrical and Instrument Cables and Cable Trays

• ESDV’s including actuators connected to the critical equipment and piping.

• Safety Systems and Safety Critical Elements

• Firewalls and Deck Platings

• Helideck

• Living Quarters and Buildings

• Bridges

Details on design requirement and performance of PFP materials are further defined in the Specification for Passive Fire Protection [Ref.21].

Sections 5.2 to 0 specifies the general requirements for the critical targets present on the COMP2 facilities.

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5.2 Fire Potential Equipment and Fire Proofing Area

Prior to determining the provision of PFP for the COMP2 facilities, fire potential equipment shall first be identified, and the risk of fire shall be verified in the FERA assessment. The FERA assessment shall investigate the extent of the damage and consequences posed by fire scenarios on the facility. The equipment present on the facility are divided into these categories [Ref.40]:

High Fire Potential Equipment

High fire potential equipment includes vessels, pumps (with a rated capacity over 45m 3/h), and similar equipment containing flammable liquids at or above 315 °C (600 °F), or above a temperature 20 °C (36 °F) lower than their auto-ignition temperature, whichever is less. Additionally, any low point drains, vents, and flanges on piping containing flammable liquids under these conditions.

Low Fire Potential Equipment

Low fire potential equipment is equipment with small inventories (less than 4 tonnes based on NLL) of flammable or combustible liquids or stationary equipment with minimal potential for leaks. This includes knockout and blowdown drums isolated from other high fire potential equipment.

Non Fire Potential Equipment

Non fire potential equipment has little or no chance of releasing flammable or combustible fluids either prior to or shortly after the outbreak of a fire.

With respect to the FERA assessment [Ref.6,17], the following equipment are identified to potentially cause escalation and the provision of PFP is further discussed in Section 5.4.1:

•

Inlet Separator, 560-V2301 A/B

• Compression Suction Scrubber, 560-V2302A/B/C/D/E

• HP Flare KO Drum 530-V8401

• LP Flare KO/Closed Drain Drum, 530-V8701A/B

• Fuel Gas Scrubber, 560-V9301

The FERA [Ref.17] shall then assess the vulnerability of sensitive receptors (described in Section 5.4.1) with respect to their respective endurance time. From the assessment, fireproofing area shall also be identified whereby these are vital areas where personnel will be present during an emergency. As such, these areas shall be provided with PFP.

As a minimum, the provision of PFP shall allow:

• sufficient time for personnel to muster, escape and evacuate.

• sufficient time for blowdown to complete to prevent escalation.

Therefore, in determining the PFP requirement, the EERA [Ref.18] and SGIA [Ref.19] safety assessments outcome shall also be considered.

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5.3 Design Accidental Load (DAL)

Design accidental load (DAL) defines the minimum load for critical safety systems that is sufficient to meet the risk criteria. The critical safety systems have to be functional, i.e. minor damage may be acceptable provided that the planned function is maintained. This includes SDVs, deluge systems, escape ways, evacuation systems, blast walls, main structural support system, etc. Note that Impairment of escape, evacuation and rescue facilities such as lifeboats and muster areas will be assessed in EERA [Ref.18].

The probability of defined main safety functions being impaired (damaged) is calculated in order to ensure that the platform design does not imply unacceptably high risk, and to provide input to the design.

According to QG QRA Guideline, the frequency 1 x 10-4 per year for each type of accidental load is the limit of acceptability for the impairment of each of the critical target with the exception of to evacuation systems for which a frequency of 5 x 10-5 per year shall be used. Based on a design accidental load (DAL) criteria of 1 x 10-4 per year, assessment on the potential requirement of passive fire protection (PFP) and other mitigation measures for identified critical equipment, structures and safety systems was carried out.

5.4 Specific Requirements

5.4.1 Equipment And Piping

Fireproofing shall be considered for equipment support structure elements (such as vessel skirts, support saddles, stub-leg structural supports for air-cooled heat exchangers, pipe supports, and structural supports for elevated ducts around fired heaters) as per API 2218 [Ref.40].

Horizontal and vertical piping supports within the fire scenario envelope area shall be considered for fireproofing if the supported piping contains flammable materials, combustible liquids, or toxic materials. Additionally, API 2218 [Ref.40] specifies that piping contains flammable materials, combustible liquids, or toxic materials that are hung by rod- or spring-type connections from a pipe-rack support member, and the rod or spring is in a fire-scenario envelope, shall be provided with “catch beam” that is fireproofed.

