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OFFSHORE
LOSS PREVENTION PHILOSOPHY PROCEDURE
APPROVAL
Effective 23 SEP 2021
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REVISION HISTORY
Rev No.
Issue Date
Revision Description
Valid Until Date
00
08 JUN 2021
First Issue - Integration of QG North and QG South Offshore LP Philosophies Update the scope for new offshore projects / facilities.
23 SEP 2024
Effective 23 SEP 2021
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CONTENTS
1 GENERAL … 6
1.1 Purpose … 6 1.2 Scope … 6
1.2.1
Interface Management … 6
1.3 Criticality … 7 1.4 Key Risks and Controls … 7
1.5 Classification … 8 1.6 Compliance … 8
1.7 Roles & Responsibilities … 8
1.7.1
1.7.2
1.7.3
Project Management Team (PMT) Loss Prevention (LP) … 8
Project Engineering Manager… 8
Head of LPE (QG OPCO LPE)… 8
2
LOSS PREVENTION PHILOSOPHY … 9
2.1 Standards, codes and references … 9 2.2 Risk Acceptance, ALARP & Vulnerability … 9
2.3 Loss prevention design philosophy … 10 2.4 Spacing and layout … 11
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Areas Segregation … 12
Utilities Location… 12
Location of EER Facilities… 12
2.5 Area Classification and Ventilation… 13 Area Classification… 13 2.5.1
2.5.2
Ventilation… 14
2.6 Buildings … 15 Fire and Blast Protection … 15 2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
Pressurisation … 15
Subsea Pipelines … 16
2.7 Plant Drainage … 17 Closed Drain System… 17 2.7.1
2.7.2
Open Drain System … 17
2.8 Plant Isolations … 17 2.9 Pressure Relief, Venting and Flaring … 18
2.9.1
2.9.2
2.9.3
Pressure Relief … 18
Venting … 19
Blowdown & Flaring … 19
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2.9.3.1 Heat Shield for Flare Tip Access Platform … 20
2.10 Fire and Gas Detection System … 20
2.10.1
Fire Zoning… 21
2.10.2
Flame Detection … 21
2.10.3
Fusible Plugs … 22
2.10.4
Smoke Detection … 22
2.10.5
Flammable Gas Detection … 24
2.10.6
Toxic Gas Detection … 25
2.10.7
Fire and Gas System Activation and Alarm Display … 26
2.10.8
Camera Surveillance… 26
2.11 Emergency Shutdown … 26
2.11.1
Emergency Shutdown/Isolation … 26
2.12 HIPPS … 28 2.13 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) … 28
2.14 Passive Fire Protection (PFP)… 29 2.15 Active Fire Protection (AFP) … 31 2.16 Emergency Power … 31 2.17 Plant Emergency Alarms … 32 2.18 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue … 33 Escape Routes … 33 2.18.1
2.18.2
Primary Muster Points / Temporary Refuge / Safe Heaven … 35
2.18.3
Secondary Muster Point… 37
2.18.4
Exit / Egress … 37
2.18.5
Safety Signs… 37
2.19 Evacuation Methods… 38 Safe Evacuation Requirements… 39 2.19.1
2.19.2 Medivac Requirements … 39
2.20 Manning level… 39 2.21 Human Factors … 39 2.22 Fire Fighting System & Equipment … 40
2.22.1 Gaseous Systems … 40
2.22.2
Fire Extinguishers… 40
2.22.3 Helicopter Facilities… 41
2.23 Life Safety Equipment … 41 Life Boat and Life Rafts … 41 2.23.1
2.23.2
Personnel Safety Equipment… 41
2.23.3
Emergency Breathing Air Equipment … 42
2.24 Pedestal Crane … 43
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2.25 Emergency Shower and Eye Wash … 43 2.26 Personal Protection … 44 2.27 Utilities… 44 2.28 Navigation Aids… 44 2.29 Aviation, Marine and Diving… 44
2.30 Personnel Protection … 46 3 SAFETY CASE … 47
3.1 Safety Studies… 47 3.2 Design Performance Standards … 47
APPENDICES … 49
Appendix 1 – References and Relevant Documents … 49 Appendix 2 – Glossary of Terms: Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations… 52
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1 GENERAL
1.1 PURPOSE
This document summarizes the general loss prevention philosophy to be adopted in Qatargas new offshore projects/facilities in order to prevent, control or mitigate Major Accident Hazards (MAH).
1.2 SCOPE
This Offshore Loss Prevention Philosophy describes the major loss prevention requirements relating to the prevention, control and mitigation of Major Accident Hazards for Qatargas Operating Company Ltd (QG OPCO) new offshore projects/facilities. Scope of this Offshore LP philosophy starts from wells actuated wing valve(s) and concludes at the first shore battery limit or isolation valve. Onshore scope and Offshore Well and Drilling Operational requirements are excluded from this LP Philosophy. (For Onshore Loss Prevention Philosophy, refer to PRT-PRS-PRC-002). The requirements are based on the Qatargas Safety, Health, Environmental and Quality Policy (#PRT-000-POL-001) as a commitment to achieve premier business performance by maintaining the highest Safety, Health, Environment and Quality (SHE&Q) standards and continually improving the effectiveness of the SHE&Q management and performance.
This document defines Qatargas minimum standards in the design of QG new offshore projects/facilities to ensure that the risk that they pose to Safety and Health, Environment, Asset/Property, and Reputation is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This document is not a comprehensive design manual.
Projects shall develop their own Loss Prevention Philosophies in compliance with this document.
This document is not a replacement of project design basis and specification as project scope and requirement may vary from one project to another based on the system criticality.
The QG OPCO Loss Prevention Engineering Section shall endorse deviations from the requirements of this philosophy. Deviations will only be endorsed if an alternative means of achieving an equivalent level of risk is proposed and demonstrated. QG OPCO Loss Prevention Engineering Section and respective Technical Authorities (TA), when applicable , will advise management on the acceptability of the deviation.
Existing QG facilities may not be necessarily in line with this philosophy and it is not the intent of this philosophy to be applied retrospectively. The requirements contained in this philosophy apply only to new projects. However, QG continuously identify any potential gaps (of the existing facilities), assess the risk and will take any appropriate actions.
Note: Modification in existing offshore facilities is excluded from this Offshore LP Philosophy scope; it will follow the guidance prescribed in PRJ-CHG-PRC-007 Managing Standards, Specifications and Practices.
1.2.1
INTERFACE MANAGEMENT
Any new project with interfaces with external parties shall develop appropriate interface protocol/interface management document with the objectives as follow:
• Define the nature of the interface in order to efficiently develop and deploy the response
capabilities to minimize the impact of any incident in case of an emergency;
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• Efficiently use available resources through cooperation, integration and collaboration on
the basis of mutual advantage;
• Define the roles and responsibilities within an integrated emergency management approach
to respond in any emergency.
1.3 CRITICALITY
This Procedure has been determined to be a Medium Criticality document.
Criticality Level : Medium
1.4 KEY RISKS AND CONTROLS
Key Risks
Key Controls
Failure to follow Qatargas Loss Prevention Requirements for the prevention, control, and mitigation of major hazards may result in major consequences such as fatality, environmental impact, financial loss, and/or impact on company reputation.
•
Improper layout of equipment/ facilities (congestion, sources, compatibility, etc.)
ignition
Key controls to prevent, control and mitigate major hazards :
• Section 2.4 – Spacing and Layout
• Use of non-standard equipment
in
• Section 2.5 – Area Classification
Hazardous Classified Areas
•
•
•
•
•
Inadequate personnel and SCEs protection against building fire
• Section 2.6 – Buildings
Improper pipeline spacing
Inadequate segregation of hazardous and non-hazardous drain
Inadequate isolation provision of units or systems from live plant
• Section 2.7 – Pipelines
• Section 2.8 – Drains
• Section 2.9 – Plant Isolation
Inadequate equipment & piping / pipeline protection against overpressure
• Section 2.10 – Pressure Relief, Venting,
and Flaring / 2.13 – HIPPS
• Delayed detection of Fire and/or Gas
• Section 2.11 – Fire and Gas Detection
System
improperly designed
• Section 2.12 – Emergency Shutdown
release
Inadequate or shutdown system
Inadequate or improperly designed safety instrumented system
Inadequate or improperly designed fire protection system
Inadequate emergency power supply
• Section 2.14 – Safety Instrumented System
• Section 2.15/2.16 – Passive and Active Fire
Protection
• Section 2.17 – Emergency Power
•
•
•
•
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Key Risks
Key Controls
during emergency condition
•
•
•
Inadequate escape, evacuation and rescue Rescue facilities for offshore personnel
• Section 2.18 – Escape, Evacuation &
Inadequate or improperly designed Plant Emergency Notification System
Inadequate provisions during emergency
personnel
protection
• Section 2.19 – Plant Emergency Alarms
• Section 2.23 – Life Saving and Fire Protection system / equipment, 2.25 – Emergency Shower and Eye Wash, 2.26 – Personnel Protection
Table 1: Key Risks and Controls
1.5 CLASSIFICATION
This Offshore LP Philosophy has been classified as Internal based on INF-ISG-POL-001 Information Classification Policy.
1.6 COMPLIANCE
Any relevant new projects must demonstrate compliances to this LP Philosophy. Specific Project LP Philosophy shall be developed meeting requirement of this philosophy. Process Safety and Risk (PSR) Project Assurance Guide (PRT-PRS-PRC-008) provides guidance on project assurance for Category I & II projects which cover a minimum list of required documentations/deliverables related to Process Safety and Risk to be prepared, updated and supplied by the Project Team for each project phase.
Procedure ONS-OES-OVR-002 Process to Manage Projects as Gate 5 deliverables shall be captured in Operations Readiness Plan (ORP).
Depending on the agreement between QG OPCO LP and Project, some critical deliverables may require endorsement/approval from QG OPCO LPE.
1.7 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES
The following section describes the typical Roles and Responsibilities for selected interacting officers and/or positions.
1.7.1 PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM (PMT) LOSS PREVENTION (LP)
Develop Loss Prevention Philosophies for Major Project in line with this philosophy.
1.7.2 PROJECT ENGINEERING MANAGER
Approve Loss Prevention Philosophies for the Project and ensure LP philosophies comply with this procedure.
1.7.3 HEAD OF LPE (QG OPCO LPE)
Approve any project deviations from this LPE philosophy document.
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2 LOSS PREVENTION PHILOSOPHY
2.1 STANDARDS, CODES AND REFERENCES
Facilities shall be designed, constructed and operated in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations and decrees of the State of Qatar. In addition, various internationally recognized codes and standards (e.g. NFPA, BS, EI, IEC etc.) are to be followed as per the approved scope of work.
The order of precedence for compliance shall be:
• State of Qatar National Standards, Regulations, Law and statutory requirements
• QG Policies and Procedures
• QG Project Philosophies and Specifications
•
International Codes and Standards
• QG Shareholder philosophies and specifications,
including QP philosophies and
specifications, unless otherwise determined or adopted as QG policies/specifications
All documents, regulations, codes and standards referred to shall be the latest editions current at the time of preparation of a project-specific philosophy. In addition to the above, specific codes and standards applicable to individual items of equipment/materials shall be identified in the specifications for that item of equipment/materials.
Throughout this document, reference is made, whenever possible to the appropriate source documents. These shall be consulted in full to understand their requirements. However, in some cases, such references may be omitted. In developing detailed specifications, it will be necessary to refer to all appropriate documentation. Omission does not imply exclusion.
For cases where multiple standards, codes and references exist, for a particular subject, the stricter shall be adopted. Where doubt or conflict exists, QG Loss Prevention Engineering section and respective Technical Authorities (TA), when applicable, shall be consulted for clarification and direction.
2.2 RISK ACCEPTANCE, ALARP & VULNERABILITY
Project shall follow the Risk Acceptance and Vulnerability criteria and ALARP Principles given in QG Offshore QRA Guidelines PRT-PRS-PRC-009 along with QG Risk Assessment Matrix RSK-IMR-SI-001 for Safety Studies and for making risk-based engineering decisions when necessary.
