THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL.

ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS AND ENGINEERING

ESCAPE, EVACUATION, RESCUE & LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES (EER & LSA) SPECIFICATION

Specification

APPROVED BY:

Abdulmunim Saif Al Kindy

NAME: Abdulmunim Al Kindy TITLE: Executive Director PT&CS EFFECTIVE DATE:

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GROUP PROJECTS & ENGINEERING / PT&CS DIRECTORATE

CUSTODIAN ADNOC

Group Projects & Engineering / PT&CS Specification applicable to ADNOC & ADNOC Group Companies

REVISION HISTORY

DATE

REV.

NO

22 Dec. 2020 1

PREPARED BY (Designation / Initial) Rajeevan K Maroli/ Eng. HSE

REVIEWED BY (Designation / Initial) Ashwani Kumar Kataria/ A/MIHE

ENDORSED BY (Designation / Initial) Abdulla Al Shaiba/ VP-GPE

ENDORSED BY (Designation / Initial) Zaher Salem/ SVP-GPE

Reuben Yagambaram/ SPM-GPE

Group Projects & Engineering is the owner of this Specification and responsible for its custody, maintenance and periodic update.

In addition, Group Projects & Engineering is responsible for communication and distribution of any changes to this Specification and its version control.

This specification will be reviewed and updated in case of any changes affecting the activities described in this specification.

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INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND STAKEHOLDERS

The following are inter-relationships for implementation of this Specification:

i. ADNOC Upstream and ADNOC Downstream Directorates; and

ii. ADNOC Onshore, ADNOC Offshore, ADNOC Sour Gas, ADNOC Gas Processing. ADNOC LNG,

ADNOC Refining, ADNOC Fertilisers, Borouge, Al Dhafra Petroleum, Al Yasat

The following are stakeholders for the purpose of this Specification:

iii. ADNOC PT&CS Directorate

This Specification has been approved by the ADNOC PT&CS is to be implemented by each ADNOC Group company included above subject to and in accordance with their Delegation of Authority and other governance-related processes in order to ensure compliance.

Each ADNOC Group company must establish/nominate a Technical Authority responsible for compliance

with this Specification.

DEFINITIONS

“ADNOC” means Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

“ADNOC Group” means ADNOC together with each company in which ADNOC, directly or indirectly, controls fifty percent (50%) or more of the share capital.

“Approving Authority” means the decision-making body or employee with the required authority to approve Policies & Procedures or any changes to it.

“Business Line Directorates” or “BLD” means a directorate of ADNOC which is responsible for one or more Group Companies reporting to, or operating within the same line of business as, such directorate.

“Business Support Directorates and Functions” or “Non- BLD” means all the ADNOC functions and the remaining directorates, which are not ADNOC Business Line Directorates.

“CEO” means chief executive officer.

“Group Company” means any company within the ADNOC Group other than ADNOC.

“Specification” means this Escape , Evacuation, Rescue and Life Saving Appliances Specification.

CONTROLLED INTRANET COPY

The intranet copy of this document located in the section under Group Policies on One ADNOC is the only controlled document. Copies or extracts of this document, which have been downloaded from the intranet, are uncontrolled copies and cannot be guaranteed to be the latest version.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL … 8

INTRODUCTION … 8

PURPOSE … 8

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS … 9

SECTION A - GENERAL … 17

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS … 17

INTERNATIONAL CODES AND STANDARDS … 17

ADNOC SPECIFICATIONS … 19

DOCUMENT PRECEDENCE … 20

SPECIFICATION DEVIATION / CONCESSION CONTROL … 20

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS / MINIMUM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS … 21

DESIGN BASIS … 21

DESIGN PARAMETERS … 23

ENVIRONMENTAL / SITE DATA … 23

AREA CLASSIFICATION … 23

MINIMUM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (/OBJECTIVES) … 23

DOCUMENT STRUCTURE … 30

SECTION B - TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS … 31

EER - FACILITY FEATURES … 31

ALARM & COMMUNICATION … 31

ESCAPE (/EVACUATION) ROUTES … 33

MUSTER AREA & TR … 35

EVACUATION POINT (PRIMARY & SECONDARY) … 37

EVACUATION POINT (TERTIARY) … 37

LSA - INSTALLED MAJOR ITEMS (OVERVIEW) … 37

EVACUATION - PRIMARY & SECONDARY (ASSISTED & CONTROLLED) … 37

EVACUATION – TERTIARY (NON-ASSISTED)… 40

LSA - INSTALLED MAJOR ITEMS (HARDWARE DESCRIPTION) … 41

LSA – OFF-SITE ARRANGEMENTS … 43

RESCUE & RECOVERY … 43

PLACE OF SAFETY … 45

LSA - CATALOGUE SMALL ITEMS … 45

OVERVIEW - LSA … 45

SECTION C – OTHER REQUIREMENTS … 48

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DETAILS OF SCOPE SUPPLY … 48