Where the use of a catch-beam is not practical to protect against failure of the spring hanger or rod supporting piping, the hangers and rods may be fireproofed as per Passive Fire Protection Specification [Ref.15]. In addition, Preformed Inorganic Panels, if used, shall be attached using only an attachment system with which they were tested.

For the facilities in NFPS Compression Project COMP2, the protected equipment are:

Table 5-1: Equipment Supports and Piping PFP Justification [Ref.6]

Equipment

Remarks

Inlet Separator

(560-V2301 A/B)

Compression Suction Scrubber

(560-V2302A/B/C/D/E)

Fuel Gas Scrubber

(560-V9301)

The hydrocarbon inventories in the Inlet Separator, Compression Suction Scrubber and Fuel Gas Scrubber exceed one (1) ton for gas or four (4) tons of liquid and operate at pressure above 4.5 bar. Failure of this equipment is catastrophic and will lead to escalation.

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Equipment

Remarks

HP Flare KO Drum

(530-V8401)

Flare Header Piping

PFP is required as the HP Flare KO Drum is crucial in an event of an emergency as it facilitates the blowdown of the process inventories. It is vital to ensure that the HP Flare KO Drum remains intact so that hydrocarbon from process vessels can safely evacuate through the HP Flare Systems to minimize the risk of escalation.

Failure of the HP Flare KO Drum will be catastrophic as hydrocarbon from the process blowdown will feed the fire continuously.

Similar to HP Flare KO Drum, the Flare Header piping is crucial to facilitate the blowdown process.

Failure of the Flare Header piping will be catastrophic as hydrocarbon from the process blowdown will feed the fire continuously

LP Flare KO/Closed Drain Drum, 530-V8701A/B

The LP Flare KO/Closed Drain Drum is not part of the emergency depressurisation system and is operating at ambient temperature, thus no PFP is recommended.

Crossover Piping in to RP6S

PFP is required for the crossover piping carry fuel gas as failure of the pipelines will result in large inventory release.

The extent of protection and endurance time shall be validated and verified in the FERA assessment [Ref.17].

5.4.2 Structures

The FERA [Ref.17] shall identify structural members that could fail within a fire-scenario envelope by considering of the fire loads and endurance times. Analysis for fire condition DAEs shall be conducted to determine if and where PFP is needed to avoid failure or collapse mechanisms, either local or global [Ref.16].

Fire proofing shall be provided for critical structures whose loss of integrity could lead to escalation of fire scenarios and subsequently impair emergency functions of safety-critical structures essential for controlled shutdown, escape, evacuation and rescue. This includes [Ref.6]:

• Platform Legs

• Platform Columns

• Bridge Support Structure

The extent of protection and endurance time shall be assessed against an endurance time of 15 minutes [Ref.6] and validated and verified in the FERA and EERA assessments [Ref.17,18].

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5.4.3 Electrical and Instrument Cables and Cable Trays

Essential and critical electrical, instrument and control systems which are responsible to activate equipment or safety systems to control a fire or mitigate its consequences shall be protected from fire damage.

Passive Fire Protection is not required if the safety systems are designed to be failsafe during fire exposure. External fireproofing is also not required for instruments or power cables if the cable itself is flame-resistant. Electrical and instrument cables that are required to be protected from fire damage shall be able to survive a minimum of 15 minutes to 30 minutes [Ref.40] of fire exposure as defined in UL 1709 [Ref.41].

However, the final endurance time required shall be based on the FERA assessment findings [Ref.17].

This requirement shall also include the supports and cable trays housing the electrical and instrument cables.

The Specification for Passive Fire Protection [Ref.15] further outlines the requirements of PFP for electrical and instrument cables.

5.4.4 ESD Valve

ESD valves shall be able to fail to their fail-safe position during an emergency and fire scenario. ESD valves endurance period shall be assessed in the FERA assessment. If required, fireproofing or other mitigating controls shall be provided to ensure valve survivability/operability on demand [Ref.40].