Offshore QRA Guidelines provide information on:
•
Individual and Societal Risk Criteria;
• Maximum Allowable Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency;
• Human Vulnerability to Thermal Radiation;
• Human Vulnerability to Blast Overpressures;
• Building Vulnerability to Blast Overpressures;
• Toxic Concentration Limit in Air.
QG Risk Assessment Matrix (RSK-IMR-SK-001) shall be applied for qualitative risk assessments.
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2.3 LOSS PREVENTION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
The hierarchy of hazard control is used to eliminate or minimize the exposure to hazards. It is principle for loss prevention design philosophy. The hazard controls, in order of decreasing effectiveness:
• Elimination
Physically removing a potential hazard is the most effective hazard control;
• Substitution
Substitution, the second most effective hazard control, involves replacing something that can cause a hazard (similar to elimination) with something that would not cause a hazard;
• Engineering controls
The third most effective mean of controlling hazards is engineered controls. These do not eliminate hazards, but rather isolate potential targets (e.g. personnel, environment) from hazards;
• Administrative controls
Administrative controls are changes to the way personnel work. Examples of administrative controls include procedure changes, personnel training, and installation of signs and warning labels;
• Personal protective equipment (PPE).
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Hazard Control
When elimination and substitution could not be performed, QG Loss Prevention Systems shall be an engineered combination of measures selected to prevent, detect, control and mitigate the life cycle risks associated with all facilities. Consequently, the risks identified are specific to the materials being handled and processed by the facilities during operation, they shall also recognize those associated with its construction, commissioning, start-up, shutdown and maintenance.
Formal hazard assessments shall be carried out progressively during the execution of Projects and subsequently during operations as required. Particular attention shall be given to plant
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modifications to ensure all risks, including those created by modifications on existing facility or vice versa, have been identified and mitigated. Gap analysis shall be performed if any differences of LP Philosophy exist between existing and new facilities (e.g. tie-in new facilities to existing facilities). The impact shall be reviewed and assessed. In case any risks are identified due to some gap, risk treatment plan/mitigation measures shall be identified and implemented. For scenarios, where intrinsic risk cannot be eliminated or substituted, engineering controls shall be the first priority option to manage such risks.
Personnel trained to work with the highest regard for safety and to react properly to emergencies will man facilities. Equipment will be inspected and maintained at the appropriate intervals to ensure proper operation and integrity. The general philosophy adopted by QG is to utilize technology that is well proven and unlikely to require specialized or excessive maintenance.
The general engineering design considers the following systems to reduce risks associated with identified potential hazards in a cost effective manner:
• Spacing and layout • Hazardous area classification • Fire and gas detection • Emergency shutdown, isolation and
depressurization
• Passive fire protection • Active fire protection • Drainage • Bund/spill basin • Emergency System (e.g. Emergency
• Pressure relief venting and flaring
Power)
2.4 SPACING AND LAYOUT
The general principle is to segregate high risk hydrocarbon or toxic hazard areas from ignition sources, normally occupied areas and adjacent hazardous areas. It can be performed by segregated location, safety distance implementation, blast/fire walls and fire protection system. The guidance for those involved in the layout of process units and offshore facilities can be referred to CCPS Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout, Facility Siting Study (FSS), Physical Effect Modeling Study (PEM), or other relevant international standard and code references (e.g. API RP 14J, NFPA 101).
Development of topside layout shall consider following goals:
• Permit efficient access for normal operation and maintenance;
• Locate wells and production facilities such that the risk from potential events are minimised;
• Permit access for operators to perform necessary emergency shutdown actions in an
emergency;
• Facilitate personnel escape, evacuation, and rescue in the event of an emergency;
• Permit access for firefighting or emergency response;
• Protect critical facilities from damage during normal operations or emergency situations;
• Segregate high-risk and low-risk facilities;
• Separate continuous ignition sources from probable points of release of flammable
materials;
• Separate air intakes from potential releases of combustible or toxic vapors;
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• Separate equipment to minimize involvement of or escalation to adjacent facilities in a fire
or explosion;
• Maximize natural ventilation to reduce the accumulation of flammable gases or vapors.
Two stairways shall be provided to connect nearest deck levels. These stairways shall be as far as practicable located at opposite ends of the installation. Additional stairways or escape ladders may be required to avoid dead ends or reduce distance to means of escapes.
2.4.1 HAZARDOUS AND NON-HAZARDOUS AREAS SEGREGATION
Prevailing wind shall be considered while defining layout of the Wellhead, Process/Utilities and Accommodation Platforms.
Separation of safe and hazardous areas can be achieved using the following:
• Distance;
• Physical barriers (fire and blast rated walls).
The safety distances between plant areas, process units, utility areas, equipment and buildings shall be established at the FEED/basic engineering stage. Any specific requirements to facility siting , spacing and layout of equipment/piping system, unless otherwise dictated by Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) / Quantitative Risk Asessment (QRA) report provided by QG OPCO or project management team, shall follow API RP 14J.
2.4.2 UTILITIES LOCATION
Selection of location of flare boom shall consider a balance of following factors:
• Helideck Obstacle Free sector;
• Prevailing wind direction;
• Boat operation sector;
• Platform Centre of Gravity;
• Potential for clash with Installation crane etc.
Flare and vent systems shall be designed and located to prevent liquid carryover spill onto the platform or boat landing areas.
Cranes and laydown areas shall be placed to optimize cargo transfer operations. A suitable dropped objects study shall be carried out to identify any protection requirements for process equipment/piping that cannot be avoided from normal lifting route.
2.4.3 LOCATION OF EER FACILITIES
Temporary Refuge shall be separated from process area by fire and blast rated walls and decks. Temporary Refuge shall be accessible from all deck at least by two routes. One stairway shall be in the vicinity of temporary refuge and lifeboat.
Helideck layout and location shall conform to latest version CAP437 requirements.
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2.5 AREA CLASSIFICATION AND VENTILATION
2.5.1 AREA CLASSIFICATION
Area classification is the division of plant or facilities into hazardous areas in which there is a risk that a flammable atmosphere may occur, and into non-hazardous areas in which such a risk is unlikely to occur or may be neglected. It provides the basis for selection and protection of electrical and instrument equipment installed in those areas.
A Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) study shall be performed. The main definitions and procedures shall be based on the Area Classification Code of Practice for Petroleum Installation s Model Code of Safe Practice EI 15 and API 505 (for hydrocarbon). The hazardous area classification shall be carried out using EI Model Code for Safe Practice Part 15 (EI Code Part 15). Wherever hazardous radius determined by EI 15 less stringent than that calculated using API 505, API 505 shall be used to determine the hazardous radii.
is
The zones to be identified are:
• Zone 0 (gas, vapour or mist) – area in which an explosive atmosphere is continuously
present or is present for long periods of time or frequently.
• Zone 1 (gas, vapour or mist) – area in which an explosive atmosphere is likely to occur in
normal operations.
• Zone 2 (gas, vapour or mist) – area in which an explosive atmosphere is not likely to occur
in normal operation and if it occurs it will only exist for a short period.
• Non-hazardous – an area not classified as Zone 0, 1 or 2.
Electrical equipment installed in hazardous areas shall be certified for use in the appropriate zone classification, and comply with the requirements of applicable codes and standards.
Specific references for electrical appliances (i.e. earthing, bonding, lighting, circuit breakers, pressurized habitat system for open flame and hot work in a hazardous area) shall be supplied with technical data according to certification in appropriate electrical zone classification.
All outdoor field / electrical equipment in the process areas shall be suitable for minimum Zone 2 Temperature T3 area. [Equipment required to operate post emergency shall be minimum Zone 1 rated].
The HAC study /Hazardous area schedule shall include the following as minimum:
• Brief description of the process and process equipment
• Source of emission (such as flange, seals, etc.)
• Process materials and operating conditions, including a listing of all the flammable and combustible materials used in the facility, as well as their pertinent properties (flash point, ignition temperature and density etc.).
• Brief description of process material containment
• Notes on likelihood of release
• The grade of release (continuous, primary or secondary)
• Hazardous area boundary dimension from source
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• The type of zone
Hazardous Area classification drawings shall be prepared showing the plan view and elevations. HAC drawings shall include the following information as applicable:
a) Identification of sources of release b) All ventilation inlets and outlets
c) Air intakes and exhausts of all internal combustion machinery d) Points of air transfer from modules that may affect classification, sealing gaps on external
module walls.
e) Tank or process vents f) The classification and extent of all hazardous zones g) Ventilation type.
2.5.2 VENTILATION
Process equipment shall be generally situated in open areas that allow good natural ventilation, thereby minimizing the risk of accumulation of flammable (or toxic) gases.
Ventilation for buildings shall be provided where necessary to:
• Dilute possible gas leaks e.g. battery rooms where there is a risk of accumulation of hydrogen. For those cases, it is also recommended to allocate a dedicated room for batteries with provision of:
o H2 detectors o
Interlock with the ventilation system such that ventilation failure will prevent the battery charger from operating; lead acid batteries emit H2 during charging.
o Back draft gas, motorized fire, gas and blast dampers and sand trap louver on the
exhaust ducts.
o For flooded lead-acid, flooded nickel cadmium, and VRLA batteries, ventilation shall be provided for rooms and cabinets in accordance with the mechanical code and API-RP-500.
• Otherwise, equipment inside such room must meet electrical area classification.
• Physically separate zones by differential pressure. Maintaining the pressure inside an enclosed area higher than the external pressure prevents the ingress of flammable (or toxic) gases into that area. Note: ventilation is still needed for equipment / human comfort in enclosed areas outside hazardous areas.
Where non-hazardous areas / buildings are located within hazardous areas, airlocks or gas tight, self-closing doors shall be provided as necessary together with sufficient mechanical ventilation to achieve a minimum level of pressurization of 50Pa above the adjacent hazardous area OR air pressure within the occupied zone and airlocks shall be minimums of 25Pa and 50Pa.
Batteries shall be located in a separate room. Battery rooms shall be adequately ventilated in accordance with API-RP-500, manufacturer’s recommendations and shall be designed to maintain the specified room temperatures and to remove gases released into the space during the charging process. Equipment inside the Battery rooms should be zone classified for safe operation. Hydrogen gas detectors shall be located in the Battery rooms.
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HVAC inlets shall have flammable gas, toxic gas and smoke detectors at air intake. In detection of smoke, toxic gas at 10 ppm H2S or 50% LEL of flammable gas to close the airtight dampers in order to prevent ingress of toxic gases into the buildings.
Upon receipt of gas or smoke detection signals at air intake, all motorized tight gas dampers shall be closed and all fresh air intake/exhaust fans shall be stopped automatically, but air conditioning system where required shall operate continuously in recirculation mode for the TR Endurance period. On confirmed toxic and flammable gas detection at air intake, the damper shall be closed, and the HVAC shall be shutdown.
The location of air intakes in relation to adjacent process equipment shall be selected by taking into account prevailing wind direction, vent dispersion patterns and the hazard that results from possible formation of a flammable vapor/air mixture. The air intakes for turbine enclosures and the ventilation systems shall be located in non-hazardous areas and as remote from the process areas and other sources of gas release as practical; as a minimum 3m(10ft) horizontally away from Zone 0/1/2 envelopes and demonstrated with Consequence based dispersion analysis. 2oo3 gas detector in voting configuration to trip the equipment shall be provided. Cross flow between extract and intake shall be avoided.
Fire/Smoke and Gas-tight dampers shall be tested in compliance with BS-EN-1751 and ISO-15138 Class 3 (for blades) and Class B (for case).
When required, purged and pressurized enclosures for electrical equipment shall be installed as per area classification.
2.6 BUILDINGS
Refer to Section 2.5.1 for Hazardous Area Classification, Section 2.5.2 for Ventilation, Section 2.11 for Fire and Gas Detection System.
