Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY Contract No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
ASSET
: NFPS
Document Title
:
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
COMPANY Document No.
:
200-20-SH-DEC-00013
CONTRACTOR Document No.
:
033764-E-D00-18-SPM-LP-S-00001
Discipline
: HSE&Q
Document Type
: DESIGN CRITERIA
Document Category/Class
:
1
Document Classification
:
Internal
B
A
19-MAR- 2025
10-DEC- 2024
Issued for Approval
Jerine Baby
Issued for Review
Jerine Baby
Dy. LOSPE Lead
Balasubramani Perumal Balasubramani Perumal
LOSPE Lead
Reetesh Kumar Jha Reetesh Kumar Jha Engineering Manager
REV.
DATE
DESCRIPTION OF REVISION
PREPARED BY
REVIEWED BY
APPROVED BY
Saipem S.p.A
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROPERTY OF QatarEnergy LNG. THIS DRAWING OR MATERIAL DESCRIBED THEREON MAY NOT BE COPIED OR DISCLOSED IN ANY FORM OR MEDIUM TO THIRD PARTIES, OR USED FOR OTHER THAN THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT HAS BEEN PROVIDED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PERMITTED BY QatarEnergy LNG.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
REVISION HISTORY
Revision
Date
Revision Description
A1
12-NOV-2024
Issued for Inter Discipline Check
A
B
10-DEC-2024
Issued for Review
19-MAR-2025
Issued for Approval
HOLDS LIST
Hold No
Hold Description
1
2
3
COMPANY Document Numbers
PAGA sounder tone and beacon colour finalization pending TQ response (COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00059)
Documents pending Rev A issue to COMPANY
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
1.1
1.2
2
2.1
2.2
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
INTRODUCTION… 8
PROJECT Objective … 8
PROJECT Scope … 8
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS … 11
Definitions … 11
Abbreviations … 12
REGULATIONS, CODES AND STANDARDS … 19
COMPANY References … 19
PROJECT Documents … 19
International Standards … 24
Standard, Codes and References … 26
PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT … 27
GENERAL … 28
Inherently Safer Design … 28
Risk Management Philosophy … 29
Risk Acceptance, ALARP and Vulnerability … 29
5.3.1 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) … 30
5.3.2
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) … 30
5.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL) … 30
5.3.4 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) … 30
5.3.5 Group Risk … 30
5.3.6 Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF) … 30
6
6.1
6.2
7
TECHNICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS … 32
Safety in Design Workshops … 32
Technical Safety Assessment … 33
LOSS PREVENTION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY … 45
7.1
Layout … 45
7.1.1 Layout Strategy … 45
7.1.2 Spacing of NFPS COMP3 FACILITIES … 45
7.1.3 Maintainability … 48
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COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
7.1.4 Dropped Object Protection … 48
7.2
Area Classification and Ventilation … 48
7.2.1 Hazardous Area Classification … 48
7.2.2 Ventilation … 50
7.3
7.4
Leak Minimization … 52
Building Protection … 52
7.4.1 Fire and Blast Protection … 52
7.4.2 Pressurization … 54
7.4.3 Requirements for Temporary Refuge (TR) … 54
7.5
Subsea Pipelines … 55
7.5.1 Design Conditions … 55
7.5.2 Pipeline Route … 56
7.5.3 Pipeline Protection … 57
7.6
7.7
Platform Drainage … 58
Platform Isolations… 59
7.7.1
Interlocks … 59
7.8
7.9
Pressure Relief, Venting and Flaring … 59
Loss of Containment (LOC) … 61
7.10 Structural Response to Vessel Impact… 62
7.11 Material Selection… 63
7.12 Fire and Gas Detection … 63
7.12.1 Main Features of Fire and Gas System (FGS) … 63
7.12.2 Gas Detection System Objectives … 67
7.12.3 Fire Detection System Objectives … 68
7.12.4 Fire and Gas Detection for LER Building of Greenfield Platforms … 69
7.12.5 Fire and Gas Detection for Process Area … 70
7.12.6 Fire Detection for Helideck … 70
7.12.7 Fire and Gas Detection for Pedestal Cranes … 70
7.12.8 Fire and Gas Detector Type and Selection … 71
7.12.9 F&G Detector Coverage … 77
7.12.10
Indoor Portable Multi-Gas Detector … 77
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
7.12.11
Manual Alarm Call Points … 78
7.12.12
Brownfield Fire & Gas Detection … 78
7.12.13
Notification Devices … 79
7.12.14
Alarm Signals & Tones (HOLD-2) … 80
7.12.15
Fire and Gas Detector Cause and Effect Basis… 82
7.12.16
Sparing and Availability … 82
7.13 Emergency Shutdown / Emergency Depressurization … 83
7.13.1 Wellhead Platform … 83
7.13.2 Riser Platform … 84
7.13.3 Manual ESD Pushbuttons … 85
7.13.4 Brownfield Platforms … 86
7.14 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) … 86
7.15 Passive Fire Protection … 87
7.15.1 Purpose … 87
7.15.2 Passive Fireproofing General Requirements … 88
7.15.3 Structure … 89
7.15.4 Equipment Support Structural Elements … 89
7.15.5 Fire and Blast Wall … 89
7.15.6 General Additional Requirements … 89
7.15.7 Additional Fire Barriers … 90
7.15.8 Helideck … 90
7.15.9 Safety Systems … 90
7.15.10
Safety Critical Elements … 91
7.15.11
LER Building … 91
7.16 Active Fire Protection … 91
7.16.1 Fire Water System … 92
7.16.2 Fire Protection for Riser Platform … 93
7.16.3 NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System … 93
7.16.4 Portable and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers … 95
7.16.5 Fire Blanket … 98
7.16.6 Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) for Helideck … 98
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
7.16.7 Emergency Power … 98
7.16.8 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue … 99
7.16.9 Access, Egress, and Escape Routes… 101
7.16.10
Decks, Stairways and Access Ways … 103
7.16.11
Muster Area (TR) … 104
7.16.12
Evacuation Methods … 106
7.16.13
Safe Evacuation Requirements … 107
7.16.14
Medivac Requirements … 107
7.16.15
Escape Route Markers … 107
7.16.16
Safety Signs … 108
7.17 Safety and Lifesaving Equipment … 108
7.17.1 Throw Overboard Type Liferaft… 109
7.17.2 TEMPSC … 109
7.17.3 Personal Safety Equipment … 109
7.17.4 Helicopter Crash & Rescue Equipment (HCRE) Cabinet … 110
7.17.5 Oil Spill Kit and Cabinet… 110
7.17.6 Emergency Breathing Air Equipment… 110
7.17.7 Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash … 111
7.17.8 Fireman Equipment Cabinet … 111
7.17.9 First Aid Kit… 112
7.17.10
Electrical Safety Kit … 112
7.17.11
Stretchers … 112
7.17.12
Portable Eyewash Unit … 112
7.17.13
Lifebuoys … 112
7.17.14
Lifejackets … 112
7.17.15
Scramble Net … 113
7.17.16
Illuminated Windsock… 113
7.17.17
Chemical Handling Safety Kit … 113
7.17.18 Work Vest & Cabinet … 113
7.17.19
Brownfield Modifications … 113
7.18 Manning Level … 113
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
7.19 Human Factors … 113
7.20 Pedestal Crane … 114
7.21 Personal Protection … 115
7.22 Navigational Aids … 115
7.23 Noise Level Limits … 115
8
8.1
8.2
HYDROGEN SULFIDE (H2S) SAFETY … 117
Purpose … 117
H2S Properties … 117
8.2.1 H2S Characteristics … 117
8.2.2 Toxic Effects of H2S … 118
8.3
H2S Risk Management System … 119
8.3.1 Prevention … 120
8.3.2 H2S Gas Detection System … 122
8.3.3 Breathing Air Systems … 122
8.3.4 Maintenance Operations … 123
8.3.5 Mitigation … 123
8.3.6 Recovery … 123
9
APPENDIX… 125
Appendix – 1 Offshore Layout Development Checklist … 125
Appendix – 2 Fire & Gas Detection Voting, Set Point, Typical Cause & Effect for Greenfield Wellhead and Riser Platforms … 127
Appendix – 3 Approved Technical Query for Safety Studies which are not required for COMP3 Project (COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027) … 130
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
1
INTRODUCTION
The North Field is the world’s largest natural gas field and accounts for nearly all the State of Qatar’s gas production. The principal objective of the NFPS projects is to sustain plateau from existing QatarEnergy LNG Operation – S1, S2, S3, N1 and N2, production areas by implementing an integrated and optimum investment program consisting of subsurface development, pressure drop reduction steps and compression.
NFPS projects comprise 3 main investment programs:
- Investment #1: Drilling and Associated Facilities [WHP12S/ WHP13S/ WHP14S/
WHP12N/ WHP13N]
- Investment #2: Trunk line Looping and Intra-field pipeline looping [32” PL1LN, 32”
PL1LS, 38”PL610LS]
- Investment #3: Compression Complexes and associated facilities [Phase 1 CP6S & CP7S; Phase 2: CP8S & CP4N; Phase 3: CP4S & CP6N Phase 4: CP1S & CP1N]
Drilling and Looping, Investments #1 and #2, projects are in execution phase and are being executed as I1P1, EPCOL Projects except for WHP13N, which will be part of NFPS Compression Projects execution which compromises total up to 9 COMPs.
1.1 PROJECT Objective
The objective of this PROJECT includes:
• Achieve standards of global excellence in Safety, Health, Environment, Security and
Quality performance.
• Sustain the Qatarenergy LNG North Field Production Plateau by installing new RPs and one WHPs to support new Compression Complex facilities CP6S & CP7S and pre-installed facilities for future Compression Complex facilities including but not limited to CP4N & CP8S tie-in with integration to the existing facilities under Investment #3 program.
• Facility development shall be safe, high quality, reliable, maintainable, accessible,
operable, and efficient throughout their required life.
1.2 PROJECT Scope
The PROJECT Scope includes detailed engineering, procurement, construction, brownfield modifications, transportation & installation, hook-up and commissioning, tie-in to EXISTING PROPERTY and provide support for start-up activities of the following facilities and provisions for future development. The WORK shall be following the specified regulations, codes, specifications and standards, achieves the specified performance, and is safe and fit‐for‐ purpose in all respects.
Facilities – 1A
• RP5S RP with 2 x 28” CRA clad pipelines to RP7S and 2 subsea composite Cables
and associated J tubes from RP7S to RP5S & from CP7S to WHP13S.
• New Fuel Gas 8” CRA Spur-lines and flanged risers from Subsea skid to RP7S. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at WHP5S/RP5S bridge connection & WHP13S/CP7S Composite cable tie-in and E&I integration including RGA Control modification.
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COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
• Pipeline decommissioning of 28” CS PL5S including associated demolition work at
WHP5S.
Facilities – 2A
• RP6N RP with 1x28” CRA clad pipeline to WHP13N, 2 Subsea composite cables and
associated J tubes from WHP12N to RP4N and RP6N to WHP13N. • New fuel gas spur-line and flanged riser from subsea skid to RP6N. • WHP13N Topside. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at WHP6N/RP6N, RP4N- HPU-Umbilical and tie- in, WHP12N-new J tube installation, E&I migration, WHP6N/RP4N/WHP4N-E&I migration (Pre-CP4N), WHP13N and RP6N interconnection to NFB.
Facilities – 3A
• RP9S RP with 1x28” CRA clad pipeline to RP4S. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at RP4S/WHP9S, Modifications to integrate
RP9S to the RGA control network.
• Pipeline decommissioning of 28” CS PL9 to WYE on existing 38” trunkline PL48
including associated demolition work at WHP9S.
Facilities – 1B
• New fuel gas spur-line and flanged riser from subsea skid to RP4N. • Fiber Optic Cable from RP6N to onshore LFP East, RP6N to RP4N and RP6N to LQ6S. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at RP6N Composite and FO Tie-ins NFB-PU (East)- FO Tie-in
(East)/BVS
Power & Control modifications, LQ6S/LFP Controls/Telecoms Integration.
Facilities – 2B
• RP5N RP with 2 x 28” CRA clad pipelines to RP4N, 1 x 28” CRA clad pipeline to RP6N and 2 subsea composite Cables and associated J tubes from WHP12N to RP5N & from RP6N to RP5N.
• Hook-up and brownfield modification at WHP5N- RP5N Bridge connection, WHP12N Composite cable tie-in, RP4N Intrafield pipeline Hook up PL54 N/LN and E&I integration including NFB-PU Power & Control modifications.
• Pipeline decommissioning of 2 x 16” PL56/PL54 Subsea Spur line from WHP5N to
reducing barred tee in subsea tie-in skid on PL6 / PL4.
Facilities – 3B
• 2 subsea composite Cables from RP4S to RP9S & from RP4S to WHP12S (with J-
tube).
• New Fuel Gas 8” CRA Spur-lines and flanged risers from Subsea skid to RP4S. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at WHP12S/ RP9S/ RP4S Composite cable tie-
in, Spurline riser installation at RP4S RGA Power & Control modifications.
Facilities - 4B
• 1 subsea composite Cable from CP8S to RP11S (or from RP8S to RP11S as Option). • New Fuel Gas 8” CRA Spur-line and flanged riser from Subsea skid to RP8S. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at WHP8S/ WHP11S for Test separator Internal Upgrade and MEG system modification, Spur lines, Power & Control Tie-ins on RP8S, RP11S/WHP11S-Tie-in (Power and Control), RGA Power & Control modifications.
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Facilities - 5B
• 2 subsea composite Cables from RT2 to WHP3S & from RT2 to WHP2S (with J-tube)
and FO Cable from RT2 to Barzan WHP1.
• New Fuel Gas 8” CRA Spur-line and flanged riser from Subsea skid to RT2. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at BRZ-WHP1 - FO cable tie-in, WHP2S/ WHP3S/ RT&RT2 Composite cable tie-in and associated modification, RGA Power & Control modifications.
Facilities – 6B
• RP3S RP with 1x24” CRA clad pipeline to RT2 with Stalk on risers. • Hook-up and brownfield modification at RT2 for 24” Intrafield pipeline and Composite/FO cable Hook-up, WHP3S for Production diversion and Utilities, Power and ICSS Hook-up, WHP2S for Composite Cable Tie-ins and Power & Control Integration RGA Power & Control modifications. topside existing and
In-situ abandonment of existing Topside/subsea Composite Cables RT-WHP2S, RT-WHP3S, Topside/Subsea FO cable RT-BRXWHP1.
• Decommissioning at
Figure 1.2.1: NFPS Compression Project COMP3 Scope
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
2.1 Definitions
Definition
Description
COMPANY
QatarEnergy LNG.
CONTRACTOR
Saipem S.p.A.
DELIVERABLES
FACILITIES
MILESTONE
PROJECT
SITE
All products (drawings, equipment, services) which must be submitted by CONTRACTOR to COMPANY at times specified in the contract. All machinery, apparatus, materials, articles, components, systems and items of all kinds to be designed, engineered, procured, tested and manufactured, constructed, supplied, permanently installed by CONTRACTOR at SITE in connection with the NFPS Project as further described in Exhibit 6.
fabricated,
A reference event splitting a PROJECT activity for progress measurement purpose.
COMP3 - NFPS Offshore Riser/Wellhead Platform & Intrafield Pipelines Project
(i) any area where Engineering, Procurement, Fabrication of the FACILITIES are being carried out and (ii) the area offshore required for installation of the FACILITIES in the State of Qatar
SUBCONTRACT
Contract signed by SUBCONTRACTOR and CONTRACTOR for the performance of a certain portion of the WORK within the PROJECT.
SUBCONTRACTOR
Any organization selected and awarded by CONTRACTOR to supply a certain Project materials or equipment or whom a part of the WORK has been Subcontracted.
WORK
Refer to article 2 of CONTRACT AGREEMENT.
WORK PACKAGE
The lowest manageable and convenient level in each WBS subdivision.
VENDOR
The Person, Group, or organization responsible for the design, the manufacture, Equipment/Material.
load-out/Shipping
testing,
and
of
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
2.2 Abbreviations
Code
ACS
AFFF
AFP
AIS
Definition
Access Control System
Aqueous Film Forming Foam
Active Fire Protection
Automatic Identification System
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practical
AMA
ANSI
API
ASME
ASTM
BA
BDV
BSP
CAP
CCTV
CFD
CFR
CHB
CO
Alternative Muster Area
American National Standards Institute
American Petroleum Institute
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
American Society for Testing and Materials
Breathing Apparatus
Blowdown Valve
Bridge Support Platform
Civil Aviation Publication
Closed-Circuit Television
Computational Fluid Dynamics
Code of Federal Regulations
Chemical Hazards Bulletin
Carbon Monoxide
COMP
Compressor
CP
CPR
CRA
Compression Platform
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
Corrosion-resistant Alloy
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Definition
Code
CS
CUI
DAL
DC
Carbon Steel
Corrosion Under Insulation
Design Accidental Load
Diagnostics Coverage
DCS
Distributed Control System
DIFFS
Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System
DRA
EER
E&I
EI
EN
Design Risk Assessment
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Electrical and Instrumentation
Energy Institute
European Standards
ENVID
Environmental Impact Identification
EPCOL
Engineering, Procurement, Construction Offshore and Looping
ERA
ESD
Explosion Risk Analysis
Emergency Shutdown
ESDV
Emergency Shutdown Valve
ESSA
Emergency System Survivability Study
EWS
FAR
FEED
FECP
FGS
FM
FO
Engineering Work Station
Fatal Accident Rate
Front End Engineering Design
Fire Extinguishing Control Panel
Fire and Gas System
Factory Mutual
Fiber Optic
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Definition
Code
FRA
F&G
GPA
Fire Risk Analysis
Fire and Gas
General Plant Alarm
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Analysis
HC
Hydrocarbon
HCRE
Helicopter Crash and Rescue Equipment
HFE
Human Factor Engineering
HMI
HP
HSE
Human Machine Interface
High Pressure
Health, Safety, and Environment
HSE&Q
Health, Safety, Environment & Quality
HSSD
High Sensitivity Smoke Detector
HUC
Hook-up and Commissioning
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
H2S
I1P1
ICSS
IDLH
IEC
IMO
IR
IRPA
ISEA
Hydrogen Sulphide
Investment 1 Project 1
Integrated Control and Safety System
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
International Electrotechnical Commission
International Maritime Organization
Infrared
Individual Risk Per Annum
International Safety Equipment Association
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Code
JUR
KO
Jack-up Rig
Knock Out
Definition
LDAR
Leak Detection and Repair
LEL
LER
LFL
LNG
LOC
LOPA
LOPC
LP
LSA
LSIR
LTEL
Lower Explosion Limit
Local Electrical Room
Lower Flammability Limit
Liquefied Natural Gas
Loss of Containment
Layers of Protection Analysis
Loss of Primary Containment
Low Pressure
Life Saving Appliance
Location Specific Individual Risk
Long Term Exposure Limit
MACP
Manual Alarm Call Point
MAE
MAH
MCC
MCR
MEG
Major Accidental Event
Major Accident Hazard
Motor Control Centre
Main Control Room
Monoethylene Glycol
MOPO
Matrix of Permitted Operations
MOV
MRP
Motor Operated Valve
Manual Release Point
MTPA
Million Metric Tons Per Annum
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Code
Definition
NEMA
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NC
NFB
Normally Closed
North Field Bravo
NFPA
National Fire Protection System
NFPS
NOC
North Field Production Sustainability
North Oil Company
NPTM
National Pipe Thread Male
NUI
OEL
OIM
OWS
PA
PAGA
PAPA
PCS
PFD
PFP
PL
PLL
POB
PPE
ppm
PS
PSD
Normally Unattended Installation
Occupational Exposure Limits
Offshore Installation Manager
Operator Workstation
Public Address
Public Address General Alarm
Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm
Process Control System
Process Flow Diagram
Passive Fire Protection
Pipeline
Potential Loss of Life
Personnel on Board
Personal Protective Equipment
Parts Per Million
Performance Standards
Process Shutdown
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Code
PST
PSV
PTFE
QG2
QMS
QRA
RAM
RGA
RGE
RP
SCBA
SCE
SCTA
SDV
SFF
SGIA
SHE
Definition
Partial Stroke Test
Pressure Safety Valve
Polytetrafluoroethylene
Qatargas 2
Quality Management System
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability
RasGas Alpha
Ras Gas Expansion
Riser Platform
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
Safety Critical Element
Safety Critical Task Analysis
Shutdown Valve
Safe Failure Fraction
Smoke And Gas Ingress Analysis
Safety, Health and Environment
SHEAM
Safety, Health, Environment Action Management
SIF
SIL
Safety Instrumented Function
Safety Integrity Level
SIMOPs
Simultaneous Operations
SIS
Safety Instrumented System
SOLAS
Safety of Life at Sea
SO2
Sulfur Dioxide
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Code
SO3
STEL
Definition
Sulphur Trioxide
Short Term Exposure Limit
TEMPSC
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TLV
TR
TRIA
TRIF
TSI
TWA
UFL
UL
UPS
USD
UV
VCA
VCE
VDU
Threshold Limit Value
Temporary Refuge
Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency
Telecom System Integrator
Time Weighted Average
Upper Flammability Limit
Underwriters Laboratories
Uninterrupted Power Supply
Unit Shutdown
Ultraviolet
Valve Criticality Analysis
Vapor Cloud Explosion
Visual Display Unit
VRLA
Valve Regulated Lead Acid
WBS
WHP
Work Breakdown Structure
Wellhead Platform
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 18 of 157
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
3 REGULATIONS, CODES AND STANDARDS
3.1 COMPANY References
S. No
Document Number
Title
PRT-PRS-PRC-014_00 Offshore Loss Prevention Philosophy
PRT-PRS-PRC-015_03
Safety Case Requirements
PRT-MOR-PRC-001_02 Risk Screening
PRT-MOR-PRC-002_06
Formal Risk Assessment
PRT-MOR-PRC-003_01
Formal Risk Assessment Application Guide
PRT-PRS-PRC-009_01
Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations
PRT-000-PRC-016_00
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment
PRT-PRS-PRC-013_00
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
PRT-ERP-POL-001_03
Qatargas Fire Protection Policy
PRT-HLT-PRC-004_03
Noise Control and Hearing Conservation
PRT-PSF-PRC-024_03
Hydrogen Sulfide Safety
PRT-PRS-PRC-010_01
Guidelines For Standard for Safety Critical Elements
the Development of Performance
PRT-PRS-PRC-012_01
Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study Guide
RSK-IMR-SI-001
Qatargas Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)
PRT-PSF-PRC-003_06
Breathing Apparatus Usage, Filling and Maintenance
PRT-PSF-PRC-012_04
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
PRT-PSF-PRC-015_01
Safety Signs Standard
PRT-ERP-PRC-037_01
Tier 1 Offshore Emergency Response Plan
3.2 PROJECT Documents
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-DEC-00002
FEED Technical Safety Basis of Design
200-20-SH-SOW-00003 Scope of Work for Safety studies for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00014
Environmental Basis of Design for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00012
Noise Design Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 19 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-00171 (HOLD-3)
Design Case – Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) for COMP3 Project
200-20-PE-DEC-00004
Project Basis of Design for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-PRC-00015
Technical Safety Execution Plan for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-SPC-00021
200-20-SH-SPC-00019
200-20-SH-SPC-00020
Specification for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent System for COMP3 Project
Specification for DIFFS (Deck Integrated Firefighting System) for COMP3 project
Specification for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 project
200-20-SH-SPC-00024
Specification for TEMPSC for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-SPC-00022
Specification for Safety Signs for COMP3 Project
200-20-ME-SPC-00038
Technical Specification for Breathing Air Packages for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-SPC-00023
Specifications of Temporary Refuge for COMP3 Project
265-20-SH-CAL-00002 (HOLD-3)
265-20-SH-CAL-00001 (HOLD-3)
200-83-SH-DTS-00005
200-83-SH-DTS-00007
Firewater Hydraulic Calculations - WHP13N
Firewater Demand Calculations - WHP13N
Datasheet for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent System for COMP3 Project
Datasheet for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DTS-00005
Datasheet for TEMPSC for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DTS-00004
Datasheet for Safety Signs for COMP3 Project
200-83-SH-DTS-00006
200-20-SH-PRC-00014
200-20-SH-SPC-00018
Datasheet for Deck Integrated Firefighting System (DIFFS) for COMP3 project
Human Factor Engineering (HFE) Implementation Plan for COMP3 Project
Human Factor Engineering (HFE) Workplace Design Specification for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00051
RGE Process Design Basis for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00052
QG2 Process Design Basis for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 20 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-PR-DEC-00053
RGA Process Design Basis for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00056
Isolation Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00055
Process Drain Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00060
200-20-PR-DEC-00061
RGE Start-Up, Operating and Shutdown Philosophy COMP3 Project
QG2 Start-Up, Operating and Shutdown Philosophy COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00062 (HOLD-3)
RGA Start-Up, Operating and Shutdown Philosophy COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00057
200-20-PR-DEC-00058
RGE Flare, Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy for COMP3 Project
QG2 Flare, Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-PR-DEC-00059 (HOLD-3)
RGA Flare, Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-EL-DEC-00008
Electrical Design Basis for COMP3 Project
200-20-EL-SPC-00031
200-91-EL-SPC-00043
200-50-IN-SPC-00001
200-51-IN-SPC-00054
200-51-IN-DEC-00011
200-83-IN-SPC-00005
Technical Specification Equipment for COMP3 Project
for Electrical Packaged
Technical Specification Helideck Lighting system for COMP3 Project
for Navigational Aids and
Specification for Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) for COMP3 Project
Specification for Field Instrumentation (incl. Flow, Level, Pressure and Temperature Instrumentation & F&G Detectors) for COMP3 Project
Instrument and Control System Design Basis for COMP3 Project
Specification (HSSD) For COMP3 Project
for High Sensitivity Smoke Detection
200-52-TC-DEC-00005
Telecommunication Basis of Design for COMP3 Project
200-20-PI-DEC-00009
Basis of Design for Piping for COMP3 Project
200-20-PI-DEC-00010
Piping and Layout Design Basis (Common) for COMP3 PROJECT
200-20-PI-SPC-00044
Piping Material Specification for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-PI-DEC-00012
Mechanical Handling Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-ME-DEC-00009 Mechanical Design Basis for COMP3 Project
200-42-HV-DEC-00004
HVAC Basis of Design – Offshore for COMP3 Project
200-52-TC-SPC-00061
Specification for Access Control System (ACS) for COMP3 Project
200-20-AB-SPC-00004
Architectural Specification – Offshore for COMP3 Project
200-26-PL-SPC-00003
Specification for Subsea Composite Cables for COMP3 Project
200-25-PL-DEC-00007
Pipeline and Riser Basis of Design for COMP3 Project
212-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
240-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
235-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
278-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
268-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
265-23-PR-REP-00003 (HOLD-3)
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for RP3S
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for RP5S
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for RP9S
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for RP5N
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for RP6N
Relief And Blow-Down Study Report for WHP13N
200-20-CE-DEC-00006 Material Selection Philosophy for COMP3 Project
200-20-ST-SPC-00030
Specification for Aluminum Helideck for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-REP-00195 (HOLD-3)
Safety Critical Elements & Performance Standard report for COMP3 Project
200-20-CE-SPC-00029 (HOLD-3)
Specification for Thermal Insulation for COMP3 Project
200-20-PI-SPC-00043
General Valves Specification for COMP3 Project
268-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
240-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
235-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for RP6N
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for RP5S
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for RP9S
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
265-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
278-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
212-51-IN-CED-00001 (HOLD-3)
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for WHP13N
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for RP5N
Cause and Effect Diagram for Fire & Gas for RP3S
212-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for RP3S
240-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for RP5S
235-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for RP9S
278-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for RP5N
268-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for RP6N
265-23-PR-CED-00002
ESD Cause & Effect Diagram for WHP13N
200-20-SH-REP-00198
Ship Collision Study for COMP3 Project
(HOLD-1)
Specification for Passive Fire Protection
240-23-PR-DEC-00002
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for RP5S
268-23-PR-DEC-00002
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for RP6N
235-23-PR-DEC-00002
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for RP9S
278-23-PR-DEC-00002 (HOLD-3)
212-23-PR-DEC-00002 (HOLD-3)
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for RP5N
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for RP3S
- 265-23-PR-DEC-00002
Process Control and ESD Philosophy for WHP13N
200-23-PR-DEC-00008 (HOLD-3)
Riser Platform RP4N - Process Control and ESD Philosophy
- 200-52-TC-DEC-00006
Telecommunication Systems Philosophy for COMP3 Project
COMP3-SPM-SH- TQY-00027
Technical Query for Safety Studies which are not required for COMP3 Project
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 23 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
3.3 International Standards
S. No
Document Number
Title
-
API RP14C
-
API 2030
-
API RP14E
-
API RP 14G
-
API RP14J
-
API RP2218
-
API RP 500
-
API RP 505
-
EI 15
-
EN 60079-10-1
-
API 521
-
API RP 752
Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms
Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries
in
Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore Production Platform Piping Systems
Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Fixed Open-type Offshore Production Platforms
Recommended Practice Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities
for Design and Hazards
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants
Standard for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities
Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2
EI Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15: Area Classification for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids
Explosive atmospheres Part 10-1: Classification of areas – Explosive gas atmospheres
Guide Systems
for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring
Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Permanent Buildings
- ASME B 31.8
Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems
- NFPA 10
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
- NFPA 15
Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
- NFPA 70
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
- NFPA 72
National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
- NFPA 101
Life Safety Code
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
- NFPA 750
Standard on water Mist Fire Protection Systems
- NFPA 2001
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
-
NFPA 850
-
SOLAS
Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 and Amendments in force
- 33 CFR Part 145
Fire Fighting Equipment
- 46 CFR Part 34
Fire Fighting Equipment
-
CAP 437
IEC 60331
IEC 60332-3
Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas: A Guide to Criteria, Recommended Minimum Standards and Best Practice
Tests for Electric Cables under Fire Conditions - Circuit Integrity
Tests on Electric and Optical Fibre Cables under Fire Conditions
IEC 60079
Explosive Atmospheres
IEC 61508
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
IEC 61511
Functional Safety Training & Certification
- DNV-RP-F107
Risk Assessment of Pipeline Protection
- DNV-ST-F101
Submarine Pipeline Systems
- UL 1709
The Protection of Structural Steel in Hydrocarbon Fires
- UL 154
Carbon-Dioxide Fire Extinguishers
IMO 754 (18)
Recommendation on Fire Resistance Tests For “A”, “B” and “F” Class Divisions
IMO Resolution A.951 (23)
Improved Guidelines Extinguishers
for Marine Portable Fire
- ASTM B444
Specification
Standard Nickel-Chromium- Molybdenum-Columbium Alloys (UNS N06625 and UNS N06852) and Nickel-Chromium-Molybdenum- Silicon Alloy (UNS N06219) Pipe and Tube
for
- ANSI Z358.1
Emergency Eyewash & Shower Standard
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
S. No
Document Number
Title
-
EN 50272-2
-
EN 1366
Safety Requirements for Secondary Batteries and Battery Installations - Part 2: Stationary Batteries
Fire Resistance Tests for Service Installations – Fire Dampers
3.4 Standard, Codes and References
The COMP3 FACILITIES shall be designed, and operated in accordance with the applicable laws, regulations of the State of Qatar, internationally recognized codes and standards listed above in the order of precedence describe as below:
• Qatari Governmental and Regulatory Requirements • COMPANY Procedures, Policies and Standards • Project Specifications. • • COMPANY and CONTRACTOR’s Lessons Learned
Industry Codes and Standards
When a conflict exists among codes, standards, and project specifications, the most stringent provision shall govern unless otherwise formally clarified and agreed with COMPANY. Conflict among applicable specification and / or codes shall be brought to the attention of the COMPANY for resolution COMPANY decision shall be final and shall be implemented.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
4 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT
The purpose of this document is to describe the philosophy of safety by design applied to the North Field Production Sustainability (NFPS) COMP3 project.
The basis of design is applicable to:
• The proposed greenfield FACILITIES, i.e., new Wellhead Platform, new riser platforms bridge connected to existing WHPs, new bridge support platforms, new intra-field pipelines, and
• Brownfield modifications.
Table 4.1: Platforms under COMP3 Scope
Greenfield
Brownfield
WHP13N, RP5N, RP6N, RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, BSP3S, BSP5S
WHP4N, WHP5N, WHP6N, WHP12N, WHP2S, WHP3S, WHP4S, WHP8S, WHP5S, WHP9S, WHP11S, WHP12S, RP7S, RP4S, RP8S, RP11S, RP4N, RP6N, RT, RT-2, PU
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 27 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
5 GENERAL
This Basis of Design describes the major loss prevention requirements relating to the prevention, control and mitigation of Major Accident Hazards for the QatarEnergy LNG offshore assets developed in NFPS COMP3 Project:
• Well head Platform (WHP) and Subsea pipelines, • Bridges, • Riser Platforms (RPs) and associated BSPs.