QUALITY CONTROL AND ASSURANCE … 48

SUB-CONTRACTORS, SUB-SUPPLERS … 48

MATERIAL CERTIFICATION … 48

INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS … 48

SPARE PARTS … 48

PAINTING, PRESERVATION AND SHIPMENT… 48

COMMISSIONING … 48

TRAINING … 48

DOCUMENTATION / MANUFACTURER DATA RECORDS … 48

GUARANTEES AND WARRANTY … 48

SECTION D (DATASHEETS & DRAWINGS REQUIRED) … 49

DATASHEET TEMPLATES (& SPECIFICATIONS) … 49

TOTALLY ENCLOSED MOTOR PROPELLED SURVIVAL CRAFT (TEMPSC) … 49

LIFE RAFTS… 52

SCRAMBLE NETS … 53

EMBARKATION LADDER … 54

FAST RESCUE CRAFT … 55

LIFEBUOY (RING) … 56

LIFE JACKETS … 57

WINDSOCK … 58

FIRST AID BOX … 60

STRETCHER … 62

SAFETY SHOWER & EYE WASH … 63

CHEMICAL KIT … 67

STANDARD DRAWINGS… 69

SECTION E (APPENDICES) … 70

APPENDIX: A CHECKLIST: 1 – ALARM & COMMUNICATION … 70

APPENDIX: B CHECKLIST: 2 – ESCAPE (/EVACUATION ROUTES) … 73

B.1. PROVISION OF ESCAPE ROUTES … 73

B.2. MARKING & LIGHTING OF ESCAPE ROUTES … 78

B.3. PROTECTION OF ESCAPE ROUTES … 82

B.4. SPECIAL CASES … 82

APPENDIX: C CHECKLIST: 3 – MUSTER AREAS (COMMON REQUIREMENTS) … 86

APPENDIX: D CHECKLIST: 4 – TEMPORARY REFUGE (TR) … 91

D.1. SUMMARY OF KEY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS … 91

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D.2.

INTRODUCTION … 95

D.3. TR BASIS OF DESIGN … 96

D.4. TR FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS … 97

D.5. TR CONTROL SYSTEM … 103

D.6. TELECOMMUNICATION … 105

D.7. AIR SUPPLY … 107

D.8. HEATING, VENTILATION & AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) … 110

D.9. ELECTRICAL … 114

D.10. CIVIL, STRUCTURAL & ARCHITECTURAL … 115

D.11. HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION … 117

D.12. HEALTH, SAFETY & WELFARE … 118

APPENDIX: E CHECKLIST: 7 – EVACUATION (PRIMARY & SECONDARY, ASSISTED) … 119

APPENDIX: F CHECKLIST: 8 – EVACUATION (TERTIARY, NON-ASSISTED) … 127

APPENDIX: G CHECKLIST: 9 & 10 – RESCUE & RECOVERY … 133

APPENDIX: H CHECKLIST: 11 – PLACE OF SAFETY … 140

APPENDIX: I CHECKLIST: 12 – LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES … 141

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1-1: DEFINITION OF KEY TECHNICAL TERMS USED … 10

TABLE 1-2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS … 14

TABLE 5-1: KEY EER MEASURES – INTERPRETATION FOR ADNOC GROUP COMPANIES … 24

TABLE 5-2: PRESENTATION FORMAT - DETAILED REQUIREMENTS … 30

TABLE 6-1: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS - ALARM & COMMUNICATION … 31

TABLE 6-2: POTENTIAL COMMUNICATION APPROACHES - GENERAL GUIDANCE… 32

TABLE 6-3: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – ESCAPE, EVACUATION & RESCUE … 33

TABLE 6-4: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – MUSTER AREA /TR … 35

TABLE 7-1: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – EVACUATION (PRIMARY & SECONDARY) … 37

TABLE 7-2: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – EVACUATION (TERTIARY) … 40

TABLE 8-1: APPLICABLE EER METHODS - OFFSHORE. … 42

TABLE 8-2: APPLICABLE EER METHODS - ONSHORE. … 42

TABLE 9-1: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – RESCUE & RECOVERY … 43

TABLE 9-2: OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS – PLACE OF SAFETY … 45

TABLE 10-1: SUMMARY OF LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES FOR ADNOC GROUP … 46

TABLE 23-1: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – PROTECTION OF ESCAPE ROUTES … 82

TABLE 23-2: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – SPECIAL CASES … 82

TABLE 23-3: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – MUSTER AREAS (COMMON REQUIREMENTS) … 86

TABLE 23-4: SUMMARY OF KEY TR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS … 91

TABLE 23-5: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – EVACUATION (PRIMARY & SECONDARY) … 119

TABLE 23-6: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – EVACUATION (TERTIARY) … 127

TABLE 23-7: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – RESCUE & RECOVERY … 133

TABLE 23-8: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – PLACE OF SAFETY… 140

TABLE 23-9: DETAILED REQUIREMENTS – LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES (LSA) … 141

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 5-1: SCHEMATIC OF KEY EER FEATURES … 22

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GENERAL

Introduction

This document contains Escape, Evacuation, Rescue and Life Saving Appliances (EER & LSA) requirements for ADNOC facilities having potential Major Accident Hazards (MAH).

Escape, Evacuation, Rescue (EER) arrangements are an essential part of ADNOC’s overall strategy for managing risk to personnel from MAHs. The arrangements are intended to allow personnel to escape from the vicinity of an initiating event, muster at a safe location and evacuate the facility in a controlled and supervised manner. This may require the use of certain Life Saving Appliance (LSA) to protect individuals while they take evasive action. The overall EER process is only considered complete when individuals have reached a designated Place of Safety (POS).

Purpose

1.2.1

Objective

The purpose of this document is to give working guidance for the design and procurement of EER and LSA facilities that are needed for the Operations phase of a facility and includes some guidance on requirements for maintenance.