2.6.1 FIRE AND BLAST PROTECTION
Permanent buildings shall be designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA 101.
Buildings shall be of non- combustible construction, containing, as far as possible, non- combustible fittings and furnishings and preferably located behind Fire / blast wall in non-hazardous area.
Temporary refuge building must be able to survive the fire and blast loads determined by Fire & Explosion Risk Analysis and/or Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis, and Passive Fire Protection Study Report.
2.6.2 PRESSURISATION
In addition to ventilation requirements specified in section 2.5.2 above, a building or equipment enclosure that contains unclassified electrical equipment or other potential ignition sources shall be pressurized when these are located in an area that is electrically classified (refer EI 15 for more details). Pressurization of building shall meet EI 15 / API 505 requirements.
Airlocks shall be provided for pressurized buildings to conserve inside pressures. An alarm shall be provided to indicate low building or enclosure pressure. Alarms associated with not normally attended buildings shall annunciate in the control room.
Refer to section 2.19.2 for specific pressurization requirements for TR & Muster Points
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Pipelines
2.6.3 SUBSEA PIPELINES
Submarine pipelines shall:
• Be based on location class, fluid category and potential failure consequences identified
in the risk analysis;
• Have sufficient safety margin against accidental loads and unplanned operational
conditions;
• Be provided with suitable pressure control systems and with an effective over pressure protection system, if it is anticipated that the design pressure can be exceeded under normal operational conditions;
• Be provided with an effective pipeline emergency shutdown system;
• Have adequate safety measures against sinking or floatation;
• Be routed with due regard to the probabilities of damage to the pipeline ;
• Be installed at suitable location to prevent or minimise geo-hazards, physical factors, and state of seabed resulting in damage to pipeline or disturbance to foreign structures, other pipeline system, wrecks, boulders, etc.;
• Be trenched, buried or appropriately protected if external damage affecting the integrity of the pipeline is likely and where necessary to prevent or reduce interference with other activities;
• Have provisions for the protection of pipeline emergency valves, valve actuators, and
pigging equipment;
• Be routed outside of crane slew areas and dropped object zones where possible. Where not possible on normally attended facilities, pipeline approaches within the crane slew area and dropped object zone shall be provided with dropped object protections.
Topsides Riser ESDVs shall be equipped with fusible plugs to release actuator pressure in case the valve is exposed to fire.
Note: When fusible tubing or other devices (such as ultraviolet flame detectors, etc.) are used instead of fusible plugs, they should provide at least the same coverage as outlined above.
Risers shall be in areas to minimize potential hazards from falling objects, ship / boat impact, liquid hydrocarbon overflow, explosion, or flame impingement to prevent damage to valves, actuators, and associated instrumentation.
The large inventory, high pressure, flammable and/or toxic materials in pipelines justifies special attention. A subsea pipeline risk assessment as part of the QRA study shall be carried out in accordance with PRT-PRS-PRC-009 to demonstrate that:
• All hazards relating to the causes of major accidents have be en identified and
documented;
• The risks arising from these hazards have been evaluated and assessed as having
adequate prevention and mitigation in place;
• The pipeline safety management system is adequate;
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• Emergency isolation valves, HIPPS (if any) and beach valves have been fitted as per
industry guidelines;
• Suitable leak detection system to be introduced for new projects (e.g. pressure monitoring devices to detect the rate of the pressure differential in case of a leak or rupture);
• Requirement for SSIV.
2.7 PLANT DRAINAGE
Drain system shall be designed to prevent:
• Migration of a fire, flammable liquids or vapours / toxic liquids or vapours from one
hazardous area to another, or to a non-hazardous area;
• Pressure build-up in the drain system.
The classification of drainage system shall be as a minimum split into two systems:
• Open drain system
• Closed drain system
2.7.1 CLOSED DRAIN SYSTEM
Drains and sample connections on vessels and equipment with a substantial hydrocarbon or toxic inventory, or operating at high pressure, shall be tied into the closed drain system. This shall consist of a matrix of piping terminating at a collection or blowdown vessel. The liquids collected in the blowdown vessel shall be returned by means of a pump to an appropriate point in the process train. Gases shall be directed to the flare. Care must be taken with high-pressure closed drain systems that may need to be segregated from low-pressure closed drain sources.
2.7.2 OPEN DRAIN SYSTEM
The open drain system is intended to prevent the release of oil-contaminated rain or wash-down water or minor oil leaks/spills to the sea. The system shall collect oily wastewater from equipment skid drain pans, solid-decking drains of the platform or offshore facilities and shall convey the contaminated water to a sump tank.
Open drain system shall be provided on site. The system will receive the runoff from the plant areas, and any over spill firewater or escaped hydrocarbon leakage from major firefighting operations.
Drainage collection and treatment systems shall be provided to meet statutory requirements of environmental and anti-pollution regulations. Open and Closed Drain systems shall always be segregated to prevent possible pressure-driven gas/liquids from coming back into the plant (and other areas) via Open Drains. Open and Closed Drains shall be independently piped systems with no interconnections even for maintenance.
References – API RP 14E and API STD 521.
2.8 PLANT ISOLATIONS
In general, it is preferential to undertake maintenance works on plants that have been totally shutdown, depressurized to atmosphere, fully isolated, and gas freed. As it is not always practicable,
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facilities shall be incorporated into the design to enable adequate isolation of units or systems from live plant to permit the safe execution of limited essential work.
The following general principles shall be followed as a minimum:
• The use of rated-for maintenance blinds, which have a low pressure rating is not
accepted;
• Blinds shall be rated for the full pipe pressure;
• The standard of isolation shall potential hazard dependent, taking into account the pipe contents (hydrocarbons, toxics, water etc.), temperature, pressure etc. Isolation standards shall include blinds, double block and bleed, single valve isolation. Note: the latter is only acceptable for low hazard systems and compliance to QG Work Management System is mandatory;
• Provision shall be made to physically lock valves open or closed;
• Physical isolation/positive isolation (e.g. blinds) shall be provided for tank, vessels, heat exchangers or equipment or system where open flame, hot work and/or confined space entry activities will be performed;
• Consideration shall be given to installing double block and bleed valves and operating blinds at spare equipment according to the hazard present. The bleed shall be directed to flare if the fluid is toxic, in high pressure, or in big inventory;
• Manual Isolation Valves or Motor Operated Valves (MOV) shall not be used/ considered
for Emergency Isolation / Shut Down;
• Double check valve or back flow preventer with different type shall be provided to prevent potential backflow considering differential pressure. Check valves are generally not suitable for high differential pressure application. The use of double checks valves to prevent/ minimize over pressurization scenarios shall be avoided. Experiences has shown they are not fully reliable and difficult to maintain [Required PPMs should be defined where check valves are identified as part of an SCE].
References: ‘OGO-OPS-OVR-003 Process Isolation by Disconnection and Blinding Procedure ’ and ‘OGO-OES-MNT-001 New Projects Isolation Blind, Specifications and Single-DBB Isolation Valves’.
2.9 PRESSURE RELIEF, VENTING AND FLARING
2.9.1 PRESSURE RELIEF
PSV sizing shall be based on API STD 520 Part I and API STD 521. All PSVs shall be assessed as a minimum against the abnormal events listed below, where applicable, which can lead to an over pressurization scenario:
• Plant fires
• Blocked outlet
•
Inadvertent inlet valve opening
• Check-valve failure
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• Utilities failure (Electricity, Inert Gas, etc.)
• Mechanical failure
• Gas blow-by
• Process changes, chemical reactions
• Thermal expansion
Based on the identified scenarios required relief rate shall be determined and relief area and the recommended PSV size shall be estimated for the governing case.
2.9.2 VENTING
Venting systems on equipment operating at atmospheric conditions dispose the gas/ vapors to safe location (or) atmosphere directly. When the possible causes of overpressure or vacuum in a tank are being determined, the following circumstances must be considered as per API STD 2000.
• Liquid movement into or out of the tank;
• Tank breathing due to weather changes (e.g. pressure and temperature changes);
• Other circumstances resulting from equipment failures and operating errors.
Normal venting shall be provided with a flame-arresting device on the open vent where deemed required. Low-pressure atmospheric tanks and vessels containing non-volatile liquids such as treating chemicals, etc. shall be provided with open vents. Flame arrester shall be provided for the storage of liquids in Hazardous Open Drain Tank. Each vent location, including exhausts, and safe venting height should be justified by Vent Dispersion analysis and commensurate with arrangements required for operation, maintenance and other regular activities. Accidental ignition scenario should be assessed as sensitivity case where such a potential can be identified.
2.9.3 BLOWDOWN & FLARING
Automatic blowdown shall be initiated to depressurize the entire inventory at the topsides between the shutdown valves during emergency depressurization in the event of confirmed gas leak and/or fire in line with API STD 521. Emergency depressurization shall be initiated with an automated signal from the emergency shutdown system upon confirmed fire and/or gas detection. All depressurizing valves (BDVs) within the fire zone shall be de-energized simultaneously. In addition, manual initiation of depressurization of each fire zone shall be possible from the control room.
The platform topsides shall divided into sections, segregated by ESD valves/ positive means of isolation. Hydrocarbon inventory for the depressurization shall be considered between each these process sections and depressurization shall be carried out with the BDVs. BDVs shall be provided for sections of trapped gas where the volume of gas is greater than 1m3 (35ft3) at each section of piping or equipment, when isolated.
Hydrocarbon disposal to flare shall be via a collecting system (flare header) through a liquid knockout drum.
The following flaring studies shall be performed for normal and blowdown flaring cases:
thermal radiation;
• • dispersion in event of flame out; • noise levels generated;
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• pollution (combustion products) dispersion.
Radiation studies shall take into account the effect of solar radiation. Studies will look at the following radiation levels (Note: radiation level shown in the table excludes solar radiation, solar- radiation-contribution adjustment to be taken into account to the values given in table below):
Permissible Design Level kW/m2 (Btu/h.ft2)
Conditions
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where urgent emergency action by personnel is required. When personnel enter or work in an area with potential for radiant heat intensity greater than 6.31 kW/m 2 (2000 Btu/h.ft2), radiation shielding and/or special protective apparel (e.g. a fire approach suit) shall be considered.
Safety precaution – it is important to recognize that personnel with appropriate clothing cannot tolerate thermal radiation at 9.46 kW/m 2 (3000 Btu/h.ft2) for more than a few seconds.
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 30 sec can be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting 2 min. to 3 min. can be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing. Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where personnel with appropriate clothing can be continuously exposed.
9.46 (3000)
6.31 (2000)
4.73 (1500)
1.58 (500)
Appropriate clothing consists of hardhat, long-sleeved shirts with cuffs buttoned, work gloves, long-legged pants, and work shoes. Appropriate clothing minimizes direct skin exposure to thermal radiation.
Table 2: Recommended Design Thermal Radiation for Personnel (API 521)
The flare tip shall provide smokeless flame in accordance with local environmental standards. The noise level shall not exceed that specified in the specific plant safety philosophy, when operating at maximum flaring capacity.
Manual access on flare access bridge would be restricted if radiation is 6.3 kw/m2 or more. Flare separation distance from other facilities shall consider any vessel or diving operations required for check the integrity of structures or other equipment as part of ES/PPM requirements.
2.9.3.1 Heat Shield for Flare Tip Access Platform
Flare tip access platform shall be provided with heat shield deck to prevent heat damage to the access platform.
2.10 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM
The protection philosophy is to locate, shut-in of flammable and toxic gas sources on detection of loss of process containment or fire, initiate safety process actions (shutdown/blowdown) and
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firefighting actions to limit escalation of hazardous event. Appropriate gas, flame, smoke and heat detectors shall be provided depending on potential hazards in the area, facilities or building.