This design basis is developed based on the COMPANY’s Offshore Loss Prevention Philosophy [Ref.1] and FEED Technical Safety Basis of Design [Ref.19].
For the detailed design engineering phase of the COMP3 project, the following philosophy documents will be developed:
• Environmental Basis of Design for COMP3 Project [Ref.21], and • Noise Design Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.22].
These above documents cover specific aspects of the Loss Prevention system design and should be read in conjunction with this Technical Safety Basis of Design.
Existing platforms’ modification scope (RPs and WHP) shall follow their respective existing safety design philosophies. Accordingly, EPCOL Technical Safety Basis of Design shall be followed for all RP’s brownfield scope. Additionally, design considerations from Technical Safety Basis of Design – Common – Offshore from EPC for North Field Production Sustainability Offshore & Pipelines Project have been included, where applicable.
The design life shall be a minimum of 30 years for all new and upgraded FACILITIES associated with the Services.
5.1
Inherently Safer Design
The NFPS Compression Project is developed as per the goals listed in Table 5.1.1 below. This list was generated during the Define HAZID workshop to fully promote the goal of an inherently safer design. These goals will be assessed during the detail design HAZID workshop.
Table 5.1.1: NFPS Compression Goals
Sl. No.
Goal
1
2
3
4
5
6
Eliminate need for additional offshore personnel during operations and maintenance
Minimize Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) leak points and volumes
No increase in operational marine risks
Eliminate lifts over live equipment
Eliminate escalation of events
Eliminate on-site ignition potentials
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Sl. No.
Goal
7
8
9
10
11.a
12.b
Minimize risks resulting from Brownfield, HUC, and Installation activities
Minimize the risk of vessel collision through the use of anchors and tug boats, and vessel positioning relative to the FACILITY for north approaches.
Minimize inventory of hydrocarbons (Diesel, etc.).
Minimize personnel risk and exposure to hazards through FACILITY layout
Minimize riser external corrosion in the splash zone
Maximize monitoring and control on NFPS COMP3 FACILITIES
5.2 Risk Management Philosophy
The Risk Management provided for the FACILITIES shall be a combination of measures to prevent, control and mitigate the lifecycle hazards associated with the FACILITIES. The general approach adopted is to identify and, where practical, eliminate hazards as an integral part of the design process. Where hazards cannot be eliminated, their potential impact shall be evaluated and those considered to be potential shall be reviewed to ensure that appropriate risk reduction measures are implemented either to reduce the consequence of the hazard or to reduce its likelihood of occurrence.
Risk reduction measures are primarily used to prevent a hazard from occurring. When an incident does occur, risk reduction measures are used to control the incident and to reduce the consequences by mitigation and/or recovery. In order of preference, the risk reduction measures are:
•
Inherent safety and prevention – such as sound process design/ engineering fire barriers/ spacing and layout/ area classification etc.
• Detection and control – such as process detection and control, fire and gas detection. • Mitigation – such as shutdown, isolation, blowdown, AFP, PFP, procedures and
emergency response etc.
Define
Identify
Analyse
Evaluate
Mitigate
5.3 Risk Acceptance, ALARP and Vulnerability
PROJECT shall follow the Risk Acceptance and Vulnerability criteria and ALARP Principles given in Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.6] along with COMPANY’s Risk Assessment Matrix [Ref.14] for Safety Studies and for making risk-based engineering decisions when necessary.
Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.6] provides guidelines for:
• Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR), • Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA), • Potential Loss of Life (PLL),
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
• Fatal Accident Rate (FAR), • Group Risk, and • Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF).
5.3.1 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)
Location Specific Individual Risk is the individual risk of fatality that an individual would be exposed to if they spend 365 days per year x 24 hours a day in a specific location. This is useful for identifying the highest risk areas for which restricted access may be employed.
5.3.2
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA)
Individual Risk Per Annum is the measure of risk experienced by a single individual over a given time period. It reflects the severity of the hazards and the amount of time the individual is exposed to and in proximity to them. The number of people present does not affect the estimate. The maximum tolerable individual risk in COMPANY has been defined as 5x10-4 per year for new/Greenfield Installations and 1x10-3 per year for existing/Brownfield Installations, any risk result above this limit is considered unacceptable. However, it is also necessary to demonstrate that risk has been reduced to ALARP if the IRPA exceeds 1x10 -6 per annum. This is the purpose of the ALARP Assessment. Any individual risk below 1x10 -6 is considered negligible and acceptable.
5.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
Potential Loss of Life is the sum of the individual risk for all personnel visiting the FACILITIES. There is no additional tolerability criterion for PLL. However, the reduction in PLL is associated with a potential risk reduction upgrade and it can be used in cost benefit assessment to demonstrate ALARP. Also, it can be useful to risk rank design options at the design stage.
5.3.4 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)
Fatal Accident Rate is the fatality risk associated with 100 million hours offshore. Based on the maximum tolerable IRPA based on 26 weeks a year offshore (4,380 hours) (i.e. 0.23 for new and 2.3 for existing installations). This is useful for assessing the risk to visitors who spend less than 26 weeks a year offshore.
5.3.5 Group Risk
Group Risk is the risk experienced by the whole group of people exposed to a major accident hazard. While such low frequency high consequence events might represent a very small risk to an individual, they may be seen as unacceptable when a large number of people are exposed. Such incidents can significantly impact shareholder value.
5.3.6 Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF)
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency is the annual frequency that the TR becomes impaired (e.g. by toxic gas ingress), requiring evacuation from the TR and abandonment from the FACILITY.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
A maximum acceptable TR impairment frequency as per below based on Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.6] shall be followed:
• 1x10-3 per annum for all TRs provided in greenfield platforms (WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S,
RP9S, RP5N and RP6N)
Moreover, each MAH “group” shall contribute an impairment probability of no more than 1 x 10-4 per year for all existing TRs. All existing TRs (brownfield platforms) shall follow existing TR impairment criteria.
COMPANY’s Risk Assessment Matrix [Ref.14] shall be applied for qualitative risk assessments.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
6 TECHNICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS
6.1 Safety in Design Workshops
The following safety in design workshops will be performed:
• Hazard Identification (HAZID): HAZID workshop focuses on qualitative risk analysis technique commonly used for the identification of potential hazards and threats in a process.
• Environmental Identification (ENVID): ENVID workshop is a structured examination of environmental aspects for a FACILITY for early identification of environmental concerns that may affect environment.
• Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP): The HAZOP workshop generally focuses on safety in design features within the process itself. The HAZOP study systematically evaluates deviations from planned operations (e.g. increased/decreased pressure, temperature, flow, level; misdirected, reverse flow, etc.) on a line-by-line basis.
• Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment: SIL Assessment establishes the risk reduction needed for each process system to protect against one or more hazards. The risk reduction is calculated as the gap between the existing risk posed by the process or equipment and the risk target. Risk reduction is provided by process and mechanical integrity and independent protection layer. SIL assessment will follow SIL matrix methodology whereas for SIL 2, 3, LOPA will be conducted.
• Design Risk Assessment (DRA): DRA is a workshop-based approach that is used for the for the identification of hazards for PROJECT functional area such as construction, operations and maintenance during design stage. DRA considers broader design aspects that could have a PROJECT wide impact in areas such as interface management, contracting strategies (WBS), construction issues, HSE issues and operating philosophies.
through structured workshops with representatives
• Bow-Tie Workshop: The Bow-Tie analysis shall be carried out using Bow-Tie XP software from FACILITY operations, maintenance, HSE&Q, management and support functions. A Bow-Tie session shall generate major accident hazard events from the supporting formal studies or industry references that will be validated by key discipline team members and subject matter experts. For each major accidental event, identify applicable preventing and mitigating barriers by development of visual representations of the relationships among each Major Scenario and its root causes and potential consequences, considering the possible escalation scenarios as well as to verify the requirement for minimum barriers.
• Matrix of Permitted Operation (MOPO) / SIMOPS: SIMOPS study shall identify hazards that could occur due to non-production activities concurrent with production activities offshore and develop a Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) for the installations to assist operation of the assets within acceptable safe limits.
• ALARP Demonstration: The ALARP Demonstration Study workshop is part of a formal demonstration of ALARP implementation of recommendations associated with Major Accident Events (MAEs) raised in Safety Studies. This workshop is to ensure that all reasonably practicable risk reduction measures have been identified, systematically assessed and the appropriate justification is recorded for each decision regarding their rejection or acceptance and implementation.
findings and
to discuss
the
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• Human Factor Engineering (HFE) and Ergonomics Workshop: Human Factors Engineering is a process of integrating current knowledge of human capabilities, limitations in the form of expectations into the design of products, workplaces, and work systems (plant and FACILITIES) to ensure effective, efficient, safe, and healthy functioning of human beings, thereby improving operational and maintenance task performance. The HFE review using 3D model shall be conducted to check technical and personnel safety aspects, operability and maintenance aspects and functionality of the design. The HFE sessions using 3D model is conducted at the end of 30%, 60% and 90% model development phases.
o HFE Screening workshop: The goal of the screening activity is to provide an overview of the level of HFE risk associated with each item of equipment to determine the appropriate level of HFE input as well as the appropriate HFE activities that should be undertaken during the PROJECT.
o Valve Criticality Analysis (VCA) workshop: The overall objective of Valve Criticality Analysis is to identify valve operations that due to either their critically or frequency of operation, are of a high priority.
o Safety Critical Task Analysis (SCTA) Workshop: The overall objective of the Safety Critical Task Analysis is to analyze the human performance while completing a particular task, which contributing to potential major accident hazards (MAHs) and major environmental hazards within offshore platforms. o Ergonomics Study Workshop: An Ergonomic Assessment Study including workshops shall be conducted to ensure that requirements for the design, layout and navigation of LER (Local Equipment Room) including HMI are clear and unambiguous and delivered in such a way that it is clearly understood. These will then ensure risk of human error is reduced to ALARP.
• Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (RAM) Study Review: A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) study report shall define basic maintenance and reliability program requirements for ensuring COMPANY practices to promote maintenance effectiveness and reliability requirements are built into the design and construction of new and modified FACILITIES. It also shall assess the performance achievable from the FACILITIES and identify critical systems and equipment.
In advance of each workshop, a Terms of Reference will be prepared, documenting the approach, methodology, required attendees and schedule for the workshop.
HAZID, ENVID, HAZOP, SIL Assessment and DRA workshop recommendations / actions closure shall be captured in separate Close-Out Reports which will include all the workshop actions, action party, the responses to those actions and evidence as applicable.
Remaining workshops (Bow-Tie, ALARP, SIMOPS/MOPO) recommendations / actions shall be captured within Safety, Health, Environment Action Management (SHEAM) Register for close-outs.
6.2 Technical Safety Assessment
Hazards and risks for the COMP3 FACILITIES will be identified and mitigated through relevant reviews, Safety Studies and Loss Prevention design.
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The figurative summary of the road map in terms of sequence for the Safety Studies is shown in Figure 6.2.1.
Figure 6.2.1 Process Flow for Formal Safety Assessment
Once risks have been quantitatively or qualitatively assessed via these reviews and studies, mitigation measures shall be proposed to minimize the risks, to ensure the overall risks to personnel on the FACILITIES are ALARP.
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Table 6.2.1 presents the technical Safety Studies to be conducted during the detailed design stage of the COMP3 Project.
Table 6.2.1 Technical Safety Studies for the NFPS COMP3 Project
No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
The purpose of SIL Verification is to verify that the analyzed Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) meet the SIL requirements from SIL assignment in terms of probability of failure on demand and hardware fault tolerance according to IEC 61508 [Ref.133] and IEC 61511 [Ref.134]. SIL Verification study shall be developed using exSILentia software.
When the calculated SIL from SIL Verification cannot meet the required SIL, then recommendations to improve the SIL shall be generated. These can include (but not limited to):
1.0 SIL Verification Study
requirements
• definition of minimum
to be requested to VENDORs (e.g. SIL certifications, recommendations on failure rates, SFF and DC, etc.), revision of SIF configuration,
• • addition of online diagnostic testing or external
comparisons, and increase of testing frequency or PST introduction.
•
The Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) will focus on major accident hazards (MAHs) associated with the PROJECT FACILITIES that can give rise to fires or explosions.
2.0
Fire Risk Assessment (FRA)
The objective of the Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) is to evaluate the consequences of Major Accident Events (MAEs) fire and explosion hazards. Consequence assessment shall be done using PHAST software.
terms of
in
The FRA will give input to the design on fire and explosion prevention, control and mitigation measures including the benefit of passive and active fire protection as well as layout considerations for improved inherent safety.
The FRA will also support the development of the PROJECT’s Passive Fire Protection (PFP) requirements.
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
The Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) will focus on Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) associated with the PROJECT FACILITIES that can give rise to fires or explosions.
The objective of the Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) is to evaluate the consequences of Major Accident Events (MAE) in terms of fire and explosion hazards. The study shall be carried out using 3D CFD software for Greenfield & RP Brownfield, while 2D Software for WHP Brownfield platforms.
The ERA will give input to the design on fire and explosion prevention, control and mitigation measures including the benefit of passive and active fire protection as well as layout considerations for improved inherent safety.
Results of the ERA will feed to the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA), Identification of Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards, and ultimately into the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and subsequently into Design SHE Case.
Integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment (iQRA) shall be updated applicable to the PROJECT scope (new and existing FACILITIES considering to establish modelling the existing FACILITY to have consistent result, the risk results shall be integrated for both new and existing FACILITIES) using appropriate specialist analysis software of the design of the FACILITIES, which shall establish that the risk to personnel, FACILITY and the environmental fall within internationally accepted norms for this type of FACILITY.
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) assessment is carried out to verify the adequacy of FACILITY’s layouts, escape routes, mustering areas, and evacuation provisions in credible accident scenarios. The EERA shall include:
• a goal analysis on how the goals for the EER process would be satisfied to determine the
3.0
Explosion Analysis (ERA)
Risk
4.0
Quantitative Assessment Study
Risk (QRA)
5.0
Escape, Evacuation, Rescue And Assessment (EERA) Study
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
adequacy and efficiency of arrangement,
the proposed
• an escape and evacuation time analysis which assesses the time needed to execute all phases of the EER process, and
• an escape, evacuation and rescue impairment
analysis.
Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA) is conducted to qualitatively assess the ability of the critical emergency systems to survive and perform their intended safety functions under Major Accident Event (such as fire and explosion), for the required duration.
The analysis shall specifically aim to:
•
identify Critical Emergency Systems that are designed to reduce the risk to personnel, to prevent event escalation or to preserve the integrity of muster areas, escape routes and evacuations systems,
• assess the potential for impairment (vulnerability) of each component in the Critical Emergency System,
•
•
identify how the Critical Emergency Systems design (fail safe or redundancy) achieves the level of integrity required, and
identify any component in the Critical Emergency Systems which may require better protection, during a Major Accident Event.
The SGIA study should:
• Assess the effects of all credible Major Accident Events (MAEs) with respect to smoke and gas exposure and ingress to the manned buildings,
• Review building locations, arrangements, type of openings, and HVAC system design as they relate to preventing smoke and gas ingress during an emergency,
6.0
Emergency Survivability Assessment Study
System
(ESSA)
7.0
Smoke Ingress (SGIA) Study
and Gas Analysis
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
• Conduct smoke and gas modelling for various
scenarios identified,
• Assess the effects to personnel from exposure to smoke (carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide), toxic gases (H2S, NOX, SOX, etc.) and un-ignited flammable gas (e.g. Methane),
• Carry out ingress calculations for smoke and gas,
• Determine the potential for building impairment due to accumulation of smoke (CO, CO2) and gas the building, (flammable and accounting for the response of the HVAC system, penetration and openings, and use during escape or evacuation, and
toxic) within
• Raise recommendations and mitigation measures,
if required.
The TRIA shall cover the following:
•
Identify the credible MAEs that can cause the Temporary Refuge (TR) impairment, e.g. thermal radiation, explosion overpressure, smoke and gas ingress and Ship Collision Impairment to the TR,
• Determine the TR impairment criteria during MAE
for the specified TR endurance time,
• Determine the potential TR impairment due to thermal radiation and explosion overpressure,
• Evaluate the potential for TR impairment due to accumulation of smoke (CO2, CO) and gas (flammable and toxic) within the TR within the specified TR endurance time,
• Determine the potential TR impairment due to Ship
Collision Impairment,
• Determine temperature rise in the TR during MAE
for the specified TR endurance time,
• Review the TR design provisions to determine if they are adequate to support life during a Major Accident Event (MAE), and
8.0
Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) Study
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
•
Identify any deficiencies in TR and equipment and recommend actions to the taken.
A Fire and Gas Mapping Study is prepared to ensure that the detection coverage meets target levels.
The F&G mapping study is prepared using industry recognized and approved industrial software.
F&G Mapping Study shall be performed to optimize the quantities and recommend appropriate detector coverage. The coverage shall be 90% for voting 1ooN and 85% for the voting 2ooN for Greenfield and Brownfield FACILITIES. The fire and gas mapping shall follow geographic approach per each deck or modified areas.
The study shall identify major noise contributors and make recommendations control measures. SOUNDPLAN should be used for the modelling of Noise Mapping Study.
noise
for
Study shall assess noise levels and mitigation in the process areas. Scope shall also include noise potential during flaring conditions during normal operations, emergency conditions, during SIMOPs conditions and during drilling operations.
The Dropped Object Analysis shall cover the following work scope:
• To identify scenarios where dropped objects/swing loads from platform crane could result in loss of containment of equipment located on the platform,
• To estimate the potential impact energy associated with the dropped object scenarios during lifting,
• To
the identify vulnerable zoned based on frequency and consequence analysis with respect to the drop points identified, and
9.0
Fire and Gas 3D Mapping Study
10.0 Noise Study
11.0 Dropped Objects Study
• To
recommend appropriate
reduction measures in line with ALARP principle. This will protection include
any Dropped
object
risk
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
requirement, particularly on BF platforms and interconnecting bridges, as required.
Specific assessment for the dropped object from platform crane onto Subsea items will be carried out in Subsea Dropped Object Study in compliance with DNV-RP-F107 [Ref.135].
for respective platforms
The Ship Collision Study shall:
• Analyze vessel collision risks to the Greenfield platform jackets from vessels visiting the complex (like supply vessel, offloading tanker and other errant vessels) and the Platform exclusion zone,
12.0 Ship Collision Study
• Verify
if
the
jacket design substructures/tripods/associated bridges (including BSP) and brownfield bridge support structures is adequate and highlight additional risk reduction measures as deemed necessary, and
of
• Review
adequacy
radar/ of communication systems to manage errant passing vessels or make recommendations, if otherwise.
proposed
13.0
Ship Traffic Interaction Assessments
14.0
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
Evaluate the frequency of interaction between ship traffic activities and subsea pipeline cables in order to provide the risk mitigation measures if needed in compliance with DNV-RP-F107 [Ref.135] and acceptability criteria of DNV- ST-F101 [Ref.136].
The study should:
• Establish the flare radiation contours and evaluate the impacts of the incident radiation on personnel and FACILITY. This also includes HUC & JUB movement during campaign as receptor points outside the platforms,
• Evaluate the noise levels on various critical
receptor points during flaring,
• Evaluate the temperature profile of flare boom
during flaring scenario,
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
• Establish the flammable and toxic gas dispersion contours for the FACILITY during flare flame-out (cold venting) and evaluate to personnel and FACILITY (crane cabin, helideck, air intake, HUC & JUB movement during campaign, etc.),
impacts
the
• For flammable gas dispersion, the 10% LFL shall not reach the helideck as per CAP 437 [Ref.129], and
• For
the
toxic toxic gas dispersion, concentration should be less than TLV-TWA (Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average) for the area where personnel might be present.
the
The Vents Dispersion Study shall be conducted to define the safe location of the vents and the characteristics of the vents.
The study should:
• Determine the atmospheric vent that has potential hazard from all P&IDs (Process, VENDOR P&IDs),
15.0 Vent Dispersion Study
• Establish
(flammable,
toxic, the hazardous the asphyxiant) gas dispersion contours FACILITY during atmospheric process venting scenarios and evaluate the impacts to personnel and FACILITY route, crane cabin, (escape helideck, air intake, etc.),
for
• For flammable gas dispersion, the 10% LFL shall not reach the helideck as per CAP 437 [Ref.129],
• For
the
toxic toxic gas dispersion, concentration should be less than TLV-TWA (Threshold Limit Value – Time Weighted Average) for the area where personnel might be present, and
the
• Raise recommendations for safe location of vent
outcomes, as deemed necessary.
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
The PS detail the specific goals and objective of the SCE, as well as the specific, measurable, and achievable requirements that assure the SCE will meet its goal and objective due to an emergency event. The study report shall separately the Design and Operational Performance Standards that shall be verified in the various stages of the PROJECT.
list
The objectives of this study are as follows:
•
Identify acknowledged during HAZID,
the SCEs based on
the MAEs
• Demonstrate the linkage between MAE causes,
controls and the SCEs,
16.0
Critical Safety Elements & Performance Standard
• Demonstrate
the
reduction measures implemented to reduce the risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), and
risk
• Present
the
findings
for use
in SCE PS development. PS are the criteria that the SCEs need to meet to effectively manage the MAEs and used to demonstrate that the SCEs have been properly designed.
for ensuring COMPANY practices
A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study shall define basic maintenance and reliability program requirements to reliability promote maintenance effectiveness and requirements are built into the design and construction of new and modified FACILITIES. It also shall assess the performance achievable from the FACILITIES and identify critical systems and equipment. The scope shall include the Greenfield FACILITY and associated Brownfield modifications.
Study shall conduct a Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard Analysis (NHHA) to assess nonhydrocarbon hazards which shall to, transportation risk, limited include, but are not occupational risk, structural failure, dropped objects, ship collision and non-process fire. The study shall assess the risk posed to personnel working on FACILITY scope (both
17.0 RAM Analysis Study
18.0
Non-Hydrocarbon Hazard (NHHA) Study
Analysis
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No.
Study
Objectives and Expectations
Greenfield and Brownfield platforms) due hydrocarbon hazards during normal operations.
to non-
The risks from the non-hydrocarbon hazards shall form part of the input to the QRA, to determine the total Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) associated with the normal operations of the platform.
19.0
Helideck Turbulence Temperature Study
Wind and Rise
20.0 Design Safety Case
The study should be used to estimate if there may be a rise of air temperature of more than 2°C (averaged over a the vertical three-second turbulence around the helideck airspace shall not exceed 1.75 m/s as per CAP 437 [Ref.129].
including
interval),
time
risk management processes during
The Design SHE Case is intended to demonstrate that there has been a systematic application of hazard and effect, the to provide PROJECT’s detailed design phase and justification that the design has taken into account all issues identified and has delivered a FACILITY design that reduces risks to ALARP. The Case would be expected to meet all SHE Case Objectives, as far as these relate to controls incorporated in the design.
The safety studies shall identify all critical areas of concern and propose recommendations to reduce these risks to ALARP. Areas of concern or design deficiencies especially those items that will impact topside weight, long lead equipment, safety critical elements and redundancies / passive fire protection to structural steel will be considered when addressing these risks.
Prior to carrying out the related studies, an Assumption Register shall be prepared which includes the basis, considerations, assumptions and methodology used for the study. FEED Assumption Register (RL1 and QG2) and Assumption Register for Integrated QRA will be followed consistently across the PROJECT scope. Any changes made from FEED / iQRA Assumption register will be captured accordingly.
For related safety studies, the recommendations / actions will be tracked and compiled into the Safety, Health, Environment Action Management (SHEAM) Register and will be closed out by implementing in design, as applicable.
The specific requirements for the safety studies and workshops are presented in the Scope of Work for Safety Studies for COMP3 Project [Ref.20] and the Technical Safety Execution Plan for COMP3 Project [Ref.25]. Dedicated Basis, Methodology and Assumptions Reports will be developed for each study for the PROJECT.
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Approved technical query for the safety studies which are not required for COMP3 Project (COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027) is included as an Appendix - 3 to this document [Ref.104].
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7 LOSS PREVENTION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
7.1 Layout
7.1.1 Layout Strategy
The main drivers for the development of an offshore facility layout are safety, costs, and lost production. A properly configured facility is a low initial cost system that maximizes its production throughout its life by minimizing downtime due to planned activities and unplanned incidents.
• The FACILITY layout strategy shall achieve the following elements:
o compact layouts, o minimum hydrocarbon inventory, o o safety risk levels for on-site workforce are ALARP, and escape, evacuation,
functional requirements,
and rescue facilities are provided to avoid the effects of hazards,
o safety and environmental risk levels for surrounding FACILITIES are ALARP,
and
o minimum lost production.
• Compact layouts FACILITIES shall:
o maximize natural ventilation in process areas to prevent accumulation of a flammable gas cloud. Forced ventilation may be used when natural ventilation is inadequate to prevent accumulation,
o separate fuel and ignition sources to prevent ignition of flammable releases,
and
o maintain the minimum required separation distances or provide safety barriers
to reduce the risk from fire and blast hazards.
• Safe and unhindered access shall be provided for future foreseeable construction
activities including simultaneous operations (SIMOPS).
Layouts for NFPS COMP3 FACILITIES shall provide the maximum safety benefit combined with ease of operation and maintenance consistent with economical design.
7.1.2 Spacing of NFPS COMP3 FACILITIES
Safety considerations for the FACILITY’s layout shall include provision of:
• Separation between flammable hydrocarbons and ignition sources, • Segregation and separation of hydrocarbon handling areas from utility areas,
emergency services, safety critical equipment and LER, • Sufficient means of escape from hazardous areas to TR, • Safe access to systems and equipment for operational and maintenance purposes, • Adequate ventilation and explosion venting shall be maximized to reduce accumulation
of flammable gases or vapors and reduce potential explosion overpressure,
• Location of hot surfaces away from normal access/egress,
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• Safety considerations to take all necessary and feasible precautions and measures to
protect personnel from fire, explosion and toxic effects of H2S, and
• The technical safety studies recommendations if any, are to be taken into consideration
in the review and design of the FACILITY layout.
The orientation of all FACILITIES shall, as far as practicable, ensure that:
• Prevailing winds direct exhaust plumes, flares, venting or release hydrocarbon gas or vapor clouds away from the FACILITY, especially away from air intakes of LER building, helideck, and main escape routes,
• Release of hydrocarbon gases or vapors are not carried toward sources of ignition, • Piping and isolation philosophy shall take into consideration of leak minimization
strategy since the process stream has H2S content,
• Support systems can operate adequately in an emergency, • Life-saving equipment for example as TEMPSC (for WHP13N), life rafts, Breathing Apparatus Escape Set, etc. shall be located at strategic locations to support the FACILITY evacuation during the major fire hazard events,
• Pressurized production equipment and associated piping is protected from dropped
objects as far as reasonably practical, and
• Hydrocarbon pipeline risers and related valves, scraper launchers/ receivers located
as far away from safe areas.
Pig Traps
• The locations of the pig traps should account for the pulled bends in the outboard
pipelines.
• Facilities and space shall be provided for operation of equipment (e.g., insertion and
removal of pipeline pigs).
• Means for handling pigs between the pigging area and crane laydown area should be
provided.
• Pig launchers and receivers should be located at the edge of the FACILITY. • Pig launchers and receivers should be pointed away from adjacent equipment and
structures.
ESD Valves
• The risk of damage to risers and riser emergency shutdown valves from fire or
explosion SHALL be demonstrated to be ALARP.
• The ESD valves should be located above the splash zone and accessible for
installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance.
• The supporting structure for the ESD valve shall be assessed for the loads from ESD
weight, process flow dynamics, and wave loading.
• The risk of jet and pool fires at sea level shall be assessed to prevent damaging the
riser below the shutdown valve.
• Hydrocarbon inventories above risers should be minimized.
Since operations such as production and crane functions may be conducted simultaneously on the installation, the layout must consider this eventuality to ensure that potential conflicts are minimized. Attention to be given to the exposure of pipeline and production equipment to dropped objects or suspended loads and ability of the crane operator to see all aspects of
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lifting operations. Crane coverage and lay down areas should be arranged to promote safe operations of the cranes and to minimize the risk of dropped objects. The crane operations lifting shall be done though a free path to minimize impact of potential drop object as much as possible. Mechanical handling and dropped object studies analyze the impact of dropped objects on critical equipment and to identify the requirement of dropped object protection.
Layout and 3D model reviews shall be performed during the detailed design stage. Any issues or concerns raised during these reviews shall be formally documented in 3D Model Action Tracking Registers and closed-out as model review action.
Prevailing wind shall be considered when locating ignition sources such as flares.
The helidecks on WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S, RP5N and RP6N shall be designed in accordance with CAP 437 [Ref.129], and in consultation with the local aviation operator and authorities. The overall platform FACILITIES shall be evaluated to identify and minimize conditions such as location of vents, flares, engine exhausts, crane booms and masts which might interfere with helicopter operations. Suitable provision shall also be made for safe and logical movement of personnel to and from a helicopter.
The pipeline / cable approach to the platform will be identified in order to reduce as much as possible any interference with the sterile area of flares during the maintenance of subsea pipeline system.
The hazard and consequence assessment studies shall be performed to include fire and gas dispersion and blast study. The results of these studies shall be used to optimize the spacing and layout of the FACILITIES with respect to safety, risk and operability. The spacing and layout design shall also to take modularization and maintenance.
logistical requirements related
into consideration
Curbing and drainage systems shall be provided to contain releases of hydrocarbons and limit the area of a spill. Curbing around the MEG injection systems shall be provided to contain any chemical releases. Drainage systems shall be considered around all major liquid hydrocarbon containing equipment such as separators, Diesel and scrapper launchers/receivers.
Access shall be such that all activities required to operate or maintain equipment and systems safely can be completed by personnel wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), including chemical suits and/or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and carrying (or using) all necessary tools and/or test equipment. Consideration shall be given to the body position of the worker while performing the task(s) as well as the equipment required to perform the task(s). A Human Factor and Ergonomic Study Workshop will be performed along with Model Review Workshop. For details, refer to HFE Workplace Design Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.41].
The LER Building located on greenfield platforms handling hydrocarbons, shall be located behind fire and blast wall. The fire rating and blast value for the fire and blast wall shall be based on the outcomes of Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) and Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) reports of the respective platform.
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7.1.3 Maintainability
The 3D model review of the FACILITIES will be carried out to ensure systems shall have been designed to satisfy the accessibility, maintenance, operations, manning, layout and spacing, etc.
A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study shall be performed, and the study results shall be assessed to determine equipment sparing requirements and maintainability and to ensure that future production forecast and other business targets are met. The study shall predict FACILITY availability and quantify the contribution of the various assets to production loss.
Trolley beams, cranes, and davits shall be provided as appropriate to service equipment such as pumps, motors, scraper launchers and relief valves. These lifting facilities shall extend beyond equipment foundations into drop zones accessible to mobile equipment. Lifting mechanism is to be employed for lifting equipment more than 23 kg in weights.
7.1.4 Dropped Object Protection
Dropped object studies for greenfield and brownfield shall be performed for each platform to assess the dropped object risk to COMP3 topsides, the riser and pipeline sections close to the platform boundary and to analyze whether additional control or mitigation measures are required to reduce the dropped object risk / swing load that leads to major hydrocarbon loss of containment. Dropped Object Study Reports will be prepared and submitted for the PROJECT scope.
7.2 Area Classification and Ventilation
7.2.1 Hazardous Area Classification
Hazardous areas are classified for the purpose of ensuring safe and proper specification, selection and installation of electrical / electronic & instrumentation equipment installed in offshore platforms. Effective controls should be placed on all potential sources of ignition within hazardous areas by a combination of design measures and systems of work. It minimizes the risk of fires or explosions that could result from arcing, sparking and heat dissipation in the FACILITY. This design basis shall be followed in the development of respective platform’s Hazardous Area Classification Schedule and corresponding Hazardous Area Classification Drawings.
Area classification studies shall be based on the Area Classification codes and standards such as API RP 505 for Greenfield Platforms, EI 15 [Ref.113] for all Brownfield North Platforms and API RP 500 [Ref.111] for all Brownfield South Platforms. Area classification for Brownfield Platforms shall follow the existing design philosophy.
All outdoor field / electrical equipment located in process area irrespective of hazardous area, shall be suitable for Zone 2, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3 as minimum.
All Instruments (including Telecom) located in outdoors (hazardous or non-hazardous), shall be certified for installation in Zone 1, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3 as a minimum.
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External equipment required to be operational during an emergency condition i.e., a Major Accident Event in which the emergency related actions need to be performed, shall be classified (hazardous) and certified for Zone 1, Gas group IIB and Temperature Class T3.
HVAC Equipment located outdoors shall be classified for Zone 2, Gas Group IIB and Temperature Class T3 as minimum.
Battery Room is considered as a Zone 1 classified hazardous area. HVAC, Electrical, Instrumentation and Telecom equipment inside Battery Room shall be certified for Zone 1, Gas Group IIC and Temperature Class T3 as minimum.
All lighting fixtures installed outdoors shall be suitable for minimum Zone 1, Gas Group IIB and temperature class T3 hazardous area.