This Specification does not require retrospective application but can be used so far as practicable to identify risk reduction opportunities for existing facilities.

1.2.2

Scope - Inclusions

This Specification covers EER and LSA requirements against Major Accident Hazards.

The specification is applicable to all ADNOC Group Companies, including:

Upstream Oil and or Gas production facilities;

Onshore facilities;

Offshore installations; and

Artificial Islands.

Downstream (Gas Processing, Refinery, LNG);

Petrochemical (Fertiliser and Polyolefins plants);

Distribution Terminals including outlets (Bulk Storage, Loading bays);

Industrial Gases.

Modifications to existing facilities shall also implement this Specification so far as practicable to reduce risk to ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). This will require the risk benefits of the EER and LSA measures to be weighed up against the time, trouble and cost of implementing them.

The applicability of this Specification to brownfield modifications shall be reviewed when developing the project- specific HSE Philosophy and the project-specific EER and LSA arrangements.

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1.2.3

Scope – Exclusions

This specification does not apply to:

Drilling facilities;

Construction & Commissioning Phases;

Temporary Combined /SIMOPS Activities (to be reviewed case-by-case);

Requirements for Occupational Health & Safety.

This document does not cover the following facility types since they fall under a different regulatory framework:

Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (Drilling Rigs /Barges);

Marine Vessels.

Definitions and Abbreviations

The following defined terms are used throughout this Specification:

‘[PSR]’ indicates a mandatory Process Safety Requirement

“MANUFACTURER” means the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or MANUFACTURER of one or more of the component(s) which make up a sub-assembly or item of equipment assembled by the main SUPPLIER or his nominated SUB-SUPPLIER.

‘may’ means a permitted option

‘shall’ indicates mandatory requirements

‘should’ means a recommendation

“SUB-CONTRACTOR” means any party engaged by the CONTRACTOR to undertake any assigned work on their behalf. COMPANY maintains the right to review all proposed SUB-CONTRACTORs; this right does not relieve the CONTRACTOR of their obligations under the Contract, nor does it create any contractual relationship between COMPANY and the SUB-CONTRACTOR.

“SUPPLIER” means the party entering into a Contract with COMPANY to provide the materials, equipment, supporting technical documents and/or drawings, guarantees, warranties and/or agreed services in accordance with the requirements of the purchase order and relevant specification(s). The term SUPPLIER includes any legally appointed successors and/or nominated representatives of the SUPPLIER.

“SUB-SUPPLIER” means the sub-contracted SUPPLIER of equipment sub-components software and/or support services relating to the equipment / package, or part thereof, to be provided by the SUPPLIER. COMPANY maintains the right to review all proposed SUB-SUPPLIERS, but this right does not relieve the SUPPLIER of their obligations under the Contract, nor does it create any contractual relationship between COMPANY and any individual SUB-SUPPLIER.

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Key technical terminology used in this Specification are defined in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1: Definition of Key Technical Terms Used

Term

Definition

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)

ALARP means to reduce a risk to a level which is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ and involves balancing the reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it. This level represents the point, objectively assessed, where further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.

Assisted (Evacuation) Evacuation arrangements where there is no requirement for evacuating individuals to take

significant action or use significant strength.

Building

Includes, and not limited to, the following enclosure types relevant to ADNOC operations (onshore, offshore platforms, islands, etc.):

Accommodation;

Control Room;

Offices;

Workshops;

Warehouses;

Machinery Spaces;

Local Equipment Rooms (LER);

Substations / Switchgear Room etc..

Controlled (Evacuation)

Controlled and directed by person in charge (Incident Commander – IC) of the Incident Management Team (IMT).

Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

Plan detailing the response requirements for specific major accident scenarios and arrangements for emergency preparedness.

Emergency Station

A Staging Area where the ERT and TRT(s) personnel with emergency duties shall be located during an emergency.

Escape Route

Route used for safe and rapid movement of persons on the installation /facility from wherever they are located to muster areas OR Temporary Refuge and from muster areas /TR to Evacuation Points to aid successful Emergency Response.

Note: ‘Escape Routes’ are also referred to as ‘Access /Egress Routes’ in other ADNOC documents.

Evacuation

To leave the facility in an Emergency towards a ‘Place of Safety’

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Term

Definition

Evacuation - Primary

Primary (Preferred) method of leaving the facility in an emergency:

With assistance;

Controlled /directed by person in charge (IC - Incident Commander);

Normal method of transport to /from the facility.

Evacuation - Secondary

Secondary (Alternative) method of leaving the facility in an emergency:

With assistance;

Controlled /directed by person in charge (IC - Incident Commander);

Independent alternative method.

Evacuation - Tertiary

Leaving a facility in an emergency when the Primary and Secondary methods of Evacuation have failed. Relies considerably on the individual’s own action.

Evacuation Point (Embarkation Point)

Place where personnel are stationed for boarding the Primary or Secondary means of Evacuation – for controlled & assisted evacuation. (Also known as Embarkation Point).

Hazard

The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to property, products or the environment; production losses or increased liabilities

Health Safety Environment Critical Equipment & Systems (HSECES)

Incident Command Centre (ICC)

Equipment and systems (including in-built software) or any component of these, the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or the purpose of which is to prevent or control the effects of a Major Accident.

A pre-determined venue from where IMT manages the incident. The ICC located at the facility offices can be different sizes with various facilities to match the specific IMT structure being used. An ICC shall have access to response documentation and pre-determined information displays that match the credible risks. If an incident expands sufficiently that a much larger IMT is needed then a larger venue should be made available to support planning the increased scale and complexity of response.