Each Fire and Gas (F&G) system shall be designed to:
• Detect a fire or flammable/toxic mixture as rapidly as possible
• Alert personnel about the location of the hazard
•
•
Initiate the relevant ESD & Blowdown (as applicable)
Initiate the relevant firefighting system logic
The executive action from F&G should be decided based on the HMB.
Manual Alarm Call points (MAC) shall be provided throughout the platform including the buildings.
Rotating machinery such as EDG & Turbine shall be equipped with early heat detection, fire and gas detection, smoke detection (as applicable).
F&G systems shall be self-monitoring to detect faults that may affect the operation of the system. Fault detection shall register an appropriate signal at the alarm panel and any annunciation panels or system displays.
Systems shall be supplied with power from the essential power supply and shall include battery backup with a dedicated battery charger designed as per NFPA 72 (Redundant UPS or main with battery backup). The back-up battery shall have sufficient capacity to operate the fire alarm system under quiescent load (system operating in a non-alarm condition).
Cables to field detectors shall be fire resistant, compliant to IEC 331.
The F&G system shall consist of cabinets located in technical rooms and a matrix panel (VDU screen) in the control room, from which the status of the detection systems is visible and normal initiation of any extinguishing system is possible.
Detectors shall be suitable as a minimum for location in Zone 1 hazardous area.
Relevant Technical Authorities shall approve the use of wireless fire and gas detection system .
In general, accepted fire and gas detection system shall be designed to meet SIL 1 requirements.
2.10.1 FIRE ZONING
Fire zoning is the segregation of area for reducing fire spread and to facilitate design of the fire and gas detection, emergency shutdown and active fire protection system. A Fire Zone is defined as a given risk area, which is geographically segregated from any adjacent hazard.
Typically, fire zones would be separated from one another by an appropriate distance or by the presence of suitable rated fire division. Fire zones shall be defined for the facilities on the basis that a fire within one fire zone shall be prevented from affecting other fire zones. A fire zoning study shall be carried out to determine different fire zones.
2.10.2 FLAME DETECTION
FD (Flame Detectors) shall be located in areas where visible flame is anticipated, without any obstructions, as the first sign of combustion. Flame detector shall be selected from the following type, depending on environmental conditions where the detector is installed:
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• UV (Ultraviolet) type •
IR (Infrared) type
• T-IR (Infrared) type
• UV/IR combination type
They shall be unaffected by sunlight and artificial light sources.
Quantities and locations of FD shall be determined with regard to the detector characteristics, equipment layout and likely fire sources. Quantities and location of flame detectors shall be determined and to be confirmed by Fire and Gas Mapping Study. For oxygen-limited or smoky fires, rate-compensated heat detectors shall be used for indoor or enclosed applications.
Systems shall be self-monitoring system (i.e. fault detection) with fault alarm signal at the main F&G panel and any other required locations. A number of FD’s may be required to cover a fire zone and confirmed detection shall cause the logic to initiate (any action shall be based on voting):
• A general area alarm • Audible and visual alarms in the control room • Start fire pumps • Activate the fire protection system • ESD/ PSD, as applicable
FD housing shall be suitable for operation in hazardous area to which it is installed and the associated temperature class. The housing shall be weatherproof as well.
2.10.3 FUSIBLE PLUGS
Fusible plug systems shall be provided as a minimum at Riser ESDV(s), Xmas Trees and pig launcher(s) / receiver(s). The systems can be pressurized by nitrogen if no pneumatic supply available.
2.10.4 SMOKE DETECTION
Ionization type Smoke Detectors (SD) are banned from importation into the state of Qatar; only photoelectric / Diffusion type SD shall be used. These detectors shall be located in areas where the first indication of fire will be smoke or other combustion product, without immediate rapid temperature rise. Detectors raise audible and visual alarms in the control room.
Smoke detectors sense combustion products and shall be used within enclosed spaces that are not subject to extremes of temperature, humidity, dust or wind. Detection is achieved in the smoldering stage before flames and high temperature occurs. Areas of selection include accommodation, ceiling void spaces, auxiliary and switch gear rooms with false floors and ceilings, where electrical cables in high density are installed. Refer to NFPA 72.
Diffusion Type Smoke Detectors
These detectors shall be located in areas where the first indication of fire shall be smoke or other combustion product, without immediate rapid temperature rise.
Diffusion Type Smoke detectors as a minimum shall be located at:
•
Inside Temporary Refuge
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• Below false floor electrical buildings
• Air intakes for pressurized enclosures
SD shall be used in non-hazardous areas, with the locations and quantities considering:
• Detector characteristics
• Equipment layout
• Likely fire sources
• Ventilation
The location, number and spacing shall be made with reference to the manufacturer’s recommendations and NFPA 72. A signal light shall be provided that illuminates when the detector is activated. If the detector is concealed (usually inside the ceiling and under false floor), the light will be installed in a visible location.
High-Sensitivity Smoke Detector (HSSD)
These detectors shall be located in areas where the first indication of fire shall be smoke or other combustion product, without immediate rapid temperature rise. In general, HSSD shall be of aspirating type smoke detector such as VESDA.
HSSD shall be installed:
•
•
in Telecom Rooms and for electrical and instrument control cabinets in the buildings
in Switchgear Room, EDG’s Control Room and ELICS Room (including subfloor areas where provided)
On detection of smoke by a single detector, an alarm shall be generated in control room and local area where the smoke is detected. HSSD shall be arranged so that single room/space can be individually monitored, and each of the control units shall transmit the following signals to the relevant fire alarm control panel:
• pre-alarm
•
fire alarm
• common fault alarm
A facility to override automatic initiation of the extinguishing system (e.g. Novec 1230) shall be provided.
Heat detector
Heat detector shall be selected from the following type, depending on environmental conditions where the detector is installed:
•
•
rate compensation fixed temperature type
rate-of-rise type
Heat detectors shall be installed where installation of smoke detector is unfavorable, e.g. galley,
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workshop, etc. Heat detectors shall be installed according to NFPA 72. Heat detector should be installed where heat is prime indicator of detection, not be considered as alternate to smoke or flame detector and should be justifiable with respect to location requirement.
In each of buildings, heat detectors shall be connected with the fire alarm control panel through addressable loop, and the control panel shall transmit one common fire alarm signal to the relevant F&G Control Unit so that any activation of heat detectors in the building can be identified building - wise, as well as MACs and other automatic fire detectors in the building.
2.10.5 FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION
The flammable gas detectors shall be located:
• At an elevation suitable for the gas being detected
• Close to the leak source
• Downwind of leak sources
Flammable gas detector shall be selected from the following type, depending on environmental conditions where the detector is installed, and taking into account maintenance requirements:
•
IR (Infrared) absorption type point detectors
• Catalytic combustion type point detectors
GD (Gas Detectors) shall be:
• Certified for use in Zone 1 areas
• Temperature class T3
• Weather proof to IEC 144 IP 65
• Calibrated for hydrogen (if in battery rooms) and methane otherwise
Any activation of the gas detectors shall be individually identified on F&G Operator Stations.
Flammable gas detector locations shall be confirmed by a suitable F&G Mapping Study and captured in the F&G Layouts.
Flammable gas detectors shall be provided for the following areas as a minimum:
• Process and utility areas where leaks of hydrocarbon or other hazardous gases
could originate;
• Wellhead areas;
• HVAC air intakes.
Fixed-point flammable gas detector is supposed to be based on the infrared absorption technology and shall allow the direct readout in percent LEL (lower explosive limit). It is also required that the detector be able to initiate alarm at a minimum of two distinct LEL levels. The supply of gas detectors is expected to be suitable for one-man calibration.
Alarm levels for the gas detectors shall be as follows:
• high alarm at 20% LEL of the flammable/combustible gas to be detected • high-high alarm at 50% LEL of the flammable/combustible gas to be detected
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Visual and audible alarms shall be provided at the F&G panel and in the Control Room.
Line of Sight or Open path type flammable gas detectors measure the amount of hydrocarbons present in an infrared beam, by determining its attenuation in relation to a reference beam. Open path GD requirement shall be based on engineering review and if required the detectors shall be located at the periphery of process area / module. Any activation of open-path gas detectors shall be individually identified on F&G Operator Stations. Alarm levels per each type of gas detection shall be as follows:
• high alarm at 1 LELm • high-high alarm at 3 LELm
It shall be possible to change the LELm at which alarms are initiated by software configuration after installation if required.
2.10.6 TOXIC GAS DETECTION
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) detection shall be provided to allow safety precautions to be taken with respect to:
• Use of respiratory protective equipment
• Escape procedures
• Rescue plans
• Remedial action
•
Initiate emergency actions (operator action)
Toxic gas detection shall initiate as distinct local audible and visual alarms in the plant.
H2S gas detectors shall be installed in high potential H2S hazard area, where H2S concentration in vapor phase of the contained stream exceeds 250 ppm.
In addition to the above, H2S gas detectors shall be installed:
• at the fresh air intake duct for HVAC Systems of the buildings (except for Analyzer Houses)
which are located within the On-Plot area, and,
•
in the Analyzer House, where an H2S stream enters and H2S gas could accumulate.
Any activation of H2S gas detectors shall be individually identified on F&G Operator Stations.
In addition to above for process areas, H2S detectors shall be provided at HVAC air intakes.
H2S gas detector shall be located close to potential leak sources but at least 0.5 m above the deck. Possible mechanical damage shall also be taken into account while locating these detectors. Numbers of detectors their location shall be determined by appropriate F&G Mapping Study and captured in the F&G Layouts.
Alarm levels for the H2S gas detectors shall be as follows:
• 1ooN at 10ppm – high level alarm (Tone # 1) • 1ooN at 45ppm – high-high level alarm (Tone # 2)
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) fixed detectors shall be set to alarm at 2 ppm (high) and 5 ppm (high-high).
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It shall be possible to change the ppm level at which alarms are initiated by software configuration after installation if required.
Open-Path Gas Detector - Toxic (H2S) gas detection
• high alarm at 25 ppm-m • high-high alarm at 75 ppm-m
It shall be possible to change the ppm-m level at which alarms are initiated by software configuration after installation if required.
2.10.7 FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND ALARM DISPLAY
Annunciation and / or fire and gas alarms are provided:
•
In the control room
• Throughout the platform and initiated from the control room
•
•
In Instrument Technical Rooms (ITR)
In buildings
Visual alarms (beacons for flammable, toxic releases, fire) shall be provided in areas of high noise.
Outputs from detection modules shall operate audible and visual alarms and initiate automatic actuation of safety features e.g. shutdown fan, close dampers, release firefighting agents.
All manual and automatic systems shall be capable of being tested without initiating executive actions. Fire and gas systems shall be provided with self-testing to detect faults.
2.10.8 CAMERA SURVEILLANCE
Camera surveillance to support monitoring critical operation activities or situation shall be provided where required following the engineering and operability review.
2.11 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
The Emergency Shutdown encompasses the whole safeguarding system including manual and automatic initiating devices, emergency shutdown valves or other final elements, the controls and related logic devices.
2.11.1 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN/ISOLATION
The Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system shall be provided in accordance with API RP 14C.
The ESD system provides the means of bringing the whole facility or parts of it into a pre-determined safe shutdown condition.
A safe shutdown condition requires that:
• The feed to the unit/equipment concerned is blocked;
• Energy input to the unit/equipment is off;
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• Pipes that might release large amounts of hydrocarbons in case of rupture are isolated
from large inventories;
• Systems that might act as an ignition source are shutdown.
The ESD system shall have a number of functional levels. Each ESD level shall shutdown either individual units without influence on any other unit and function level, or together with the ESD level to which it belongs. Any ESD level activates all ESD functions below it.
The ESD system shall include segregation of the following as a minimum for permanently manned installations (below list for guidance only):
• ESD 0 – Platform Shutdown & depressurise;
• ESD 1 – Process/Wells/Pipeline and utilities shutdown;
• ESD 2 – Individual process unit level;
• ESD 3 – Individual equipment level shutdown.