All lighting fixtures installed inside Battery Room shall be classified for Zone 1, Gas Group IIC and Temperature Class T3 area.
Hazardous Area Classification Drawings shall be developed based on Hazardous Area Classification Schedule. The schedule shall list as a minimum:
• Process equipment, • Process materials and condition, • Notes on likelihood of release, • The grade of release (continuous, primary or secondary), and • The type of zone.
LER Building (except Battery Room) shall be designed as a non-hazardous area and shall be pressurized in accordance with API RP 505. The air intake for a pressurized building shall be from a non-hazardous area.
Equipment located in classified areas shall be certified to IEC “Ex” scheme & inline with IEC 60079 [Ref.132] standards. Equipment that complies with NEMA & ATEX is acceptable subject to COMPANY approval.
Areas above Zone 2 locations, in order to be designated as “unclassified,” shall be either of the following:
• An outdoor location without restricted ventilation, or • within a closed building (LER Building), in which floor level is above the Zone 2 area and with the space beneath the floor solid filled. If lighter-than-air gas is involved, then the floor shall be without openings and non-skirted.
7.2.1.1
Ignition Control
The FACILITY shall be designed and configured to reduce the probability of a flammable gas cloud forming, and further, if such an event does occur, to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of ignition of a flammable gas cloud by electrical equipment, static discharge, hot surfaces or sparking produced by mechanical impacts.
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Ignition control is accomplished by:
•
Inherently safe design - locating arcing and sparking devices away from high-risk process equipment with the means to isolate / segregate electrical equipment, electrical earthing, control of static charge build-up, control of hot surfaces and elimination of mechanical impacts likely to produce sparking, the design of equipment to prevent mechanical sparking, exhaust systems for internal combustion engines and vent arrangements for tanks containing flammables.
• Detail-oriented methodology - capturing hazardous area data in both tabular and layout form allows for better identification of hazardous areas. Utilization of both the hazard area report and hazardous area equipment register allows for verification that electrical equipment is matched to the corresponding process conditions.
• Consistent approach - all outdoor / field electrical equipment (including equipment behind fire and blast wall) will be specified for minimum area classification requirements mentioned under Sec. 7.2.1. This accounts for uncertainty in developing the hazardous area drawings, potential for future process equipment near existing ignition sources, and provides additional ignition mitigation for catastrophic events.
7.2.2 Ventilation
Adequate ventilation is necessary to:
• Disperse fugitive emissions to prevent ignition and toxic effects on personnel, • Allow accidental releases to disperse and reduce consequences, and • Reduce severity of explosion.
Ventilation comprises the movement of air within and through platform decks for introduction of fresh air and dilution and removal of contaminants.
Equipment, piping and building layout on a deck shall be such that the wind or natural convection and air speed is not obstructed and reduced.
Following principles shall be followed to improve natural ventilation:
• Where possible long equipment should be oriented along the direction of prevailing
wind,
• Use of fire and blast wall should be minimized, • Congested areas where leaked gas can accumulate should be avoided, • Grated deck area shall be maximized to improve vertical air movement, and •
Inadequately ventilated areas must be avoided where personnel access is required.
Inadequately ventilated areas should be classified as Zone 1 since a secondary grade release may form a localized flammable atmosphere and persist for long periods. Adequacy of ventilation will be established through natural ventilation assessment as per EI 15 [Ref.113] guidelines as part of CFD dispersion and explosion modelling in Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA).
Process equipment shall be generally situated in open areas which allow good natural ventilation, thereby minimizing the risk of accumulation of flammable (or toxic) gases.
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Ventilation for buildings shall be provided where necessary to:
• Dilute possible gas leaks e.g. Battery Rooms where there is a risk of accumulation of
hydrogen, and
• Physically separate zones by differential pressure. Maintaining the pressure inside an enclosed area higher than the external pressure prevents the ingress of flammable (or toxic) gases into that area.
The Battery Room is held pressurized above atmospheric but below adjacent non-hazardous areas to prevent the egress of H2 gas and the ingress of HC gas.
Where non‐hazardous areas are located within hazardous areas, gas tight, self‐closing doors shall be provided as necessary together with sufficient mechanical ventilation to achieve a minimum level of pressurization of 50 Pa above the adjacent hazardous area.
When required, purged and pressurized enclosures for electrical equipment shall be installed to meet the applicable area classification.
The “Open Platform” concept of design shall maximize the use of natural ventilation facilities by using open grating on the platform to the extent possible.
7.2.2.1 Building
The location of air intakes in relation to adjacent process equipment shall be selected by considering prevailing wind direction, vent dispersion patterns and the hazard that results from possible formation of a flammable vapor/air mixture.
Air intakes shall be located in unclassified areas minimum 3 m (10 ft) horizontally away from Zone 0/1/2 envelopes.
Smoke, Toxic and Flammable Gas detection shall be provided for air intakes to shutdown air intake dampers and trip HVAC system upon confirmed detection of fire / gas.
For Battery Rooms, possible internal hydrogen gas releases to be diluted to an acceptable gas concentration where there is a risk of accumulation of hydrogen. It is also recommended to have the following provisions:
• H2 detectors, •
Interlock with the ventilation system such that ventilation failure will prevent the boost charging of battery charger (lead acid batteries emit H2 during charging),
• Motorized fire and gas damper at supply and exhaust. Blast damper shall be added if the building is prone to blast loads based on Explosion Risk Assessment (ERA Report), • For flooded lead-acid, flooded nickel cadmium, and VRLA batteries, ventilation shall be provided for rooms and cabinets in accordance with the mechanical code and API RP 500 [Ref.111], and
• Battery Room exhaust air flow rate shall comply with minimum exhaust required for H2 emission rate as per EN 50272-2 [Ref.143] or conditioned air flow rate required to meet Battery Room design temperature whichever is higher.
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7.3 Leak Minimization
The leak minimization shall be achieved by considering the applicable guidelines from the following for implementation:
• Material selection shall be critical to the inherent safe design and shall be assessed based on the fluid composition, temperature, pressure and external environment. Material selection shall be inherently corrosion resistant, and methods of corrosion prevention/ mitigation shall be specified,
• Design shall take into cognizance anticipated extreme operating and upset pressure, temperatures and external conditions considered for life cycle of the platform / FACILITY Equipment, Piping and supporting structures design to withstand accidental loads to minimize loss integrity during a Major Accident Event,
• Leak sources shall be minimized through design and critical review process like HAZOP, Design reviews, etc. This is critical since the fluid is toxic and it is necessary to ensure every effort is made to minimize the leak paths e.g., optimizing the flange joints, welded connection, use of non-intrusive instruments, etc.,
• Piping Layout design shall avoid dead legs, • Shutting down the source of supply (i.e., closing wells, stopping pumps, closing SDVs)
and depressurizing the blocked inventory,
• Equipment isolation shall minimize the potential leak sources, • Minimizing number of flanges as much as possible, and •
Installation of sensitive leak detection and fast-acting isolation to limit the inventory being released.
7.4 Building Protection
Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room; and UPS, Instrument & Telecom Room inside LER Building are categorized under Technical Rooms.
7.4.1 Fire and Blast Protection
LER Building shall be designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA 101 Life Safety Code [Ref.122] and API RP 752 [Ref.116].
Buildings shall be of non-combustible construction, containing, as far as possible, non- combustible fittings and furnishings. For more details, refer to Architectural Specification – Offshore for COMP3 Project [Ref.68].
LER Building includes TR Room, shall be protected by Fire and Blast wall and must be able to survive the fire (including the fire scenario for the endurance time) and blast loads stated in Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) Reports, and Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) Reports. LER Building is also to be located at non-hazardous area and at upwind location relative to the process facility.
Refer to Sec. 7.15.11 for LER Building and Passive Fire Protection Criteria.
Blast design should be considered as another load case in addition to those that are applied for the fire loading, transportation loading and environmental loading i.e. seismic and wave loadings, etc. In the structural evaluation of a defined fire and/or blast event, the structure should be designed to meet specific performance criteria.
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It may be that in some instances the blast load requirements are not the governing load design case, and that the inherent resistance of the structure as a resulting of designing for other design cases is capable of resisting credible load cases.
The purpose of blast philosophy is to:
• Provide the basis for establishing the applicable blast loading, • Provide a basis for the blast requirements, • Provide a basis where to apply the blast loads and drag loads, and • Determine those activities required to enable this philosophy to be applied.
Where areas exist that may produce an explosion / blast hazard, these areas are to be evaluated and protected as per safety study recommendations as applicable.
The explosion risk analysis shall be performed using CFD software (FLACS) to analyze potential explosion scenarios.
The ERA shall be based on the 3D model inputs which consider the complexity of the FACILITY. The potential for explosion events shall be prevented by implementing following measures:
• Design the FACILITY layouts to promote natural ventilation, • Provide sufficiently large vents at the periphery of any enclosure, •
If practicable, orient large items of equipment or equipment rooms such as to face their smallest cross-sectional area against the direction of flame front, and
• Avoid multiple obstructions generating turbulence.
Based on the generated exceedance curves a set of explosions loads with a reoccurrence frequency, as per Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.6] shall be conformed in respective platform’s Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) and Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) Reports.
According to COMPANY’s QRA Guideline:
• The frequency 1 x 10-4 per year for each type of accidental load is the limit of acceptability for the impairment of safety functions (e.g. escape routes, riser ESDV, flare boom supports, critical piping), and
• 5 x 10-5 per year frequency DAL values are applicable where the system or structure is required to survive to protect evacuation systems. 5 x 10-5 per year frequency DAL values will be applicable to primary members required to prevent collapse of platform thus protecting the evacuation systems.
7.4.1.1 Structures
The critical platform structures shall be designed to resist blast overpressures determined by Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA).
Structures that are essential for controlled evacuation of the platform are considered critical and must survive the accidental event. Structure that needs to survive any blast event are:
• At least One primary escape route from each deck towards TR (within LER Building),
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• At least One Staircase (connected with above survived escape route), • LER Building, • Supports of TEMPSC, • At least one life raft, • Primary and secondary beam around WHP and RP’s LER Building and WHP13N
TEMPSC,
• Fire and Blast walls on WHP and each RPs Main Deck and Mezzanine deck and
associated structural beams,
• Structural supports for critical piping such as riser support, ESDVs flare piping,
structural members supporting HC vessels,
• Flare knock out drum and separators, and • Bridge support structural beams.
7.4.2 Pressurization
A building or equipment enclosure that contains unclassified electrical equipment or other potential ignition sources shall be pressurized when these are located in an area that is electrically classified. Pressurization of LER Building shall meet API RP 505 [Ref.112] requirements (50 Pa).
Airlocks shall be provided for pressurized LER Building to conserve inside pressures while opening and closing of doors. It shall be provided for the normally accessed perimeter door.
An alarm shall be provided to indicate low building or enclosure pressure after 30 seconds (allowance for opening / closing of doors). Alarms associated with not normally attended buildings shall annunciate in the RGA/NFB complex.
7.4.3 Requirements for Temporary Refuge (TR)
Following are the essential requirements for Temporary Refuge (TR):
• The TR shall be located as far from drilling and process hazards as practicable, • Shall be capable of accommodating 100% of POB with the minimum area of 0.6 m2
per person,
• The TR shall provide the communications, monitoring and control equipment
necessary to ensure personal safety,
• There shall be at least two independent means of communicating from TR to RGA/NFB
complex located away from the installation,
• Additional space may be required to enable personnel to undertake any required activities e.g. (donning breathing apparatus etc.). Space shall also be provided to accommodate stretcher,
• The TR shall provide space for the storage of, and access to, adequate quantities of
emergency/medical equipment,
• The TR shall have at least two independent exits to the evacuation stations (i.e.
helideck, TEMPSC, etc.),
• The TR shall be designed for internal environmental factors such as temperature increase and air quality following HVAC shutdown in an emergency, together with any other local environmental factors that could persist for the duration that the TR is specified to be required, and
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• The TR shall be designed to offer personnel protection from fire (e.g. radiant heat and smoke), blast and other hazards as necessary, consistent with EER analysis, for sufficient time to allow for organized controlled evacuation. The TR should also provide protection from environmental hazards, as applicable (i.e. sun, wind, cold and heat).
Specification for Temporary Refuge for COMP3 Project [Ref.32] shall be prepared to cover the detailed requirements of the same.
7.5 Subsea Pipelines
7.5.1 Design Conditions
Pipelines shall:
• Be designed as per the design code requirement (DNV-ST-F101 [Ref.136] / ASME B
31.8 [Ref.117], as applicable),
• Be designed to COMPANY standards and procedures applicable for the pipeline
design,
• Be designed to convey fluids without loss of integrity, • Be based on location class, fluid category and potential failure consequences for each
failure mode identified in the risk analysis,
• Have sufficient safety margin against accidental loads and unplanned operational
conditions,
• Fulfil the COMPANY safety and reliability objectives and have the required resistance
against the loads they are exposed to during operational conditions,
• Fulfil the specified transport under given operational conditions capacity (pressure,
temperature, flow, composition etc.),
• Fulfil the possibility of changes during pipeline systems lifetime with respect to
composition or type of product to be transported,
• Take into account the need to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance, • Be monitored for violation of its integrity by provision of appropriate monitoring systems
such as:
o Corrosion Monitoring (Internal and External), and o
Inspection (Internal & External).
• Shall provide with suitable pressure control systems, • Be provided with an effective over pressure protection system if it is anticipated, the
design pressure can be exceeded under normal operational conditions,
• Be provided with an effective Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system, • Be provided with an automatic pressure safety system to protect the downstream system during incident operation. A pressure safety system is not required if the pressure source to the pipeline cannot deliver a pressure in excess of the maximum incidental pressure,
• Have adequate safety measures against sinking or floatation, • Be routed with due regard to the probabilities of damage to the pipeline, • Be installed at suitable location to prevent or minimize geo-hazards, physical factors, and state of seabed resulting in damage to pipeline or disturbance to foreign structures, other pipeline system, wrecks, boulders, etc.,
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• Be trenched, buried or appropriately protected if external damage affecting the integrity of the pipeline is likely and where necessary to prevent or reduce interference with other activities, and
• Be routed outside of crane slew areas and dropped object zones where possible. Where not possible on normally attended FACILITIES, pipeline approaches within the crane slew area and dropped object zone shall be provided with dropped object protections. Subsea drop object assessment shall be carried out to evaluate the risk of drop object impacting the lines and set of mitigation measure as applicable.
7.5.2 Pipeline Route
The Subsea Pipeline route shall be selected with due regard to the probabilities of damage to the pipe.
Ideally, pipeline shall be routed as close to a straight line as possible. However, factors such as route obstructions, seabed soil conditions, geohazards, third party existing FACILITIES, rig exclusion zones, environmental considerations, etc. may necessitate the introduction of turning points into the pipeline routing. Some of the key criteria considered while routing the proposed fuel gas network pipeline are summarized in this section.
The pipeline routes selection based on local regulations, guidelines and requirements outlined in DNV-ST-F101 [Ref.136] as summarized below:
• Pipeline route selection shall comply with government regulations and authority
permits that apply to the jurisdiction of Qatar,
• Minimize total pipeline length as much as practicable to achieve hydraulic efficiency, • Minimizing number of pipeline crossings, • Crossing of existing pipelines and cables on acute angle crossing (< 30 deg) are to be avoided. Any crossing with < 30 deg angle needs to get prior approval from COMPANY. For third party crossing NOC, crossing angle shall not be less than 60degree. For other third-party crossings (other than COMPANY and NOC), crossing angle shall not be less than 45 degree,
• Avoid pipeline crossing on curves, where possible, • Minimize third party interfaces (pipelines, cables, platforms), where reasonably practicable. Assess clearance requirements, installation and legal aspects to determine risk prior to finalization,
• The following minimum separation distances from platforms shall be maintained:
o 500 m from Third Party platforms, o 200 m from third parties subsea pipelines and cables (wherever possible), o 1500 m from third parties SPM / FPSO, and o 200 m from COMPANY’s platforms.
• The platform approaches shall allow for the spool pieces and riser stalk-on installation, • Minimize interference between future looping and compression investments and
drilling investment pipelines,
• Avoid shipping, fishing, military lines and areas, • Avoid existing or unknown future obstructions/crossing (pipelines, cable, etc.) and seabed obstructions and hazards (seabed depression, pockmark, outcrop, craters and shallow gas pocket, etc.).,
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• Minimum allowable horizontal pipeline curvature shall be determined along the
proposed pipeline route based on curve stability during installation,
• Minimum straight section at start and laydown locations will be selected to avoid
potential pipeline shifting during pipe lay, and
• Ensure safe pipeline installation and approach to platform location.
No pipeline is allowed to be routed within Drilling Rig Exclusion Zone (Subsea and Pipeline).
Topsides Riser ESDVs located area shall be covered with flame detectors to initiate ESDVs to shut in case the valve is exposed to fire.
Risers shall be in areas to minimize potential hazards from falling objects, liquid hydrocarbon overflow, explosion, or flame impingement to prevent damage to valves, actuators, and associated instrumentation.
Pipeline and cable route approaches to platform will be designed to minimize the risks of accidental dropped objects from platform crane onto subsea items. In particular, the platform laydown areas and the off-boarding of equipment will be located as much as possible far and in the opposite edge of riser / J-tube locations.
The integrity of submarine pipeline system will be ensured based on the DNV-ST-F101 [Ref.136] as regarding the accidental loads. The target failure frequencies reported in Sec. 2 of DNV-ST-F101 [Ref.136] will be considered both for the dropped object assessment and ship traffic interaction assessment.
7.5.3 Pipeline Protection
The integrity of the pipelines will be ensured through compliance with the applicable design codes as outlined in the Trunklines and Pipelines Design Basis [Ref.70] and Technical Specification for Subsea Composite Cables Cables [Ref.69].
In addition, any requirement for supplementary protection to the pipelines and cables against accidental loads caused by abnormal and unplanned conditions will be evaluated in accordance with DNV-RP-F107 [Ref.135].
The identified credible threats include:
• Dropped objects in close proximity of the platforms which may have an impact on the
risers, spools, pipelines and cables,
• Vessel impact on the platform which may have an impact on the risers, • Dropped and dragged anchors which may have an impact on the pipelines and cables,
and
• Trawl interference which may have an impact on the pipelines and cables.
The pipeline design that might have a big impact to personnel safety on the platform is the pipeline releases in close proximity to the platform, including the risers. The riser and pipeline failure on the close proximity to the platform is considered to be the biggest risk contributor in terms of loss of containment event due to their large volume inventories.
Some risk reduction measures shall be incorporated into the design of the process piping and pipelines. Both High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) for pipeline overpressure
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scenarios and low-pressure trip systems for pipeline leaks scenarios will be considered in the design of the platform to protect the pipelines from failure (high pressure) or to provide mitigation by isolating the pipelines in the case of pipeline loss of containment (low pressure). Other measures will be considered as part of the FRA, ERA and EERA assessments.
Dropped Object Studies will be performed for each platform to assess the dropped object risk to the riser and pipeline sections close to the platform boundary and to analyze whether additional control or mitigation measures are required to reduce the dropped object risk.
A failure of the pipeline at any point along the route may pose a risk to the environment and people safety (vessels crossing the pipeline). This scenario may result due to interference with third party activities such as commercial ship traffic and trawling activity. The need of protection will be evaluated with a specific assessment, Intrafield Pipelines, Spur Lines and Cables Ship Traffic Interaction Assessment [Ref.1].
The below protection measure will be considered in the design:
• exclusion zone of minimum 500 m from platform to avoid any access for third-party
vessel.
Since no boat trawling activity in the PROJECT area has been recorded from the Marine Traffic Data acquired during EPCOL PROJECT and considering bottom trawling activities are banned in Qatari waters, no fishing traffic assessment will be carried out for COMP3 Project.
7.6 Platform Drainage
Drain system shall be designed to prevent:
• Migration of a fire, flammable liquids or vapors / toxic liquids or vapors from one
hazardous area to another, or to a non-hazardous area, and
• Pressure build-up in the drain system.
The classification of drainage system is split in two (2) systems:
• Open Drain System, and • Closed Drain System.
The Open Drain System is intended to prevent the release of oil-contaminated rain or washdown water or minor oil leaks/spills to the sea. The system shall collect oily wastewater from equipment skid drain pans, solid-decking drains of the platform or offshore FACILITIES and shall convey the contaminated water to an Open Drain Tank and Open Drain Caisson.
Drains from pressurized equipment shall be routed to a system of closed drain headers and a LP Flare KO / Closed Drain Drum. The drum is located on the lowest deck of platform where recovered hydrocarbons shall be pumped back to process stream.
Drain System shall comply with Process Drain Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.46].
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7.7 Platform Isolations
Isolation of systems, equipment and instruments from either within the system or from adjacent systems will be required for the following reasons:
• Maintenance/inspection of the system or individual components and instruments within
the system, Isolation of the standby system, component or instrument during operation,
• • Media segregation, e.g. utility connections to process systems, and • Limit the inventory in case of emergency.
The following key aspects shall be considered in developing isolation philosophy:
• Bridge connected piping ESD isolation, with ESDV provided at the receiving FACILITY
end including for fuel gas purging to flare at WHP.
Isolation requirements shall be detailed within Isolation Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.45].
7.7.1
Interlocks
Interlock for pig launcher / receiver door, meant to prevent opening when the launcher / receiver is under pressure, shall be of mechanical interlock.
7.8 Pressure Relief, Venting and Flaring
Pressure Relief System collects the vapor and gas discharges from pressure relief valves, vapor depressurizing valves and route the relief to flare system. There are High Pressure (HP) Flaring and Low Pressure (LP) Flaring systems. Relief and Blowdown Study Report [Ref.71 to 76] for respective greenfield platforms shall be prepared and submitted for COMPANY approval. For brownfield platforms, Instrument Adequacy Report will be prepared and submitted to COMPANY.
Relief protection for fire and thermal contingencies must be considered as applicable from codes and / or standards.
For a fire condition, pressure safety valves are provided as per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Automatic depressurization facilities at the affected platform and bridge-linked piping section (and manually / automatically initiated with time delay for non-affected area) are provided on NFPS COMP3 topsides in the event of emergency.
Depressurization valve is to be provided for isolated hydrocarbon gas volume of 1 m3 or higher.
The location and elevation of flare shall meet the thermal radiation and gas (Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), H2S, SO2) dispersion criteria defined in below Table 7.8.3.
The flare gas dispersion must be assessed for flameout conditions at peak relief rates.
The flare boom location shall also meet the requirements of CAP437 [Ref.129] on obstacle free zone and temperature limit on Helideck.
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BDV hardwired push button will be provided on the Auxiliary console (within Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER Building) for the WHP13N and reset will be provided on the DCS graphics.
Flare Studies shall be carried out for normal and emergency flaring case. The FACILITY’s design shall take into account radiation level, SO2 dispersion of flare gas, H2S dispersion in case of flame-out, flame proximity to equipment and structures, temperature rise on equipment and structures, presence of heat sensitive equipment etc. Radiation studies shall consider the effect of solar radiation as one of the scenarios.
Flare Radiation and Dispersion calculations shall be carried out as per below criteria:
Table 7.8.1: Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Emergency Flaring in W/m 2 (Btu/Hr/Ft2) Excluding Solar Radiation
Receptor Type
Travel time to shelter:
Appropriate Clothing kW/m2 (Btu/Hour/Ft2) Note1
1 min
3 min
6.3 (2000)
4.73 (1500)
15.77 (5000)
2.3 (750)
Personnel
Equipment
Volatile liquid tanks, API separator
Notes:
Without Appropriate Clothing kW/m2 (Btu/Hour/Ft2) Note1 3.15 (1000)
1.58 (500)
(1)
Appropriate clothing such as coveralls, long sleeved shirts, pants, hard hat, etc., which can shield all body areas except for the face and hands from exposure to flare radiant heat.
The limits for radiant heat flux (excluding solar radiation) during periodic long duration flaring is provided below:
Table 7.8.2: Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities for Periodic Long Duration Flaring Excluding Solar Radiation
Area/Region
Hot / Tropical
Radiation intensity (kW/m2)
0.780
Radiation calculations shall be made for flares on existing platforms when the maximum flowrate has changed. A safe working zone shall be defined for pipeline installation activities outside flare radiation zone (3.2 kW/m2).
Dispersion calculations shall be made for flares (assuming flame-out) to ensure that concentrations shall be below hazardous limits (e.g. 25% lower flammable limit for flammable fluids and threshold limit value for toxic fluids as per Table 7.8.3) anywhere in the FACILITY
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during expected releases. The dispersion analysis shall also ensure that concentrations in areas where gas detectors are present shall be below the alarm set point of the detectors.
Table 7.8.3: Allowable H2S and SO2 Limits
Limit Type
Parameter
Limit
Threshold Limit Value (TLV)
Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) (15 minutes)
H2S
SO2
H2S
SO2
5 ppm during 8 hr. period
2 ppm during 8 hr. period
10 ppm
3 ppm
For Helideck, the maximum permissible concentration of hydrocarbon gas within the helicopter operating area is 10% LFL, as per CAP 437 [Ref.129].
Vent rate shall be at least 100 ft/sec (30 m/sec) for effective dispersion but shall not exceed 75% of sonic rate (for noise and choked flow consideration) for greenfield platforms. For brownfield platforms, existing criteria shall be followed.
The distance between the flare and helideck should be maximized.
Flare tip access platform
Flare tip access platform shall be designed to withstand anticipated heat intensity; hence heat shield is not required as the flare platform access is restricted.
7.9 Loss of Containment (LOC)
The following lists the potential LOC related to the PROJECT, and the methods to minimize the potential of LOC:
• Potential LOC could occur as result of future corrosion, flange and seal leaks during operations. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC are the use of double seals, LDAR, preventative maintenance, inspection, appropriate material selection and minimizing the numbers of flanges,
• Potential LOC could occur if pigging procedures are not followed or if pig ejects from receiver due to improper latching during pigging operations. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC are using interlocks, orienting it away from the process area / equipment,
• Potential LOC could occur due to the overpressure leading to a vessel rupture. Methods to minimize the potential for LOC is through using ESD, rupture disc and relief valves, In general, kerb & drain for containing and channeling of spilled or leaked hydrocarbons / chemicals shall be provided around the process areas,
•
• Design shall take into cognizance anticipated extreme operating and upset pressure, temperatures and external conditions considered for life cycle of the platform / FACILITY’s Equipment, Piping and Supporting Structures design to withstand accidental loads to minimize loss integrity during a major accident event,
• Piping Layout design shall avoid dead legs,
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• Pipe pressure rating to be designed as fully rated against the pump shut-in pressure,
as extensive as possible, and
• For hydrocarbon piping across bridges, fully welded joints (including interface with valves) to be implemented; connection between bridge and topside should be flanged.
The potential Loss of Containment shall be identified during the HAZOP Analysis or via other Safety Studies.
7.10 Structural Response to Vessel Impact
This section does not consider high energy impacts from passing vessels. This risk is managed largely through Automatic Identification System (AIS) rather than relying on the installation structural capacity.
AIS may be installed on the North and South greenfield platform locations, based on the results of coverage study by TSI for RP5N, RP6N, WHP13N, RP5S, RP9S and RP3S platforms. AIS will support the marine radar system and shall provide the respective platforms information (platform name and position) to identify a particular offshore platform to the passing vessels / ship in order to avoid any collision. It shall also be used to monitor the vessels’ movement within the surrounding FACILITIES using the system. The AIS system shall be used to monitor and alarm if any vessels are approaching or in the near vicinity of COMPANY subsea cables and pipelines.
Collision can be caused by:
• drifting in wave, wind and current, and • operator error or system failure resulting in drive on impact.
Impact from vessel collision can cause structural member failure, partial failure or in extreme cases complete failure of the installation structure. This can impair the Temporary Refuge (TR) or cause equipment failure. Equipment such as risers, ESD valves, conductors and caissons located in the vicinity of the impact zone are vulnerable to vessel impact and can also be damaged by:
•
failure or partial failure of members supporting or shielding vulnerable equipment. Most risers and some conductors are supported or shielded by legs, braces and guards, • excessive deflection or relative displacements of equipment supports as a result of
structural damage, and
• deck accelerations caused by vessel impact - these can be sufficiently high to cause
damage to equipment supports, the equipment itself or its controls.
The risk of vessel collision should be controlled by ensuring that WHP (WHP13N), RPs (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N) and Bridge Supports Platforms (BSP3S and BSP5S) installations are able to retain sufficient structural integrity to withstand vessel collision.
The ship collision study should contain all the relevant details of the vessel impact assessment. The safety case should contain full details of the measures taken to manage vessel impact, including reference to:
• structural assessment and consequences of damage or deflections, • marine procedures,
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limiting sea states and the assumed drift speed, and
• • other relevant considerations.
The Ship Collision Study shall:
• Analyze vessel collision risks to the Greenfield platform jackets from vessels visiting the complex (like supply vessel, offloading tanker and other errant vessels) and the Platform exclusion zone; and
• Verify if the design of jacket substructures/tripods/associated bridges (including BSP) and brownfield bridge support structures is adequate and highlight additional risk reduction measures as deemed necessary.
7.11 Material Selection
Materials shall be selected to prevent catastrophic failures or major environmental releases. The type of service (sweet, sour, wet, dry and acid gas) and the use of materials for low and high temperature services should be considered for material selection. The selection of materials of construction is based on the process simulations, Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), Material Design Basis Memorandum, Heat Material Balances (HMBs) and the Lessons Learned (LL) where applicable as per scope of work and requirements available, for the PROJECT.
Materials used for piping and equipment shall be per the design specifications and in accordance with the PROJECT materials specifications and engineering standards. It shall also comply with Piping Material Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.63] and Material Selection Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.77]. All carbon steel and alloy steel thermally insulated systems shall be protected from Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) by adequate coating application.
The corrosive effects of the components of the process streams should also be considered. Special considerations of material selection are required for CO2, sour gas, and produced water. The major corrosive component in the process fluid is wet CO2 and H2S. This CO2, dissolves in water form carbonic acid which is corrosive to carbon steel. H2S is present in the production fluid during the design life of the PROJECT. Severity of Wet H2S service shall depend on the H2S content and pH of water in contact with the metal.
7.12 Fire and Gas Detection
7.12.1 Main Features of Fire and Gas System (FGS)
The main objective of Fire and Gas System (FGS) is to detect gas releases and fires as early as possible such that any hazard to personnel and damage to assets is minimized.
FGS shall alert personnel to a detected F&G situation and give information on its approximate location and extent so that timely action can be taken to minimize risk to personnel, assets and the environment.
FGS shall monitor areas where fire, flammable gas or toxic gas is expected.
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Upon confirming flammable gas or fire, FGS shall initiate automatic Emergency Shutdown (ESD), isolation and depressurization of the concerned equipment / system via interface with logic and control by ESD.
FGS shall automatically activate:
• DIFFS upon confirmed fire via flame detection at Helideck, and • NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System upon confirmed fire via smoke detection inside Technical Rooms of LER Building to mitigate hazard consequences.
FGS shall also initiate isolation, shutdown & depressurization through ESD interface based on confirmed fire and gas detection conditions and transmit all F&G status & alerts to DCS.
FGS shall be connected to UPS, via two power sources.
The design life for all greenfield FACILITIES including WHP13N and each RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N), pipelines, pig receivers, subsea cables, all equipment, all connector systems, and associated hardware items shall be 30 years. The FGS shall also meet this FACILITY design life span requirement.
The typical sequence of development of F&G detection layout are:
Identify the type of hazard (fire, gas and smoke),
• • Define the relevant fire zones, • Classify the criticality of the identified hazards, • Develop F&G detector layouts and FGS configuration, • Perform F&G mapping study, and • Confirm F&G detector locations.
As far as practicable for maintenance simplification and in particular for brownfield, the new fire & gas detectors should be selected of similar type and brand as those installed on the existing FACILITIES.
Prevailing wind direction shall be considered while locating the F&G detectors.
7.12.1.1 Logic System
The FGS, which includes all fire detectors, flammable, H2 & toxic (hydrogen sulfide) gas detectors and applicable active fire protection systems shall be hardwired to FGS and interfaced with DCS for operational monitoring, testing and alerting purposes.
On each greenfield platforms, an operator workstation with Auxiliary console shall be provided within the Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of the LER Building.
FGS Graphics for the scope of work of this PROJECT shall be configured within the existing RGA/NFB complex. No new workstation/HMI is envisaged inside RGA/NFB Complex as part of this PROJECT. All critical alarms, detection and notification shall be available to the DCS Console Operator.
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7.12.1.2 Basic Functions
The FGS shall operate with the following functionality:
• Detection of fires and accumulations of flammable or hazardous gases, • Annunciation of alarms to alert personnel and identify the general location of the
hazard,
• Operation of strobe lights of specific color and audible alarms through PAGA based on
•
fire and gas signals from FGS, Initiate executive actions such as emergency shutdown, blow down and isolation of Electrical System through ESD based on confirmed fire and flammable gas signals from FGS,
• Electrical Isolation of crane through ESD based on confirmed fire and flammable gas
•
• •
•
signals from FGS, Initiate executive actions such as Fire and gas Damper closure and trip HVAC system / HVAC AHU system fan based on confirmed fire and gas signals from FGS, Initiate Helideck Wave-off Lights based on confirmed fire and gas signals from FGS, Initiate door opening of LER Building through ACS based on confirmed fire and gas signals from FGS, and Initiate DIFFS and NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System based on confirmed fire at the respective fire zones from FGS.