Lifeboat (TEMPSC)

Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC)

Life Saving Appliances (LSA)

The International Life-saving Appliance (LSA) Code provides international requirements for the life-saving appliances covered by Chapter III of the 1974 SOLAS Convention. These include personal life-saving appliances, visual aids, survival craft, rescue boats, launching and embarkation appliances and marine evacuation systems. general alarm and public address systems.

Muster Area (Assembly Point)

A place where people can assemble safely while investigations, Emergency Response and Evacuation preparations are undertaken.

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Term

Definition

Major Accident (MA) Major accident means an ‘Occurrence’ such as a emission, fire or explosion resulting from

uncontrolled developments in the course of operation leading to major, catastrophic or disastrous consequences irrespective of their likelihood and serious consequences assigned with risk rank 3F (Refer to ADNOC Corporate Risk Matrix) affecting people, assets, the environment and/or company reputation. The consequences may be immediate or delayed and may occur outside as well as inside the operating facility. There will also be a high potential for escalation.

Examples of ‘Major Accidents’ would include, but are not limited to:

Loss of containment of flammable and/or toxic fluids leading to fire, explosion and/or toxic

injury

Events resulting in structural failure which could lead to further progressive collapse

Loss of stability of mobile offshore installation

Well blowouts

Ships colliding with offshore installations or onshore jetties used for bulk loading, explosive,

flammable or toxic substances.

Service vessel colliding with or otherwise affecting offshore installations

Other external hazards affecting offshore and onshore sites e.g. Accommodation/work

barges alongside fixed installations, helicopters and aircraft, road/marine product tankers.

The definition of ‘Major accident’ specifically relates to “Process Safety” and excludes ‘Occupational safety accidents’ which have bounded, albeit possibly severe or catastrophic consequences

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Personal Protective Equipment; Any device or appliance designed to be worn or held by an individual for protection against one or more health and safety hazards.

Place of Safety (POS) A place of safety is defined as a place where evacuees are no longer exposed to the hazards at

the facility. Suitable medical facilities to treat injured evacuees must be available at the POS.

POS should be a place sufficiently away from the facility so as not to be affected by the facility hazards.

Personnel on Board (POB)

This is the number of personnel on board an offshore facility. The term is also used to represent the number of persons at an onshore facility (PAF)

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Term

Definition

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Formal and systematic approach of estimating the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events, and expressing the results quantitatively as risk to people, the environment, asset or reputation.

A structured approach to assessing the potential for incidents and expressing this potential numerically. In QRA statistical values are derived for potential loss of life and damage to resources and environment. Note: These values must never be interpreted as unavoidable and acceptable losses.

It must always be recognised that the calculated fatality (or loss) figures are based on experience, statistical failure and incident rates representing an average historical quality of management. Incident investigations usually show that these ‘historical’ incidents were, with the benefit of hindsight, quite preventable.

QRA is a tool which helps to translate this hindsight into foresight (planning) in order to assist management in deciding the best approach and show ways and means (e.g. improved engineering, procedures, supervision, etc.) to prevent the potential incidents from happening. QRA is not to be used to justify or encourage risk taking

Rescue

Rescue of persons near the facility and provide them with basic first aid if required.

This may involve suitable persons beyond the facility, for example:

Offshore: Fast Rescue Craft, Safety Standby and Rescue Vessels, etc.;

Onshore: Rescue vehicles, external agencies.

Recovery

Transport of personnel to a Place of Safety (POS) after their rescue, following Evacuation from a facility (Secondary or Tertiary methods).

Safety Standby and Rescue Vessels (SSRV)

Ships specially designed to perform safety duties with Rigs, installations and oilfields. Their duties include firefighting, Medivac, MOB recovery, oil spill containment, and safety and security. ADNOC Logistics & Services owns Field Control Vessel and emergency response and rescue vessels, which service several oil majors operating in the region.

Temporary Refuge (TR)

Temporary Refuge is an enclosed place where people can muster with relative safety whilst investigations, emergency response and evacuation preparations are undertaken.

Personnel to be protected in the TR:

For the duration required to safely evacuate from the facility, or to bring the incident under

control;

Against any hazardous effects that are credible at the TR location (e.g. fire, heat, explosion,

toxic etc.)

Note: Toxic Gas Refuge (TGR) is also covered in the above definition where a toxic hazard

exists.

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The abbreviations used throughout this Specification are shown in Table 1-2

Abbreviations

Table 1-2 List of Abbreviations

ACGIH

ADNOC

AEGL

ALARP

ANSI

AOC

BOP

BS

BSI

CBA

CFD

CO

CO2

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company

Acute exposure guideline levels

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

American National Standards Institute

Accidentally Oil Contaminated

Blowout Preventer

British Standard

British Standards Institute

Cost Benefit Analysis

Computational Fluid Dynamics

Carbon Monoxide

Carbon Dioxide

COMAH

Control of Major Accident Hazards

DCS

ECP

EEBA

EEBA

EER

EERA

EERS

EN

EPIRB

ER

ERP

ESD

ESSA

EST

F&G

FACP

FEED

FERA

FPD

Distributed Control Systems

Emergency Control Panel

Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus

Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Strategy

Euro Norm

Emergency Position-indicating Radio Beacon

Emergency Response

Emergency Response Plan.