Where ESD valves and associated elements cannot be mounted in a safe location outside the fire zone, Passive Fire Protection shall be applied for:

• Valves

• Valves Actuators

• Shutdown Cabinets

• Air Reservoir Drums

•

Interconnecting piping and tubing pneumatic and hydraulic control lines.

• Conduits

Fire safe requirement for valves and actuators refers to API Standard 607, API Standard 6FA, API RP 2218 and API RP 553. All fire and gas signals to technical/control rooms shall be fire resistant type according to IEC 331.

The extent of protection and endurance time for the ESD valves shall be assessed against an endurance time of 5 minutes [Ref.6] and validated and verified in the FERA assessment [Ref.17].

With respect to the FERA assessment [Ref.6,17], no PFP was proposed for the SDVs on the CPs as the impairment frequency does not exceed the 1 x 10-4 per year Design Accidental Load (DAL) criteria. However, the ESDVs and MOVs at tie-ins to the riser platforms from CPs were recommended to be provided with PFP where failure could lead to potential escalation.

Table 5-2 summarises the PFP requirement for these SDVs and MOVs.

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Table 5-2: SDVs and MOVs at Riser Platforms Identified to Require PFP [Ref. 6]

Location

SDV/MOV Tag

Fire Resistance Rating

RP6S Riser Section and Crossover Piping

233SDV49023, 233SDV49025, 233MOV50204, 233MOV50205, 233MOV50121, 233MOV50118

RP7S Riser Section and Crossover Piping

228SDV48025, 228SDV48021, 228MOV50121

J-30

J-30

5.4.5 Safety Systems and Safety Critical Elements

Safety systems on a facility aim to trigger emergency functions to prevent or mitigate major accident events or, in the worst case, to facilitate safe evacuation of the facility. The FERA report [Ref.17] shall assess the vulnerability of the safety systems against credible fire scenarios.

The survivability of the systems identified shall be ensured by separation, where possible, or by segregation by fire-rated decks and bulkheads. Where this is not feasible, fireproofing shall be directly applied on the portions of the systems directly exposed to a fire, or other means, such as redundancy or active protection shall be provided.

All relevant safety systems which are within fire zones and are required to function during a fire event shall be provided with fireproofing. This includes [Ref.6]:

• Firewater System – Deluge Skids, Firewater Pump, Firewater Ringmain

• Emergency Depressurizing System – HP Flare Header and LP Flare Header

• Emergency Power System – Emergency Diesel Generator

• Emergency Evacuation System – Muster Areas and Temporary Refuge

The body and structural support for the flare knockout drum shall be passively fireproofed, unless it can be demonstrated by risk assessment that such fireproofing is not necessary to maintain support of the vessel during credible fire/blowdown scenarios.

The extent of protection and endurance time shall be assessed against an endurance time of 5 minutes and validated and verified in the FERA, EERA and TRIA assessments [Ref.17,18,19].

Identification of Safety-Critical Elements are described in Safety Critical Element Identification and Performance Standards [Ref.23].

5.4.6 Firewalls & Decks

Firewalls shall be installed to separate process areas from non-process areas to prevent or limit damage to buildings and safety critical equipment due to fire. The fire walls shall be constructed of steel or will be applied with fireproofing material with a fire rating determined in FERA report [Ref.17].

Additionally, requirements for fire barriers and internal divisions shall be based on the FERA report [Ref.17] and the EERA [Ref.18] assessments.

Based on the assessments, endurance times shall be established for the following:

a) Sections of escape routes to Temporary Refuge(s) (TRs) that allow for safe escape from the

fire-exposed area and allow for emergency response activities.

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b) The TR(s), until safe evacuation can take place.

c) Sections of the evacuation routes from the TR(s) to the locations used for evacuation.

For the facilities in NFPS Compression Project COMP2, the following table summarizes the provision of firewalls.