7.12.1.3 Components Parts
Detection - Fire and Gas detectors shall be positioned throughout the installation and shall consist of the following:
• Detection systems in the HVAC air intakes and HVAC plenum outlet of AHU fan, of the
LER building,
• Fire and Gas (F&G) control logic solver integrated with the platform safety system or
SIS will provide:
o Control: The Fire and Gas (F&G) logic solver shall continuously examine input from all sensors and generate alarms, also indications and data for appropriate operator action to be taken, if deemed necessary,
o
o Voting logic shall be used for automatic control actions to minimize nuisance trips and unnecessary production losses. This means using a combination of detector alarm signals from a fire zone, typically, 2ooN voting arrangements, such that two detectors are required to confirm a fire and gas detection before control / executive action can occur, In general, fault alarms from fire detectors that are part of 2ooN voting logic should be treated by the voting logic as a fire condition (e.g., one detector in fault condition in a 2oo3 voting group means the logic requires 1oo2 of the remaining detectors for control action). 2ooN voting logic degrades to 1ooN voting logic and a faulted device will count as a vote. However, Fire & Gas System VENDOR shall verify with the logic of the existing North / South platforms and align the philosophy as per the existing philosophy,
o Operator override/bypass of fire detectors should be treated by the voting logic
as being in the healthy condition,
o The application of an override to a detector shall not prevent audible and visual
alarms at the HMI for that detector, and
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o Local override devices shall NOT be installed on Fire, Gas and Smoke
detection systems.
• Active Fire Protection: Active fire protection such as DIFFS is to be provided for Helideck; and NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System is to be provided for Technical Rooms inside LER Building. Where initiation of an active fire protection system is required, this shall be operated automatically on receipt of control signals (confirmed fire); (or) remote manually from central RGA/NFB complexes for QGS and QGN platforms; (or) manually via local pushbuttons. The remote manual activation of fire protection system will be limited to the DIFFS and is not considered for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System. In addition, mechanical means of activation at the individual skids will be also available.
7.12.1.4 The Effective Design
The effective design of FGS shall ensure detection and alarm a loss of containment or F&G event and alert & take appropriate executive actions thereby reducing the risk to personnel, environment and asset.
New FGS shall be provided on greenfield platforms to monitor the FACILITY for the detection of fire and flammable / toxic gas and for initiating active fire protection systems like NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System for Technical Rooms in LER Building and DIFFS for Helideck.
FGS shall initiate F&G damper closure and interface with HVAC system for taking appropriate action (HVAC System trip / start permissive) based on fire and gas detection. FGS shall also initiate interface with HVAC system for tripping of HVAC AHU fan based on smoke detection. FGS shall also interface with ESD system for shutdown & electrical isolations.
Self-monitoring detection systems shall be provided to detect faults. Fault detection shall register an appropriate signal at system displays on workstations in RGA/NFB complex.
Instrumentation Cables to field detectors and ESD cable shall be fire resistant as per IEC 60331.
FGS shall be supplied with power from the essential power supply main battery back-up designed as per NFPA 72. FGS shall be connected to UPS, via two power sources. Battery autonomy time shall be as per Specification for Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) for COMP3 Project [Ref.56].
The FGS shall consist of cabinets located in Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER Building and operator workstation from which the status of the detection & protection systems is visible.
For Brownfield modifications, extensions to the existing Fire and Gas monitoring system shall be required to monitor the FACILITY for the fire and gas detection.
7.12.1.5 Control and Indicating Equipment
F&G Detectors should be connected to a suitable controller (logic solver) that implements any logic functions.
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• Type and configuration of controller (logic solver) should be suitable for the following:
o Size and complexity of application, and o Voted channel logic consistent with functional effectiveness and minimizing
spurious trips.
Specification for Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) for COMP3 Project [Ref.56] will be prepared for the PROJECT, capturing the requirements.
7.12.1.6 FGS Outputs
The following is a summary of the outputs for the FGS control system:
• Fire Control - direct hardwired outputs to Fire Extinguishing Control Panel (FECP) for the initiation of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression Systems upon confirmed fire detection in the clean agent protected room,
• Fire Control - direct hardwired outputs to Local Control Panel for the initiation of DIFFS
upon confirmed fire detection on the Helideck,
• To ESD System – ESD network interface to initiate emergency shutdown (ESD-1) and electrical system isolation (including crane power isolation) upon confirmed fire and flammable gas detection,
• To initiate Helideck Wave-off Lights based on confirmed fire and gas signals, • To PAGA System - automatic initiation of general warning alarms (audible) under certain designated hazardous situations (fire & gas detection and activation of active fire protection system) are driven by PAGA via FGS,
• To PAGA System - automatic initiation of F&G Strobes (visual) under designated fire and gas situations, and for activation of active fire protection system is driven by PAGA via FGS,
• To HVAC System – direct hardwired signals to initiate shutdown of the system for confirmed toxic gas, flammable gas and fire (smoke) at HVAC air intakes, confirmed fire & gas detection at platform, confirmed fire detection at LER building, manual activation of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System; and to close Fire and Gas dampers,
• To HVAC System – direct hardwired signals to for tripping of HVAC system AHU fan
based on smoke detection, and
• To Access Control System (ACS) – to initiate unlocking of doors upon confirmed fire
and gas detection.
Specification for Field Instrumentation (incl. Flow, Level, Pressure and Temperature Instrumentation & F&G Detectors) for COMP3 Project Ref.57] will be prepared to cover the technical requirements of F&G Detectors.
7.12.2 Gas Detection System Objectives
The main objective of flammable and toxic gas detection is to detect accumulations and leaks of flammable gas as early as possible, such that action can be taken manually or automatically to minimize release size and likelihood of ignition and to allow sufficient time to evacuate personnel to safety.
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The secondary objective is to achieve this detection, with minimum nuisance alarms, at minimum installed and operational cost and to provide the highest reliability or likelihood of detection.
Gas detection shall be required when any of the following apply:
• Detection is assumed or recommended in safety studies, such as:
o Fire Risk Analysis, and o Fire and Gas Mapping.
• Enclosed or semi-enclosed areas where flammable gases could credibly accumulate
and present a hazard from releases either:
Inside the area,
o o Outside the area but drawn into the area by mechanical ventilation, o Systems, differential pressures, or air movement, and o Areas in which large volumes of gas could credibly be released.
Gas detectors shall be provided on all decks where leaks of hazardous gases could originate. Flammable and Toxic gas detection shall be provide near the fresh air intake of crane cabin. Toxic and Flammable Gas detectors shall also be provided at the air intakes to the LER building; and toxic gas detector for LER’s airlock area. H2 gas detection is employed in the Battery Room of LER Building. If hazardous gases are present in the process areas in hazardous quantities, detectors shall be provided to detect leaks of these gases. Multiple gas detectors for each area shall be provided for area coverage. The type and location of gas detectors within these areas shall be determined considering the following:
• Gas composition (flammability, toxicity), • Ventilation or airflow pattern, • Environmental conditions (wind, rain, dust, and airborne contaminants), • Accessibility for maintenance, calibration and testing, and • Protection from accidental damage.
7.12.3 Fire Detection System Objectives
The main objective of fire detection is to detect fires in its incipient stage, to minimize immediate consequences and prevent escalation. Detection enables action to be taken manually or automatically to:
•
Isolate the fuel source, if safe to do so, to minimize fire size and risk to personnel, the environment, and damage to the FACILITY, and
• Evacuate personnel to safety,
The secondary objective is to achieve this detection:
• With minimum nuisance alarms, and • Provide the highest reliability or likelihood of detection.
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Triple-band IR type flame detectors will be provided on all decks. In addition, heat detectors and smoke detectors shall be provided for crane engine and cabin, respectively. Smoke detection is also employed within LER Building.
FGS shall interface with FECP of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System provided for Technical Rooms inside LER Building. Local alarms on status panel shall be provided to indicate when these fire suppression systems are temporarily deactivated / inhibited. Local alarm shall be provided to indicate imminent discharge to warn personnel when the platform is manned.
FGS shall actuate DIFFS in case of confirmed fire detection via flame detectors installed on Helideck.
7.12.4 Fire and Gas Detection for LER Building of Greenfield Platforms
Internal positive pressure is maintained in LER building in WHP13N and RPs (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N).
Following detectors shall be provided:
• At Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) air intake:
o Flammable Gas Detector (3 Nos.), o Hydrogen Sulfide Gas Detector (3 Nos.), and o Smoke Detector (3 Nos.).
• At Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) plenum AHU outlet fan:
o Smoke Detector (2 Nos.) for each system.
• At building airlock area:
o Hydrogen Sulfide Gas Detector (1 No.)
•
Inside building:
o High Sensitivity Smoke Detection (HSSD) for Electrical, Instrument & Telecom
Cabinets; and False Floor Void of Technical Rooms and TR Room,
o Smoke Detectors (for Technical Rooms, and TR Room, Office, Toilet, Battery
Room),
o Smoke Detectors below false floor void (for Technical Rooms and TR Room), o Hydrogen Gas Detectors (inside Battery Room), and o Manual Alarm Call Points (MACP).
Positioning of smoke detector in buildings shall be according to NFPA 72 [Ref.121].
7.12.4.1 NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System
Automatic release of extinguishing agents shall be controlled by the FGS but shall only occur if at least two (2) smoke detectors within the same fire zone confirm a fire condition. Manual initiation of the extinguishing agent shall be via pushbuttons for local activation and mechanical release shall be from the cylinder bank. All automatic & manual (from local manual release
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push buttons) extinguishing agent releases shall be locally pre-alarmed prior to initiation. System shall be provided with main/reserve selection, abort and auto/manual/inhibit selection capabilities.
7.12.5 Fire and Gas Detection for Process Area
The following types of Fire and Gas detection shall be provided:
• Flammable Gas Detectors (IR point type), • Toxic (H2S) Gas Detectors, • Flame Detectors (triple-band IR), and • Manual Alarm Call Points (MACP).
7.12.6 Fire Detection for Helideck
The following types of Fire detection shall be provided:
• Flame Detectors (triple-band IR), and • Manual Alarm Call Points (MACP).
7.12.6.1 Deck Integrated Firefighting System (DIFFS)
Automatic release of DIFFS shall be controlled by the FGS but shall only occur if at least two (2) flame detectors within the Helideck confirm a fire condition. Manual initiation of the DIFFS shall be local and from the FGS (from RGA/NFB complex). For remotely activating the DIFFS system from NFB (for North platforms), or RGA (for South platforms) complex, additional provision shall be considered at their control rooms. In future, post all the compression hubs being in place, the provision for remote DIFFS activation from RGA/NFB Control Room for the new RPs and WHP of COMP3 project, shall be shifted to their respective CP/LQ hubs and to be executed as part of future Project scope by other EPC Contract. Post compression for RP5N, remote manual activation of DIFFS shall be available from CP4N & CP6N platforms (by other EPC Contract). System shall be provided with main/reserve selection for N2 cylinders, manual override and auto/manual/inhibit selection capabilities.
7.12.7 Fire and Gas Detection for Pedestal Cranes
IR point type flammable gas detectors (3 Nos.) shall be located near fresh air intake of crane cabin.
Electro-chemical type toxic gas detectors (3 Nos.) shall be located near fresh air intake of crane cabin.
Rate compensated type heat detectors (2 Nos.) shall be installed in the crane machinery compartment.
Photo-electric type smoke detectors (2 Nos.) shall be installed in the crane cabin.
Local audible and visual alarm for flammable and toxic gas, confirmed flammable and toxic gas, fire, confirmed fire, loss of pressurization, general platform alarm and prepare to abandon shall be provided in the Operator’s cabin. One (1 no.) red and blue flashing strobe light shall be provided on the top of the crane cabin and inside the crane cabin.
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7.12.8 Fire and Gas Detector Type and Selection
The following should be considered when choosing the type of detectors to be implemented on the FACILITY:
• Detectors should be selected to detect the appropriate hazard, • Detectors should be capable of detecting hazards as they occur, especially considering
onsite sources that will affect device detection performance,
• Consideration should be given to sources on the FACILITY that could cause the
detector to false alarm,
• Equipment will have diagnostics capability to detect faults, confirm detector online and
provide fault alarms,
• Use of detectors with independent certification in accordance with IEC 61508 [Ref.133] as SIL capable is encouraged but is not a requirement for F&G functions that do not have a SIL rating of 1 or higher,
• CCTV located at the deck areas support the F&G detection. CCTV images will be
displayed on the new EWS at RGA/NFB complex,
• The following are the recommended detector types for the platform:
o Photo-electric Smoke Detectors – Technical Rooms & TR Room (including false floor void), Battery Room, Office Room, Toilet, HVAC System air intake & plenum outlet of AHU fan and crane cabin,
o High Sensitivity Smoke Detector (HSSD) - Technical Rooms & TR Room (for Electrical, Telecom & Instrument Control Cabinets and room’s raised floor), o Toxic gas detector shall be Electro-chemical Cell sensing technology - all deck areas, near fresh air intake of crane cabin, LER Airlock, and HVAC System air intake of LER Building,
o Triple-band IR type detectors shall be used for flame detection - all deck areas
and transformer area,
o Point type IR detectors shall be used for flammable gas detection – all deck areas, near fresh air intake of crane cabin, and HVAC System air intake of LER Building,
o Heat Detectors (rate compensated) shall be used for crane machinery room,
and
o Hydrogen gas detector shall be used in Battery Room.
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Table 7.12.8.1 provides summary of F&G devices envisaged for the PROJECT scope for greenfield platforms:
Table 7.12.8.1: Details of F&G Detectors
F&G Detector Type
Type
Area
Remarks
Flammable Gas Detectors
IR point type
HVAC Fresh Air Intake of LER Building
3 Nos. to be provided on duct
Process Area
Toxic (H2S) Gas Detectors
Electro-chemical type
Near Fresh Air Intake of Crane Cabin
3 Nos.
Process Area
HVAC Fresh Air Intake of LER Building
3 Nos. to be provided on duct
Near Fresh Air Intake of Crane Cabin
LER Building Airlock Room
3 Nos.
1 No.
Process Area
Flame Detectors
Triple-band IR type
Transformer Area
HSSD
Aspirating type
Heat Detectors
Rate compensated type
Smoke detectors Photo-electric type
Helideck
Technical Rooms & TR Room including their false floor voids Crane Machinery / Engine Room
Technical Rooms including their false floor void
TR Room including false floor void HVAC Fresh Air Intake of LER Building
To activate DIFFS 3 Nos. minimum
2 Nos.
To activate NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) clean agent fire suppression system
3 Nos. to be provided on duct
HVAC plenum outlet of AHU fan
2 Nos. to be provided for each AHU
Crane Cabin
2 Nos.
Battery Room
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F&G Detector Type
Type
Area
Remarks
Office Room (only for WHP13N)
Toilet (only for WHP13N)
1 No.
1 No.
H2 Gas Detectors Catalytic type
Battery Room
Manual Alarm Call Points (MACP)
Lift flap, push-and- stay type / Break glass type (indoor) Pull Lever type (outdoor)
Indoor and Outdoor area – General
All fire and gas detectors shall be certified Safety Integrity Level SIL 2.
For fire detection in outdoor areas, flame detectors shall be utilized.
7.12.8.1 Flammable Gas (HC) Detection
Following type of flammable gas detectors shall be considered:
• Point type IR flammable gas detectors
Gas detectors shall be located:
• At an elevation suitable for the gas being detected and exact elevation shall be
confirmed based on F&G mapping study,
• Close to the leak source, and • Downwind (considering prevailing wind direction) of leak sources.
Flammable gas detectors shall be provided for the following area:
• Process and utility areas where leaks of hydrocarbon or other hazardous gases could
originate, and
• HVAC air intakes of LER Building, and • Near fresh air intake for crane cabin.
Point flammable gas detectors shall be located on a grid with maximum 8 m spacing. Flammable gas detector locations will be confirmed in fire and gas layout based on 3D F&G Mapping Study.
Flammable point type gas detection shall be installed in HVAC air-intakes of pressurized rooms. Flammable point type gas detection shall not be installed inside the rooms of LER Building, since these rooms are pressurized.
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7.12.8.1.1 Flammable Gas Set Point
Following set points apply to hydrocarbon gas detectors:
• Point Type Detectors Set Point:
o Flammable Gas High set at not more than 20% LFL, and o Flammable Gas High-High set at not more than 50% LFL.
7.12.8.1.2 Flammable Gas Detection Level
The gas detection system shall provide two levels of flammable gas detection:
• Single Flammable Gas detection (causing single detection alarm only):
o Single point detector registering Flammable Gas High or High-High.
• Confirmed Flammable Gas detection (causing confirmed detection alarm and
executive action):
o Two or more-point detectors registering Flammable Gas High-High.
On two detector’s High-High level flammable gas detection at HVAC Air Intake, the F&G dampers shall be closed, and the HVAC system shall be shutdown.
Executive action is upon confirmed Flammable Gas detection as per the Fire and Gas Cause and Effect Matrix of respective platforms.
7.12.8.2 Toxic Gas (H2S) Detection
H2S detectors shall be provided in all areas where the fluid stream contains > 250 ppm concentration of H2S. Toxic gas detector shall be Electrochemical cell type point detectors.
Toxic (H2S) gas detectors shall be provided for the following areas:
• Process areas, • Near fresh air intake for crane cabin, • HVAC air intakes of LER Building, and • Airlock room of LER Building.
H2S gas detector shall be located close to potential leak sources but at least 0.5 m above the deck. Possible mechanical damage shall also be taken into account while locating these detectors. Toxic gas detection shall initiate as distinct local audible and visual alarms in the plant.
Toxic gas detector location shall be confirmed in fire and gas layout based on F&G mapping study. H2S gas detection shall not be installed inside the rooms of LER Building, since these rooms are pressurized. However, H2S detection is provided in the airlock of LER Building.
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7.12.8.2.1 Hydrogen Sulphide Set Point
Following set points apply to toxic gas detectors:
• Hydrogen Sulfide detector High set at 10 ppm H2S, and • Hydrogen Sulfide detector High-High set at 45 ppm H2S.
7.12.8.2.2 Hydrogen Sulphide Detection Level
The gas detection system shall provide single level of toxic gas detection:
Hydrogen Sulfide Gas detection (causing alarm only) at outdoor process areas:
• Single (or more) gas detector registering Toxic Gas High and Toxic Gas High-High.
On single High-High or two detectors at High level toxic gas detection at HVAC Air Intake, the F&G dampers shall be closed, and the HVAC system shall be shutdown.
Executive action is upon Toxic Gas High-High alarm as per the Fire and Gas Cause and Effect Matrix of respective platforms.
7.12.8.3 Fire Detection
7.12.8.3.1 Flame Detection
Triple-band IR type detectors shall be used for flame detection, as they shall be unaffected by sun-light or artificial light sources. Selection of detector sensitivity option shall be based on VENDOR / Manufacturer guidance on detection conditions.
Flame detectors shall be located in areas where visible flame is anticipated as the first sign of combustion and energized equipment that could initiate electrical fire on running e.g., hydrocarbon fires in process area.
Quantities and location of flame detectors shall be determined with regard to the detector characteristics, equipment layout and likely fire sources and shall be confirmed as part of 3D F&G Mapping Study
Flame detectors are installed on the perimeter of the helideck with the height not exceeding 150 mm above helideck level. Upon detection, Helideck flame detection will provide alarm at RGA/NFB complex.
Helideck wave-off light shall also be provided, which shall be activated during confirmed fire or gas (flammable and toxic) scenarios at WHP13N and each RP’s: RP3S, RP5S, RP5N and RP6N (expect RP9S as helideck is not present). Upon confirmed fire (2ooN) detection at helideck, FGS shall initiate alarms at RGA/NFB complex and activate DIFFS firefighting system.
7.12.8.3.2 Heat Detection
For the oxygen limited or smoky fires, rate compensated detectors shall be used for indoor or enclosed applications.
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Heat detectors (rate compensated) shall be installed where installation of smoke detector is unfavorable. Within PROJECT scope, heat detection is envisaged for Crane Machinery / Engine Room. Heat detectors shall be installed according to NFPA 72 [Ref.121].
Heat detectors shall be hardwired to platform’s FGS.
7.12.8.3.3 Smoke Detection
These detectors shall be located in areas where the first indication of fire shall be smoke or other combustion product, without immediate rapid temperature rise.
Photo-electric Type Smoke detectors shall be located at:
• • •
Inside Crane Cabin, Inside Battery Room of LER Building, Inside Technical Rooms of LER Building: Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room, and UPS, Instrument & Telecom Room, Inside Temporary Refuge Room of LER Building, • Inside Office Room and Toilet of LER Building (only for WHP13N), • • Below false floor of Technical Rooms & TR Room of LER Building, • HVAC plenum outlet of AHU fan of LER Building and • Air intakes for HVAC System of LER Building.
Upon confirmed fire (2ooN) detection at NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System protected room, FGS shall initiate alarms at RGA/NFB complex and activate NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression Systems. A local facility outside the protected room to inhibit automatic initiation of the NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be provided.
7.12.8.3.4 HSSD
High Sensitivity Smoke Detection (HSSD) shall be provided for Electrical, Telecom and Instrumentation control cabinets including future, spare cabinet and false floor void (as applicable) for the following rooms in LER Building:
• Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room, • UPS, Instrument & Telecom Room, and • TR Room.
The HSSD system shall be aspirating type smoke detector. The HSSD system shall aspirate from within the control cabinets.
The HSSD system shall consist of a high sensitivity laser-based smoke detector chamber with microprocessor-based control panel, aspirator pumps and a network of detector pipe work, filters, calibration kit and programmer (integral or portable).
On detection of smoke by a single detector, an alarm shall be generated in RGA/NFB complex and local area where the smoke is detected, and no executive action shall be initiated.
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7.12.8.3.5 Fire Detection Level
Single Fire Detection (causing single detection alarm only):
• Single triple-band IR flame detector (outdoor), • Single smoke detector (indoor), and • Single heat detector (indoor).
Confirmed Fire Detection (causing confirmed detection alarm and executive action):
• Any combination of two fire detectors (adjacent, within the same Fire Zone).
Executive action is upon confirmed Fire alarm as per the Fire and Gas Cause and Effect Matrix of respective platforms.
7.12.8.4 Hydrogen Gas Detection
Hydrogen gas detectors shall be located in the Battery Room of LER Building where accumulated hydrogen gas potentially occur during battery charging activity. Interlock with the ventilation system shall be provided, such that ventilation failure will inhibit boost charging of the battery charger.
Confirmed H2 detection inside Battery Room shall initiate inhibit boost charging of the battery chargers to prevent H2 evolution but the HVAC system and ventilation / exhaust fans (Duty + standby) shall be maintained running continuously to speed up dilution of H2 gas to below LEL.
7.12.8.4.1 Hydrogen Detector Set Point
Following set points apply to H2 gas detectors:
• Hydrogen Gas Detector High set at 10% LEL, and • Hydrogen Gas Detector High High set at 20% LEL.
7.12.9 F&G Detector Coverage
The following minimum detection coverage per deck has been applied for flammable gas and flame detection:
• 90% for a single detector alarm (1ooN) based on N detectors in the deck level, and • 85% for two or more detectors (2ooN) raising alarm signal / initiating safety control
action based on N detectors.
For toxic gas detector, minimum detector coverage is 90% for a single detector alarm (1ooN) based on N detectors in the deck level.
7.12.10
Indoor Portable Multi-Gas Detector
One (1) Nos. of portable multi gas detector(s) shall be provided inside the Temporary Refuge Room of LER Building of each greenfield platform.
The portable multi gas detector shall be provided with built-in audible and visual alarm, and it shall be of re-chargeable battery-operated type. Autonomy time of battery shall be of minimum
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4 hours in line with platform UPS autonomy for FGS as per Specification for Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) for COMP3 Project [Ref.56].
Portable multi-gas detector shall be a Stand-alone device, independent from FGS and shall detect flammable hydrocarbon gas, toxic (H2S) gas, CO, O2, SO2.
7.12.11
Manual Alarm Call Points
Manual Alarm Call points (MACP) shall be provided to allow personnel to manually initiate alarms.
Manual Alarm Call points do not initiate ESD-1, neither unlock ACS doors nor initiate release of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression Systems / DIFFS. Such actions will be initiated by other manual ESD or relevant fire suppression system’s manual release push buttons / provisions.
MACP shall initiate audible and visual signals. Alarms shall indicate the area where the MACP was initiated in the HMI alarm display.
MACP shall be strategically located at or near building doorways, boat landing and exits on escape routes. MACP shall be located for easy operation by personnel wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
Maximum distance between MACP is 30 m. They shall be located at an elevation between 1015 mm and 1400 mm above floor level.
MACP shall be protected from inadvertent operations. MACP shall be located for easy operation from the exit route where they are located. MACP shall be clearly visible and labelled.
7.12.12
Brownfield Fire & Gas Detection
Fire and Gas detection devices added / relocated as part of Brownfield modification at QGN- WHPs & QGS-WHPs under this PROJECT scope are below:
• Toxic Gas Detectors, and • UV/IR Flame Detectors.
Flammable gas detectors for the QGN-WHPs & QGS-WHPs platforms have not been considered in line with existing philosophy.
Fire and Gas detection devices added as part of Brownfield modification RP platforms are:
• Point type flammable gas detectors, • Toxic Gas Detectors, and • UV/IR Flame Detectors.
The location and elevation of new or relocated detectors shall be based on the results of F&G Mapping Study performed as part the PROJECT scope.
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The voting logic for the brownfield modification shall follow the existing cause & effect drawings.
7.12.13
Notification Devices
Audio alarm devices & visual strobe lights with beacons shall be provided throughout the platform and shall be connected to the PAGA system.
The PAGA system will be interfaced with the FGS through NC potential free contacts from FGS in order to initiate automatic audio-visual alarms; wherein the PAGA will broadcast audible alarm tones and visual alarm flashing beacons based on MACP actuation, Fire or Gas detection.
7.12.13.1
Visual Alarms (Beacon)
Dedicated flashing beacon shall be installed generally; and at strategic locations around the FACILITIES based on respective platform’s Noise Study Reports. The beacons shall be visible from all directions.
The FGS shall automatically alert all platform personnel visually via red, blue, amber or yellow strobes located throughout the FACILITY; in noisy areas, for a hazardous situation such as fire condition or hydrocarbon gas release:
Table 7.12.13.1.1: Visual Alarms (Beacons) (HOLD-2)
Color
Alarm Type
Platform
Red
Fire Alarm
General Plant Alarm
Abandon Platform Alarm
WHP13N, RP5N, RP6N
Fire Alarm
RP3S, RP5S, RP9S
Yellow
Toxic Gas (H2S) Detection Alarm
WHP13N, RP5N, RP6N
Blue
Toxic Gas (H2S) Detection Alarm
RP3S, RP5S, RP9S
Amber
Abandon Platform Alarm
RP3S, RP5S, RP9S
7.12.13.2
Audible Alarms (Horn)
Field alarm devices shall consist of dedicated gas horn / fire horn via PAGA system speakers installed at suitable locations as per TSI PAGA Study. Refer to Sec. 7.12.14 for the differentiation of alarm tones at RGE and QG2 FACILITIES. Field mounted audible alarm devices shall be installed to alert personnel working at a particular location.
The horn audio level shall be at least 15 dB above the average ambient sound level or 5 dB above the maximum sound level. The sound shall be high enough to be heard above the normal background noise from all locations within the respective operating FACILITY.
LER Building shall utilize the PAGA speakers for audible alarm purpose.
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Each detector control unit or logic system shall be designed to provide a means for silencing (acknowledging) the audible alarm in the RGA/NFB complex only and shall be configured so that subsequent critical alarms will re-initiate the horn.
7.12.14
Alarm Signals & Tones (HOLD-2)
Fire alarms, Gas alarms and Toxic gas alarms per Fire Zones are displayed on the HMI of Distributed Control System (DCS) located inside the RGA/NFB complex.
In case of fire, gas or toxic gas detection; visual and audible alarms are activated by FGS through Public Address and General Alarm system (PAGA).
There will be 4 types of alarms tones for RGE and 3 types of alarm tones for QG2 FACLITIES (Table 7.12.14.1 and 7.12.14.2 respectively):
• Fire Alarm, • Toxic (H2S) Gas Alarm, • GPA: General Plant Alarm (Flammable Gas Alarm is communicated utilizing the same
GPA Alarms), and
• Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA).
Fire Alarm, Flammable / Toxic Gas Alarm and General Alarm lead to mustering at the assigned TR and PAPA alarm leads to Platform evacuation.
FGS shall interface with PAGA for annunciation and alarms.
Gas Alarm (Flammable / Toxic)
The alarm shall be initiated automatically by:
• H2S gas detection (10 ppm by one detector), and • Flammable gas detection (20% LFL by one detector).
Fire Alarm
The alarm shall be initiated automatically by:
• Fire detection by field / indoor detectors.
General Plant Alarm
The alarm shall be initiated automatically by:
• Outdoor / indoor Manual Alarm Call Points.
Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA)
The purpose of PAPA alarm is to inform platform personnel that a serious incident has occurred, and controlled evacuation of the platform must start. Upon PAPA, all personnel must proceed for evacuation from the platform.
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PAPA Alarm is initiated by ESD-0 / PAPA push buttons located in Operator Workstation within Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER Building of respective platform.
The philosophy of operation of ESD-0 / PAPA push button shall follow the Process Control and ESD Philosophy of the respective platform [Ref.96 to 102].
Table 7.12.14.1: Alarms on Offshore Installations (RGE - RP3S, RP5S, RP9S) (HOLD-2)
Emergency Type of Alarm Alarm
Visual
Reason
TGA -Toxic Gas Alarm (H2S)
Howl
Fire Alarm
Intermittent 1000 Hz
General Plant Alarm (GPA)
Flammable Gas Alarm
Continuous Tone 600 Hz
Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA)
Warble 600 – 1000 Hz
Blue Flashing Beacon
Red Flashing Beacon
No visual alarm, only audible
10 ppm H2S detection by indoor/outdoor toxic gas detector
Fire detection by indoor/outdoor fire (flame/smoke/heat) detector
By indoor/outdoor General Manual Alarm Call Point
20% LFL flammable gas detection by indoor/outdoor flammable gas detector 20% H2 gas detection by indoor H2 detector
Amber Flashing Beacon
Actuation at OIMs Discretion via ESD-0 pushbutton
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Table 7.12.14.2: Alarms on Offshore Installations (QG2 - WHP13N, RP5N, RP6N) (HOLD-2)
Emergency
Type of Alarm
Alarm
Visual
Reason
TGA -Toxic Gas Alarm (H2S)
General Plant Alarm (GPA)
Fire Alarm
Flammable Gas Alarm
Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA)
Warble 600 – 1000 Hz
Yellow flashing
Intermittent tone 1000 Hz
Red Flashing Beacon
10 ppm H2S detection by indoor/outdoor toxic gas detector
By indoor/outdoor General Manual Alarm Call Point
Fire detection by indoor/outdoor fire (flame/smoke/heat) detector
20% LFL flammable gas detection by indoor/outdoor flammable gas detector 20% H2 gas detection by indoor H2 detector
Continuous Tone 600 Hz
Red Flashing Beacon
Actuation at OIMs Discretion via ESD- 0 pushbutton
Alarm Management study / workshop shall be conducted to avoid spurious alarms that may distract the operator.
7.12.15
Fire and Gas Detector Cause and Effect Basis
Protective / Executive actions and audio / visual alarm conditions to be executed in case of positive indication by each fire and gas detection device shall be documented in a cause-and- effect logic matrix similar to the matrix for the shutdown system. Process shutdown actions initiated by the fire and gas detection system shall be executed via the ESD. The fire and gas detection system shall be designed such that it can be functionally tested, and individual detectors can be calibrated without affecting production processes and equipment operation.
Typical Fire and Gas Cause and Effect Charts to be followed for greenfield platforms are attached as Appendix 2.
Individual Fire and Gas Cause and Effect Charts will be developed for Fire and Gas System of respective platforms.
7.12.16
Sparing and Availability
Refer Instrument and Control System Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.58] for FGS sparing and availability details.
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7.13 Emergency Shutdown / Emergency Depressurization
Emergency Control Systems are safety critical systems required to operate and remain operable on detection of an incident or during incident. All emergency control systems shall be designed to remain operational for the duration based on Electrical Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.53].
An Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system is provided for process safeguarding, to ensure the safe shutdown (and if necessary, blowdown) of the process when required. The philosophy of the ESD is to make an element within the FACILITY safe by isolating it from a risk (hydrocarbon inventory).
The following objectives are to be used as a basis of design (arranged in order of priority):
• Protection of personnel, • Protection of equipment, • Protection of the environment, and • Continuity of plant operation (by minimizing spurious shutdowns).