The configuration of the ESD system shall be of high reliability and redundancy. Systems shall be designed to fail-safe. ESD systems to be rated based on the SIL assessment study and designed accordingly. The voting principle of sensors/initiators of logic shall be performed in accordance with the SIL assessment.
The plant ESD 0 shall be initiated only manually from the Main Control Room (MCR) or other designated points (e.g. lifeboat stations).
ESD 1 shall be initiated by pushbutton in the MCR; pushbutton in designated locations.
ESD 1 shall be fail safe (i.e. circuits are energized for normal operating status); Emergency Shutdown Valve (ESDV) shall close on loss of power. Pressing an ESD pushbutton will de -energize the operating solenoids of the ESDV for that zone. Re-energizing the ESDV solenoids shall require a local permissive reset of the individual solenoids.
For normally unmanned installations, below ESD hierarchy shall be developed and below table can be used as guidance.
Shutdown Level
Purpose
ESD-0
ESD-1.1
ESD-1.2
ESD-2.1
To trip AC/DC UPS (Primary and Secondary) with condition of ESD-1.2 has been initiated To isolate the platform from wells and the pipeline and depressurize to make safe. To isolate the platform from the wells and the pipeline to make safe based on a confirmed gas leak. ESD-1.2 initiates platform depressurization but does not close the SSSVs.
To shutdown the process and certain utilities, isolate the pipeline and platform from the wells but remain pressurized.
Table 3 – Emergency Shutdown Hierarchy [Unmanned WHPs]
As ESDVs are required to fail safe/closed into their ESD position.
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Pumps provided with ESDVs located in the suction line shall be provided with the appropriate machinery protection system.
The process safety shutdowns shall be included in the ESD system (high-high and low-low trips) for equipment. This shall be totally independent from the DCS (Distributed Control System).
Activation of ESDV’s must be via hard-wired controls. Remote activation by telemetry/wireless is not acceptable, unless supported by Risk Assessment and approved by Technical Authorities (I&C, Process). Usage of optical fiber transmission link with required level of SIL certification is considered acceptable.
The ESD systems including sensors, actuators and their associated connections and circuits shall be arranged to operate independently of other monitoring, control and alarm systems.
The ESD system shall have sufficient separation to ensure that a failure in a particular part of the system would not render other parts of the system inoperative. ESDVs shall be located on the incoming and outgoing lines containing flammable materials and as necessary to define the depressurization zones within the process system.
All ESDVs shall be manually operable locally at the valve as well as from the control room.
2.12 HIPPS
High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) is sometimes provided to replace a mechanical safety device (e.g. a pressure safety valve) with instruments, valves and logic. HIPPS shall only be used if it can be demonstrated that there is no practical alternative available and there are some benefits (e.g. topsides piping protection against well pressure).
Subsea HIPPS is a proven system as per API RP 170.
A comprehensive reliability study shall be performed for any proposed HIPPS application. The study shall address hazard and failure rates; redundancy; voting systems; on-line testing and maintenance. The study shall be reviewed and approved by Qatargas Loss Prevention Engineering (LPE), in consultation with Engineering and Maintenance.
The target SIL (Safety Integrity Level) for HIPPS shall be assigned as SIL 3, as per SIL Assessment.
2.13 SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM (SIS)
The below points are to be considered while designing SIS for any new project.
The philosophy of SIS design shall be:
• Perform its Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) with an internationally recognized level
of integrity as per IEC 61511;
• Conform to applicable sections of API RP 14C for HIPPS;
• The SIS shall be designed to meet the target SILs of the SIFs at a testing frequency that is in accordance with standards and acceptable by the operating asset where it is to be installed;
• The SIS shall be designed with the ultimate objective of ensuring process safety while minimizing human errors for critical processes to minimize spurious (nuisance) trips/disturbances;
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• The SIS components shall be designed to be functionally independent of components used for monitoring and control functions as part of Basic Process Control System (BPCS);
• The SIS shall be designed to automatically move the process to a safe state on loss of
energy (i.e. instrument air, electrical power, and hydraulic fluid) ;
• SIS functions shall be kept as simple as possible using the least number of steps to
prevent or mitigate the hazardous condition;
• SIS hardware common to multiple SIFs shall be capable of meeting or exceeding the highest Target SIL of those corresponding SIFs as de termined during Safety System Function Analysis (SSFA). All the components of any SIFs shall be suitable for equal or greater than the SIL of the respective SIF;
• The SIS alarm shall be displayed in the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) Human
Machine Interface (HMI);
• SISs shall be designed to simplify maintenance and reduce maintenance costs where
possible.
Refer to PRT-000-PRC-016 for SIL Assessment Procedure and latest Qatargas SIL Verification Procedure.
2.14 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION (PFP)
Passive fire protection is a barrier, coating, or other safeguard that provides protection against the heat from a fire without additional intervention. It is a protective measure to improve the capacity of equipment and its support structure to maintain their structural integrity during a fire. It acts as shield for essential operating systems when they are exposed to fire.
PFP helps prevent escalation of fires to an acceptable level by providing temporary protection until full firefighting capabilities can be deployed, and/or to give sufficient time for escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel before structural collapse or equipment failure.
The first step in evaluating fireproofing requirements is identifying the location and types of fire hazard areas including capacity and flow pattern of associated drainage areas. Factors considered include quantities, pressures, temperatures and chemistry of the materials present in the area that are potential fuels. This fire hazard identification may be included as part other process safety hazard evaluation work.
Fireproofing shall be provided on structures and equipment /equipment supports identified to be critical from the standpoint of fire escalation based on recommendations from safety studies (FEA, QRA, etc.). Fire proofing of the buildings and fire/blast wall shall be implemented based on outcome of safety studies and applicable international standards. PFP schedule should enumerate all the specific protection requirements (length, height etc.).
Blowdown or fire scenarios shall be configured to minimize the requirement of passive fire protection.
ESDV located in fire zone shall be able to fail to their fail-safe position and remain in such position for the required time when under a fire challenge, otherwise fire proofing or other mitigating controls shall be provided to ensure valve survivability/operability on demand.
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The structural design of the platform and modules shall be evaluated for the fire loads and the endurance times developed based on FRA and accordingly passive fire protection shall be specified for any part of the structure whose loss of integrity could impair the emergency functions of safety critical structures essential for controlled shutdown, escape, evacuation and rescue. Requirements for additional fire barriers and internal divisions shall be based on the FEA
Firewalls shall be installed to separate process areas from non-process areas to prevent or limit damage to buildings and safety critical equipment due to fire. The firewalls shall have constructed of steel or be applied with fire proofing material with fire rating determined in Fire Risk Analysis. Oil transformer containing 1893 L (500 gal) or more shall be separated from adjacent structures by a 2-hour rated firewall [Refer to NFPA 850].
All penetrations through bulkheads and decks, including electrical, piping, and ventilation systems penetrations, shall have the same fire and blast integrity as the bulkhead and deck through which they penetrate. The fire resistance of doors provided in fire divisions shall be certified to the same class division.
Ventilation systems shall be designed with an intent to maintain the required fire divisions. For ducts penetrating A Class and H Class divisions, suitable fireproofing and fire dampers shall be provided to prevent the passage of smoke. Additional protection shall be provided where ducts pass through multiple spaces to maintain smoke-free escape routes, TRs, and other occupied spaces.
Passive fire protection shall be established for the Safety Systems if necessary, to maintain their emergency function to prevent or mitigate major accident hazards. The survivability of the systems identified shall be ensured by separation, where possible, or by segregation by fire - rated decks and bulkheads. Where this is not feasible, fireproofing shall be directly applied on the portions of the systems directly exposed to a fire, or other means, such as redundancy or active protection shall be provided.
Some Safety-critical elements may have to function for a period of time after the event has started, until the event has been controlled or, in the worst case, to facilitate safe evacuation of the facility. The identification of these safety-critical elements, their exposure to potential major accident events, and the required duration of protection shall be based on the FEA.
A set of plans and elevations shall be prepared showing fire-potential equipment and designated fire-exposed areas.
The designation of fire-exposed areas and the selection of fire potential equipment such as structures, vessels, equipment, instrumentation requiring fireproofing or fire safe requirements of electrical cables and other components shall be in accordance with API-RP-2FB. Refer to API Standard 607 and API Standard 6FA for fire safe requirement for valves and actuators. Within fire- exposed areas, the PFP used shall be rated to meet the high rate-of-rise (hydrocarbon) test as specified by UL 1709. All fire and gas cables to technical/control rooms shall be fire resistant type according to IEC 331.
Proprietary fireproofing material can only be used if satisfactory evidence is given that it has passed appropriate fire tests. The test shall be recognized by QG OPCO and witnessed by QG OPCO or an independent company agency recognized by QG OPCO. Competent personnel approved by the manufacturer of the proprietary system shall only install PFP.
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2.15 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION (AFP)
Active fire protection systems is to be provided to control vapors, extinguish fires, and provide cooling depending upon the type of fire involved, until the source of fuel can be isolated or consumed, in order to protect personnel, critical structures, safety critical equipment and larger fuel inventories.
Active fire protection shall be covered by fixed systems that are installed for specific risks. In addition, portable firefighting equipment shall also be provided strategically. Fire protection shall be integrated active and passive fire protection systems.
Fire water systems shall be provided on all normally attended platforms, including complexes with bridge-connected facilities and a living-quarters platform. Where possible, primary firefighting shall be provided through fixed firefighting systems such as remotely operated monitors or automatic deluge systems. Manual firefighting is intended for incipient fires only, and fire escalation is addressed with isolation and blowdown. The provision for fire water systems on not normally attended platforms shall be as determined by hazards analysis and approved by Qatargas.
The fire area may be divided into more than one deluge zone, but this shall not be done for the purpose of reducing the capacity of the fire water system and size of fire water pumps. Water spray system shall be provided on normally attended facilities in all areas that handle flammable and combustible liquids and gases, such as wellheads, separation, and gas compression. Fixed monitors shall be provided for protection of hydrocarbon-containing equipment in open areas of the platform. Automatic sprinkler systems shall be installed in living quarters.
The firewater supply shall be sufficient to cover the area with the largest firewater demand. The firewater ringmain shall be sized for the demand of the largest fire area. The system shall be hydraulically balanced based on the required fire water demand.
The design and specification of Active Fire protection shall refer to the Fire Protection Policy (PRT- ERP-POL-001) for Active Fire Protection System design and specification.
In any case, there shall be a well-documented assessment and analysis and approved by QG Asset Owner / Loss Prevention supporting the decision making behind the fire protection approach and selection of any specific type of active/passive fire protection system. A good fire protection approach is a combination of passive and active system.
2.16 EMERGENCY POWER
Emergency power shall be integrated in the operating power system in such a way that loss of main to supply continuously power essential/emergency equipment.
to emergency power
in automatic
transfer
results
The emergency power shall be capable of supplying required power to essential/emergency equipment (for example emergency power for F&G system is required for a period at least 24 hours).
The following is a typical list of essential/emergency equipment:
• Safety Instrumented System (SIS) / Process Safety System (PSS) / Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) / Emergency Depressurization System (EDP). Emergency Power shall cover
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also the scenario of power failure leading to opening of multiple blowdown system that can lead to flare overload.
• Emergency depressurization system shall be considered with additional backup power
for the loss of UPS scenarios.
• Process Control System (PCS)
• High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS)
• DCS system
• Emergency plant/building lighting/escape lighting (30% of light fittings)
• HVAC systems required for operation during emergency conditions
• Switchgear
• Fire and gas detection and alarms
• PAGA / PAEA
• Firefighting system
•
Instrument air
• Machinery and start up air compressor (to start up GTG)
• Telecoms systems (Communications and CCTV/Closed Circuit Television)
Emergency generators or alternative means of power supply such as Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) shall be provided in this case.