Table 5-3: Passive Fire Protection Provision for Firewalls on CP and LQ Platform [Ref.15]

Area

Fire Resistance Rating

From North to South fire wall (East face)

(CP Main Deck) [Ref.8,9,10]

From East to West fire wall (South face)

(CP Main Deck) [Ref.8,9,10]

From North to South fire wall (East face)

(CP Production Deck) [Ref.11]

From West to East fire wall (North face)

(CP Production Deck) [Ref.11]

From North to South fire wall separating Fire water Pumps (East and West face)

(LQ Cellar Deck) [Ref.13]

J-30

J-30

J-30

J-30

A-0

5.4.7 Helideck

The Helideck shall be constructed of material that provides structural and fire integrity [Ref.42]. The material of construction will be Aluminium enhanced safety with passive fire suppression and DIFFS firefighting system reference Aluminium Helideck Specification [Ref.22]. Helideck wave-off light shall also be provided, which shall be activated during confirmed fire or gas (flammable and toxic) scenarios at both CP and LQ. Upon fire detection at helideck, this shall initiate alarm at CCR and activate DIFFS firefighting system.

Power and Instrument cables for DIFFS shall be fire rated type compliance to IEC 60331 [Ref.44].

5.4.8 Room and Buildings

All buildings shall be constructed of non-combustible materials as minimum. The external walls of the accommodation building shall be of non-combustible material and shall have minimum one-hour fire- rated exterior walls, per ASTM E119 (A-60 fire rating) [Ref.43] unless noted otherwise in the FERA assessment [Ref.17]. The insulation material installed within the interior of the buildings shall conform to IMO 754 (18) [Ref.45] fire test requirements.

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Table 5-4: Passive Fire Protection Provision for CP Technical Rooms, CP Temporary Refuge, LQ Accommodation and LQ Technical Rooms [Ref.15]

Area

Fire Resistance Rating

Switchgear 1 Room – 1st floor (CP Main Deck)

Main Switchgear Room 2 – 2nd floor (CP Main Deck)

Workshops, Laboratory and Battery Room – 1st floor (CP Production Deck)

Instrument Room and UPS Room – 2nd floor (CP Production Deck)

Temporary Refuge (CP Production Deck)

LQ BuildingNote 1

• Platform North and West walls: (A-60),

• Deck plating: (A-60); (J-30 - under side of deck plating that is exposed to outdoor process area)

• Platform North and West walls: (A-60),

• Deck plating: (A-60),

• Roof: (A-60)

• Platform South, North, West and East

walls: (A-60), Internal wall: (A-60 – partition between Battery room and Workshops),

• Deck plating: (A-60), under side of deck

plating

• Platform South, North, West and East

walls: (A-60),

Internal wall: (A-60),

• Deck plating: (A-60),
• Roof: (A-60)
• Platform South, North, West and East

walls: (A-60),

Internal wall: (A-60),

• Deck plating: (A-60),
• Roof: (A-60)
• Platform South, North, West and East

walls: (A-60),

Internal staircase wall: (A-60),

Internal cabling service shaft: (A-60),

• Emergency / UPS Room, Emergency

Generator Room, Central Control Room, Electrical Room, Instrument Room, Telecom Room, Battery Room wall: (A- 60),

• Deck plating: (A-60), under side of deck

plating,

• Roof: (A-60),
• Exposed external wall (All Level) : (A-

60),

• Service Drops within A-60 enclosure,
• Enclosure of Internal Staircase Access.

Note 1: The insulation material installed within the interior of the buildings shall confirm to IMO 754 (18) fire test requirements

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5.5 Other Requirements

5.5.1 Penetrations

All penetrations through bulkheads and decks, including electrical, piping, and ventilation systems penetrations, shall have the same fire and blast integrity as the bulkhead and deck through which they penetrate. The fire resistance of doors provided in fire divisions shall be certified to the same class division [Ref.15].

5.5.2 Ventilation

Ventilation systems are designed with an intent to maintain the fire divisions. For ducts penetrating A Class and H Class divisions, suitable fireproofing and fire dampers shall be provided to prevent the passage of smoke. Additional protection shall be provided where ducts pass through multiple spaces to maintain smoke-free escape routes, TRs, and other occupied spaces [Ref.15].

5.6 Documentation

The extent and rating of Passive Fire Protection shall be presented in the layout deliverables of plans and elevations view for the COMP2 scope as required. These layouts shall be aligned with the recommendations of the FERA report [Ref. 6].

The PFP layout shall also include the extent of fire proofing area from fire potential equipment. Area of assessment includes the following areas:

a) PSV Service Platform,

b) Discharge Cooler Platform,

c) Main Deck,

d) Production Deck,

e) Sump Deck,

f) Living Quarters, and

g) Flare Platform.