The ESD system shall act independently from all other systems to:
• Detect upset conditions of equipment and generate an alarm to alert the operators, • Automatically react to such conditions with shutdown or isolation of equipment, •
Initiate appropriate manual or automatic emergency shutdown in response to a fire or gas detection, and
• Automatically depressurize the equipment via flare when necessary.
The ESD system shall be designed to fail-safe. The shutdown valves shall be fail closed and the blow down valves fail open. Valve position indicator (Open / Close) of ESDVs shall be provided.
The Safety Integrity Level of ESDV valves will be defined during the relevant SIL Allocation Workshop.
RGE/QG2/RGA Start-Up, Operating and Shutdown Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.47, 48, 49] shall cover the details for ESD levels and RGE/QG2/RGA Flare, Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.50, 51, 52] will be prepared for the PROJECT.
7.13.1 Wellhead Platform
7.13.1.1 ESD Levels
There are 4 levels of shutdown, which apply to the new WHP13N:
• ESD Level 0 – WHP Total Platform Shutdown, involving total electrical isolation of
power supply to all field equipment,
• ESD Level 1 – WHP Process and Utilities Shutdown, involving total platform shutdown
with production units isolated and depressurized to flare,
• ESD Level 2 – WHP Process Shutdown (PSD), involving production shutdown with
production units isolated but maintained under operating pressure, and
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• ESD Level 3 – Local or Unit Shutdown (USD), involving individual process and
equipment trips.
7.13.1.2 ESD Level Executive Actions
• ESD Level 0 activation shall cause:
o Complete Electrical Isolation of power.
• ESD Level 1 activation shall cause:
o Closure of the subsurface and surface safety valves on all production wells, o Shutdown of the processes and all ESDVs, including those on the top of
pipeline risers,
o Depressurization of topsides hydrocarbon FACILITY; opening of all BDVs and
activating flare ignition system,
o HVAC System Shutdown, o Initiate General Alarm by PAGA through FGS, o Shutdown / isolate crane after 5 mins time delay, o Electrical isolation of all non-essential equipment / devices and their electrical
supply with the following exceptions for emergency operations:
▪ Emergency Lighting, ▪ Navigation Aids, ▪ Fire and Gas System and devices, ▪ ESD System, ▪ DCS, ▪ Helideck Systems, ▪ Fire Protection Systems, ▪ UPS, ▪ Communication Systems, ▪ Flare Ignition System, ▪ Emergency Equipment, and ▪ Systems in the Temporary Refuge as needed for life support.
• ESD Level 2 activation shall cause:
o Shutdown of all hydrocarbon processing facilities, and o Shutdown of all incoming and outgoing pipelines.
• ESD Level 3 Activation shall cause shutdown of the respective equipment or unit.
7.13.2 Riser Platform
7.13.2.1 ESD Levels
There are 4 levels of shutdown, which apply to the new RPs (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N):
• ESD Level 0 – Total Platform Shutdown, involving total electrical isolation of power supply to all field equipment, Evacuation Level, plant restricted zone ignition suppression,
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• ESD Level 1 – Overall Process and Utilities Emergency Shutdown (manual
depressurization),
• ESD Level 2 – Overall Process Shutdown, and • ESD Level 3 – local process and equipment trips.
7.13.2.2 ESD Level Executive Actions
• ESD Level 0 activation shall cause:
o Complete Isolation of power.
• ESD Level 1 activation shall cause:
o Closure of pipelines depressurization valves, o Shutdown of all ESDVs, o Open all BDVs, o HVAC System Shutdown, o Electrical isolation of all non-essential equipment, o Initiate General Alarm by PAGA through FGS, o Shutdown/Isolate Crane after 5 mins time delay, o Shutdown of bridge ESDV valve at the existing well head platforms. The
following system will remain active:
▪ Emergency lighting, ▪ Navigation aids, ▪ Fire and Gas System and devices, ▪ ESD System, ▪ DCS, ▪ Helideck Systems, ▪ Fire Protection Systems, ▪ UPS, ▪ Communication Systems, ▪ Emergency Equipment, and ▪ Systems in the Temporary Refuge as needed for life support.
• ESD Level 2 activation shall cause:
o Shutdown of all hydrocarbon processing facilities, and o Shutdown of all incoming and outgoing pipelines as well as bridge isolation
valves.
• ESD Level 3 Activation shall cause shutdown of the respective equipment or unit.
7.13.3 Manual ESD Pushbuttons
ESD level 0 or PAPA push button shall be provided on the Operator Workstation within Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER Building.
ESD level 1 or ESD-1 push button shall be provided:
• on the Operator Workstation within Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER
Building,
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• at Field: on top of jacket level inside security gate, near each helideck exit stair; and • at RGA complex with back-up at PU South for QGS & from NFB complex for QGN.
ESD level 2 or ESD-2 push button shall be provided:
• on the Operator Workstation within Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room of LER
Building,
• at Field: near connecting bridge to other platform; and • at RGA complex with back-up at PU South for QGS & from NFB complex for QGN.
Manual ESD Level 1/2 Pushbutton shall be provided to allow personnel at field to manually initiate ESD Level 1/2. They shall be located at an elevation between 1015 mm and 1400 mm above floor level. Manual ESD Level 1/2 Pushbutton shall be protected from inadvertent operations. Manual ESD Level 1/2 Pushbutton shall be located for easy operation from the place where they are located. Manual ESD Level 1/2 Pushbutton shall be clearly visible and labelled.
7.13.4 Brownfield Platforms
Existing ESD philosophy/Hierarchy shall be followed for all Brownfield modifications under COMP3 Project.
7.14 Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Inherently safe design or mechanical protections is preferred over Safety Instrumented System. For the PROJECT, SIS functionality is achieved through ESD system.
The SIS shall be designed to:
• Perform its Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) with level of integrity per IEC 61511
[Ref.134],
• Conform to applicable portions of API RP 14C [Ref.105], • Meet the Target SILs of the SIFs at a testing frequency that is acceptable by the
operating unit where it is to be installed,
• SIS shall be functionally separate from the DCS. This may be implemented using either identical or diverse operation. The field sensors, final elements, and logic solvers of the SISs require separation from the DCS,
• The SIS shall be designed to automatically bring the process to a safe state on loss of
energy (i.e. instrument air, electrical power and hydraulic fluid),
• SIS functions shall be kept as simple as possible using the least number of steps when
activating to prevent or mitigate the hazardous condition,
• SIS alarm shall be displayed in the DCS HMI (Human Machine Interface), • SIS shall be designed to simplify maintenance and reduce maintenance efforts where
possible, and
• The SIS SIF components shall be designed so that they can be regularly tested to ensure they will function properly on demand. Testing intervals shall be selected as per standard requirements and to satisfy the Target SILs of the SIFs.
SIS classification and verification shall be as per COMPANY’s Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment Procedure [Ref.7].
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7.15 Passive Fire Protection
7.15.1 Purpose
The primary objective of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) system is to prevent the fire escalation involving critical process equipment and valve failure or structural failure of topsides prior to personnel evacuation of the platform.
PFP prevents fire spread across boundaries for defined periods or increases the inherent fire resistance of structural members or specific items of instrumentation equipment by the application of coating, claddings, blankets or enclosures.
Where practicable, blowdown shall be configured to minimize the requirement for passive fire protection. Where it is shown that vessels, pipework and supports may fail within the available time for depressurization as determined by the capacity of the flare system, PFP shall be provided to mitigate.
Main structures and SCE’s shall be designed to withstand the relevant DAL in each area of the FACILITY.
Fire Risk Analysis and Explosion Risk Analysis shall be performed to identify any credible fire scenarios for the installation. Critical structural members and equipment that require passive fire protection shall be identified based on credible fire scenarios identified in FRA. The fire divisions and ratings recommended by FRA shall be provided on those identified structural members and equipment.
Penetration of the fire and blast wall shall be avoided as far as practicable. Where penetration is required fire and blast seals with the same fire and blast rating as the original fire and blast wall shall be installed.
The following critical targets shall be assessed for PFP while performing Fire Risk Analysis:
• Fire and Blast wall, • Primary load bearing structures for topside modules including secondary beam
supporting critical equipment / LER Building,
• Temporary Refuge (TR), • LER Building, • Tall structures such as crane pedestal, • Critical equipment handling hydrocarbon, i.e. process vessels and its supports, • Critical piping (flare header and its supports), • Flare boom structure, • ESDV’s including actuators connected to the critical equipment and piping, • BDVs, and • Risers.
The FRA study shall identify critical targets that will be exposed to a jet or pool fire with a duration long enough to cause loss of structural integrity with a frequency higher than specified in Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations [Ref.6].
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Passive Fire protection shall meet the following requirements:
• Asbestos free, • Reliable in service and effective lifespan of 30 years taking into account offshore
environment,
• System shall not initiate or sustain any deleterious effects, such as corrosion of the
painted steel work when exposed to damp conditions,
• Easy to access to the installed equipment inside for repairs and maintenance, • Designed to withstand mechanical damage, and • System shall comply with all applicable standards and certified for the fire and/or cold
spill resistance specified.
Lightweight concrete coatings shall not be used. The PFP used shall be rated to meet the high rate-of-rise (hydrocarbon) test as specified by UL 1709 [Ref.137]. Refer to Specification for Passive Fire Protection [Ref.95] for further details.
For Brownfield FACILITIES, passive fire protection shall be fully based on updated Brownfield FRA Study Results.
7.15.2 Passive Fireproofing General Requirements
Any passive fire protection provided shall be suitable for the specific fire scenarios identified. For the greenfield FACILITIES, the following shall be guaranteed as minimum:
• The Distributed Control System (DCS) data highway cable shall be flame retardant to IEC 60332-3 [Ref.131]. All fire and gas signals to technical / control rooms shall be fire resistant type according to IEC 60331 [Ref.130],
• The Public Address (PA) System cable shall be capable of withstanding a 1093°C (2000°F) flame for 60 minutes or longer without melting or propagating a flame. PAEAS cable will be Flame retardant in accordance to IEC 60332-3 [Ref.131] Category A,
• Cable supporting systems are not required to be fireproofed, • The pipeline emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) and the motor operated valves (MOV)
shall be protected in line with FRA reports,
• All pipeline ESDV actuators and outboard MOV actuators shall be protected in line with FRA report fire resistance rating. This shall be accomplished by the use of thermal insulation, prefabricated panels, or fireproofing wrap systems. Insulation method employed shall be designed for easy removal to facilitate maintenance. Valve and actuator design shall ensure they will operate without overheating due to the absence of ventilation. Power supply cable for pipeline MOV actuators shall be fire resistant IEC 60331[Ref.130],
• The passive fire protection for the exposed portion of pipeline and associated piping components, downstream of the pipeline ESDV and upstream of the dead weight support clamp (piping above hanger flange up to outboard ESDV) shall be verified by FRA study considering all realistic fire scenarios,
• Fireproofing of Test Separator shall be based on FRA Study, • Fireproofing shall be applied to vessels, structures, walls, bulkheads, and the supporting elements of equipment and piping in areas where flammable liquids and gases are processed and handled based on FRA results. The extent of fireproofing intended for design and appropriate fireproofing materials to be selected shall be based on this section,
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to be critical
• Fireproofing shall be provided on structures and equipment /equipment supports identified fire escalation based on recommendations from FRA. Fireproofing of the buildings and fire and blast wall shall be implemented based on outcome of Safety Studies and applicable international standards,
the standpoint of
from
• The fireproofing needs for critical electrical and instrumentation runs shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and as the needs are developed. If required based on FRA results and if the runs are to survive a fire, then the fireproofing shall be for 1 hour. If they are to remain intact long enough to allow shutdown and blowdown, then the fireproofing shall be for 15 minutes, and
• Blowdown or fire scenarios shall be configured to minimize the requirement of passive fire protection where it is shown that equipment / vessels may fail within the available time for depressurization as determined by the capacity of the flare system.
7.15.3 Structure
Structural fireproofing shall be provided based on respective platform Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) report. The structural design shall be evaluated for the fire loads and the endurance times developed based on FRA and accordingly passive fire protection shall be specified for any part of the structure whose loss of integrity could impair the emergency functions of safety critical structures essential for controlled shutdown, escape, evacuation and rescue.
7.15.4 Equipment Support Structural Elements
Equipment’s support structure elements (such as vessel skirts, support saddles, pipe supports) may be protected by PFP as recommended by FRA.
Where the use of a catch-beam is not practical to protect against failure of the spring hanger or rod supporting piping, the hangers and rods may be fireproofed as per Specification for Passive Fire Protection [Ref.95]. In addition, Preformed Inorganic Panels, if used, shall be attached using only an attachment system with which they were tested.
7.15.5 Fire and Blast Wall
• Fire walls shall be installed to separate process areas from non-process areas to prevent or limit damage to buildings and safety critical equipment due to fire. The walls are constructed of steel or will be applied with fireproofing material with fire rating determined in Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) report.
• J-60 fire wall shall be utilized to protect safe area (LER Building) from process area.
Fire rating and duration will be confirmed by FRA Study.
7.15.6 General Additional Requirements
7.15.6.1 Penetrations
All penetrations through bulkheads and decks, including electrical, piping, and ventilation systems penetrations, shall have the same fire and blast integrity as the bulkhead and deck through which they penetrate. The fire resistance of doors provided in fire divisions shall be certified to the same class division.
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7.15.6.2 Ventilation
Ventilation systems shall be designed with an intent to maintain the fire divisions. For ducts penetrating A Class and H Class divisions, suitable fireproofing and fire dampers shall be provided to prevent the passage of smoke. Additional protection shall be provided where ducts pass through multiple spaces to maintain smoke-free escape routes, TRs, and other occupied spaces.
All Fire/smoke/gas tight dampers used in offshore shall be manufactured, tested and certified as per SOLAS/IMO and not to follow EN 1366-2 [Ref.144] or UL555S.
7.15.7 Additional Fire Barriers
Requirements for additional fire barriers and internal divisions shall be based on the results of Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) and / or the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis.
COMPANY approved risk assessment shall establish the endurance times for the following:
• Sections of escape routes to Temporary Refuge(s) (TRs) that allow for safe escape
from the fire-exposed area and allow for emergency response activities,
• The TR(s), until safe evacuation can take place, and • Sections of the evacuation routes from the TR(s) to the locations used for installation
evacuation.
The FACILITY’s Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) Reports and the EER assessments or other COMPANY approved risk assessment may identify the need for protecting equipment and piping that are potentially exposed to a fire, including the following:
• Pipeline risers and associated pig launchers and receivers containing hydrocarbons.
7.15.8 Helideck
Helideck shall be constructed of material that provides structural and fire integrity. The material of construction will be aluminum with enhanced safety passive fire-retardant type.
Specification for Aluminum Helideck for COMP3 Project [Ref.78] will provide the details.
7.15.9 Safety Systems
Passive fire protection shall be established for the Safety Systems if necessary, to maintain their emergency function to prevent or mitigate major accident hazards.
The survivability of the systems identified shall be ensured by separation, where possible, or by segregation by fire-rated decks and bulkheads. Where this is not feasible, fireproofing shall be directly applied on the portions of the systems directly exposed to a fire, or other means, such as redundancy or active protection shall be provided.
Structural support for the flare knockout drum shall be passively fireproofed as recommended by FRA.
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The Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) and Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) report, Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis Report (EERA) and Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) and Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA) shall establish extent of protection and endurance time for safety systems.
7.15.10
Safety Critical Elements
Systems and equipment that are identified as controlling or mitigating a major accident event (typically referred to as safety-critical elements) may have to function for a period of time after the event has started, until the event has been controlled or, in the worst case, to facilitate safe evacuation of the FACILITY.
The identification of these safety-critical elements, their exposure to potential major accident events, and the required duration of protection shall be based on the results of Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) report and Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) for the FACILITY.
Safety Critical Elements & Performance Standard Report for COMP3 Project [Ref.79] will be prepared for the PROJECT.
7.15.11
LER Building
As a minimum, all the buildings shall be constructed of non-combustible material. The insulation material installed within the interior of the buildings shall confirm to IMO 754 (18) [Ref.139] fire test requirements.
Design requirements and detailed locations for PFP shall be in accordance with conclusions and recommendations indicated in FRA reports, specific for each FACILITY; unless noted otherwise, the requirements for exterior, interior doors shall be as minimum as follows. PFP for LER Building shall be minimum:
• H60 - Walls facing platform which could be exposed to hydrocarbon fires from bridge,
WHP & RP platform, and
• A60 - Walls behind Fire and Blast wall and facing to sea, roof and floor (under deck).
Technical Room and Battery Room inside LER Building shall be individually segregated from adjacent internal areas by A60 fire rated divisions.
Exterior walls and roof shall be constructed from non-combustible materials and shall be protected from atmospheric corrosion either through use of resistant materials or low maintenance surface finishes (painted carbon steel wall or prefabricated stainless-steel wall).
The Fire Risk Assessment and the Escape Evacuation Rescue (EER) Assessment shall establish PFP rating, extent of protection and endurance time for the above.
7.16 Active Fire Protection
Active fire protection (AFP) system shall be provided to control vapors and extinguish fires by reliable, timely and effective application of firewater and other extinguishing media to limit escalation, provide cooling of topsides equipment and structures and protect personnel from the effect of smoke and radiation. Objective is to protect structures and plant essential to the preservation of life for the duration of their emergency function i.e., escape and evacuation.
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Active fire protection system activation is automatic upon confirmation of fire detection from fire zones and can be activated manually via local pushbuttons when automatic system is not working. DIFFS system can be initiated remote manually by operator from RGA/NFB complex. Active fire protection systems include DIFFS (Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System) and NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System.
7.16.1 Fire Water System
7.16.1.1 Wellhead Platform
Wellhead Platform (WHP 13N) is considered as Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) FACILITIES and considered as single fire area.
For the Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) remote operated wellhead platforms, fire protection based on activation of the emergency shutdown systems, which in case of confirmed fire or gas detection shall:
Isolate all ignition sources,
• • Perform all relevant isolation of process sections, • Blowdown to minimize the inventory and hence reduce the risk of cascade effects
following the first hazardous event,
• Upon audible and visual alarm activation by FGS via PAGA, operator shall have local / remote manual activation of fire water pump at Jack-up Rig or vessel / boat to control and provide cooling by activation of dry spray water system on the well bay area.
There is no fixed wet fire water ring main system considered for the Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) wellhead platforms, which follows burndown philosophy.
A dry well bay deluge network shall be provided with high velocity spray nozzle (working pressure in the range of 3.5 barg – 5 barg) for hook up to an attendant deluge system for use as required. Firewater pumps and deluge valve skids shall be located on the attendant vessel. Downstream of deluge valve (dry system) shall be Copper Nickel 90-10 for all pipe dimensions. Basis of Design for Piping for COMP3 Project [Ref.61] and Piping Material Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.63] shall be referred for MOC of the firewater ring main.
Dry fire water system shall be provided to protect the well bay area at design density of 30 l/min/m2 (0.75 gpm/ft2). The firewater system shall be designed based on the maximum firewater demand calculation for well bay fire area.
The firewater pump and deluge valve located in Jack-Up Rig (JUR) or vessel / boat will supply the fire water to the well bay deluge distribution system. During attended platform (SIMOPS), 6” fire water line from Jack-up Rig to be connected to fire water ring main on Wellhead Platform. For standby firewater supply, pipe header connection shall be provided at boat landing area.
The firewater system shall be capable, at its design conditions and integrity, of meeting the maximum firewater demand. Firewater demand calculation shall include allowance of 15% for wind loss and 15% for hydraulic imbalance.
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The system shall be hydraulically balanced based on the required fire water demand. Pipe flow velocities shall not exceed 6 m/s (20 ft/sec) in any section of the distribution system piping, or any lower velocity required shall be used based on properties of the pipe material.
Firewater Hydraulic Calculations - WHP13N [Ref.33] shall be referred for the actual hydraulic flowrate, deluge valve size and required pressure.
7.16.2 Fire Protection for Riser Platform
For the Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) remote operated Riser Platforms (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N), fire protection based on activation of the emergency shutdown systems, which in case of confirmed fire or gas detection shall:
Isolate all ignition sources,
• • Perform all relevant isolation of process sections, and • Blowdown through the flare on future compression platforms (appropriately designed) to minimize the inventory and hence reduce the risk of cascade effects following the first hazardous event. The rest of the riser platform will follow existing Well head emergency shutdown philosophy.
There is no firewater system considered for the Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) Riser platforms which follows burndown philosophy.
7.16.3 NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System
NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be provided for the Technical Rooms (including false floor void) in LER Building of greenfield WHP and Riser platforms.
The NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Extinguishing System will be provided for areas incorporating critical equipment where water could cause significant damage to the equipment leading to loss of assets. Protected locations are as follows:
• Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room, • UPS, Instrument & Telecom Room, and • False floor void of the above-mentioned rooms.
The gaseous extinguishing system shall be self-contained and uses centralized cylinder skids sized for the protection of largest room. It is considered that not more than one (1) protected room is having fire event at one time.
NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be provided for the rooms and areas with potential electrical fire risk. Battery Room, TR Room, Office Room and Toilet will not be protected by clean agent.
Where a total flooding clean agent is to be applied and personnel access is possible, the firefighting system shall be equipped with a time delay and pre-discharge alarm to provide the personnel clear warning before the gas is released into the space.
Automatic fire detection and alarm system for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be in accordance with NFPA 70 [Ref.120] and NFPA 72 [Ref.121]
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requirements. The detection system shall be SIL3 certified by TUV. The NOVEC 1230 (FK-5- 1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be automatically activated by confirmed smoke detection. Local Manual Release Points shall be provided to manually activate the system.
The executive action for automatic activation of the NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be developed in accordance with following:
• Fire (smoke) detection in the protected rooms will be by platform FGS and shall send confirmed fire signal to NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) FECP (Fire Extinguishing Control Panel) for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Fire Suppression System activation / release. Also, NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) FECP shall send pre-discharge and discharge status alarm signals to FGS and will be displayed in DCS HMI.
• Audible and visual alarms for the protected room for pre-discharge and discharge shall
be triggered by NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) FECP.
The extinguishing system shall provide a high-speed release of suppressant based upon the concept of total flooding. It shall be designed so that it can be activated automatically by receiving confirmed fire signal. Manual activation and abort of suppressant release shall be located at the entrances / exits of the enclosed protected area. The suppressant shall have an adequate Main source and 100% Reserve supply cylinders and manifold together (which shall allow manual change over through main/reserve selection) and located outside the area.
The gaseous cylinders shall be located adjacent to the hazards they protect, but they shall not be located in areas where they may be exposed to fire or explosion hazards.
FGS upon confirmed smoke detection inside protected room shall send trip signal to HVAC system and close F&G dampers.
The NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System control and alarm signals (fire, pre-discharge, discharged, fault and common cylinder low weight or pressure) shall be directly wired to the FECP. Status lamps on status panel shall be located at the protected room (indoor) and shall indicate the manual or automatic mode status of the system. An audible / visual alarm shall be actuated immediately prior to and during discharge of the extinguishing agent. All the exit doors shall be of self-closing type. FGS will interface with ACS for unlocking doors in case of confirmed fire, manual release activation or clean agent discharge confirmation.
NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall be designed and supplied by specialist VENDOR. The design of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System and its accessories shall comply with latest NFPA 2001 [Ref.124]. Complete system shall be UL listed/FM approved.
The NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System shall provide a uniform concentration of the agent for the protected area. The design shall be in accordance with the latest edition of NFPA 2001 [Ref.124].
After the clean agent extinguishant is released into the room, the enclosed air-Conditioned Technical Rooms of LER Building shall be purged to remove the NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) agent residue, before start-up of the HVAC system to ensure the rooms are gas-free and suitable to operate safely. The details of start-up after extinguishant release and purging
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operation are covered within the HVAC Basis of Design – Offshore for COMP3 Project [Ref.66].
Specification and datasheet for NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent for COMP3 Project [Ref.26 & 35] will be prepared for the PROJECT.
7.16.3.1 NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) System Activation Philosophy
Following philosophy shall be followed for activation of NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System:
• Automatic activation upon confirmed fire detection in concerned protected room, • Manual activation through manual release push button outside the protected room,
and
• Manual (mechanical) activation at the cylinder skid.
7.16.4 Portable and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers
7.16.4.1 General Requirements
• Portable and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers shall be provided for firefighting in order to effect rapid extinguishment of incipient fires. Fire Extinguishers shall be intended as a first line of defense against fires of limited size,
• Portable and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers shall be strategically distributed on the platform and in particular in the LER building to allow a manual firefighting response by the Operators,
• Portable Fire Extinguishers shall be UL listed, FM approved or equivalent, • Extinguishers shall conform to 33 CFR Part 145 [Ref.127], NFPA 10 [Ref.118] & API
RP 14G [Ref.108], as applicable,
• The Portable Extinguishers located outdoor shall be provided with weather-proof
cabinet,
• The Extinguishers located indoor shall be provided with wall mounting hanger /
bracket,
• Wheeled Fire extinguishers located outdoor shall be provided with a UV-resistant red-
vinyl cover,
• Extinguishers shall be provided with extra corrosion protection, including their associated mounting devices. A baked polyester, polyurethane coating or equivalent shall be used for extinguishers. Fire Extinguisher Cabinets shall also be suitable for corrosive environments,
• Fire Extinguishers shall be installed so that the top of the Fire Extinguisher is not more
•
than 3 1⁄2 ft (1.07 m) above the floor, In no case shall the clearance between the bottom of the Portable Fire Extinguisher (handheld) and the floor be less than 4 in. (102 mm),
• Extinguishers shall be easily accessible with at least one Portable Fire Extinguisher (handheld) located within 15 m (50 feet) travel distance from any point in the production areas,
• CO2 extinguishers (stored pressure type) shall be designed for a minimum pressure of 1800 psig (124 barg) and it shall be provided with pressure relief device as per UL 154 [Ref.138] standard,
• Dry chemical powder extinguisher shall be cartridge operated type with the N 2
expellant gas, and
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• The expellant gas cylinder of dry chemical powder and AFFF wheeled units shall be made up of steel. CO2 handheld fire extinguisher material shall be of Aluminum and of 4.5 kg capacity as per Qatargas Fire Protection Policy [Ref.9].
7.16.4.2 Fire Extinguisher Types
Fire Extinguisher type and location shall be in accordance with the provisions of Specification for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting items [Ref.28] and Datasheet for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items [Ref.36], NFPA 10 [Ref.118], 33 CFR Part 145 [Ref.127] and API RP 14G [Ref.108].
The following types of Portable and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers shall be distributed throughout the installation as required:
• 4.1 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Handheld Fire Extinguisher, • 9 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Handheld Fire Extinguisher, • 56.7 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Wheeled Fire Extinguisher, • 136.4 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder - Wheeled Extinguisher, and • 4.5 kg CO2 Handheld Fire Extinguisher, • 22.5 kg CO2 Wheeled Fire Extinguisher, • 135 L AFFF Wheeled Fire Extinguisher.
7.16.4.3 Fire Extinguisher Location
Extinguishers shall be located as specified below:
Process and Manifold Area
Process area and Valve manifolds on platforms shall be protected with 9 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Handheld Fire Extinguishers (9 m from that particular fire hazard).
In addition, one 56.7 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Wheeled Fire Extinguisher shall be provided at that deck level.
Wellhead Platform
Wellhead platform shall be protected with at least one 136.4 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder - Wheeled Extinguisher.
Helideck
The following fire extinguishers shall be provided for firefighting on the helideck:
• 56.7 kg Dry Chemical Powder (Potassium Bicarbonate) Wheeled Fire Extinguisher,
and
• 22.5 kg CO2 Wheeled Fire Extinguisher.
Equipment shall be selected for minimum maintenance requirements.
In addition to the above, any additional extinguishers required by CAP437 [Ref.129] and Gulf Helicopters shall be provided.
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Rooms in LER Building
4.5 kg CO2 Handheld Fire Extinguisher shall be provided for electrical fires in Technical Rooms, TR Room and Battery Room of LER Building.
A minimum of two (2 Nos.) 4.5 kg CO2 Handheld Fire Extinguishers shall be provided within 15 m reach inside the room.
Crane Cabin
• One 4.1 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Handheld Fire Extinguisher
shall be mounted in the Operator’s cabin, and
• 9 kg Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder Handheld Fire Extinguisher inside
Crane Machinery room.
Table 7.16.4.3.1: Extinguisher Type and Location Details
Agent
Capacity Handheld/Wheeled Areas of application
4.1 kg
9 kg
Handheld Fire Extinguisher
56.7 kg
Wheeled Fire Extinguisher
136.4 kg
Wheeled Extinguisher
4.5 kg
Handheld Fire Extinguisher
22.5 kg
135 L
Wheeled Fire Extinguisher
• Crane Cabin
• Crane Machinery Room • Valve Manifold • Process Area • Helideck • Valve Manifold • HC/Chemical Handling and
Storage
• Wellhead Area
• Technical Rooms, TR Room and Battery Room in LER Building
• Helideck
• HC Liquid Storage Area
Dry Chemical (Potassium Bicarbonate) Powder
CO2
AFFF
7.16.4.4 Brownfield Modifications
Portable Handheld and Wheeled Fire Extinguishers shall be provided (if required) for readily available first-aid firefighting in order to effect rapid extinguishment of incipient fires within brownfield modification scope area.
Fire protection systems and equipment shall be arranged and located with sufficient capacity to respond quickly and effectively to fire without exposing personnel to extreme danger.
The design application of extinguishers in the brownfield modification scope shall be in line with existing fire protection strategy / fire protection layouts.
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7.16.5 Fire Blanket
Fire blankets shall be provided and strategically located inside Technical Rooms for extinguishing of minor fires using smothering action. The fire blanket can also be used for personnel protection during minor fires. The type of fire blanket shall be Type 2.
The fire blanket shall be able to withstand temperature up to 450°C. The blankets shall have a minimum size of 6 ft. x 6 ft. (1.8 m x 1.8 m). Weatherproof box suitable for wall mounting shall be provided to contain each folded blanket. The box shall be painted fire-engine red and shall be equipped with a latched cover that can be readily opened in emergencies.
7.16.6 Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) for Helideck
Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS) shall be provided in accordance with CAP 437 [Ref.129] requirements for the helidecks in WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S, RP5N and RP6N. DIFFS shall typically consist of a series of pop-up / non pop-up nozzles with both horizontal and vertical components to provide an effective distribution of water spray to the whole helicopter landing area. The design water demand shall be based on CAP 437 [Ref.129] requirements. The helideck shall be monitored in line with CAP 437 [Ref.129] using flame detectors; any confirmed fire event shall activate DIFFS system through Fire & Gas system.
Refer to Specification for DIFFS (deck integrated firefighting system) for COMP3 project [Ref.27] and Datasheet for Deck Integrated Firefighting system (DIFFS) for COMP3 project [Ref.39].
7.16.6.1 DIFFS Activation Philosophy
Following philosophy shall be followed for activation of DIFFS system:
• Automatic activation from the confirmed (2ooN) flame detection on the helideck, • Local Manual Activation from the manual pushbutton located at entry / exit points of
the helideck,
• Local Manual Activation from the manual pushbutton located on the DIFFS Local
Control Panel,
• Local Manual activation from the DIFFS skid using manual release lever at the skid,
and
• Remote Manual Activation by operator from RGA/NFB Complex.
The application rates for this area shall be 3.75 lpm/m2 as per CAP 437 [Ref.129] standard.
7.16.7 Emergency Power
Emergency power systems shall be installed to provide power during platform emergencies that result in the loss of the primary power source.
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As minimum the following systems shall receive power from an emergency power source:
UPS system
• Communications:
o Radio (VHF and UHF), o Telephones, and o PAGA system throughout the platform.
• NOVEC 1230 (FK-5-1-12) Clean Agent Fire Suppression System and Firefighting
systems (DIFFS),
• DCS, • Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD), • Fire and Gas Systems (FGS), • HVAC Control Panel, • Illuminated Windsock, • Temporary Refuge (within LER Building), • Helideck Lighting System, • Aircraft Warning System, and • Aviation Obstruction Light.
Navigation Aids – Self-Contained Battery Back-Up:
• Permanent Navigation Aids, and • Temporary Navigation Aids with solar power.
Duration of emergency power supply should be adequate to complete the emergency safety functions like ESD, temporary refuge and escape and evacuation as a minimum.
Battery Autonomy time is given in Electrical Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.53].
7.16.8 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
The purpose of the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Philosophy is to ensure that personnel can leave affected areas in case of an incident by at least one safe route to reach the designated Temporary Refuge (TR as Primary Muster Point) / Secondary Muster Point from any location of the installation. Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Assessment (EERA) Reports will be prepared for respective platforms capturing the PROJECT requirements.
The purpose of the evacuation system is to ensure means of safe abandonment of the installation for the maximum personnel on board, following a hazardous incident and a decision to abandon the installation.