2.17 PLANT EMERGENCY ALARMS
The plant emergency alarm system shall consist of a ‘Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) / Public Address and Emergency Alarm (PAEA)’ system with multiple public address speakers strategically located to ensure coverage throughout the facility and building, as applicable. The alarm signal shall be clear, audible, distinctive from similar signals used for other purposes and capable of being heard throughout all plant areas. High-noise areas shall be provided with visual alarm (flashing light) to alert personnel in those areas. Qatargas Emergency Response Team should be consulted for the types of alarms and their profile (visual colour, duration, frequency). Table below is for guidance only:
Alarm Type General
All Clear
Type of Alarm Saw tooth tone 700 to 1100 Hz Continuous Tone 1 kHz
Visual Red flashing
None
Duration and Profile
3 minutes
/////////
2 minutes
Table 4: Typical Plant Emergency Alarms
A distinctive visual and audible alarm for gas release shall be installed when required.
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code can be used as a reference. Also, refer to Qatargas Incident Management Plan Procedure (#PRT-ERP-PRC-023) and Emergency Response (Operations) Procedure (#PRT-ERP-PRC-008).
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2.18 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE
The EER philosophy shall include a sufficient number and type of independent methods of evacuation to ensure redundancy in EER facilities.
The Escape and evacuation philosophy shall be developed to include the following consideration, as minimum:
• Provision of Primary and Secondary Escape Routes
• Arrangement of Connecting Bridges
• Detecting the incident and raising the alarm.
• Escape and reach the muster / Temporary Refuge (TR).
• Provision of Temporary Refuge (TR).
• Provision of adequate facilities to escape, evacuate and rescue.
• Availability of at least one escape route.
• Emergency Breathing Air Equipment / facilities
• Escape routes to Temporary Refuge (TR) shall take consideration of predominant wind
direction.
• The building exit doors shall not open towards Process area or block escape route.
• TEMPSC / Life raft location shall be with respect to wind and wave direction and at safe
location.
• Assessment from Thermal radiation and Gas Dispersion Analysis
• Adequate Time for Safe Evacuation
When the decision is made to evacuate, all personnel shall evacuate the platform by the following evacuation methods as listed in Section 2.20 of this philosophy.
2.18.1 ESCAPE ROUTES
Every exit shall be clearly visible, or the route to reach each exit shall be clearly marked so the direction of escape from any point is readily known.
Every building or area of the platform shall be provided with sufficient exits to permit the prompt escape of personnel. Exits shall be arranged to provide free and unobstructed egress from all parts of every building, structure, section or area at all times.
A minimum of two (2) separate and remote exits shall be provided from every building, structure, section or area of high hazard occupancy. Any compartment that would otherwise have a travel distance exceeding 6 m (20 feet) to the nearest exit shall have a minimum of two (2) exits. Where two (2) means of egress are required, they shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that both may be rendered impassable by the same emergency condition.
There shall be no dead-end spaces exceeding 6m.
The escape philosophy applicable for the new facilities shall cover the primary and secondary escape routes, the evacuation means, the emergency breathing air equipment and the adequate time for safe evacuation.
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Escape routes shall be as direct as possible, avoiding frequent changes of direction and the need to repeatedly ascend and descend deck levels. Where changes in deck level are required, stairs or ramps shall be used rather than ladders. The stairs shall be located so that it would be very unlikely for a single event to impair both stairways.
Considerations shall be as discussed below and shall be updated in consultation with QG as the project progresses.
• Primary and Secondary Escape Routes
• Escape routes shall allow easy transport of 2-man operation stretcher carrying an adult
person.
• Escape routes shall be marked to lead personnel on board (POB) to the primary mus ter area
(Personnel Shelter, MCR etc.).
• Escape routes shall be designed in the same manner as walkways, access platforms and
stairs where minimum width is 0.9 m (3 ft), per NFPA 101.
• Primary escape route clear passage width shall be minimum 1.1 m. This dimension shall be
maintained for any stairways in the escape route.
• Secondary escape route clear passage width shall be at least 0.760 m. This dimension shall
be maintained for any stairways in the escape route.
• Clearance height of escape routes shall be a minimum 2.3 m.
• Access/Egress routes shall be established at the plot plan/equipment layout stage of the work and at least one route between the muster area and helideck /boat landing shall be provided without entering the process area.
• Design and construction of all ladders and stairs shall conform to ANSI A14.3 or ANSI A64.1,
respectively, or other national standards approved by QG.
• Walking/working surfaces shall be designed to avoid slippery conditions and tripping
hazards. In addition, walkways shall be free of obstructions.
• Equipment, valves, and instrumentation located above deck level shall be designed to be operated, tested, and calibrated from deck level, to the extent feasible. Alternatively, those accessed routinely shall be provided with a stairway to an elevated platform. Those accessed infrequently may be provided with a fixed vertical ladder.
• Scaffolding shall be limited to very infrequent access, such as turnaround activities.
• Designated walkways shall have adequate vertical and horizontal clearance for emergency
response personnel and their equipment (such as stretchers etc.).
• Where grade separations are unavoidable on the same deck level, ramps shall be provided to minimize tripping hazards and to facilitate use of wheeled equipment (for example, fire extinguishers, oxygen/acetylene rigs, and handcarts).
• Access to equipment, such as compressors and pumps, shall be provided, to avoid stepping
on piping or other appurtenances not specifically designed for that purpose.
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2.18.2 PRIMARY MUSTER POINTS / TEMPORARY REFUGE / SAFE HEAVEN
The safe haven is a designated area where platform personnel can take one or more of the following actions:
-
Assemble during an emergency
-
Take refuge from fire, smoke, and other hazards
-
Initiate emergency actions (including requirement to have secure communications)
-
Effect safe and orderly platform evacuation.
The minimum acceptable features of the safe haven shall be as follows:
- Construction as specified by QG and other international / national standards approved by
QG
-
Non-combustible construction
-
Construction capable of withstanding hydrocarbon fires and explosion for TR endurance
period and in accordance with API RP 14B.
- A heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system to provide for the comfort and
safety of occupants
-
An HVAC system capable of maintaining a positive pressure in the safe haven / TR / buildings. Safe haven / TR / buildings shall be pressurized in accordance with NFPA 496, Project specification with a positive pressure value of 25Pa for TR and 50Pa for airlocks outside. The air intake for a pressurized building shall be from a safe area. Positive air pressure switches will monitor air pressure, and upon loss of pressure, an alarm will alert the operators. ‘Buildings air tightness target (plant and non‐plant buildings) of 0.25 ACH maximum shall be used when in TR mode and provision of fit for purpose air locks (i.e. properly sealed double doors at main entrances provided with HVAC air supply.
-
Fire detection and alarm
-
HVAC inlets located to reduce the possibility of smoke and gas ingress
-
HVAC inlets incorporating gas detection & toxic gas detection in TR (airlock)
-
Platform emergency shutdown capability
-
Internal (platform) and external (other installations, marine vessels, etc.) communications
capabilities
- Emergency lighting powered from the emergency generator(s), (UPS), and/or individual
battery packs
- At least two means of egress.
Muster points shall be located in safe areas determined by specific studies, taking into account wind direction, hazard location that may result in fire or explosion or heat radiation or toxic gas releases, safe distance as per facility siting and layout, walking distance to/between muster points and physical plant boundaries, etc.
Basic facilities, to be provided at muster points, include shelter from weather, means of communications, a personnel tracking system to account for personnel mustering, adequate space
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for personnel, prominent signs.
Requirements for Temporary Refuge muster points inside any occupied buildings shall be identified where there are exposure from toxic gas release.
In the event of a major emergency, Temporary Refuge shall be considered as a primary Muster Point.
The TR shall contain means to monitor facility F&G alarms, communicate externally with an Emergency Control Center and rescue party, and communicate internally, including the use of the public-address system.
To ensure that the TR delivers its intended design function, it shall be tested during commissioning and regularly during operations to measure the leak rate. The measured leakage rate shall not exceed the design rate by 20%.
Fully charged waterproof hand-held UHF/VHF radios shall be made available for use at the Temporary refuge.
Power for the public address and TR external communications shall be designed to be available during any credible emergency.
There shall be at least two independent means of communicating from the TR to an Emergency Control Center away from the installation.
The TR shall be designed to offer personnel protection from fire (e.g., radiant heat and smoke), blast, and other hazards as necessary for evacuation time estimated in EERA or for a minimum of 30 minutes duration to allow for organized controlled evacuation. The TR shall also provide protection from environmental hazards (i.e., sun, wind, cold, heat, etc.).
The TR shall be large enough to accommodate max POB, based on a minimum space of 0.6 to 0.7 m2 (6.5 to 7.5 ft2) per person.
TR shall provide additional space required to enable personnel to undertake any required activities (e.g., donning survival/immersion suits, life jackets, breathing apparatus, escape breathing sets, and use of stretcher etc.).
The TR shall have at least two independent exits to the evacuation stations (helidecks, and survival crafts) as required.
The TR shall protect personnel for TR endurance period and following confirmation through Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis and Temporary Refuge Impairment Analysis.
The TR shall provide breathing air for 2 hours through the Cascade Breathing Air system.
Temporary Refuge will have following facilities:
-
Cascade Breathing Air System (2 hours capacity) with Masks
-
Escape Breathing Apparatus
-
Communication Equipment
-
Stretcher
-
Fireman Equipment Cabinet that includes Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
-
Life Jackets
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-
First Aid Box
-
Eye Wash Fountain
-
Fixed Gas Detectors and Gas Detector Panel
-
TR Instruction Board
-
Muster Board
-
Fire & Gas Status display panel
Consult LPE and Safety focal point for more details to determine safest location for muster points.
2.18.3 SECONDARY MUSTER POINT
When the Primary Muster point / Temporary Refuge is impaired during an emergency, all the personnel shall proceed to Secondary Muster point which shall be identified and located at Safe location.
2.18.4 EXIT / EGRESS
Any areas, the dead end shall not exceed 6 m of travel distance.
Areas over 6m shall be provided with at least two exits, leading to escape routes. In case of closed rooms, these exits shall be doors hinged to swing to the outside. Where two (2) means of egress are required, they shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that both may be rendered impassable by the same emergency condition.
Every exit shall be clearly visible, or the route to reach each exit shall be provided with Safety signs and clearly marked such that the direction of escape from any point is readily known. There shall be no dead- end spaces or corridors on the facilities.
Every exit shall be clearly visible and the route to each exit shall be clearly marked so the direction of escape from any point is readily known. Escape routes and exits shall be adequately lighted and provided with emergency lighting.
Emergency exit doors shall be provided with panic bars and clearly marked EMERGENCY EXIT KEEP CLEAR or EMERGENCY EXIT DO NOT BLOCK.
Windsocks shall be provided at such locations as deemed necessary to ensure personnel can readily identify the wind direction and evacuate the area by the safest route.
Fire-rated doors shall be designed according to NFPA 101 and NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protective, marked FIRE DOOR KEEP SHUT and shall be provided with approved self- closing devices and hinges. Test certificates shall be available.
Fire Action Procedures shall be posted in suitable locations such that all occupants are aware of actions required in the event of fire.
Manual “break glass” call points shall be installed near escape routes/exits, or at a safe distance from specific hazards.
2.18.5 SAFETY SIGNS
Safety signs shall be categorized according to their function and prominently displaye d all around the facility / installation including buildings.
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Safety signs assist in ensuring that people are aware and informed of hazards and risk control measures. Safety signs may address any of the following needs:
• To warn about physical, chemical, biological or psychological hazards;
• To prohibit hazardous actions or behavior;
• To prohibit access;
• To mandate specific actions, procedures or practices;
• To locate and identify safety equipment;
• To address requirements of health and safety legislation.
A system of safety signs shall be used to indicate one or more of the following:
• Prohibition signs - prohibition instruction to reduce the risk associated with a particular
hazard;
• Mandatory signs - mandatory instruction to reduce the risk associated with a particular
hazard;
• Warning signs - warning about particular hazard;
•
Informative/Emergency signs - location and identification of safety equipment and safety facilities and indication of means of safe access or egress.