Emergency Shutdown

Emergency Systems Survivability Assessment

Emergency Support Team

Fire and Gas

Fire Alarm Control Panel

Front End Engineering Design

Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

Fall Prevention Device

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Abbreviations

FRC

FTP

H2S

HAZID

HAZOP

HCl

HCN

HF

HMI

HQ

HSE

HSE

HSECES

HVAC

IC

ICC

ICSS

IMT

ISEA

ISO

kgf

LED

LER

LNG

LOS

LQ

LSA

LV

MAH

MCP

NFPA

NIOSH

NOx

O2

OEM

Fast Rescue Craft

Fire Test Procedure

Hydrogen Sulphide

Hazard Identification

Hazard and Operability

Hydrogen Chloride

Hydrogen Cyanide

Hydrogen Fluoride

Human Machine Interface

Head Quarters

Health, Safety & Environment

Health, Safety and Environment

Health Safety Environment Critical Equipment & Systems

Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

Incident Commander (leader of the IMT)

Incident Command Centre

Integrated Control & Safety System

Incident Management Team

International Safety Equipment Association

International Standards Organisation

Kilogram Force

Light Emitting Diode

Local Equipment Room

Liquefied Natural Gas

Line of Sight

Living Quarters

Life Saving Appliances

Low Voltage

Major Accident Hazard

Manual Call Point

National Fire Protection Association

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Nitrogen Oxides (generic term)

Oxygen

Original Equipment Manufacturer

OPITO

Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation

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Abbreviations

Pa

PA/GA

PAF

PAS

PFEER

POB

POS

PPE

QRA

RPE

SAR

SART

SCADA

SCBA

SIMOPS

SO2

SOLAS

SSRV

STEL

Pascals

Public Address and General Alarm

Personnel at Onshore Facility (similar to POB)

Personnel Accounting System

Prevention of Fires, Explosions and Emergency Response

Personnel on Board Offshore (similar to PAF)

Place of Safety

Personal Protective Equipment

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Respiratory Protective Equipment

Search and Rescue

Search and Rescue Transponder

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

Simultaneous Operations

Sulphur Di-Oxide

Safety of Life at Sea

Safety Standby and Rescue Vessel (SSRV)

Short Term Exposure Limit

TEMPSC

Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft

TGR

TR

TRT

TRV

UAE

UK HSE

UKOOA

UPS

US EPA

UV

VCE

VHF

Toxic Gas Refuge

Temporary Refuge

Tactical Response Team

Toxic Rescue Vehicle

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive

UK Oil Operators Association

Uninterruptible Power Supply

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ultra-Violet

Vapor Cloud Explosion

Very High Frequency

WHT/P

Wellhead Tower / Platform

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SECTION A - GENERAL

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

International Codes and Standards

The following Codes and Standards shall form a part of this Specification. When an edition date is not indicated for a Code or Standard, the latest edition in force at the time of the contract award shall apply.

IMO (INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION)

SOLAS

IMO Resolution MSC.48(66)

International Maritime Organisation (IMO), The convention of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

IMO, International Life-Saving Appliances Code

SOLAS_MSC.1-Circ.1392

Guidelines for Evaluation & Replacement of Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1206

Measures to Prevent Accidents with Lifeboats and its: Annex 1; Guidelines for Periodic Servicing and Maintenance of Lifeboats, Launching Appliances and On-Load Release Gear. Annex 2; Guidelines on Safety During Abandon Ship Drill using Lifeboats

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1205

Guidelines for Developing Operations and Maintenance Manuals for Lifeboat Systems;

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1327

Guidelines for the fitting and use of all fall preventer devices

MSC.1/Circ.1392

Guidelines for Evaluation and Replacement of Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems

HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (UK)

PFEER L65 (3rd edition)

PFEER

UK HSE -HID Inspection Guide Offshore- Inspection of Evacuation Escape and Rescue (EER)

10. UK HSE -

SPC/Tech/OSD/30.

Indicative human vulnerability to the hazardous agents present offshore for application in risk assessment of major accidents

AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, INC.

ANSI Z358.1

ISEA Z308.1

Standard for Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment 2009

American National Standard— Minimum Requirements for Workplace First Aid Kits and Supplies

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AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE.

API RP 2FB

Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading

BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (BSI), EUROPEAN NORM (EN) & INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)

BS EN ISO 15544

Offshore Production Installations – Requirements and Guidelines for Emergency Response

BS EN ISO 7731

ISO Std Communication PAGA, Alarm

BS EN 842 (ISO 11428)

Safety of machinery - Visual danger signals - General requirements, design and testing

BS EN 1838

BS EN 12207

BS 5725 - Part 1

Lighting Applications, Emergency Lighting

Windows and doors. Air permeability. Classification

Specification for Panic Bolts and Panic Latches Mechanically Operated by a Horizontal Push-Bar

EN15154

Safety Showers

EN ISO 13485

Medical Devices – Quality Management Systems – Requirement for Regulatory Purposes

EI 15

EN12021

Model code of safe practice Part 15: Area classification for installations handling flammable fluids

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)

ISO 11429

ISO 15138

ISO 13702

ISO 7933

ISO 15138

ISO 15544

ISO 7010

AGES-SP-03-001

Ergonomics – System of Auditory and Visual Danger and Information Signals

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production installations — Requirements and guidelines

Ergonomics of the Thermal Environment Determination and Interpretation of Heat Calculation of the Predicted Heat Strain

Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore Production Installations – Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning.