The goals of escape and evacuation shall be as follows:
• Detecting the incident and raising the alarm, • Escape and reach the TR muster areas, • Provision of sufficient muster areas, • TEMPSC / life raft location shall consider the predominant wind and wave direction,
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• During an accidental event, at least one escape route shall be passable at the opposite
direction,
• Escape routes to Temporary Refuge (TR) muster area shall take into consideration the
predominant wind direction,
• The building exit doors shall not open towards Process area.
In the event of an emergency, all the personnel shall be properly trained to follow the relevant evacuation procedures.
Concerning all details of Escape, Emergency and Evacuation facilities which will be present, the following studies are performed:
• Escape & Evacuation Review Analysis (EERA) - evaluating time to muster / evacuate
the installation,
• Essential System Survivability Study (ESSA) - evaluating Emergency System Survivability under emergency circumstances and incidental scenarios which may occur on the platforms,
• Safety Equipment Layouts - listing and illustrating escape routes and personnel
lifesaving equipment drawings, and • Human Factor Evaluation Activities.
The EER systems shall be designed to match the potential consequences of Major Incident of topsides, pipelines and risers. The EER Philosophy / Strategy with respect to the EER design being implemented in the FACILITIES layout shall be performed and presented in Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA).
The EER philosophy shall include a sufficient number and type of independent methods of evacuation to ensure redundancy to meet EER analysis.
The following evacuation methods are listed in an order that is increasing in typical risk of incident during evacuation:
• Evacuation by helicopter from the helideck (for platforms WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S,
RP5N and RP6N),
• Other dry evacuation methods (e.g., transfer directly to an attending vessel, to another
platform through interconnecting bridges),
• Escape via TEMPSC or other marine survival craft, and • Throw-over rafts and any other methods of evacuation requiring individuals to directly
enter the sea.
The estimate of TEMPSC seating capacity shall assume that personnel have donned exposure suits (where required) and / or lifejackets; it shall also take into account any variations in normal body size for the personnel typically operating the installation.
Helicopter Evacuation
Helideck lighting power shall be on emergency power bus and shall be designed to be available during any credible emergency defined in the EER analysis.
Where specified following EER analysis, helicopter transit suits or exposure suits designed to prevent progressive body cooling shall be utilized during personnel transfers to and from the
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installation. Where required, these suits shall be equipped with a wave splash shield, strobe lights, and whistle.
Escape Directly to the Sea
There shall be multiple devices to assist direct entry to the sea by personnel who may have no other means of evacuating the installation.
The numbers, types, and storage locations of such devices shall be determined with input from Operations personnel, approved by COMPANY Engineer, and confirmed by the EER analysis.
Escape to the sea devices include fixed stairs and ladders, Scramble Net.
Other systems, which have an established performance record or approval by acceptable authorities such as SOLAS [Ref.126] may be used with prior approval by COMPANY Engineer.
7.16.9 Access, Egress, and Escape Routes
Means of Access and Egress shall meet the functional requirements of all operation and maintenance activities anticipated in the area.
Access / Egress paths, Platforms, Stairs, Ladders and Hatches shall be designed according to Human Factors Engineering Workplace Design Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.41].
Primary Escape Routes shall be provided at the periphery of decks which leads to staircases to adjacent decks, TR muster area, boat landing and embarkation zones. Primary escape route clear passage width including staircases (exclusive of handrails, wall-mounted equipment, etc.) shall be at least 1.12 m (44 in.). This dimension shall be maintained for any stairways in the escape route.
Other escape routes running across the deck and those connecting with primary escape routes may be treated as secondary escape routes. Secondary escape route clear passage width (exclusive of handrails, wall-mounted equipment, etc.) shall be at least 0.760 m (30 in.). This dimension shall be maintained for any stairways in the escape route.
Height of escape routes shall be a minimum 2.286 m (90 in.).
Whereas for existing Brownfield FACILITY, all primary escape routes including stairways are designed in line with existing primary escape route.
Escape routes shall be as direct as possible, avoiding frequent changes of direction and the need to repeatedly ascend and descend deck levels. Grade change along primary escape route of deck area is not allowed. Where changes in deck level are required, stairs or ramps shall be used rather than ladders. The stairs should be located so that it would be very unlikely for a single event to impair both stairways.
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Following are the essential requirements for Escape Routes:
• Escape routes shall be sized and located to handle the maximum flux of personnel in
emergencies as determined by the EER analysis scenarios,
• There shall be at least two (2) independent escape routes around the FACILITY leading to TR muster point and two (2) independent escape routes leading from TR muster point to an embarkation area (when a muster point is not also an embarkation area),
• Escape route lighting shall be designed to be available during any credible emergency
as determined by EER analysis, and
• All emergency doors, hatches and kick panels shall be clearly labeled such that they
can be readily located in an emergency.
Walking and working surfaces shall:
• Be designed to avoid slippery conditions and tripping hazards, • Avoid grade separation on same deck level, • Provide ramps at grade separation (subjected to COMPANY’s approval) to minimize
tripping hazards and to facilitate use of wheeled equipment,
• Provide access to equipment to avoid stepping on piping or other appurtenances, and • Provide sufficient clearance to permit use of mobile equipment and power tools for
equipment service, maintenance and turnaround activities.
Exits and escape routes shall be engineered so as to maintain such routes in an accessible condition, taking into account potential operational impacts. A formal risk assessment result shall be taken into consideration in the design and provision of the escape routes.
The EER system for the offshore installation shall be designed according to an EER philosophy / specific emergency preparedness requirement established by a formal, documented EER analysis or other installation specific risk analysis.
An EER analysis shall consider the following:
• The range of environmental conditions expected at the installation, including air and sea temperatures, winds, waves, currents, anticipated natural light and visibility and sea spray as applicable,
• The installation is normally attended or not normally attended, • Major emergency scenarios and their escalation, including fire, explosion, toxic gas release, major structural failure, collision, and loss of essential support facilities, • The possible hazards to personnel in the scenarios considered, accounting for hazard
and personnel locations,
• Time to impairment of EER activities as well as the time required to perform them, • The location and integrity of Temporary Refuge muster area, escape pathways to the
TR, and pathways from the TR to evacuation points,
• The endurance requirements for the TR, based on the emergency scenarios and fire
and explosion assessments,
• Whether or not alternative muster areas is required. These could be mandated to allow for situations in which personnel may not be able to reach primary locations in the event of credible hazards occurring,
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• Use of active or passive fire protection, when appropriate, to help ensure availability of
escape routes and equipment, and
• The time required for personnel to escape to the TR and to move from the TR to
evacuation points under various emergency scenarios.
Stairways and ladders to be separated, to allow alternative escape routes, taking into account prevailing wind, major FACILITY risks (fires, explosion, toxic vapors, etc.), escape and evacuation options.
A minimum of two (2) separate and remote exits shall be provided from LER Building, structure, section or area of high hazard occupancy.
For buildings, in accordance to NFPA 101 [Ref.122], dead ends (i.e. areas with a single means of egress) shall not be longer than 15.2 m. For areas with a length greater than 15.2 m, a second means of egress shall be provided. For outdoor areas, the dead end shall not exceed 6 m of travel distance.
In case of closed rooms, these exits shall be doors hinged to swing to the outside (except for toilet of WHP13N). When fully open, the door leaf in a means of emergency egress shall not project more than 7 in. (180 mm) into the required width of an escape route (Life Safety Code). Where two (2) means of egress are required they shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that both may be rendered impassable by the same emergency condition.
Every exit shall be clearly visible, or the route to reach each exit shall be clearly marked such that the direction of escape from any point is readily known.
Stairway landing and corners shall allow a clear width of 1.4 m to accommodate stretchers.
Escape route lighting shall be designed to be available during any credible emergency as determined by EER analysis. Emergency Lights in TR muster areas, escape routes, and Embarkation points (TEMPSC or Life rafts) are supplied internal self-contained batteries. For Emergency / Escape lighting requirements, refer to Electrical Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.53].
Escape routes are considered to be impaired if:
• The heat flux exceeds 6.3 kW/m2, and • The concentration of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) exceeds 200 ppm.
In event of bridge impairment, personnel trapped on each platform shall escape and muster to the respective TRs and await further instructions.
A movement study shall be carried out as part of EER analysis to ensure that at least one route is available by which stretchers can be moved to / from the TR, Helideck and boat landing.
7.16.10
Decks, Stairways and Access Ways
Deck surfaces shall incorporate sufficient strength to withstand local loading without permanent deformation.
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Access / Egress paths, Platforms, Stairs, Ladders and Hatches shall be designed according to Human Factors Engineering Workplace Design Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.41].
A fix ladder shall be provided on the boat landing so that a person who falls overboard will have a way back onto the platform.
All areas, where possible, are required to be present (regularly or irregularly) shall as far as is practicable be provided with safe means of access to and egress from the area. “Safe” means free from major obstructions and affording quick means of escape in an emergency.
7.16.11
Muster Area (TR)
Muster area shall be provided to protect personnel while efforts are made to control an emergency situation or until a decision is made to abandon the installation.
The TR in LER Building is designed as Primary Muster Area (PMA) in the event of an emergency on the remote wellhead platforms.
A Secondary TR is located on RP LER Building, which is also the designated as Alternative Muster Area (AMA). In the event of bridge is impaired / inaccessible, personnel shall escape to their respective TRs on either WHP or RP.
The muster areas / TR and escape strategy shall take into consideration to offer personnel protection from fire, smoke and blast hazards consistent with the EER analysis, for sufficient time to allow for organized controlled evacuation. The muster areas shall be large enough to accommodate max POB based on a minimum size of 0.6 m2 person. Additional space shall be considered to house life safety equipment such as life preserver (Cascade Breathing Air System Manifold, etc.). Space shall also be provided to accommodate stretcher. Furthermore, the airlock dimension shall be designed to considered stretcher maneuvering carried out by two people without compromising the pressurization. The TR muster area for all the platforms is sized based on requirement of 100% POB as per Sec. 7.18.
TR impairment results shall be addressed in Fire Risk Assessment, Explosion Risk Assessment and Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis. TR design with respect to escape, muster and evacuation shall be improved / finalized based on results and recommendations from the aforesaid studies.
The major factors influencing the integrity of the TR are:
• Porosity of the TR (Penetrations, holes and leakage paths to the outside that lead the
TR to breathe), • Blast Resistance, • Thermal Radiation Impairment, •
Internal Effects Impairment (events such as fire (heat and combustion products) and cumulative effects during a MAH such as heat rise, O2 depletion and CO2 intensification), and
• Other External events (helicopter crash and/or non-process fire; and vessel impacts at vulnerable locations that have sufficient energy to render the TR unfit to perform its primary function).
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The integrity of the TR can be maintained by adequate availability of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). Such systems include but not limited to:
• FGS, • Fire-fighting equipment, • TR Cascade Breathing Air Systems supply, and • PFP rating for the TR of LER Building.
UK HSE guidelines shall be referred to for more risk reduction measures with TR.
The TR shall contain means to monitor FACILITY alarms, to communicate externally with RGA/NFB Complex and rescue party, and to communicate internally, including the use of the public address system.
TR shall be designed for internal environmental factors such as temperature increase and air quality following HVAC shutdown in an emergency, together with any other local environmental factors that could persist for the duration that the TR is rated.
There shall be at least two independent means of communicating from the TR to RGA/NFB Complex away from the installation. The means of communicating shall be assessed in the ESSA study.
The TR shall have at least two independent exits to the evacuation stations (i.e., life rafts and TEMPSC).
On the remote wellhead platforms, TR impairment due to explosion overpressure is considered to occur if the overpressure exceeds 1 bar (the blast wall itself may not fail at this overpressure, but the TR shall be impaired if the supporting structure fails).
The TR shall be located as far from drilling and process hazards as practicable.
Fully charged waterproof hand-held UHF/ VHF radios shall be available for use at every TR. The Emergency Response Team shall have intrinsically safe radios.
Power for the public address and TR external communications shall be designed to be available during any credible emergency as determined by the EER analysis.
The following communication equipment shall be available in the TR:
• Hotline Telephone, • IP Telephone, • PAGA Access panel, • Two ways UHF Handheld Radio, • VHF Handheld Radio (Aircraft), and • VHF Handheld Radio (Marine).
An Operator Workstation will be also provided within the TR for monitoring the F&G conditions, and alarms for the platform.
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Space shall be allocated, and containers shall be used, when necessary, for storing equipment required as part of emergency escape, evacuation, and rescue. Items that may be required within the TR, such as emergency / medical equipment, shall be readily available.
7.16.12
Evacuation Methods
In the event of a major incident and subsequent Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) all personnel will muster in the Temporary Refuge on WHP (Primary Muster Area) or Temporary Refuge on RP (Secondary Muster Area). TR Room is located within the LER Building of greenfield platforms.
7.16.12.1
Evacuation System for WHP13N
The evacuation systems for the WHPs shall be as follows:
• Primary methods of evacuation:
o Stand-by boat / vessel (when a remote platform is manned, presence of a
stand-by boat at a safe distance is mandatory),
o Helicopters, and o Drilling rig (when available).
• Secondary methods of evacuation:
o One (1 No.) Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) with
capacity of 100% POB.
• Tertiary methods of evacuation:
o Life rafts (2 Nos. x 50% POB), and o Donning Lifejackets and descending to sea via Scramble Net.
7.16.12.2
Evacuation System for each Greenfield RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and
RP6N)
The evacuation systems for the RPs shall be as follows:
• Primary methods of evacuation:
o Escape to primary TR in adjacent WH platform via interconnecting bridge.
• Secondary methods of evacuation:
o Stand-by boat / vessel (when a remote platform is manned, presence of a
stand-by boat at a safe distance is mandatory), and o Helicopters (available at RP3S / RP5S / RP5N / RP6N).
• Tertiary methods of evacuation:
o Life rafts (2 Nos. x 50% POB), and o Donning Lifejackets and descending to sea via Scramble Net.
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7.16.12.3
Evacuation System for Brownfield Modification
The evacuation methods for all brownfields platforms shall be based on existing EER philosophy.
7.16.13
Safe Evacuation Requirements
In case of H2S detection, personnel on platform shall immediately wear Breathing Air (BA) Escape Set and escape to Temporary Refuge.
Cascade Breathing Air System manifold is provided inside the Temporary Refuge. If decision is made to evacuate the platform, they should don wear Breathing Air Escape Set and proceed to the TEMPSC.
Safe evacuation shall align with COMPANY’s emergency management plan with due consideration to the FACILITY’s mustering philosophy, availability of evacuation means including allowances for search and rescue operation.
7.16.14
Medivac Requirements
Means of Medical Evacuation (Medivac) considered for this FACILITY is as follows:
• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Temporary Refuge if there is continuing Fire /
Explosion / Gas impairment on platform, and
• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Helideck for Helicopter Medivac.
7.16.15
Escape Route Markers
To ensure a safe and rapid evacuation, escape routes shall be provided with the following:
• Escape routes between exit points shall be clearly defined by lines painted on the floor
•
in oil resistant photoluminescent paint, Illuminated and certified direction arrow markers will be strategically positioned along escape routes where it is necessary to guide personnel to the platform’s perimeter walkway or to the safe areas,
• At points along the platform perimeter walkway, signs shall be erected to indicate the
direction to the muster points,
• Escape routes shall be clearly marked and shall have arrows indicating the preferred
direction of travel,
• Directional signs shall be provided to help personnel find their way. Signs shall be posted on walls, above doors, on walls near floor level and on the floor itself, and • Self-illuminating or photo-luminescent signs shall be easily seen under emergency lighting conditions. The illumination levels on the face of the photo-luminescent signs shall be in accordance with appropriate standards.
All personnel doors leading out of a room shall have an exit sign positioned in a clearly visible location.
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7.16.16
Safety Signs
Safety signs shall be provided to indicate escape routes, to warn of hazards, indicate required precautions, provide instructions and convey information within that specific area and to show the location of fire, safety and lifesaving equipment. Specification for Safety Signs for COMP3 Project [Ref.30] and Datasheets for Safety Signs for COMP3 Project [Ref.38] shall be prepared with design details.
Escape signs shall be installed so that wherever someone is standing in an occupied area a directional sign to the escape path shall be visible.
Chemical Hazards Bulleting (CHB) shall be provided at the chemical handling areas.
Signs shall be pictorial as far as is practicable and if text is required this shall be in English.
Safety signs are categorized under the following headings:
• Mandatory (White on Blue), • Prohibition (Red on White), • Warning (Black on Yellow), • Fire Equipment (White on Red), and •
Informative & Emergency (White on Green).
Safety signs shall be as following:
• All Informative, Fire Equipment and Emergency Signs shall be of photo luminescent
type such that it is visible even in the complete darkness for at least 60 minutes, and
• All other warning signs (Mandatory, Prohibition and Warning Signs) shall be of 3M high
intensity photo reflective type.
Material of construction of the safety signs shall be as below:
• All outdoor sign board material of construction if not of rigid type shall be of 3 mm thick
Stoved Aluminium, and
• All indoor sign boards shall be of 3 mm thick acrylic type.
All controls on fire and safety equipment, alarm and shutdown pushbuttons, etc. shall be clearly labelled with their function.
Safety Sign Layouts will be prepared for each platform to cover for type, position and quantity of all signs.
7.17 Safety and Lifesaving Equipment
The following Safety and Lifesaving Equipment shall be provided for the FACILITIES. All lifesaving appliances shall comply to IMO and SOLAS [Ref.125] requirements. Specification for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 Project [Ref.28] and Datasheets for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 Project [Ref.36] will be prepared for design requirements of the equipment.
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7.17.1 Throw Overboard Type Liferaft
Two (2 Nos.) throw overboard type life raft (capacity: 95 kg/ person) shall be provided considering the POB on each platform:
• 2 x 50% POB for WHP13N, and • 2 x 50% POB for each RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N and RP6N).
Refer to Specification for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 Project [Ref.28] and Datasheets for Safety, Lifesaving and Firefighting Items for COMP3 Project [Ref.36] for details.
Each liferaft shall be capable of single man launch and have automatic inflation action following launch. Each canister shall be mounted at handrail level and clearly marked to show its method of operation.
Life rafts, and the launch or deployment systems associated with them, shall be located so that incidents causing damage to TEMPSC shall not likely result in damage to rafts or launch systems.
Life rafts and their deployment systems shall comply with SOLAS [Ref.125] (IMO IE110E) requirements. Easy to follow, clearly illustrated instructions for launching life rafts and/or escape systems shall be posted adjacent to and (where appropriate) inside the equipment.
7.17.2 TEMPSC
One (1) Davit launched Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) with 100% POB capacity (95 kg/person) shall be provided for WHP13N platform. The TEMPSC shall be designed as per Specification for TEMPSC for COMP3 Project [Ref.29] and Datasheet for TEMPSC for COMP3 Project [Ref.37]
The following requirements shall apply to clearances between TEMPSC and adjacent structure:
• TEMPSC should be positioned in such a way that it does not touch the installation as
it is lowered/launched,
• The distance between a davit launched TEMPSC, when lowered to the waterline, and the nearest element of the offshore installation at the waterline shall not be less than 8 m (26.25 ft). This provides an allowance for wind, wave, or current in sea states up to Beaufort 8 or 9, and
• For dual-fall, davit-launched TEMPSCs that are oriented parallel to the rectangular gravity-based structures, the distance between the TEMPSC, when lowered to the waterline, and the nearest element of the offshore installation at the waterline may be reduced to 5 m (16.4 ft), with no wind, wave, or current. This provides an allowance for wind, wave, or current in sea states up to Beaufort 8 or 9.
7.17.3 Personal Safety Equipment
Suitable safety helmets shall be available for all personnel on the installation. Sufficient protective clothing, welding aprons, gloves, overalls, safety boots and shoes, wet gear, cold weather gear and safety equipment (eye protection, ear protectors, welding masks and
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goggles safety belts, breathing apparatus, portable gas detectors) shall be available for all personnel engaged in operations where they are exposed to risk of injury or disease. Equipment shall be provided by COMPANY for Operations.
7.17.4 Helicopter Crash & Rescue Equipment (HCRE) Cabinet
Minimum two (2) Nos. of Helicopter Crash & Rescue Equipment (HCRE) shall be provided for WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S, RP5N and RP6N that shall be located at the stairway landing of each helideck.
Helicopter Crash & Rescue Equipment shall include adjustable wrench, bolt cutter, hacksaw, side cutting pliers, set of assorted screw drivers, harness knife with sheath, fire-resistant gloves, ladder, lifeline, fire extinguishers, power cutting tool, SCBA (2 Nos.) etc.
7.17.5 Oil Spill Kit and Cabinet
One (1) Spill kit with cabinet shall be provided near Helideck.
7.17.6 Emergency Breathing Air Equipment
Several modes of breathing air shall be provided, such as:
• Cascade Breathing Air System shall be provided in wellhead platform WHP13N and
each RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP5N, RP9S and RP6N),
• 15 min capacity Breathing Air (BA) Escape Sets shall be provided at the Temporary Refuge in WHP13N & each RPs (RP3S, RP5S, RP5N, RP9S and RP6N) for 100% POB, and
• 45 min Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) – two (2) units to be installed inside each helideck Crash and Rescue cabinet. Dedicated 45 Minutes SCBA sets (4 Nos.) with cabinet should be provided for WHP13N and each RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP5N, RP9S and RP6N) for investigation team use only. No other person should use those SCBA sets. These SCBA’s shall be stored within weatherproof cabinets outside the TR Room.
Cascade breathing system air manifolds with quick connections shall be provided for use during an emergency and while personnel perform maintenance, as defined below:
• For WHP13N, breathing air manifolds for twelve (12) persons shall be located on the drill deck near each of the helideck staircase readily available for use in case of an emergency. Manifolds for (6) persons shall be located at strategic locations on the drill, production, and cellar decks as well as near the pig launcher handling area for use during routine maintenance plus EBA and SCBA plug-in facilities, and
• For each RP’s, breathing air manifolds for 6 people shall be located at strategic locations on the top deck, main deck, drain/cellar deck as well as near the pig launcher handling area for use during routine maintenance plus EBA and SCBA plug-in facilities.
All outdoor breathing air manifolds shall be installed inside green fiberglass enclosures with “Breathing Air Manifold” in 3” high yellow stenciling.
The breathing air system shall contain sufficient breathing air for 100% POB for a minimum of 2 hours.
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All breathing air tubing utilized for assembly of breathing air manifolds and cylinder racks etc. shall be Inconel 625 as per ASTM B444 [Ref.141]. Breathing air distribution piping shall be in accordance with Piping Material Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.38]
One (1) number Breathing Apparatus (BA) Escape Set for 15 minutes shall be provided inside the crane cabin.
Oxygen Cylinder with face mask for CPR purpose shall be provided inside the TR.
7.17.7 Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash
Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash Station (combination type), conforming to ANSI / ISEA Z358.1 [Ref.142], will be provided within 10 sec reach or 15 m distance from chemical handling area.
During summer high water temperature is anticipated on NFPS WHP13N and each RP’s (RP3S, RP5S, RP5N, RP9S and RP6N) which could worsen chemical splash injuries and cause scalding. Therefore, the safety shower and eyewash station shall be provided with insulation to maintain water temperature between 15°C and 35°C. Safety shower and eyewash unit including chiller shall conform to Zone 2, Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T3 requirements.
Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash shall be constructed of a material resistant to corrosion in their installed environment. Potable water shall be capable of flowing through eyewash/shower units simultaneously with the required flow rate, pressure and temperature. Refer to Specification for Safety, Lifesaving and firefighting for COMP3 Project [Ref.28]. Installation, and equipment and materials shall also meet the standard ANSI/ISEA Z358.1 [Ref.142].
7.17.8 Fireman Equipment Cabinet
WHP13N and each RP’s shall be provided with one (1 No.) Fireman equipment cabinet at outside the LER building and each cabinet shall contain 2 sets of fireman equipment.
Each set of equipment provided shall comprise of the following as minimum:
• Protective outfit (Clothing that protects the skin from scalding steam and the heat of fire, and that has a water-resistant outer surface), including gloves, boots (made of rubber or other electrically non-conductive material), a face mask or hood and a helmet,
• Self-contained breathing apparatus, • Portable battery-operated lamp capable of functioning efficiently for a period not less
than 3 hours,
• A fireman axe, • A safety harness and lifeline, and • SCBA cylinders (Spare).
Each fireman outfit shall be stowed in a cabinet with suitable instructions prominently displayed on the lid / door. The cabinet shall be of ample size to preclude the possibility of damage to the equipment on restoring after use. Cabinets shall be suitable for the storage of two fireman kits.
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7.17.9 First Aid Kit
First aid kit with instructions will be located at Technical Rooms & TR room of LER Building and crane cabin.
7.17.10
Electrical Safety Kit
Electrical Safety Kit shall be provided inside Electrical / Electrical & Instrument Room and UPS, Instrument & Telecom room of LER Building.
7.17.11
Stretchers
Stretchers (2 Nos.) shall be provided in WHP13N and each RP’s within TR Room of LER Building. These stretchers will be packed in a carrying valise and will be used to transport casualties from the area of an accident to the boat landing/Helideck.
7.17.12
Portable Eyewash Unit
A portable, self-contained eye wash unit with 2 Nos. of bottles shall be provided inside the Battery Room of LER Building.
Battery type to be used in WHP13N and each RP’s is VRLA (Valve Regulated Lead Acid) as per Electrical Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.39].
7.17.13
Lifebuoys
Lifebuoys shall be provided at strategic locations around the perimeter of the platform with minimum 4 Nos. of Lifebuoys at each deck level. The lifebuoys shall be handrail mounted and fitted with automatic light marking devices and 40 meter (min) lanyards, secured to the hand railing and shall be sized accordingly to the elevation above LAT. All lifebuoys shall be of standard units.
Lifebuoys shall comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the LSA Code.
7.17.14
Lifejackets
Lifejackets shall be provided as inherently buoyant. Lifejackets shall be provided for 100% POB at WHP and each RPs, sufficient for 100% POB. Lifejackets shall be stored within weatherproof cabinets outside the TR Room.
A lifejacket shall be provided in the crane cabin.
Each Lifejacket shall be provided with body straps that shall not dislodge if the wearer falls/jumps from a height of at least 4.5 m (14.8 ft). Each lifejacket shall be provided with a whistle, fluorescent light, and lanyard.
Fiberglass containers to store the lifejackets shall be provided and labelled accordingly.
Lifejackets for offshore installations shall comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the LSA Code.
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7.17.15
Scramble Net
Scramble Net shall be provided at liferaft station as a last resort for evacuating personnel. These shall allow rapid and controlled evacuation down to the sea level to embark life rafts.
7.17.16
Illuminated Windsock
Illuminated Windsock shall be provided above crane.
7.17.17
Chemical Handling Safety Kit
A Chemical Handling Safety Kit shall be provided nearby hazardous chemicals handling area.
7.17.18
Work Vest & Cabinet
Work vests shall be provided in for 100% POB at the Production Deck of WHP13N and Main Deck of each RPs. These shall be worn whenever work is being performed in locations where an employee is in danger of falling overboard e.g. near railings. They shall be stored inside cabinet.
7.17.19
Brownfield Modifications
For brown field modifications, adequate safety, personnel life-saving appliances and devices shall be supplemented (if required) in line with the existing escape and evacuation philosophy and fire and safety device layouts.
7.18 Manning Level
The WHP and RPs are normally unmanned, the safety and lifesaving appliance selection should cover the maximum POB for each FACILITY. The maximum POB is tabulated as below:
Table 7.20.1: Platform POB Details
Platform WHP13N RP3S (including existing wellhead WHP3S) RP5S (including existing wellhead WHP5S) RP9S (including existing wellhead WHP9S) RP5N (including existing wellhead WHP5N) RP6N (including existing wellhead WHP6N)
Maximum POB 30 24 24 24 20 20
7.19 Human Factors
The overriding objective for HFE in design is to ensure that the FACILITIES installations and their inherent design can accommodate for safe and reliable operational and maintenance activities and minimize the potential for human error. In order to meet these objectives, it is necessary to:
• manage and integrate HFE principles, specifications and requirement across
engineering disciplines,
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• maintain HFE as a PROJECT responsibility across several roles, •
identify the systems and tasks with human interaction and evaluate work areas with regards to occupational safety, human error and health risks, identify critical tasks and how they are handled, identify the potential for human error, human injury exposure and the consequences that may result, review any existing measures / safeguards that minimize the likelihood of the event occurring or limit the severity of the consequences,
• •
•
• provide recommendations for mitigation measures in the design to manage the risks,
and
• maintain a risk register and document information, historical data for operational
planning and experience transfer in this and other projects.
Human errors during operation and maintenance activities can contribute to accidents. Human errors can also contribute to unsuccessful emergency escape and evacuation.
The design shall consider good practice in the design of all man machine interfaces as well as other human factors including:
• Ease of safe access to equipment, instruments and valves for both normal operation
and maintenance,
• Operating valve (manual or automatic), • Clarity of displays on control systems and visual display units (VDU), • Alarm handling on control and emergency systems, • Operating weather conditions, • Labels and signs, and • Emergency Evacuation Systems.
Human Factor Implementation plan document will be developed to systematically implement the HFE design requirements in PROJECT life cycle. Refer Human Factor Engineering (HFE) Implementation Plan for COMP3 Project [Ref.40].
For PROJECT specific HFE requirements, refer to Human Factors Engineering Workplace Design Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.41].
7.20 Pedestal Crane
Crane shall have capacity to safely lift and carry all normal operation and maintenance cargo at required lift radius.
Pedestal crane location will be located such that:
• Lifting over hydrocarbon piping and equipment and occupied building is minimized,
and
• Avoid impact of flare plumes and vents on Crane Operator.
For general material handling including to avoid lifting path over live hydrocarbon equipment, refer to Mechanical Handling Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.64].
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Pressurized production equipment and associated piping shall be protected from dropped objects as practical (including dropped crane loads), as well as swinging loads and crane booms. The protection shall be as per the recommendation from the Dropped Object Study – Greenfield of respective platform and Dropped Object Study – Brownfield RP and WHP.
7.21 Personal Protection
Personal protection insulation shall be provided for surfaces that will operate above 60 oC or below (-) 10 oC and that are located within 0.3 m horizontally and 2.2 m vertically above a normal walkway or work area. Personal protection shall be in the form of metal barriers or standoffs such as casing, caging, guards, shields, railing or insulation mesh. Use of insulation shall be approved by COMPANY.
For details, refer Specification for Thermal Insulation Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.80].
7.22 Navigational Aids
Navigation aids shall be installed as specified by Technical Specification for Navigational Aids and Helideck Lighting systems [Ref.55] and local regulatory requirements.
Since navigation aids need to be functional continuously, electrical equipment shall be suitable for Zone 1, Group IIB, T3 minimum equivalent per API RP 505. This prevents the potential for an ignition source in the event of a major hydrocarbon release.
Provision shall be made for safe access to permit inspection and maintenance of all navigation aids. Temporary navigation aids to be installed at jackets via solar power.
The riser platform and wellhead platforms shall be provided with navigation aids.
One (1 no.) red flashing strobe light shall be provided and located on the flare boom top. A helicopter wave-off light shall be provided on the helideck. The helideck wave-off light shall be activated upon ESD-1 activation.
Additional marker lights of the same intensity shall be provided along the crane boom at 10 m intervals down to the level of the landing area.
7.23 Noise Level Limits
For all greenfield platforms, the cumulative / combined noise limit applicable shall be 85 dB(A) Considering the COMP3 FACILITIES are unmanned (infrequent operations) with personnel work shifts equal to or less than an 8 hours per shift based on COMPANY’s Noise Control and Hearing Conservation Program [Ref.10].
Noise limit for individual equipment/packages shall be 83 dB(A) measured at 1m from equipment surfaces (conservative reduction of 2 dB(A) to ensure cumulative noise within 85 dB(A)).
For brownfield platforms, followed. Combine/cumulative noise level will be estimated and documented accordingly in the respective noise reports where applicable.
the existing platform’s noise criteria shall be
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The noise from the flare at any operating location shall be limited to 105 dB (A) for the emergency flaring cases. Sound levels at muster area shall not exceed 70 dB (A).
Refer to Noise Design Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.22] for Noise emission level limits.
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8 HYDROGEN SULFIDE (H2S) SAFETY
8.1 Purpose
Purpose is to define the H2S hazards prevention and mitigation philosophy to be considered for NFPS COMP3 Project FACILITIES containing high concentrations of Hydrogen Sulphide gas (H2S).
8.2 H2S Properties
With reference to RGE/QG2/RGA Process Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.42,43,44], process fluid composition for the FACILITIES have indicated the design H2S concentration for WHP and RPs in the range of 1% to 4.1 mole%. Therefore, an uncontrolled release of process fluid to the atmosphere would pose a major hazard to personnel due to highly toxic H 2S gas. This is in addition to inherent fire and explosion hazards caused by released Hydrocarbon gases.
As for all risks, a range of measures are considered in order to reduce risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Risk to personnel on due to H2S gas could arise:
• During an accidental release, • Unignited release through flare, • During normal maintenance operations, for example, confined space (vessel, pig launcher etc.) entry or from opening/dismantling of instrumentation or valve etc., and
• During venting from open drain tank, instrument or any other equipment/system.