Safety signs shall be provided to indicate an escape and evacuation route and direction, the location of Escape facilities, evacuation facilities, Rescue facilities, Firefighting and Safety Equipment, Lifesaving and first aid equipment, muster /TR location, Manual Alarm Call points, a safety action (safe condition signs), mandatory action signs, prohibition signs and warning signs, as minimum. Moreover, safety and emergency instructions shall be provided in TR.
The signs shall be of photo luminescent type in order to be visible in dark or dense smoke and shall comply with QG standard (PRT-PSF-PRC-015) and international standards/ guidelines referred.
2.19 EVACUATION METHODS
In the event of a major incident and subsequent PAGA all personnel will muster in the Temporary Refuge (Primary Muster Point) or Secondary Muster Point. Upon receiving instruction to evacuate the platform, all personnel shall evacuate by one or more of the following ways:
• The normal mode of personnel transportation to platforms will be by boat. Primary means
of evacuation shall be at the boat landing by nearby boat or field marine vessel;
• Secondary means of evacuation shall be by life boat in case boat is unavailable or unable to
approach the platform in case of a major accident event;
• Where primary and secondary means are not available, life rafts suitably located on the
platform shall be used;
• Scramble nets and life jackets shall also be provided in conjunction with the available modes
of evacuation;
• Helicopter can be used based on availability and type of emergency (for example medical
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evacuation).
2.19.1 SAFE EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS
In case of H2S detection, personnel on platform shall immediately wear escape hoods and escape to Temporary Refuge.
Cascade breathing air manifold shall be provided in Temporary Refuge. If decision is made to evacuate the platform, they shall don Escape Breathing Air Sets and proceed as per QG ERP.
Safe evacuation shall align with QG’s emergency management plan with due consideration to the facility’s mustering philosophy, availability of evacuation means including allowances for search and rescue operation.
2.19.2 MEDIVAC REQUIREMENTS
Means of medical evacuation (medivac) for facility shall following, as minimum:
• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Helideck for Helicopter Medivac.
• Transfer casualty in stretcher to muster area. Transfer to stand-by boat/ support vessel.
• Transfer casualty in stretcher to Temporary Refuge if there is continuing Fire /
Explosion / gas impairment on platform.
2.20 MANNING LEVEL
Remote Wellhead Platforms (RWHP) are generally “not normally manned”, and equipment selection shall minimize the need for visits to the facilities.
The platform’s Escape, evacuation, rescue and emergency facilities shall be designed to cater for maximum POB.
2.21 HUMAN FACTORS
Human errors during operation and maintenance activities can contribute to accidents. Human errors can also contribute to unsuccessful emergency escape and evacuation.
The design shall consider good practice in the design of all man machine interfaces as well as other human factors including:
• Ease of safe access to equipment, instruments and valves for both normal operation
and maintenance.
• Operating valve (manual or automatic).
• Clarity of displays on control systems and visual display units (VDU).
• Alarm handling on control and emergency systems.
• Operating weather conditions.
• Labels and signs.
• Emergency Evacuation Systems.
Human Factor Implementation plan document shall be developed to systematically implement the
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HFE design requirements in project life cycle. Human Factors workshop can be carried out to review the requirements. Comprehensive Human Factors Engineering Specification shall be developed for the project and be implemented in all relevant design.
2.22 FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM & EQUIPMENT
Portable hand and wheeled fire extinguishers shall be provided for readily available first -aid firefighting in order to perform rapid extinguishment of incipient fires.
Fire protection systems and equipment shall be arranged and located with sufficient capacity to respond quickly and effectively to fire without exposing personnel to extreme danger.
Firefighting appliances required on facility, as minimum are:
• Portable and wheeled dry chemical powder extinguishers in deck area and helideck.
• Carbon dioxide extinguishers in electrical and instrument rooms, transformer area and
helideck.
• Wheeled foam extinguisher near chemical injection pumps, pig traps and helideck.
• DIFFS system for helideck and fire suppression systems of building containing electrical
equipment.
2.22.1 GASEOUS SYSTEMS
For enclosures where a total flooding clean agent is to be applied and personnel access is possible, the firefighting system shall be equipped with a time delay and pre-discharge alarm to provide personnel clear warning before the gas is released into the space. A clean agent release strobe light shall be located outside the room /enclosure to alert personnel that discharge has occurred.
Applicable rooms/ buildings shall be provided with total flooding Inergen clean agent extinguishing systems designed in accordance with NFPA 2001.
2.22.2 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Fire Extinguishers shall be filled with the extinguishing agent best suited for the fire hazard expected in the area where the extinguisher is located. Fire Extinguishers shall include corrosion control coatings, suitable mounting devices and GRP boxes. Fire extinguishers installed outdoor shall be supplied with weatherproof fiberglass enclosures. Fire Extinguisher type and location shall be in accordance with the provisions of NFPA 10.
• Production Areas: Production areas shall be equipped with a sufficient number of suitable and appropriately located potassium bicarbonate dry chemical hand portable and wheeled fire extinguishers. Extinguishers shall be easily accessible with at least one hand held portable extinguisher located within 15 m (50 feet) travel distance from any point in the production areas;
• Support Buildings: Equipment Rooms, MCC/Switchgear Rooms, and Control Rooms shall be equipped with sufficient number of suitable and appropriately located hand portable CO 2 fire extinguishers. The extinguishers shall be installed so that at least one fire extinguisher is readily accessible at all times;
• LQs and Kitchens: Extinguishers type and location shall be in accordance with the provisions
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of NFPA 10.
Kitchen Hoods shall be design in accordance with NFPA 96. The Wet chemical system shall be installed, in compliance to NFPA 17A and manufacturer’s recommendation, for Kitchen hoods where dedicated cooking operations at a significant level are undertaken and the cooking appliances used are that of used in commercial kitchens.
2.22.3 HELICOPTER FACILITIES
QG Fire Protection philosophy (PRT-ERP-POL-001) to be followed and compliance to CAP 437 to be ensured.
2.23 LIFE SAFETY EQUIPMENT
2.23.1 LIFE BOAT AND LIFE RAFTS
Each lifeboat and life raft shall be designed to accommodate Max POB based on N+1 philosophy on Offshore Complex (Process Facility connected to LQ). The capacity and location of lifeboat(s) and life raft(s) shall be determined in conjunction with Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis.
One life boat (TEMPSC) and one life raft shall be provided for each Remote Wellhead Platform, depending upon the maximum PoB.
2.23.2 PERSONNEL SAFETY EQUIPMENT
An approved life jacket, approved by appropriate GOVERNMENT authorities, shall be provided for each person on the FACILITY and adjacent to lifeboat and life raft in accordance with its capacity.
Work vests shall be provided in suitable numbers, considering potential for work over open water. These shall be worn whenever work is being performed in locations where an employee is in danger of falling overboard (such as near railings, landings, bridges, or in unloading operations).
Ring buoys shall be provided on each deck level in accessible places. Each ring buoy shall be equipped with a water-activated light.
Scramble nets, as required by regulatory authorities, shall be provided as an alternative means of escape from the platform in an emergency. The location of these devices shall be prominently marked.
Additional safety equipment shall include (but not limited to) an adequate complement of the following:
•
Inflatable Life Rafts
• Life Jacket and Storage Boxes
• Work Vest and Storage Boxes
• Breathing Air Packs
• Breathing Air System
• Eyewash/Safety Showers
• First-aid Burn Stations
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• Fire Blankets
• Stretchers
• First-aid Kits
• H2S flags
• FROG Personnel Transfer Capsule with stretcher capability
Lifesaving appliances required on Remote wellhead platforms, as minimum are:
• Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (Life Boat)
• Life Rafts
• Scramble net near each life raft to descend to sea level to embark life rafts
• Life Jackets in TR and near each Life Raft for emergency evacuation
• Life Vest for work overboard or in splash zone locations.
• Life Buoys for rescuing man overboard
• Cascade Breathing Air System in TR building
• Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus inside TR and CAM building
• Electrical Safety Kit inside Mezzanine Deck HV room and Upper Deck CAM Building
• Escape Breathing Sets inside TR
• Grab Bags
• Fall protection line for stairs on flare boom
• First Aid in CAM and TR buildings
• Fireman’s Cabinet in TR building
• Helicopter Crash Rescue Tool Box below helideck
• Emergency Safety Shower and Eye Wash near chemical injection pumps
• Eye wash bottle inside Temporary Refuge
• Stretchers inside TR building
•
Illuminated Windsock for Helideck
• Windsock near pig traps
2.23.3 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR EQUIPMENT
Several modes of breathing air shall be provided, such as:
(a) 15 min capacity breathing air escape sets. Personnel shall bring set with them to remote Facility. Sets provided on remote Facility are back-ups. Compliance to QG PPE Procedure PRT-PSF-PRC-012 should be ensured;
(b) 45 min self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) – SCBA shall be distributed around the
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platform.
(c) Cascade breathing air system manifolds with quick connections shall be provided for use during an emergency and while personnel perform maintenance. Breathing air manifolds (for max POB including spare slots) shall be located in Muster point / TR building and near the lifeboat area. Manifolds slots shall be located at strategic locations for use during routine maintenance plus ELSA and SCBA plug-in facilities.
All outdoor breathing air manifolds shall be installed inside green fiberglass enclosures with “Breathing Air Manifold” in 3” high yellow stenciling.
The breathing air system shall contain sufficient breathing air for max POB for a minimum of 2 hours.
Actual locations and slots in the platform shall be decided in consultation with QG during the detail design stage relevant to the emergency procedure requirements for facility.
Locations of additional breathing air manifolds for maintenance purposes shall be indicated in Emergency Escape and Safety Device Layouts.
Optimization of BA Cascade system requirement for a facility shall be subjected to decision in consultation with QG at early Engineering stage and justified with Risk Based Approach.
2.24 PEDESTAL CRANE
Crane shall have capacity to safely lift and carry all normal operation and maintenance cargo at required lift radius.
Pedestal crane location will be located such that:
• Lifting over hydrocarbon piping and equipment and occupied building is minimised.
• Avoid impact of flare plumes and vents on Crane Operator.
Pressurized production equipment and associated piping shall be protected from dropped objects as practical (including dropped crane loads), as well as swinging loads and crane booms.
Pedestal crane cabin shall be provided with:
• Air Conditioning;
• Communication;
• First aid box;
• Fire extinguisher;
• Escape breathing set;
• Eyewash bottles.
2.25 EMERGENCY SHOWER AND EYE WASH
Emergency safety shower and eye wash station (combination type), conforming to ANSI/ISEA Z358.1, will be provided within 15m distance from chemical handling area.
During summer high water temperature is anticipated on offshore platforms that could worsen
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chemical splash injuries and cause scalding. Therefore, the safety shower and eyewash station shall be provided with chiller unit to maintain water temperature between 15°C and 35°C. Safe ty shower and eyewash unit including chiller shall conform to Zone 1, Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T3 requirements.
Water level in safety shower and eyewash tanks shall be checked and replenished periodically.
2.26 PERSONAL PROTECTION
Personal protection insulation shall be provided for surfaces that will operate above (160oF) [API RP 14C] and that are located within 0.3 m horizontally and 2 m vertically above a normal walkway or work area. Personal protection shall be in the form of metal barriers or standoffs such as casing, caging, guards, shields or railing. Use of insulation shall be approved by QG.
2.27 UTILITIES
Utilities required to be available during upset and emergency conditions shall not be routed through hazardous areas.
2.28 NAVIGATION AIDS
Since navigation aids must be functional at all times, electrical equipment shall be suitable for the area to be installed in and as a minimum for Class 1, Division II, Group D atmospheres. This prevents the potential for an ignition source in the event of a major hydrocarbon release.
Provision shall be made for safe access to permit inspection and maintenance of all navigation aids.