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Requirements and guidelines for emergency response

Graphical Symbols – Safety Colours and Safety Signs – Registered Safety Signs

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BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (BSI) & EUROPEAN NORM please see up

BS EN 12021

Breathing Apparatus, Breathing Air Quality

EN 1751 Class 3 Class B

Ventilation for buildings - Air terminal devices - Aerodynamic testing of damper and valves

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA)

33. NFPA 101

34. NFPA 1911

35. NFPA 72

36. NFPA 496

OTHERS

37. US EPA AEGLs

Life Safety Code

Inspection, Maintenance, Testing and Retirement of In-Service Emergency Vehicles

National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code

Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment

ACGIH Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, and

TNO “Green Book”

IOGP Report 434-19:2010

Evacuation, Escape & Rescue

IOGP Report 434-14:2010

Vulnerability of Humans

42. CAAP 71

IEC 61508

IEC 61511

Abu Dhabi CAAP 71 helidecks (Offshore) CAAP 70 Heliport

Functional Safety of Electrical /Electronic/ Prorammable Electronic Safety-related Systems.

Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector

45. CDGH-OP-25

UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice

IBC 2009

International Building Code

ADNOC Specifications

47. HSE-CE-ST01

Emergency Response and Crisis Management

48. HSE-CE-ST03

Fire and Rescue Operations

49. HSE-GA-ST07

HSE Design Philosophy

50. HSE-OS-ST20

Personal Protective Equipment

51. HSE-OS-ST21

Management of H2S

52. HSE-RM-ST10

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

53. HSE-OS-ST29

HSECES Management

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54. HSE-RM-ST01

HSE Risk Management System

55. HSE-RM-ST02

Health, Safety & Environmental Impact Assessment (HSEIA)

56. HSE-RM-ST06

Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)

57. HSE-RM-ST07

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA)

58. HSE-RM-ST08

Emergency System Survivability Assessment (ESSA)

59. HSE-RM-ST09

Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)

60. HSE-OS-ST24

Marine Operations Safety

AGES-PH-03-002

F&G Detection and Fire Protection Systems Philosophy

AGES-SP-04-003

F&G System Specification

AGES-SP-09-001

Piping Basis of Design

AGES-GL-03-001

Facility Layout & Separation Distances Guidelines

AGES-GL-02-001

Electrical Engineering Design Guide

AGES-PH-04-001

Automation and Instrumentation Design Philosophy

DOCUMENT PRECEDENCE

The specifications and codes referred to in this Standard shall, unless stated otherwise, be the latest approved issue at the time of contract award.

It shall be the CONTRACTOR’s responsibility to be, or to become, knowledgeable of the requirements of the referenced Codes and Standards.

The CONTRACTOR shall notify the COMPANY of any apparent conflict between this specification, the related data sheets, the Codes and Standards and any other specifications noted herein.

Resolution and/or interpretation precedence shall be obtained from the COMPANY in writing before proceeding with the design/manufacture.

In case of conflict, the order of document precedence shall be:

UAE Statutory requirements

ADNOC HSE Standards

Equipment datasheets and drawings

Project Specifications and standard drawings

Company Specifications

National / International Standards

SPECIFICATION DEVIATION / CONCESSION CONTROL

Any technical deviations to the Purchase Order [or Sub-contract] and its attachments including, but not limited to, the COMPANY’s General Specifications shall be sought by the CONTRACTOR only through technical deviation request format. Technical deviation requests require COMPANY’S review/approval, prior to the proposed

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technical changes being implemented. Technical changes implemented prior to COMPANY approval are subject to rejection.

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS / MINIMUM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

Design Basis

Provision of EER measures requires a goal-based approach to ensure all personnel can safely escape, muster, evacuate and be rescued to a Place of Safety (POS). Achievement of the goals shall be demonstrated though an Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) performed in accordance with Ref.57. The EERA involves a review of the potential Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) and the proposed Emergency Response (ER) provisions, including their supporting systems (detection, alarm and communication, etc).

EER measures required for ADNOC facilities are presented as a generic schematic in Figure 5-1, which is intended to show the overall protection framework, and applies to all ADNOC Group Companies (onshore, offshore, etc.).

The left side of Figure 5-1 shows a typical facility arrangement where the high hazard process (and utility) areas are separated so far as practicable from areas of high manning. EER arrangements are marked with star labels, and are listed on the right side, using the following categories:

Facility Features:

1. Alarm & Communication;

2. Escape Routes;

3. Muster Area;

4. Temporary Refuge;

5. Evacuation Point – Primary & Secondary;

6. Evacuation Point – Tertiary;

Installed Items:

7. Evacuation - Primary & Secondary (Assisted & Controlled Evacuation);

8. Evacuation - Tertiary (No Assistance, Directly to Sea or Offsite);

Off-site Arrangement:

9. Rescue;

10. Recovery;

11. Place of Safety.

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ADNOC Classification: Internal