If there is H2S gas present in the vicinity of equipment / FACILITIES, the level to which personnel could be exposed depends upon the concentration of H2S in the process fluid and the dispersion under local topographic and atmospheric conditions.
All FACILITIES that are exposed to H2S must be designed to resist the harmful effects of H2S at anticipated operating temperatures and pressures.
8.2.1 H2S Characteristics
• Highly toxic & flammable gas, • Colourless, • At low concentrations (0.01 - 5 ppm), it is detectable by its characteristic of rotten-egg odour. At higher concentrations (above 100 ppm), H2S will cause rapid paralysis of sense of smell. Odour shall not therefore be used as a warning measure, In normal ambient conditions H2S is in gaseous phase,
• • Soluble in both water and hydrocarbon liquids. Pools of water or sludge at the bottom of a tank may thus contain concentrations of H2S and if agitated or heated the tank bottom content will release the H2S gas,
• Pure H2S is heavier than air. Hydrocarbon gas containing H2S can settle in low-lying areas, especially pits and sumps which are closed-in and have poor ventilation. However, mixture of dispersing H2S in open area will depend on the molecular weight of the gas, H2S content in the gas, topography and weather conditions,
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• Besides toxic, H2S is flammable and gas/air mixtures can be explosive in concentrations between 4% LFL and 44% Upper Flammability Limit (UFL). If ignited, the gas burns to produce toxic vapours and gases, such as Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) and Sulphur Trioxide (SO3) which also cause health hazards,
• Gas or liquids containing H2S in contact with metal surfaces and equipment may develop a layer of pyrophoric scale (Iron Sulphide) on their internal surfaces. When these lines or equipment are opened to the atmosphere, oxygen from the atmosphere can react with the pyrophoric scale to produce spontaneous combustion,
• H2S is water soluble. Agitating, mixing and changing temperature or pressure of a liquid solution will cause the release of H2S from fluids. This release can occur quickly, and It causes cracking and embrittlement of metals under certain conditions but steel of the suitable composition/ quality, which are resistant to these forms of attack can be used without any adverse effect.
•
8.2.2 Toxic Effects of H2S
H2S concentrations and the respective effects are provided in Table 8.2.2.1 in accordance with COMPANY’s Hydrogen Sulfide Safety Procedure [Ref.11].
Table 8.2.2.1: Effects of H2S to Humans at Different Concentrations
Concentration (ppm, % by Volume)
Effect
0.00011 - 0.00033 ppm
Typical background concentrations
0.01 - 1.5 ppm 0.000001 - 0.00015 %
2 - 5 ppm 0.0002 - 0.0005 %
10 - 20 ppm 0.001 – 0.002 %
50 ppm 0.005%
100 ppm 0.01%
100 - 150 ppm 0.01– 0.015 %
200 - 300 ppm 0.02 – 0.03 %
Odour threshold (when rotten egg smell is first noticeable to some) Odour becomes more offensive at 3-5 ppm Prolonged exposure may cause nausea, tearing of the eyes, headaches or loss of sleep Airway problems (bronchial constriction) in some asthma patients 5 ppm COMPANY accepted level for LTEL (8 hours TWA) Possible fatigue, loss of appetite, headache, irritability, poor memory, dizziness 10 ppm COMPANY accepted level for STEL (15 min) Decreasing sense of smell Associated variable signs of coughing, eye irritation, altered respiration, pain in eyes, drowsiness and throat irritation, depending upon exposure time, concentration and individual sensitivity Classed as Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentration Exposures of 30 min or more could prevent a person from evacuating area safely
Loss of smell (olfactory fatigue or paralysis) May burn eyes and throat
Marked conjunctivitis and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour Pulmonary edema may occur from prolonged exposure
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Concentration (ppm, % by Volume)
Effect
500 - 700 ppm 0.05 – 0.07%
700 - 1000 ppm 0.07 – 0.1 %
≥ 1000 ppm ≥ 0.1 %
Loss of sense of reasoning and balance Staggering, collapse in 5 minutes Serious damage to the eyes in 30 minutes Death after 30-60 minutes Rapid unconsciousness, “knockdown” or immediate collapse within 1 to 2 breaths, breathing stops Death within minutes
Nearly instant death
COMPANY uses the following defined Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL) for H2S:
• Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) – 10 ppm for a 15 minutes exposure, and • Long Term Exposure Limit (LTEL) – 5 ppm for an 8 hours average.
Moreover, following H2S concentration level is defined as IDLH:
•
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) – 100 ppm.
IDLH concentration of H2S is considered capable of causing death or having immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects (or prevent escape from such an environment).
Fixed H2S detectors shall have a minimum of 2 level alarm set points:
• Level-1 (High – 10 ppm H2S) - This will initiate Toxic Gas Alarm (both visual and
audible), and
• Level-2 (High High – 45 ppm H2S) - This will send a signal to the DCS HMI for operator to respond. For detection at HVAC air intake, FGS shall send trip signals to close HVAC air intake F&G dampers and HVAC system to shutdown.
8.3 H2S Risk Management System
The H2S Risk Management System shall include consideration of H2S throughout the FACILITY’s life cycle.
For hazard identification and quantification of risks associated with high H2S FACILITY, structured safety reviews shall be conducted.
To control the H2S risks, the following four levels of controls shall be implemented:
Prevention Minimize the potential for the hazard to occur or to effect personnel,
Detection
If the hazard occurs alert personnel and safety systems so that measures can be initiated, and emergency response plans can be put into effect, Mitigation Minimize the impact of the event by passive (e.g. fire and blast walls, fire proofing) and/or active (e.g. emergency shutdown, blowdown, deluge) means, and
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Recovery Rescue and medical treatment of personnel, making the FACILITY safe for re-
entry and re-start.
The main aspects to be considered in design stage are:
• Minimizing process stream with high H2S levels at design stage. Process selection should seek inherent safe design concepts to minimize H2S levels and avoid generation of process streams with very high levels of H2S,
• Minimizing leak sources, • Appropriate material selection, • Minimizing exposure of operational and maintenance personnel to H2S risk, e.g. by
designing for unattended facility operation and minimum maintenance requirements,
• Ensuring that design minimizes the risk of H2S release, e.g. by selecting CRA materials or CRA cladding for equipment and piping and thereby reducing the potential corrosion damage and consequent H2S releases,
• Ensuring that adequate personnel protection is provided. This includes consideration of training, access control, toxic gas detection, personal protective equipment, and escape means, and
• Ensuring that risk associated with H2S is quantified and recorded.
8.3.1 Prevention
The primary means of minimizing H2S risk resides in the prevention of uncontrolled H2S releases to the atmosphere. This is achieved through the application of inherent safety design principles, material selection, fabrication/construction integrity and compliance with operating procedures.
a)
Inherently Safe Design
The adoption of an inherent safety approach requires the identification and removal of hazards at an early stage of the design process. This often also has the added benefit of reducing complexity and manual intervention requirement. Inherently safe design requires application of sound engineering judgement together with the right blend of experience and knowledge of operating and maintenance requirements. An inherently safe approach also adds value and reduces lifecycle costs through minimizing equipment, management and maintenance requirements.
b) Material Selection
Process equipment shall be NACE compliant for H2S and CO2. This has resulted in the use of Alloy 625 material (solid CRA or CRA cladded CS) for the production system piping and equipment according to Material Selection Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.77].
MEG shall be injected topsides for the protection of the carbon steel export pipeline. All elastomers and thermoplastics shall be suitable for the chemical environment, temperature range, and pressure in which they shall operate. Selection of these materials for valve seats and seals shall be in accordance with the General Valve Specification for COMP3 Project [Ref.81] to prevent explosive decompression in such materials.
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c) Piping and Fittings
The following design approach shall be adopted:
• Minimize spare nozzles on equipment, • Minimize flange connections in piping, • Minimize drain connections, vent valves and other fittings, • Where possible, minimize small-bore fitting diameter of less than 50 mm, • Gasket selection shall comply with Basis of Design for Piping for COMP3 Project
[Ref.61],
• Specification of caps, plugs or blind flanges for open-ended valves and nozzles, • Avoid dead legs as far practicable as possible and avoid pockets in dead sections of
line,
• All hydrocarbon maintenance drains / periodic drains (instruments, filters and pig traps) to closed drain system after
/ equipment shall be routed
from pipework depressurization, and
• Atmospheric Vent / Relief System is provided on NFPS COMP3 and it collects normal and emergency venting sources discharging into a collection piping system with minimal piping directed to the nearest safe location for discharge and disposition.
d) Design Pressure
Design pressure of process equipment shall be maintained within the limits mentioned in RGE/QG2/RGA Process Design Basis for COMP3 Project [Ref.42, 43, 44].
e) Mechanical Joints Minimization
All Joints shall be welded except as permitted for Flanges & Flanged Joints, Threaded Joints or “Proprietary and Other Joints”.
f)
Instrumentation
The use of non-intrusive instrumentation, e.g. pig alerts, shall be used wherever practical. Instrument isolation bleeds shall be routed to closed system.
g) Venting & Draining
Vents / drains/ bleeds from isolation facilities shall not terminate in local atmosphere and shall be piped to a closed system based on process Isolation Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.45] and Process Drain Philosophy for COMP3 Project [Ref.46]. Vents and drains installed on piping, equipment and instruments shall be valved and shall be either capped or blinded. All liquid in sour service shall be piped into a closed drain system appropriate for the fluid properties. System design shall be such that no cold venting is permitted. Any vent gas shall be disposed through lit flare only. Vents from Hazardous Open Drains Tank shall be routed to safe locations. Gas dispersion calculation can be performed provided flowrates, compositions and vent sizes are available. The design criteria for dispersion is 50% LFL.
h) Sampling Systems
Closed loop circuit bomb purging loops shall be used for gas sampling, with spring-closing valves provided on gas supply and non-return valves on outlet connections.
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i) Pump Seals
Double mechanical seals with H2S-free flushing medium shall be provided on centrifugal pumps. Reciprocating Pumps will be equipped with Leak Detection Systems and suitable seals (PTFE or Viton) and gaskets for H2S service. Alternatively, seal-less pumps shall be used.
j) Natural Ventilation
The process areas are open and uncongested and as such, take maximum advantage of natural ventilation to assist with the dispersion of any gas.
k) Fabrication / Construction Integrity
To assure soundness of joints, all pipe welds shall be 100% radiographed and all mechanical joints helium leak tested. Special attention to materials control systems will be required during fabrication, to ensure that the specified materials are used in the correct applications. Moreover, leak testing should also be done after installation of topside.
8.3.2 H2S Gas Detection System
Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) gas detectors will be installed around pumps, vessels and piping manifolds where process fluid leak might cause toxic atmosphere.
Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) detectors will be provided for LER Building HVAC’s air intakes.
H2S gas detection shall lead to:
• Distinct audible and visual alarm in the FACILITY’s RGA/NFB complex as per Fire and
Gas Detection Layout of respective platform,
• Closure of LER Building’s HVAC Air Intakes F&G dampers and HVAC system trip, and • Escape to and mustering in Temporary Refuge of LER Building.
The detection set points for H2S detectors are defined in Fire and Gas Detection Sec. 7.12.8.2.1.
8.3.3 Breathing Air Systems
Due to high H2S toxicity levels of process fluids, breathing air supply is required on NFPS WHP and RPs. Use of breathing air supply is required during certain maintenance activities, accidental leaks or rescue activities. Therefore, all personnel on WHP and RPs shall have quick access to breathing air supplies at all times while on board platform.
Following three types of breathing air supplies will be available on NFPS WHP and RPs as part of COMP3 Project:
• Supplied Cascade Breathing Air System, • Portable 45 mins. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), and • Portable 15 mins. Breathing Air Escape Sets.
Refer Sec. 7.17.6 for further details.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Every person visiting WHP and RPs shall wear a personal H2S monitor and carry an H2S Escape Mask as a part of prescribed PPE. The visiting person shall carry the H2S Escape Mask with them all times while visiting the platform to wear it immediately during any gas leak.
During a gas leak and/or fire emergency, all personnel on platform shall immediately wear the H2S Escape Mask and proceed to TR. While in TR, procedurally personnel have to don Breathing Air Escape Sets and connect it to the Cascade Breathing Air System.
If decision is made to evacuate the platform, they should disconnect Breathing Air Escape Set from Cascade Breathing Air System and proceed to the embarkation area while using only Breathing Air Escape Sets.
8.3.4 Maintenance Operations
When breaking of containment is required for maintenance activities the piping or equipment involved must be isolated, depressurized and purged before exposing open parts of the equipment to atmosphere.
Despite isolation, depressurization and purging some activities (e.g. sampling) may results in minor releases to atmosphere. When there is a possibility of toxic (H2S) gas emission during maintenance, personnel involved in such activities shall wear Breathing Air Escape Sets. Additional Breathing Air Escape Sets are provided within TR Room of the LER Building. Cascade Breathing Air System manifolds has been distributed at different locations across WHP and RPs deck levels to be utilized for maintenance. Additional precautions required by Permit to Work System shall also be deployed, for example the use of blower fan, provision of safety watch, gas testing etc.
8.3.5 Mitigation
High level detection of H2S at a concentration of 10 ppm or greater in the process area, the detection system should sound a unique alarm (both aurally and visually) and register a visual alarm in the RGA/NFB complex.
High-high level detection of H2S at a concentration of 45 ppm or greater in HVAC Air Intakes of LER Building located at WHP and RPs, shall raise the alarm, closure of the air intake dampers and transfer of the HVAC system controls to shutdown mode. MACPs are located at each 30 meters interval of the platform area.
In addition to the above measures, each person on the platform shall carry a Breathing Air Escape Set and wear it immediately upon sounding of gas / H2S alarm and / or personal H2S monitor alarm.
8.3.6 Recovery
Contingency plans shall be developed for the effective rescue and medical treatment of personnel who may be exposed to H2S Toxic gas release.
Locations where H2S can be present in the air above 5 ppm, shall follow Sec. 2.1.4.5 of COMPANY’s Hydrogen Sulfide Safety procedure [Ref.11].
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 123 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
All personnel who visit, work or carry out emergency duties on platform in an area where H2S is a potential hazard will need to have a level of competence compatible with the tasks they are expected to carry out and must have appropriate training.
All portable H2S gas detectors used on the FACILITY shall be suitable to use in classified hazardous areas.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 124 of 157
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
9 APPENDIX
Appendix – 1 Offshore Layout Development Checklist
Following checklist should be used as a guideline for development of offshore layouts:
- Design with the following operations and maintenance requirements in mind, the key
words are “access” and “lifting”:
• Locate access hatches / lifting points in wellhead area to avoid lifting over flowlines.
•
Install lifting points (e.g., monorails/pad-eyes) above large pumps, motors, etc.
• Provide adequate vertical clearance for use of lifting points.
• Provide ample space for maintenance around rotating equipment.
• Design to avoid the necessity for scaffolding to make inspection / repairs possible.
• Ensure manholes, cleanouts, etc. are accessible.
• Provide clear lifting access above equipment requiring frequent disassembly.
• Consider permanent maintenance/access platforms versus temporary ladders and
scaffolding.
• Protect exposed systems on upper decks handling flammable or hazardous fluids
from dropped object damage to the extent practical.
• Consider laydown areas / access for boats, recognizing weather conditions.
• Consider sling laydown areas for module and/or deck erection/installation.
• Consider hook-up and commissioning equipment storage requirements when
designing laydown areas.
-
Provide laydown space and properly protected and/or segregated storage areas.
-
Locate module inter-deck stairwells at module edges to minimize space requirement.
Where possible, locate stairways in grated areas.
- Protection of personnel during platform evacuation shall be considered in location of
stairwells and may overrule placement at module edges as mentioned above.
- Consider use of removable grating over infrequently used access ways in decks instead of permanent openings with handrails. Barricades and/or temporary posts with safety chains should be specified and provided for times when personnel are in the area while the access way may be open.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
- Radio antennas and their physical radiating path requirements shall be considered in
layout development. Provide room for safe and efficient installation.
-
Communications equipment shall be located separate from switchgear and motor control center rooms and any other equipment that may cause radio frequency interference.
-
Check that doors have no obstructions to opening.
-
Ensure that instruments face towards access ways, platforms, etc. but do not protrude into access ways, causing obstructions. Group instruments for convenience in viewing and locate near associated equipment. Provide adequate access around vessels and instrument bridles for operation, inspection, and maintenance.
-
Arrange major cable tray routings in conjunction with piping to ensure runs are as straight as practical with a minimum of elevation changes. Indicate and reserve adequate space on piping drawings for cable trays.
-
During design, continuously review and coordinate inter-disciplinary items that may cause mutual interference (e.g., light fixtures, control panels, cable tray, bus duct, and HVAC / pressurization ducting) to avoid interference.
-
Avoid installing unprotected equipment in areas with deluge or other automatic fire
water systems.
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Appendix – 2 Fire & Gas Detection Voting, Set Point, Typical Cause & Effect for Greenfield Wellhead and Riser Platforms
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 127 of 157
SYSTEM GENERAL
ESD INTERFACE (Note-4)
CRANE
PAGA INTERFACE (Note-6) (North Platform)
PAGA INTERFACE (Note-6) (South Platform)
ACS INTERFACE
RADIO
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM (NOVEC)
DIFFS (Note-5)
HVAC SYSTEM & F&G DAMPERS
HELIDECK (Note-5, 8)
BATTERY
) A P G
(
m r a A
l
l
a r e n e G e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
) s u o u n i t n o C ( e b d u A
i
l
) A G T (
l
m r a A c i x o T e t a i t i n
I
i
g n h s a l F e u B + ) l
l
w o H
l
( e b d u A
i
e n i r a M M F
F H V
,
R M D F H U
r o o D k c o n U S C A
l
n o c a e B
i
s o d a R e n a r C & o d a R
i
1 o t
r e w o p t i
m s n a r t e c u d e R
t t a W
d e m
r i f n o c
s i
e r i F e r e h w m o o R
e r i F t n e g A n a e C e t a v i t c A
l
X t a m e t s y S n o i s s e r p p u S
1
D S E e t a i t i n
I
X
X
X
X
APPENDIX-2
TYPICAL CAUSE & EFFECT DIAGRAM FOR FIRE & GAS DETECTION WELL HEAD PLATFORM - WHP13N RISER PLATFORM - NORTH (RP5N, RP6N) & SOUTH (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S)
TYPE
AREA
VOTING LOGIC
Manual Alarm Call Point
Decks / Stair / LER / Crane
Triple IR Flame Detector - 1 detector in alarm Triple IR Flame Detector - 2 detectors in alarm Triple IR Flame Detector - 1 detector in alarm Triple IR Flame Detector - 2 detectors in alarm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @10 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @45 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @10 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @45 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @10 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 1 detector @45 ppm Toxic Gas Detector - 2 detectors @10 ppm Flammable Gas Detector - 1 detector @20% LEL Flammable Gas Detector - 1 detector @50% LEL Flammable Gas Detector - 2 detectors @50% LEL Flammable Gas Detector - 1 detector @20% LEL Flammable Gas Detector - 1 detector @50% LEL Flammable Gas Detector - 2 detectors @50% LEL
Heat Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Heat Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Smoke Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Smoke Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Smoke Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
Process & Transformer Area
Helideck
Process Area / Pedestal Crane - Near Fresh Air Intake
LER -Airlock
LER HVAC Air Intake
Process Area / Pedestal Crane - Near Fresh Air Intake
LER HVAC Air Intake
Pedestal Crane Machinery Room
Pedestal Crane Cabin
LER HVAC Air Intake
LER HVAC plenum outlet of AHU fan
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Smoke Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
LER - Technical Rooms & Voids
1ooN
2ooN
1oo3
2oo3
1ooN
1ooN
1oo1
1oo1
1oo3
1oo3
2oo3
1ooN
1ooN
2ooN
1oo3
1oo3
2oo3
1oo2
2oo2
1oo2
2oo2
1oo3
2oo3
1oo2
2oo2
1ooN
2ooN
l
y a p s i D S G F e t a i t i n
I
&
)
U D V
B F N / A G R t a t n e m e c n u o n n a
S C D
(
t n e m e c n u o n n A
I
M H
l
x e p m o C
r o t a r e p O t a y a p s i D & m r a A
l
l
g n d
i
l i
u B R E L n
i
s n o i t a t S
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
5 r e t f a e n a r c o t
r e w o p e t a o s I
l
)
D S E a i v ( y a e d e m
l
i t
s n m
i
m r a a
l
l
a u s i v
l
i
/ e b d u a e t a i t i n
I
) S A E A P a i v ( e r i F
e n a r c
t a
m r a a
l
l
a u s i v
l
i
/ e b d u a e t a i t i n
I
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
l
i
e b d u A
l
m r a A e r i F e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) s u o u n i t n o C (
l
i
e b d u A
) A P A P (
m r a A
l
l
c i x o T / e b a m m a l F
e n a r c
t a
) A G A P a i v (
s a g
l
m r o f t a P n o d n a b A e t a i t i n
I
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
) A P G
(
m r a A
l
l
a r e n e G e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) t n e t t i
m r e t n I (
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
) A G T (
l
m r a A c i x o T e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + e b d u A
i
l
w o
l l
e Y + ) e b r a W
l
l
( e b d u A
i
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
l
m r o f t a P n o d n a b A e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B g n h s a l F
i
l
i
e b d u A
) A P A P (
m r a A
l
i
n o c a e B g n h s a l F r e b m A
l
i
e b d u A
l
m r a A e r i F e t a i t i n
I
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) t n e t t i
m r e t n I (
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
k c e d
i l
e H n
i
S F F I D e t a v i t c A
X
d e n r e c n o c o t d n a m m o C p i r T
n a F U H A
C A V H o t d n a m m o C p i r T
X
X
X
X
s r e p m a D G & F l l
a e s o C
l
X
X
X
X
f f o
e v a W k c e d
i l
e H e t a v i t c A
i
f o g n g r a h c
t s o o b t i b h n
i
I
s r e g r a h C y r e t t a B
t h g i L
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
128 of 157
SYSTEM GENERAL
ESD INTERFACE (Note-4)
CRANE
PAGA INTERFACE (Note-6) (North Platform)
PAGA INTERFACE (Note-6) (South Platform)
ACS INTERFACE
RADIO
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM (NOVEC)
DIFFS (Note-5)
HVAC SYSTEM & F&G DAMPERS
HELIDECK (Note-5, 8)
BATTERY
APPENDIX-2
TYPICAL CAUSE & EFFECT DIAGRAM FOR FIRE & GAS DETECTION WELL HEAD PLATFORM - WHP13N RISER PLATFORM - NORTH (RP5N, RP6N) & SOUTH (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S)
TYPE
AREA
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
Smoke Detector - 2 detectors in alarm
LER - Battery Room, TR Room
VOTING LOGIC
1ooN
2ooN
Smoke Detector - 1 detector in alarm
LER OFFICE & TOILET
1oo1
Hydrogen Detector - 1 detector @10% LEL Hydrogen Detector - 1 detector @20% LEL Hydrogen Detector - 2 detectors @20% LEL
HSSD - Smoke Detection - Pre-alarm
HSSD - Smoke Detection - Alarm
LER - Battery Room (Note-9)
(Note-7)
1ooN
1ooN
2ooN
l
y a p s i D S G F e t a i t i n
I
&
)
U D V
B F N / A G R t a t n e m e c n u o n n a
S C D
(
t n e m e c n u o n n A
I
M H
l
x e p m o C
r o t a r e p O t a y a p s i D & m r a A
l
l
g n d
i
l i
u B R E L n
i
s n o i t a t S
1
D S E e t a i t i n
I
5 r e t f a e n a r c o t
r e w o p e t a o s I
l
)
D S E a i v ( y a e d e m
l
i t
s n m
i
m r a a
l
l
a u s i v
l
i
/ e b d u a e t a i t i n
I
) S A E A P a i v ( e r i F
e n a r c
t a
m r a a
l
l
a u s i v
l
i
/ e b d u a e t a i t i n
I
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
w o
l l
e Y + ) e b r a W
l
l
( e b d u A
i
l
i
e b d u A
l
m r a A e r i F e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) s u o u n i t n o C (
l
i
e b d u A
) A P A P (
m r a A
l
l
c i x o T / e b a m m a l F
e n a r c
t a
) A G A P a i v (
s a g
l
m r o f t a P n o d n a b A e t a i t i n
I
X
X
X
) A P G
(
m r a A
l
l
a r e n e G e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) t n e t t i
m r e t n I (
X
X
X
X
X
) A G T (
l
m r a A c i x o T e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
i
g n h s a l F d e R + e b d u A
i
l
X
X
X
l
m r o f t a P n o d n a b A e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B g n h s a l F
i
l
i
e b d u A
) A P A P (
m r a A
l
i
n o c a e B g n h s a l F r e b m A
l
i
e b d u A
l
m r a A e r i F e t a i t i n
I
) A P G
(
m r a A
l
l
a r e n e G e t a i t i n
I
n o c a e B
) s u o u n i t n o C ( e b d u A
i
l
) A G T (
l
m r a A c i x o T e t a i t i n
I
X
X
X
i
g n h s a l F d e R + ) t n e t t i
m r e t n I (
X
X
X
X
X
i
g n h s a l F e u B + ) l
l
w o H
l
( e b d u A
i
1 o t
r e w o p t i
m s n a r t e c u d e R
t t a W
d e m
r i f n o c
s i
e r i F e r e h w m o o R
e r i F t n e g A n a e C e t a v i t c A
l
X t a m e t s y S n o i s s e r p p u S
i
s o d a R e n a r C & o d a R
i
e n i r a M M F
F H V
,
R M D F H U
n o c a e B
r o o D k c o n U S C A
l
X
X
X
X
k c e d
i l
e H n
i
S F F I D e t a v i t c A
d e n r e c n o c o t d n a m m o C p i r T
n a F U H A
C A V H o t d n a m m o C p i r T
s r e p m a D G & F l l
a e s o C
l
X
X
f f o
e v a W k c e d
i l
e H e t a v i t c A
i
f o g n g r a h c
t s o o b t i b h n
i
I
s r e g r a h C y r e t t a B
t h g i L
X
NOTES:
- DCS/FGS HMI is located at the RGA and NFB complexes for QGS and QGN platforms respectively.
- All individual alarms / status indication for F&G detection and Fire Protection System shall be displayed on the DCS graphics at these locations.
- Status / alarms indication from FGS to DCS are transferred via soft link while trip logics are transferred via redundant safety network.
- FGS shall provide signal upon confirmed fire or flammable gas detection to ESD system for initiating ESD-1. All subsequent actions related to ESD-1, shall be initiated by ESD system. These details shall be covered as part of the Process Shutdown Philosophy and hierarchy.
- Helideck is not available on RP9S platform. DIFFS System and Helideck Wave-off lights are hence not available on these platforms.
- Incase of F&G detection in any of the North/South platforms, only the Audio-visual alarms of the concerned platform will be activated via PAGA system.
- For Electrical, Telecom & Instrument Cabinets in Technical Rooms of LER and false floor void.
- Upon confirmed fire, flammable gas and toxic gas detection, helideck wave off lights shall be activated.
- In the event of hydrogen detection inside Battery room, both the exhaust fans (Duty + standby) will continue running to speed up dilution of H2.
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
TECHNICAL SAFETY BASIS OF DESIGN (OFFSHORE) FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Appendix – 3 Approved Technical Query for Safety Studies which are not required for COMP3 Project (COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027)
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Page 130 of 157
Docusign(cid:1)Envelope(cid:1)ID:(cid:1)2315B343-0299-433B-8A6C-5FA362981832
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY AGREEMENT No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 TECHNICAL QUERY FORM
☒
TECHNICAL QUERY
Technical Query Number: COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
Section (A) – To be completed by Initiator
Initiating Party:
Balasubramani Perumal
Revision No:
D
Date Initiated:
26th February 2025
Technical Discipline:
HSE&Q
Location / Area:
Offshore
Applicable Specification(s): N/A
Short Title: TECHNICAL QUERY FOR SAFETY STUDIES WHICH ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR COMP3 PROJECT
Description of Query:
Safety studies for COMP3 Project will be developed and performed based on requirement in:
a. Exhibit 6A Scope of Work, Clause 5.2.9. Related to Process Safety and Loss Prevention scope
of work
b. Exhibit 6A Appendix B, Clause 3.2.6 related to Minimum Contractor Deliverables Loss
Prevention Engineering and Drafting
From those references, some of deliverables/activities are not essentially required to be performed in COMP3 Project due to limited scope and complexity of the Project, including limited Brownfield scope.
Contractor Proposed Solution: Considering above, CONTRACTOR have evaluated necessity of performing some safety study deliverables/activities and proposed to exclude some of them as summarized in below points. Detail technical justification is provided in Attachment 1.
a. Following safety studies/deliverables to be excluded for COMP3 Project scope.
No.
1
Safety Studies
Excluded for:
Reason for Exclusion
Remarks
Health Risk Assessment Workshop
All GF & BF Platform NUI platform which has
little to personnel, and no exposure health additional hazard chemical) introduced in the COMP3 platforms
occupational new
(e.g.
2
Vibration Study
All GF & BF Platform No equipment in COMP3 project scope which has potential to generate high/significant vibration levels
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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No.
3
4
5
Docusign(cid:1)Envelope(cid:1)ID:(cid:1)2315B343-0299-433B-8A6C-5FA362981832
Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY AGREEMENT No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 TECHNICAL QUERY FORM
Technical Query Number: COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
Safety Studies
Excluded for:
Reason for Exclusion
Remarks
Emergency Response Plan
All GF & BF Platform COMP3 Scope platforms is NUI with similarity with existing platforms, thus existing ERP can be adopted for COMP3 scope.
other
ERP will be developed for construction phase by HSE, to refer COMP3-SPM-SH- PLN-00004 Emergency Response and Preparedness Plan. Dedicated ERP developed will specific each to site/vessel.
be
To be integrated with workshop Bow-Tie Report
Major Accident Hazard Report
Vessel Analysis
Survivability
6
Manning Study
All GF & BF Platform MAH Report is similar to Bow-Tie all Workshop Report. information in MAH Report will be combined in Bow-Tie Workshop Report
Thus,
All GF & BF Platform Pressure Vessel in COMP3 scope have inventory less than 4 tons, where potential escalation effects due to large hydrocarbon inventory are considered if a vessel has > 4 tons inventory
All GF & BF Platform All platforms within COMP3 Project scope are NUI and Maximum POB for each platform have been in Technical Safety established Basis of Design
7
Gas Dispersion & Hot Plume Study
All GF & BF Platform No exhaust source
in COMP3 Project scope other than temporary EDG. Flare and Vent dispersion studies will be developed in dedicated reports.
Helideck wind turbulence & temperature rise study will cover hot source from temporary EDG and Flare
8
Firewater Transient and Surge Analysis Report
All GF & BF Platform No fixed firewater pumping & wet piping system on WHP13N and the scope of firewater spray distribution piping is limited on the well bay area. RP platforms are not protected with firewater system
9
Deluge Arrangement Calculation Report
Nozzle
All GF & BF Platform
Limited number of spray nozzle and the absence of any large equipment requiring verification of coverage on WHP13N, and RP platforms are not protected with firewater system.
Firewater Demand and Hydraulic Calculation developed be will (already in MDR)
included
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY AGREEMENT No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 TECHNICAL QUERY FORM
Technical Query Number: COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
No.
10
Safety Studies
Excluded for:
Reason for Exclusion
Remarks
Utility Flow Diagram – Clean Agent
All GF & BF Platform NOVEC 1230 is fully designed and supplied by VENDOR, including the detailed P&IDs. No additional detail is foreseen within a separate UFD
11
Noise Study
BF: WHP5N, WHP6N, WHP3S, WHP9S, WHP5S, WHP4N, WHP11S
Related to BF modification in those specific platforms, is no there additional equipment/valve/items which can potentially generating noise. Accordingly, the existing noise maps remain valid. In case there are some new pumps, those are only replacement from old is already it pumps, hence considered existing Noise in studies.
b. Since the COMP3 Project scope are limited for below listed platforms, a common Technical Note will be developed to assess each potential hazard due to Brownfield modifications:
• WHP11S • RP4S • RP7S • RT-2 • RP8S
c. Considering these platforms are existing and there will be no impact/additional hazard and risk identified on brownfield modification, no safety studies will be performed for these platforms:
• RP11S • WHP12S • WHP13S • WHP12N • WHP1S • NFB • RGA-LQ • WHP2S • WHP8S
COMPANY is kindly requested to confirm CONTRACTOR proposed solution or advise otherwise.
IMPACT ON: ☐ COST ☐ SCHEDULE ☐ HSE / RISK
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY AGREEMENT No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 TECHNICAL QUERY FORM
Technical Query Number: COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
List of Attachments (If any):
- Technical Justification of Safety Studies Scope for COMP3 Project
Initiated by:
Name: Balasubramani Perumal
Sign:
Position: LOSPE - PSL
Date: 26-Feb-2025
Endorsed by:
Name: Jobi George
Approved by:
Sign:
Position: Technical Manager
Date: 26-Feb-2025
Name: Reetesh Kumar Jha
Sign:
Position: Engineering Manager
Date: 26-Feb-2025
Section (B) – To be completed by Responder
Response:
COMPANY takes no exception, whereby omit of listed safety studies provided technically justified, however, from the perspective of Scope of Work (SoW), business team has to take note of the optimized studies, accordingly, exercises the applicable procedure.