2.29 AVIATION, MARINE AND DIVING
Facilities shall be designed to minimize hazards and achieve safe interface between platform operations and the support services provided by aviation and marine activities. Appropriate communications shall be provided for routine and emergency activities.
Overall platform facilities layout shall be evaluated to identify and to minimize conditions that might interfere with helicopter operations. These include:
• Location of vents and flares
• Engine exhausts (especially gas turbine)
• Projections such as crane booms, masts, radio towers
• Air turbulence (for example, the airfoil effect).
Appropriate provisions shall be made for the safe and logical movement of personnel to and from a helicopter.
Facilities provided for the interface with marine vessels shall be evaluated to identify and minimize conditions that negatively affect safety associated with the following:
• Mooring bridles and bumpers for close-in activities.
• Handling of hoses for transfer of water, fuel, drilling materials, etc.
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• Compatibility of personnel transfer facilities with the type(s) of vessels to be used.
A determination shall be made as to the need for diving support facilities on board the platform. When it is determined that there is a permanent or periodic need to place diving facilities on board, provision shall be made to ensure that the following conditions are met:
• Space is available to place all modules
• Modules will be placed in a safe area
• Storage is available for diving gases, compressors, etc.
• Compressors are located for intake air from a safe location
• Means of platform voice communication is provided between the control room and the
diving supervisor.
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2.30 PERSONNEL PROTECTION
An assessment shall be made to determine personnel protection requirements based upon the following:
• Potential exposures of personnel to harmful chemical or physical agents during normal
operations or maintenance activities.
• Need for manual firefighting, rescue, or other emergency response activities.
• Local affiliate standards.
• Local regulatory requirements.
A list of recommended personnel protection equipment shall be provided with quantities and types of each item. Equipment shall include, but not be limited to the following:
• Respiratory protection equipment.
• Fire fighter protective clothing (turnout gear), including helmets, coats, pants, and boots.
• Exposure suits and personal flotation devices for working over water.
• Emergency shower/eye wash stations.
• Special apparel, such as hoods, aprons, and gloves, etc., for handling corrosive materials.
• Miscellaneous items, such as goggles and face shields.
For each item of required equipment, provision shall be made for the following:
• Placement of equipment strategically located in proximity to the hazard for which it is
intended.
• Storage of equipment that is accessed infrequently.
• Service and repair of equipment that is maintained offshore.
• All equipment required by this section shall be tested and certified in accordance with
standards acceptable to QG.
•
Items for personnel protection necessary for safe platform abandonment shall be as specified by EPG 70-B-10.
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3 SAFETY CASE
In FEED, Design Safety Case shall be developed according to QG Safety Case Requirements PRT-000- PRC-008 (Section3.2.2 Design Safety Cases).
Design Safety Case is intended to demonstrate that Major Accident Hazards ( MAH) associated with Project Facilities are known and that suitable risk reduction philosophies and measures are in -place to manage the risk to a level that is tolerable and ‘As Low As Reasonably Practical’ (ALARP).
The Design Safety Case will also identify non-major accident hazards and demonstrate their control through the existing QG SHE management system arrangements in place.
The Design Safety Case is not intended to provide detailed analysis of non -MAHs (hazards which may result in, for example, a Lost Time Incident (LTI) or restricted workday case, or a minor environmental release).
3.1 SAFETY STUDIES
Safety studies must be conducted in accordance with guiding principles to ensure consistency and validity of results.
Safety studies such as Hazard Identification study (HAZID), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs), Safety Integrity Level (SIL) studies, Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA), Building Risk Assessment and other safety and risk studies shall be performed as required in different project phases in accordance with Process Safety and Risk (PSR) Project Assurance Guide (PRT-PRS-PRC-008).
Safety Case Studies shall be conducted in accordance with Qatargas Safety Case Requirements Procedure (PRT-00-PRC-008).
Safety Integrity Level Studies shall be conducted in accordance with Qatargas SIL Assessment Procedure (PRT-000-PRC-016).
QRA shall be conducted in accordance with Qatargas Offshore QRA Guidelines (PRT-PRS-PRC-009).
Methodology, rule sets, software and assumptions of all safety studies that are to be performed by third party consultants are to be approved by QG Project LPE in alignment with OPCO. QG Project LPE shall also approve the frequency and failure rate database referenced for performance of QRA before study commences.
3.2 DESIGN PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Performance standards are the parameters that are measured or assessed so that the suitability and effectiveness of each Safety Critical Element (SCE) can be assured and verified. Performance standards will be the essential requirements that the SCE must maintain throughout its life in order to fulfil their intended purposes.
Design performance standards will be developed for all SCEs identified using Bow Tie analysis technique. Relevant design documents shall be reviewed to verify and confirm that performance standards are implemented in design.
Design Performance Standards shall be specified for following aspects of each Safety Critical Element:
• Functionality
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• Availability
• Reliability
• Survivability
Means of Assurance in Design shall be specified in Performance Standards for above characteristics.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 – REFERENCES AND RELEVANT DOCUMENTS
The following Policies and Procedures shall be read in conjunction with this document:
Number
PRT-000-POL-001 INF-ISG-POL-001 PRT-000-PRC-008 PRT-PRS-PRC-009 PRT-ERP-PRC-008
PRT-PRS-PRC-010
PRT-ERP-PRC-037
PRT-MOR-PRC-002 PRT-MOR-PRC-001
PRT-000-PRC-012 OGO-OPS-OVR-003 ONS-OES-OVR-002 OGO-OES-MNT-001
PRT-PSF-PRC-024 RSK-IMR-PRC-006 PRT-PRS-PRC-008 PRT-PRS-PRC-003
PRT-ERP-POL-001 PRT-000-PRC-016 RG-PRO-8381 PRT-ERP-PRC-023 PRT-ERP-PRC-008 PRJ-CHG-PRC-007 RSK-IMR-SI-001 RAM EPG 70-B-10 QP-PHL-S-001
Policy and Procedure Title
Safety, Health, Environmental and Quality Policy Information Classification Policy Safety Case Requirements Quantitative Risk Assessment Guideline for Offshore Installations Emergency Response (Operations) Procedure
Guidelines For The Development Of Performance Standard For Safety Critical Elements
Qatargas Tier-1 Offshore Emergency Response Procedure
Formal Risk Assessment Procedure Risk Screening Procedure
SHE Handbook Process Isolation by Disconnection and Blinding Process to Manage Projects New Projects Isolation Blind, Specifications and Single-DBB Isolation Valves Hydrogen Sulfide Safety Procedure Enterprise Risk Management Process Safety and Risk (PSR) Project Assurance Guide Management of Portable / Temporary Buildings Procedure
Fire Protection Policy SIL Assessment Procedure SIL Verification Qatargas Incident Management Plan Procedure Emergency Response (Operations) Procedure Managing Standards, Specifications and Practices Qatargas Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) Survival System for Offshore Platforms QP Corporate Philosophy for Fire and Safety Inlet Pipeline Task Force (IPTF) report Note: no specific document number for this report
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The following Codes and Standards are used as references in this document:
Code and Standard
Description
API STD 6FA
API RP 2FB
API RP 14B
API RP 14C
API RP 14E
API RP 14J
API RP 170
API RP 500
API 505
API STD 520
API STD 521
API STD 607
API STD 2000
ANSI A14.3
ANSI A64.1
ANSI/ISEA Z358.1
BS EN 1751
Specification for Fire Test for Valves
Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading
Recommended Practice for the Design, Installation, Operation, Test, and Redress of Subsurface Safety Valve Systems
Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms
Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore Production Platform Piping Systems
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities
Recommended Practice for Subsea. High Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS)
Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2
Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2
Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices
Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
Fire Test for Quarter-turn Valves and Valves Equipped with Nonmetallic Seats
Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks
Ladders - Fixed - Safety Requirements
Requirements for Fixed Industrial Stairs
Emergency eyewash and shower equipment
Ventilation for buildings. Air terminal devices. Aerodynamic testing of damper and valves
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Code and Standard
Description
EI 15 Model code of safe practice Part 15
Area classification for installations handling flammable fluids
IEC 331
IEC 61511
ISO 15138
HSG 23
NFPA 30
NFPA 45
NFPA 850
NFPA 72
NFPA 101
NFPA 497
NFPA 496
NFPA 80
UL 1709
Fire Resisting Characteristics of Electrical Cables
Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
The Safe Isolation of Plant and Equipment
Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code
Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals
Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations
National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
Life Safety Code
Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas
Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
Standard for Rapid Rise Fire Test of Protection Materials for Structural Steel
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APPENDIX 2 – GLOSSARY OF TERMS: DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Term AC/DC ACH AFP ALARP API ASME BA BDV BPCS BS Btu CCPS CCTV CO2 COO DBB DCS EDG EDP EER EI ELICS ELSA ESD ESDV F&G FD FEA FEED FSS GD GTG H2 H2S HAC
Description Alternate Current / Direct Current Air Change per Hour Active Fire Protection As Low As Reasonably Practicable American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers Breathing Apparatus Blowdown Valve Basic Process Control System British Standard British thermal unit Center for Chemical Process Safety Closed Circuit Television Carbon Dioxide Chief Operating Officer Double Block & Bleed (valves) Distributed Control System Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Depressization Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Energy Institute Electrical Integrated Control System Emergency Life Support Apparatus Emergency Shutdown Emergency Shutdown Valve Fire and Gas Flame Detector Fire and Explosion Assessment Front End Engineering Design Facility Sitting Study Gas Detector Gas Turbine Generator Hydrogen Hydrogen Sulphide Hazardous Area Classification
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Term HAZID HAZOP HIPPS HMI HSEQ HSG HSSD HVAC IEC IPTF ISEA ISO ITR kW LEL LP LPE MAC MAH May
MCR Might
MOV Must
NFPA OPCO ORP PAEA PAGA PCS PEM PFP PMT POB
Description Hazard Identification Hazard and Operability High Integrity Pressure Protection System Human Machine Interface Health Safety Environment and Quality Health and Safety Guidance High Sensitivity Smoke Detection Heating Ventilating Air Conditioning International Electrotechnical Commission Inlet Pipeline Task Force International Safety Equipment Association International Standards Organisation Instrument Technical Room Kilo Watt Lower Explosive Limit Loss Prevention Loss Prevention Engineering Manual Alarm Call point Major Accident Hazards An authoritative word meaning the action referred to, is acceptable and to be considered. Main Control Room It is not an authoritative word when used in this document. It means the action could occur. Motor Operated Valve An authoritative word meaning the physical action referred to is mandatory and has to be justified in writing if the action is not carried out. National Fire Protection Association Operating Company Operational Readiness Plan Public Address and Emergency Alarm Public Address and General Alarm Process Control System Physical Effect Modeling Study Passive Fire Protection Project Management Team Personnel On Board
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Term PPE ppm ppm PSD PSR PSS PSV QG QGMS QP QRA RP SCE SD Shall
SHE SHE&Q Should SIF SIL SIS SO2 SSFA SSSV STD TA TEMPSC T-IR TR UHF UK UL UPS UV/IR VDU
Description Personal Protection Equipment parts per million parts per million – meter Process Shutdown Process Safety and Risk Process Safety System Process Safety Valve Qatargas Qatargas Management System Qatar Petroleum Quantitative Risk Assessment Recommended Practice Safety Critical Element Smoke Detector An authoritative word meaning the performance referred to is mandatory. It is generally used in the legal sense. Safety, Health and Environment Safety, Health, Environment and Quality An authoritative word meaning the action referred to is strongly recommended. Safety Instrumented Function Safety Integrity Level Safety Instrumented System Sulfur Dioxide Safety System Function Analysis Sub Surface Safety Valve Standard Technical Authority Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft Thermal Infra-Red Temporary Refuge Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom Underwriters Laboratories Uninterruptible Power Supply Ultra Violet / Infra-Red Visual Display Unit
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Term VESDA VHF VRLA
Description Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus Very High Frequency Valve Regulated Lead Acid
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Project: Q-32705 - Saipem COMP3 Folder: RFQ Files