Figure 5-1: Schematic of Key EER Features

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Operational Control Boundary Process AreasMajor AccidentF&G DetectionY1Alarm & Communication YEscape Routes2Escape RoutesGoal-2YUtility Areas3Muster AreaGoal-34Temporary Refuge - TR Goal-42Escape (/Evacuation) RouteGoal-2Y5Evacuation Point - Primary & SecondaryY6Evacuation Point - TertiaryYY8Evacuation - Tertiary (no assistance)YRescue9RescueYRecovery10Recovery Y11Place of Safety (POS)YSurrounding Area LSA / Off Site FacilitiesRef.DescriptionEER GoalsFacility FeatureInstalled Major LSA Items.Alt. Escape Pt. (No-Assistance)Alt. Evacuation Pt. (Assisted & Controlled)Alt. Escape Pt.Alt. Muster Goal-1Manned AreasMuster & TR YEvac. Pt. - Tert.Evacuation (Assisted & Controlled)Primary (normal)7Evacuation - Primary & Secondary (Assisted & Controlled)Goal-5No AssistanceSecondary (Alt.)Evac. - Tertiary Goal-6Place of Safety (POS)11MAAlarmF&G Dtn.126103574289

ADNOC Classification: Internal

Figure 5-1 also shows the six ADNOC EER Goals, as identified in Ref. 57.

The scope of this document covers all 11 elements, and comprises the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) and Life Saving Appliance (LSA) required to protect personnel so that they can have a good prospect of reaching a Place Of Safety (POS).

At the highest level, it is a requirement of this Specification that each facility with Major Accident Hazards shall develop all 11 elements of the EER arrangements and provide the necessary LSA for this purpose.

Design of these facilities, at each stage of a facility lifecycle shall be guided by an appropriate EERA, FERA (Fires & Explosions Risk Assessment) and QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) in compliance with methodologies specified in Ref. 57, 59 and 52, respectively.

Design Parameters

A full list of information required for the EERA, FERA and QRA is given in Ref. 57, 59 and 52, respectively.

Environmental / Site Data

EER arrangements shall be suitable for use in extreme environmental conditions that could occur at the facility.

Relevant location-specific information shall therefore be used to develop the EER strategy (EERS) and to inform the procurement of equipment.

Area Classification

Any equipment required to continue operation during an emergency shall be suitable for Zone 1 Hazardous Area Classification (Ref. 22) if it can be impacted by a Major Accident gas cloud.

Minimum Design Requirements (/Objectives)

Each of the EER elements identified in Figure 5-1 is described in Table 5-1 below in terms of its objectives and how this objective should be interpreted for the various ADNOC Group companies under the following headings:

Onshore & associated buildings;

Offshore, islands & associated buildings.

Table 5-1 (column 2) also identifies the six ADNOC Goals for EER identified in the EERA Standard (Ref. 57).

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Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

Table 5-1: Key EER Measures – Interpretation for ADNOC Group Companies

1

Alarm & Communication

(Goal-1)

Means to alert personnel of an emergency and advise them to immediately Escape to their designated Muster Area or Place of Temporary Refuge (TR). This shall comprise:

Same

Same

Warning of emergency event to all personnel on the facility (audible and visual where necessary)

Communication for ER (see Ref. 47) between Incident Management Team (IMT) / Incident Commander (IC) at Incident Command Centre (ICC) and:

i. Tactical Response Team (TRT);

ii. Other personnel on facility;

iii. Persons engaged in activities related to

facility (but not at the facility);

iv. Emergency Support Team (EST);

EST and Crisis Management Team (CMT).

Provide Information: To ensure person in overall charge (IC) has all information needed to perform a successful Evacuation.

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Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

2

Escape (/Evacuation) Routes

(Goal-2)

Routes to enable all:

Same

Same

Personnel to leave the area where they are

directly affected by an incident, such that their safety is maintained, as far as reasonably practicable, at the level existing before the incident.

Personnel to Escape from a part of the Facility they are likely to occupy to a Muster /TR.

Personnel to transfer from the Muster /TR(s) to the Evacuation Points, in order to evacuate successfully using the selected method, within the Muster /TR endurance time.

Escape Routes from areas likely to be occupied, including the TR(s), to be capable of handling the maximum flow of personnel required for subsequent successful Evacuation.

Escape Routes available from all areas of the

Facility to be readily identifiable by all personnel in any emergency.

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Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

3 Muster Area

A place where personnel can assemble safely

(Goal-3)

while investigations, Emergency Response and Escape (/Evacuation) preparations are undertaken.

In this Specification the term Temporary Refuge (TR) is used where muster facilities are provided within an enclosed space.

Normally outdoors, at a safe distance away from major accident event.

Offshore Platform: unlikely to have outdoor muster area if pressurised hydrocarbon leaks can occur on the facility.

Or Muster area away from MAH (e.g. separate LQ Platform)

Islands: May have outdoor muster areas depending on size of island and nature of potential accidents.

Same

Same

4

Temporary Refuge (TR)

(Goal-4)

An enclosed place where people can muster while investigations, ER and evacuation preparations are being undertaken. The refuge shall have sufficient capacity to protect the maximum capacity of personnel at the installation /facility.

Personnel to be protected in the TR:

For the duration required to safely evacuate from the facility, or to bring the incident under control;

Against any hazardous effects that are credible at the TR location (e.g. fire, smoke, heat, explosion, toxic, etc.).

Note: Toxic Gas Refuge (TGR) is also covered for installations where toxic hazards exist.

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5

6

7

Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

Evacuation point (Primary & Secondary)

Place where personnel are stationed for boarding the Primary or Secondary means of Evacuation – controlled & assisted.

Same

Same

Evacuation Point (Tertiary)

Location from which Tertiary Evacuation (without assistance) may be carried out in an emergency when the Primary and Secondary methods of Evacuation are not safely accessible (directly away from facility or to sea).