COMPANY Discipline Engineer/SME:
Name:
Mojahid Elamin
Sign:
Reviewed by COMPANY Lead Engineer:
Position:
Head of Technical Safety/LP
Date:
06.03.2025
☐
ENDORSED
☐ ENDORSED WITH COMMENTS ☐
REJECTED
Name:
Ali Mehrpour
Sign:
Lead Engineer Comment:
Final Approval:
Name:
Grace L Marichez
Sign:
Manager’s Comment:
Query Close out by Initiator:
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
Position:
Lead of Technical Safety & LP
Date:
06.03.2025
Position:
Engineering Manager (COMP3)
Date:
06.03.2025
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Classification: Internal
NORTH FIELD PRODUCTION SUSTAINABILITY (NFPS) PROJECT
COMP3 - NFPS OFFSHORE RISER/WELLHEAD PLATFORM & INTRAFIELD PIPELINES PROJECT
COMPANY AGREEMENT No.: LTC/C/NFP/5129/20 TECHNICAL QUERY FORM
Technical Query Number: COMP3-SPM-SH-TQY-00027
CONTRACTOR Project No.: 033764
Query Close out by Initiator:
AGREED RESPONSE IMPLEMENTED: ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not Applicable Comment if any:
Name:
Sign:
Position:
Date:
Close out Approval by COMPANY:
Comment if any:
Name:
Sign:
Position:
Date:
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
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Attachment - 1 Technical Justification of Safety Studies Scope For COMP3 Project
1 OBJECTIVE OF DOCUMENT
The objective of this technical justification is to evaluate the requirement of some of the safety study deliverables as part of COMP3 detail design scope. Some deliverables are not necessarily required to be developed for some specific platform due to limited modifications, or for all COMP3 Facilities because of the manning plan, the complexity of the Facility, etc.
There are 2 (two) different sections developed for this Technical justification, which are Exclusion of Common Document (Section 2) and Exclusion of Brownfield Document (Section 3). Summary of documents excluded from COMP3 Project scope are defined in Section 4.
Note that unless specified here, all safety studies defined in Exhibit 6 Contract SOW [Ref. 1 and 2] remain to be under CONTRACTOR responsibility in COMP3 Project scope.
2 EXCLUSION OF COMMON DOCUMENT
Contract Scope of Work [Ref. 1 and 2] elaborates minimum CONTRACTOR deliverables including scope for Process Safety and Loss Prevention. From those lists, some of them are not essentially required to be performed in COMP3 Project due to limited scope and complexity of the Project. CONTRACTOR proposes to exclude some activities/documents as listed below from CONTRACTOR deliverable list/scope, based on the appropriate justification provided for each.
2.1 Health Risk Assessment Workshop
Based on Contract SOW [Ref. 1 and 2], Health Risk Assessment workshop’s objective is to identify and deliberate on the working environment of the FACILITIES and job tasks with respect to potential exposure to occupational health hazards (physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic, and psychological).
COMP3 Project scope is similar to EPCOL project (where no HRA was carried out/required), which constitutes of WHP and RP Platform, including some BF modifications in bridge connected existing WHP/RP Platforms whereas those platforms are normally unmanned facilities. This COMP3 scope is less complex compared to COMP2 Project scope, where compression platforms including LQ platforms have been designed and evaluated, including permanent manned facility and big & complex equipment.
Considering COMP3 Project scope has very little exposure to personnel related to occupational health hazards, and there are no additional occupational health hazards (especially no new chemical hazard) introduced in the scope, Health Risk Assessment workshop activities is excluded from CONTRACTOR COMP3 Project scope.
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Since HRA Workshop for Operation were not performed during EPCOL, CTR propose to go- through COMP2 HRA Workshop report [Ref. 5], list out all applicable recommendation for COMP3 Project scope, then apply it to the design directly.
2.2 Vibration Study
Based on Contract SOW [Ref. 1 and 2], it is CONTRACTOR responsibility to perform vibration study on equipment to ascertain the impact of vibration to the platforms decks and supporting structures.
Based on FEED Noise and Vibration Study [Ref. 6 and 7], vibrating equipment screening criteria is established to identify any equipment that could induce human vibration exposure, as follows:
Type
Exceedance Criteria
Package Weight
Power Output
5000 kg
1000 kW equipment) 50 equipment)
kW
(for
rotodynamic
(for
reciprocrating
Excluded Mount Types
Anti-vibration mounts
From COMP3 Project scope, it is concluded that there are no equipment packages/items with weight greater than 5,000 kg, with a power output of 1,000 kW for rotodynamic equipment or 50 kW for reciprocating equipment operated during normal operations (equipment that are meeting these criteria e.g. permanent EDG, GTG or GTC, whereas there is no mentioned equipment within COMP3 Project scope).
Since no equipment in COMP3 project scope which has potential to generate high/significant vibration levels, the vibration study is excluded from COMP3 Project scope of work. Also, in EPCOL, vibration analysis was not carried out/required as per SoW.
Referring to COMP2 Noise and Vibration Study [Ref. 8], for a conservative approach it is recommended to provide Temporary EDG and Closed Drain pumps with vibration accelerometers to measure vibration levels.
2.3 Emergency Response Plan
Based on Contract SOW [Ref. 1 and 2], Emergency Response Plan shall provide guidelines to QatarEnergy Emergency Response Team (ERT) when responding to emergencies. It shall establish procedures to manage and coordinate the mitigation and control measures following an emergency and provides details of the emergency organization and resources used when responding to an emergency.
COMP3 Project scope is a normally unmanned platforms, with frequency of visit is maximum 48 times a year. COMP3 Platforms are also similar to existing EPCOL and other existing platforms, hence ERP for other existing platforms can be directly utilized in COMP3 platforms.
Considering COMP3 platforms similarity with other existing platforms, Emergency Response Plan is excluded from CONTRACTOR COMP3 Project scope. PRT-ERP-PRC-037_01
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Qatargas Tier-1 Offshore Emergency Response Procedure [Ref. 4] is applicable for determining ERP in COMP3 platforms hence can be utilized right away.
ERP will be developed for construction phase by HSE as elaborated in COMP3-SPM-SH- PLN-00004 Emergency Response and Preparedness Plan [Ref. 11]. Dedicated ERP will also be developed specific for each site/vessel.
2.4 Major Accident Hazard Report
Based on Contract SOW [Ref. 1 and 2], a separate MAH report deliverable shall be prepared by CTR. However Major Accident Hazard Report has some similarities with Bow-Tie Workshop report, since MAH Report intention is to enlist all MAE with its barrier, while Bow- Tie activities is to be developed from MAH register. The outcomes of Bow-Tie Workshop report are the same as MAH Report – detailed assessment of each MAE including elimination, prevention, detection and control, and mitigation barriers. This includes also MAE identification from other safety reviews and studies, which are firstly identified in MAH Report then further discussed in Bow-Tie Workshop activities.
It is proposed to combine Major Accident Hazard Report and Bow-Tie Workshop Report, since the content and detailed outcome of those two reports are the same. Seperate MAH report deliverable will not be prepared/issued.
2.5 Vessel Survivability Analysis
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to perform Vessel Survivability Analysis as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities.
The purpose of vessel survivability analysis is to identify integrity of a vessel while exposed to a certain level of jet fire. The integrity needs to be assessed in order to predict potential rupture before blowdown is completed, further to consider passive fire protection in the vessel body.
Considering pressure vessel in COMP3 project scope has volume less than 4 tons (potential escalation effects due to large hydrocarbon inventory are considered if a vessel has > 4 tons inventory), vessel survivability analysis is excluded from COMP3 project scope. In EPCOL also, vessel survivability analysis was not carried out/required as per SoW.
2.6 Manning Study
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to prepare a Manning Study deliverable as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities. The objective of manning study is to determine the optimum manning level requirement for operations and maintenance for the platforms within the Project scope. This assessment is developed especially for permanently manned platform, to understand required personnel to be present in the platform and avoid exceeding the specified maximum POB.
Considering all platforms within COMP3 Project scope are NUI (Normally Unattended Installation) hence manning study is not required to be developed and excluded from COMP3 Project.
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Maximum POB for each platform have been established in Technical Safety Basis of Design [Ref. 9] and to be followed while personnel visiting the platform, since it is related to the quantity of life saving / evacuation means designed on each platform. In EPCOL also, manning study report was not prepared/required as per SoW.
2.7 Gas Dispersion and Hot Plume Study
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to perform Gas Dispersion and Hot Plume Study as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities.
The objective of Gas Dispersion and Hot Plume Study is to assess thermal impact and toxic gas dispersion from exhaust gases in the Platform. Dispersion of hot and toxic gas is assessed to determine its impact to personnel, operations and other sensitive receptors (e.g. air intake).
Since there is no exhaust source in COMP3 Project scope other than temporary EDG, the gas dispersion and hot plume study is excluded from COMP3.
Note that turbulence levels above helideck is assessed under Helideck Wind Turbulence and Temperature Rise Study and will also include temporary EDG and flare as source of helideck temperature rise. Hence a separate deliverable for Gas dispersion and hot plume study will not be prepared for COMP3 scope similar to EPCOL project.
2.8 Firewater Transient and Surge Analysis Report
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to perform Firewater Transient & Surge Analysis and report as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities.
The objective of Firewater Transient and Surge Analysis is to identify the surge forces generated under particular conditions in order to ensure safety measures have been sufficiently provided/designed for the firewater network piping in the FACILITY, such as adequate design pressure, surge relief valves etc.
As per the COMP3 scope of work, only a dry deluge firewater spray system is required to be installed on the well bay area of the greenfield platform WHP13N, as there is no fixed wet fire water ring main system considered for a NUI wellhead platform. The Firewater pump and deluge valve located in Jack-Up Rig (JUR) or vessel / boat will supply the fire water to this well bay deluge distribution system. During attended platform (SIMOPS), 6” fire water line from Jack-up Rig will be connected to fire water ring main on WHP13N. Considering there is no fixed firewater pumping & wet piping system on WHP13N and the limited scope of firewater spray distribution piping on the well bay area, Firewater Transient and Surge Analysis is considered not required to be performed for the PROJECT.
The RP greenfield platforms (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N & RP6N) are not protected with firewater system; hence the activity is not required to be performed for these platforms.
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2.9 Deluge Nozzle Arrangements Calculation Report
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to perform Deluge Nozzle Arrangements Calculation Report as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities.
The objective of Deluge Nozzle Arrangements Calculation is to verify and demonstrate adequate firewater spray coverage is available for the protected equipment.
As per the COMP3 scope of work, only a dry deluge firewater spray system is required to be installed on the well bay area of the greenfield platform WHP13N as there is no fixed wet fire water ring main system considered for a NUI wellhead platform.
The well bay area is protected with spray nozzles (3 no’s) installed on top of each wellhead. Considering the limited number of spray nozzle and the absence of any large equipment requiring verification of coverage on WHP13N, Deluge Nozzle Arrangement Calculation is considered not required to be performed for the PROJECT.
The RP greenfield platforms (RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N & RP6N) are not protected with firewater system; hence the activity is not required to be performed for these platforms.
Note that Firewater Demand and Hydraulic Calculation for WHP13N will still be developed as part of COMP3 Project scope (already included in MDR).
2.10 Utility Flow Diagram – Clean Agent
Based on Contract Exhibit 6 Appendix B Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverables [Ref. 3], it is mentioned to submit as a deliverable - Utility Flow Diagram for Clean Agent as part of CONTRACTOR responsibilities.
The objective of the UFD is to schematically represent the Clean Agent Fire Suppression System (NOVEC 1230) with its main equipment, piping, valves, instruments and controls.
As per the COMP3 scope of work, Clean Agent Fire Suppression System (NOVEC 1230) will be installed within the Technical Rooms of the LER Building of the greenfield platforms (WHP13N, RP3S, RP5S, RP9S, RP5N & RP6N).
Clean Agent Fire Suppression System (NOVEC 1230) is a package fully designed and supplied by specialized VENDOR. Preliminary P&IDs will be prepared by the CONTRACTOR at the initial stage for Clean Agent Fire Suppression System (NOVEC 1230). Subsequently, detailed P&ID will be prepared and submitted to COMPANY by the VENDOR. CONTRACTOR does not anticipate any additional detail could be covered within a separate UFD for these specialized VENDOR supplied systems. Hence, UFD for Clean Agent System is considered not required to be prepared for the PROJECT.
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3 EXCLUSION OF BROWNFIELD DOCUMENT
3.1 Deliverables for WHP5N Platform
3.1.1 WHP5N Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP5N is bridge connected with Greenfield RP5N as shown in Figure below. The main modifications at WHP5N are as follows:
• New 30” parallel Production header with new connection of selected flowlines to cater for lower operating pressure as the existing 18” WHP5N production header is inadequate to cater for the compression phase
• WHP5N Flow split assessment for pre and post compression phase • Test Separator internals upgrade and upgrade of topside instruments • Expand the Utilities to support BF scope. • Existing HIPPS valve decommissioning and conversion to manual valves • Existing Pipeline MEG Injection flow control system will be replaced for compression
operating conditions. • Isolate the Pig-launcher and associated piping / instruments. • Decommissioning/ demolish the existing 16” subsea spur lines Instrument replacement • • Dropped Object Protection
Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
32-V-2301
Test Separator
Internal upgrade and instruments upgrade
WT5-Y-9711
Pig Launcher
To be isolated and decommissioned
Main Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
32-SDV-48210/11/00/01
HIPPS valve
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
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Tag Number
Instrument Type
32-MOV-51210/200
32-SDV-49210/200
MOV
Riser SDV
Instrument Status
Decommissioned
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
32-SDV-49C00
SDV from RP5N to Test Separator 32-V-23_01
New
32-FV-50010/020/030/ 040/050/060/070/080/090/ 100/110/120/130
Choke Valves
Replacement
32-PV-50238
32-FV-50233
Pressure Control Valve
Flow Control Valve
Replacement
Replacement
32-SDV-49C02/C03
32-FCV-50C08/09/10/11
32-PSV-51C00/01/02/03
SDV for MEG
FCV for MEG
PSV for MEG
New
New
New
WT5-MOV-9580A/B/C
MOV related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
WT5-SDV-9501
SDV related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
3.1.2 Noise Study
3.1.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
3.1.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.1.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP5N platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP5N existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
32-SDV-48210/11/00/01
HIPPS valve
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
32-MOV-51210/200
MOV
Decommissioned
32-SDV-49210/200
Riser SDV
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
32-SDV-49C00
SDV from RP5N to Test Separator 32-V-23_01
New
32-FV-50010/020/030/ 040/050/060/070/080/090/ 100/110/120/130
Choke Valves
Replacement
32-PV-50238
Pressure Control Valve
Replacement
32-FV-50233
Flow Control Valve
Replacement
200-20-SH-DEC-00013_B
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
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Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
32-SDV-49C02/C03
SDV for MEG
32-FCV-50C08/09/10/11
FCV for MEG
32-PSV-51C00/01/02/03
PSV for MEG
New
New
New
WT5-MOV-9580A/B/C
MOV related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
WT5-SDV-9501
SDV related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No additional noise as it is handling liquid
No additional noise as it is handling liquid
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP5N is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.2 Deliverables for WHP6N
3.2.1 WHP6N Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP6N is bridge connected with Greenfield RP6N as shown in Figure below. The main modifications at WHP6N are as follows:
• To receive Produced fluid from WHP13N via RP6N • Preinstall facility to divert WHP6N produced fluids to RP6N and receive compressed fluid
from RP6N.
• Modify FAP MEG receiving system • Utility modification to supply Utility to RP6N • EG Injection pump / CI Injection pump PSV calibration • • Piping modifications below Drill Deck to accommodate installation of new 28” header • Replacement of flowline thermowells welded type along with spool u/s of choke valve and
Instrumentation modifications
flanged type d/s of choke valve
• Open and closed drain collection headers modifications • MEG storage system modifications to receive MEG from RP6N MEG storage facilities. • MEG hose reel modification to allow Bridge installation. • Helideck Decommissioning
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Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
33-V-2301
Test Separator
Internal upgrade and instruments upgrade during Post Compression Phase
Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
33-SDV-49241
33-LV-50232BA
33-FV-50233
33-PV-50238
SDV from RP6N to Test Separator
Level Control Valve from Test Separator
Flow Control Valve from Test Separator
New
Replacement
Replacement
Pressure Control Valve from Test Separator
Replacement during post compression phase
33-SDV-49231
SDV from Test Separator
Replacement during post compression phase
33-MOV-51240
MOV from RP6N
33-PSV-51243A/B
PSV for MEG Injection
New
New
33-SDV-48200/201
HIPPS to PL6
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves during post compression phase
3.2.2 Noise Study
3.2.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
3.2.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.2.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP6N platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP6N existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
33-SDV-49241
33-LV-50232BA
33-FV-50233
33-PV-50238
SDV from RP6N to Test Separator
Level Control Valve from Test Separator
Flow Control Valve from Test Separator
New
Replacement
Replacement
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
Pressure Control Valve from Test Separator
Replacement during post compression phase
No additional noise as it is a replacement
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Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
33-SDV-49231
SDV from Test Separator
Replacement during post compression phase
No noise contribution from on-off valve
33-MOV-51240
MOV from RP6N
33-PSV-51243A/B
PSV for MEG Injection
33-SDV-48200/201
HIPPS to PL6
New
New
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves during post compression phase
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No additional noise as it is handling liquid
No noise contribution from on-off valve
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP6N is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.3 Deliverables for WHP3S
3.3.1 WHP3S Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP3S is bridge connected with Greenfield RP3S as shown in Figure below. The main modifications at WHP3S are as follows:
• Derating of WHP3S Topsides design pressure to 234 barg • New Production header (24”) to RP3S along with existing 16” header to RT to reduce the
backpressure at WHP3S.
• Utilities supply to RP3S, Receive Closed Drain/Vent from RP3S • Diesel Pumps adequacy • Helideck removal
Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
WT3-P9301A/B
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Diesel Transfer Pump
Replacement
3.3.2 Noise Study
3.3.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
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3.3.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.3.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP3S platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP3S existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
WT3-P9301A/B
Diesel Transfer Pump
Replacement
No additional noise contribution as it is a replacement
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP3S is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.4 Deliverables for WHP9S
3.4.1 WHP9S Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP3S is bridge connected with Greenfield RP9S as shown in Figure below. The main modifications at WHP9S are as follows:
• Production fluid diversion to RP9S • Topsides, Pig-launcher and associated piping decommissioning/demolition • Supply of utilities including MEG from WHP9S to RP9S • To Replace diesel transfer pumps based on adequacy check • Upgrade of topside instruments, as applicable
Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
WT9-Y9711
Equipment Type
Pig Launcher
Equipment Status
Decommissioned
WT9-P9301A/B
Diesel Transfer Pump
Replacement
Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
WT9-MOV-9980A/B/C
MOV Related to Pig Launcher
WT9-SDV-9901
SDV Related to Pig Launcher
WT9-SDV-9986
SDV from Closed Drain Pump
WT9-PSV-9909
PSV to MEG Storage Tank
Instrument Status
Decommissioned
Decommissioned
New
New
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3.4.2 Noise Study
3.4.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
3.4.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.4.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP9S platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP9S existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
WT9-P9301A/B
Diesel Transfer Pump
Replacement
WT9-MOV-9980A/B/C
WT9-SDV-9901
WT9-SDV-9986
WT9-PSV-9909
MOV Related to Pig Launcher
SDV Related to Pig Launcher
SDV from Closed Drain Pump
PSV to MEG Storage Tank
Decommissioned
Decommissioned
New
New
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No additional noise as it is handling liquid
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP9S is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.5 Deliverables for WHP5S
3.5.1 WHP5S Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP5S is bridge connected with Greenfield RP5S as shown in Figure below. The main modifications at WHP5S are as follows:
• Scope is limited to Simulations for the Cluster. Engineering by EPC 8A CTR
• Topsides, Pig-launcher and associated piping decommissioning/demolition
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Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
WT5-Y9711
Equipment Type
Pig Launcher
Equipment Status
Decommissioned
Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
WT5-MOV-9580A/B / 9579
WT5-SDV-9501/9685A/ 9585B
MOV Related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
SDV Related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
WT5-PSV-9581
PSV Related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
3.5.2 Noise Study
3.5.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
3.5.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.5.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP5S platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP5S existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
WT5-MOV-9580A/B / 9579
MOV Related to Pig Launcher
WT5-SDV-9501/9685A/ 9585B
SDV Related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
Decommissioned
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
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Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
WT5-PSV-9581
PSV Related to Pig Launcher
Decommissioned
No additional noise contribution
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP5S is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.6 Deliverables for WHP4N
3.6.1 WHP4N Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP4N is bridge connected with Brownfield RP4N as shown in Figure below. Whilst for RP4N, complete updates in the deliverables will be conducted during COMP3 Project scope, updates in WHP4N are focused on:
• Diversion of WHP4N produced fluids to RP4N 34” common header Piping work in support
of Pressure instrument recalibration/ refitting at d/s of choke valve.
• Hook up the new 30” RP4N export production header to existing WHP4N export header. • Upgrade of topside instruments, as applicable (Thermowell replacement on Upstream and
Downstream of choke valve, Production and test header)
• Test Separator internals upgrade and upgrade of associated instruments • Existing HIPPS valve decommissioning and conversion to manual valves.
Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
31-V-2301
Test Separator
Test separator internal modification
Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
31FV-50010/ 020/ 030/ 040/ 050/ 060/ 070/ 080/ 090/ 100/ 110/ 120
Choke Valves
Replacement
31PV-50238
31PV-50233
Pressure Control Valve from Test Separator
Flow Control Valve from Test Separator
Replacement
Replacement
31SDV-49231
SDV from Test Separator
Replacement
31SDV-48200/01
HIPPS Valves
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
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Tag Number
31SDV-48202
31MOV-50C00
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
Bypass HIPPS Valves
Decommissioned
MOV from RP4N
New
To be noted for RP4N BF platform, re-assessment will be performed for all safety studies considering major modifications part of COMP3 project scope.
3.6.2 Noise Study
3.6.2.1 Objective of Noise Study
The objective of the study is to identify major noise contributors and make recommendations for noise control measures. The study shall assess noise levels in platform work areas due to equipment, HVAC, control valves, etc. to ensure that noise levels do not exceed specified noise level criteria.
3.6.2.2 Scope of Noise Study
As per modification details in Section 3.6.1, there is no additional major noise generated equipment that will be added to WHP4N platform. Because of that, no major impact is foreseen with regards to Noise study in WHP4N existing platform.
The noise generating equipment that are added/modified as part of the modification are listed below.
Tag Number
Equipment Type
Equipment Status
Remarks
31FV-50010/ 020/ 030/ 040/ 050/ 060/ 070/ 080/ 090/ 100/ 110/ 120
Choke Valves
Replacement
31PV-50238
31PV-50233
Pressure Control Valve from Test Separator
Flow Control Valve from Test Separator
Replacement
Replacement
31SDV-49231
SDV from Test Separator
Replacement
31SDV-48200/01
HIPPS Valves
Decommissioning and conversion to manual valves
31SDV-48202
Bypass HIPPS Valves
Decommissioned
31MOV-50C00
MOV from RP4N
New
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No additional noise as it is a replacement
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
No noise contribution from on-off valve
Hence, Noise Study for Brownfield WHP4N is proposed to be excluded from COMP3 project scope of work.
3.7 Deliverables for WHP11S
3.7.1 WHP11S Brownfield Scope
Wellhead Platform WHP11S is bridge connected with existing RP11S as shown in Figure below. Whilst for RP11S there is no COMP3 Project scope, updates in WHP11S are focused on:
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•
Installation of parallel 24” Production header.
• Upgrade of existing topside instruments and recalibration as applicable.
• Test Separator internals and associated instruments upgrade.
• MEG System modifications (Flow control valves modification)
Main equipment items as part of the modifications are listed below:
Tag Number
WT11-V-5501
Equipment Type
Test Separator
Equipment Status
Test Separator Internal Modification
Valves which are part of this modification are as per below list:
Tag Number
Instrument Type
Instrument Status
WT11-PV-9B10
WT11-FV-9B08
Pressure Control Valve from Test Separator
Flow Control Valve from Test Separator
Replacement
Replacement
WT11-FV-9BA1A/B
Flow Control valve for MEG System
Replacement
WT11-SDV-9BC1
SDV for MEG system
New
3.7.2 Assessment for WHP11S Potential Hazard
Since COMP3 project scope in WHP11S platform is limited, assessment of hazards due to COMP3 modification in WHP11S will be included in a common technical note for brownfield platforms. This common technical note will contain quantitative analysis for each safety studies subject, to demonstrate that there will be limited/negligible additional risk due to the modification.
If from the technical note it is shown that the additional risk is significant and haven’t been captured in the existing safety studies, then complete re-assessment will be developed, and full report of specific safety study will be documented.
3.8 Deliverables for RP4S, RP7S and RT-2
3.8.1 RP4S, RP7S and RT-2 Brownfield Scope
Brownfield scope at RP4S, RP7S and RT-2 platforms are limited to the tie in of intrafield pipelines and fuel gas spur lines, as detailed below.
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RP4S:
• Topside intra-field pipelines tie-in PL9S & PL9LS from GF RP9S • 8” fuel gas spur line tie in.
RP7S:
• Topside pipeline tie-in PL5S 28” & PL5LS 28” CRA lines from GF RP5S • 8” fuel gas spur line tie-in
RT-2:
• 24” Intra-field pipeline tie-in from RP3S • 8” fuel gas spur line (CRA) tie in.
There is no equipment/valve in these RP4S, RP7S and RT-2 platform for COMP3 scope, since all valves are already pre-installed in previous EPCOL project scope.
3.8.2 Assessment for RP4S, RP7S and RT-2 Potential Hazard
Since COMP3 project scope in RP4S, RP7S and RT-2 platform are limited, assessment of hazards due to COMP3 modification in those platforms will be included in a common technical note for brownfield platforms. This common technical note will contain quantitative analysis for each safety studies subject, to demonstrate that there will be limited/negligible additional risk due to the modification.
If from the technical note it is shown that the additional risk is significant and haven’t been captured in the existing safety studies, then complete re-assessment will be developed, and full report of specific safety study will be documented.
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3.9 Deliverables for RP8S
3.9.1 RP8S Brownfield Scope
Existing Riser Platform RP8S is bridge connected with existing WHP8S as shown in Figure below. Whilst for WHP8S there is no COMP3 Project scope, updates in RP8S are focused on: • 8” fuel gas spur line tie in, with battery limit from Spool of Subsea Skid to Riser Hanger
flange in RP8S Platform.
There is no equipment/valve in RR8S platform for COMP3 scope, since the modifications are only in subsea part up to riser hanger flange. Other modifications at RP8S Topsides will be responsibility of other Contractor.
3.9.2 Assessment for RP8S Potential Hazard
Assessment of hazards due to COMP3 modification in RP8S platform will be included in a common technical note for brownfield platforms. This common technical note will contain quantitative analysis for each safety studies subject, to demonstrate that there will be limited/negligible additional risk due to the modification.
If from the technical note it is shown that the additional risk is significant and haven’t been captured in the existing safety studies, then complete re-assessment will be developed, and full report of specific safety study will be documented.
Note that applicable recommendations carry forward from previous project phase, i.e. EPCOL, will be enlisted in the technical note and applied in RP8S brownfield modification.
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3.10 Other Brownfield Platforms
Other platforms that have very limited brownfield modifications are listed below. Considering there will be no impact/additional hazard and risk identified on this brownfield modification, no safety studies will be performed for these platforms.
Platforms
Modification Scope
RP11S
WHP12S
WHP13S
WHP12N
WHP1S
NFB
RGA-LQ
WHP2S
WHP8S
Telecom Scope
J-tube installation for Cables
J-tube installation for Cables
J-tube installation for Cables
Telecom Scope
Telecom scope
Instrument Modification
J-tube installation for Cables
Test separator Internals & MEG upgrade
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4 SUMMARY
Below is summary of this Technical justification for exclusion of safety studies deliverable. Note that other safety studies not mentioned here remain CONTRACTOR’s responsibilities within COMP3 Project.
a. Safety studies/deliverables excluded for COMP3 Project are summarized in below table.
Safety Studies
Excluded for:
Reason for Exclusion
Remarks
No.
1
Health Risk Assessment Workshop
2
Vibration Study
All GF & BF Platform NUI platform which has little exposure to personnel, and no additional occupational health hazard (e.g. new chemical) introduced the COMP3 platforms
in
All GF & BF Platform No equipment
in COMP3 scope which has project potential generate to high/significant vibration levels
3
Emergency Response Plan
All GF & BF Platform COMP3 Scope platforms is NUI with similarity with other existing platforms, thus existing for ERP can be adopted COMP3 scope.
4
5
Major Accident Hazard Report
All GF & BF Platform MAH Report is similar to Bow- Tie Workshop Report. Thus, all information in MAH Report will in Bow-Tie be Workshop Report
combined
Vessel Analysis
Survivability
All GF & BF Platform
refer
ERP will be developed for construction phase by HSE, to COMP3-SPM-SH-PLN- Emergency 00004 and Response Preparedness Plan. Dedicated ERP will be to developed specific each site/vessel.
To be integrated with Bow-Tie workshop Report
6
Manning Study
All GF & BF Platform
tons, where
Pressure Vessel in COMP3 scope have inventory less than potential 4 escalation effects due to large hydrocarbon inventory are considered if a vessel has > 4 tons inventory
All platforms within COMP3 Project scope are NUI and Maximum POB for each platform have been established in Technical Safety Basis of Design
7
Gas Dispersion & Hot Plume Study
All GF & BF Platform No exhaust source in COMP3 than
Project scope other temporary EDG. Flare and Vent dispersion studies will be developed in dedicated reports.
wind Helideck turbulence & temperature rise study will cover hot source temporary EDG from and Flare
8
Firewater Transient and Surge Analysis Report
All GF & BF Platform No fixed firewater pumping & wet piping system on WHP13N firewater the scope of and spray distribution piping is limited on the well bay area. RP platforms are not protected with firewater system
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No.
9
Safety Studies
Excluded for:
Reason for Exclusion
Remarks
Deluge Arrangement Calculation Report
Nozzle
All GF & BF Platform
Limited number of spray nozzle and the absence of any large equipment requiring verification of coverage on WHP13N, and RP platforms are not protected with firewater system.
Firewater Demand and Hydraulic Calculation will be developed (already included in MDR)
10
Utility Flow Diagram – Clean Agent
All GF & BF Platform NOVEC 1230 is fully designed and supplied by VENDOR, including the detailed P&IDs. No additional detail is foreseen within a separate UFD
11
Noise Study
BF: WHP5N, WHP6N, WHP3S, WHP9S, WHP5S, WHP4N, WHP11S
no
potentially
Related to BF modification in those specific platforms, there additional is equipment/valve/items which can generating noise. Accordingly, the existing noise maps remain valid. In case there are some new pumps, only replacement from old pumps, hence it is already considered in existing Noise studies.
those
are
b. Since the COMP3 Project scope are limited for below listed platforms, a common Technical Note will be developed to assess each potential hazard due to Brownfield modifications: • WHP11S • RP4S • RP7S • RT-2 • RP8S
c. Considering these platforms are existing and there will be no impact/additional hazard and risk identified on brownfield modification, no safety studies will be performed for these platforms:
• RP11S • WHP12S • WHP13S • WHP12N • WHP1S • NFB • RGA-LQ • WHP2S • WHP8S
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5 REFERENCES
5.1 Company References
S. No
Document Number
Title
LTC/C/NFP/5129/20
Exhibit 6 – Scope Of Work
LTC/C/NFP/5129/20
Exhibit 6 (COMP 3B) – Scope of Work
LTC/C/NFP/5129/20
Exhibit 6 Appendix B – Minimum CONTRACTOR Deliverable
PRT-ERP-PRC-037_01
Qatargas Tier-1 Offshore Emergency Response Procedure
5.2 Project Documents (FEED & Other Complex)
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-REP-00098_00
COMP2 – Health Risk Assessment (HRA) Study Report
200-20-SH-REP-01001
FEED – Noise and Vibration Study – Greenfield
200-20-SH-REP-05001
FEED – Noise and Vibration Study (RL1 and QG2)
200-20-SH-REP-00084
COMP2 – Noise and Vibration Study for CP6S and CP7S Complexes
5.3 Project Documents (EPC)
S. No
Document Number
Title
200-20-SH-DEC-00013
Technical Safety Basis of Design (Offshore) for COMP3 Project
COMP3-SPM-SH-SOW-
Scope of Work for Safety Studies for COMP3 Project
00001
COMP3-SPM-SH-PLN-
Emergency Response and Preparedness Plan
00004
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