Details of fireproofing application shown on the detail design drawings referred at Section 3.3.

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6 FIREPROOFING MATERIALS AND SYSTEMS

VENDOR shall be responsible for the design, supply of materials, fabrication and assembly, surface preparation, inspection, testing, certification, guarantee, protection and delivery of the Passive Fire Protection.

The Passive Fire Protection materials shall be supplied in accordance to the guideline stipulated in the Specification for Passive Fire Protection [Ref.15]. Table 6-1 overleaf summarizes the list of approved fireproofing materials for the respective Passive Fire Protection elements.

Table 6-1: Approved Fireproofing Systems and Materials [Ref.6]

Element

Material

Specific Approved Configurations/Materials

Structure

Mastic

International Protective Coatings: Chartek 7

Leighs Paints: Firetex M90

Carboline: Thermo-Lag 3000

PPG Protective and Marine Coatings: Pitt-Char XP

Fire Rated Divisions

Steel Panels

Composite Panels

Vessels, Piping, and Equipment

Insulation System Aspen Aerogel: Pyrogel XTF

Aspen Aerogel: Cryogel Z

Or equivalent products under Armacell, Jotun, International PC, etc. subject to COMPANY approval.

Mastic

International Protective Coatings: Chartek 7

Riser

Rubber Type

Leighs Paints: Firetex M90

Carboline: Thermo-Lag 3000

PPG Protective and Marine Coatings: Pitt-Char XP

Trelleborg rubber type material to be selected to meet the maximum operating temperature of 91 deg C.

Safety-Critical Elements (Risers ESD valves, Electric, Hydraulic and Pneumatic Control systems, HIPPS Valve System)

Preformed Inorganic Panels

Insulation System

Aspen Aerogel: Pyrogel XTF (hot)

Aspen Aerogel: Cryogel Z (cold)

Or equivalent products under Armacell, Jotun, International PC, etc. subject to COMPANY approval.

Prefabricated Boxes

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Element

Material

Specific Approved Configurations/Materials

Wrap-Type Systems

Mastic

International Protective Coatings: Chartek 7

Leighs Paints: Firetex M90

Carboline: Thermo-Lag 3000

PPG Protective and Marine Coatings: Pitt-Char XP

Thermal Designs: K-Mass

Proposals for material and system types shall be selected considering following [Ref. 15]

1. Fireproofing materials shall be suitable for the ambient conditions of the location(s) where the

fireproofing will be applied and where the fireproofed items will be permanently located.

2. Fireproofing materials and systems shall be capable of withstanding fire hose stream

impingement. Refer to fire hose stream tests described in NFPA 251.

3. Magnesium oxychloride plasters shall not be used for fireproofing.

4. Materials containing asbestos are not permitted.

5. Lightweight concrete coatings shall not be used. The PFP used shall be rated to meet the high

rate-of-rise (hydrocarbon) test as specified by UL 1709.

6. PFP materials shall be suitable for the parameters given in this Specification and the following:

a. A maximum design relative humidity of 100%. The environment will be salty, dusty and,

if minor gas leaks occur, may contain some hydrogen sulfide.

b. Intermittent spraying with fire water during fire tests.

c. A design air temperature in the range 9°C to 49°C and a design temperature for surface

exposed to direct sunlight of 85°C.

7. All Paints and PFP Materials for any particular system shall be from the same paint

manufacturer.

8. The selection of PFP type and materials shall be based on following considerations.

a. Fire performance, the duration and type of fire.

b. Weight limitation imposed by the strength of supporting structure.

c. Adhesive strength and durability.

d. Weatherability and mechanical impact strength.

e. Ease of application and repair.

f. Smoke generation and toxicity.

g. Integrity of performance after blast, when applied on a blast resistant wall.

h. Maintainability / Operability.

9. The reinforcement system used to retain, stabilize the PFP product and /or enhance to blast and

deformation of the substrate, may comprise one or more of the following:

a. Welded rectangular mesh.

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b. Woven hexagonal mesh (chicken mesh).

c. High temperature cloth (based on graphite fibre).

d. Where anchoring to steelwork is required, suitable pins or studs shall be welded to the base steel in accordance with a COMPANY-approved welding procedure and provided with retaining washers.

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Project: Q-21699 - Saipem COMP2 Folder: RFQ Files