Point from which personnel can directly leave the facility from the plant boundary, without assistance, e.g. escape gate on plant fence.

Point from which Tertiary Evacuation methods can be used, e.g. life raft, etc. (see item 8 below).

Evacuation – Primary (assisted & controlled)

(Goal-5)

Evacuation – Secondary (assisted & controlled)

(Goal-5)

Primary (Preferred) method of leaving the facility in an emergency:

For example, bus, van, etc.

For example, helicopter. Marine Vessel (Boat)

With assistance;

Controlled /directed by IC;

Normal method of transport to /from the facility.

Secondary (Alternative) method of leaving the facility in an emergency:

With assistance;

Controlled /directed by IC;

Independent alternative method.

Not common to provide alternative means on Onshore, as long as there is sufficient capacity and redundancy (/extra capacity) in primary method.

Alternative method of assisted & controlled escape from the facility if primary /preferred method is not available (e.g. gas cloud becomes a hazard to helicopter / Marine vessel operations, etc.).

Typical to use a lifeboat (/TEMPC).

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Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

For some normally unattended facilities (e.g. WHP/T), it may not be justifiable to provide a Secondary Evacuation means of Evacuation based on:

Very low man-hours occupation;

Limited space (effects of MAH over

entire platform);

Challenge of launching (/TEMPSC) with

low platform manning;

Requirement for trained lifeboat

coxswain.

8

Evacuation - Tertiary (without assistance)

(Goal-5)

Leaving a facility in an emergency when the Primary and Secondary methods of Evacuation have failed.

Relies considerably on the individual’s own action.

Leave the facility directly from the plant boundary, without assistance and without reaching a designated muster point, e.g. directly through an escape gate at the plant fence if Primary and Secondary Evacuation are prevented.

Tertiary evacuation offshore may involve entering the sea directly and is a ‘last resort’ method of getting people off the facility.

Requires a variety of independent Tertiary means for personnel to access the sea, e.g. life raft.

9

Rescue

(Goal-6)

Rescue of persons near the facility and provide them with basic first aid if required.

Rescue of personnel with:

Suitable arrangements to provide:

Toxic Rescue Vehicles (TRV);

Helicopter;

General rescue vehicles to pick-up

Fast Rescue Craft;

personnel outside plant fence if they are not able to reach the designated Muster Area.

SSRV, etc.

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Term

Objective

Onshore, (& Buildings)

Offshore, Islands (& Buildings)

10 Recovery

(Goal-6)

Transport of personnel to a Place of Safety (POS) after their rescue, following Escape from a facility (Secondary or Tertiary methods).

Directly by means of Secondary evacuation (bus, van, etc.)

Transport for personnel:

SSRV;

Marine vessel (Crew boat).

11 Place of Safety

(POS)

A place of safety is a place where evacuees are no longer exposed to the hazards at the facility. Suitable medical facilities to treat injured evacuees must be available at the POS.

For example:

Nearby hospitals;

For example:

SSRV;

Other onshore facility;

Marine vessel (Crew boat, Supply

POS should be a place sufficiently away from the facility so as not to be affected by the facility hazards.

Community halls where medical facilities

Vessels;

can be quickly set up.

Neighbouring Platforms;

Islands;

Shore.

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Document Structure

The high level requirements for each of the 11 elements are presented in Sections 6 to 9. Detailed checklists to assist the design process are presented in APPENDIX: A to APPENDIX: I . A consistent presentation has been used as follows.

5.6.1

Overview of Requirements (Sections 6 to 9)

The ‘overview of requirements’, are presented in the Table format and cover the following key aspects:

Objectives;

Functionality;

Availability;

Survivability;

Dependencies & Interactions (if relevant).

This presentation covers the main requirements for an HSECES (Health, Safety, Environmentally Critical Equipment & Systems, Ref. 53).

Performance Standards for EER systems shall align with the contents of document as a minimum.

5.6.2

Detailed Requirements (APPENDIX: A to APPENDIX: I )

Detailed requirements for each of the 11 EER elements have been presented in Tabular form as shown in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Presentation Format - Detailed Requirements

Ref.

Requirement

1.1

xx

e r o h s n O

e r o h s f f

O

s d n a l s I

s g n d

i

l i

u B









This format has been used to allow each clause to be easily converted into a practical checklist for design and for auditing these HSECES.

The Table contains four-columns on the right side that are used to show applicability of each clause for the various ADNOC facility types (onshore, offshore, islands, buildings).

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SECTION B - TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

EER - FACILITY FEATURES

This Section defines technical requirements for EER that are ‘features of a facility’ (see Figure 5-1), namely:

Alarm (& Communication);

Escape (/Evacuation) Routes;

Muster Area

Temporary Refuge (including Toxic Gas Refuge – TGR, if relevant);

Evacuation Points.

Alarm & Communication

Table 6-1: Overview of Requirements - Alarm & Communication

Aspect

Description

Objectives

See Table 5-1, Item 1

Functionality

The initial alarm & its communication shall cover all foreseeable emergencies and shall be

established through systematic assessment (e.g. FERA, QRA, EERA, etc.).

They shall be effective & clear to all personnel during foreseeable emergencies.

If acoustic alarms are not audible in an area, visual alert shall be provided that an emergency message is being transmitted.

Availability & Reliability

Alarm & communication arrangements shall always be available (or require contingency measures to be taken to achieve an equivalent level of performance)

Survivability

Single accident /event shall not compromise communication of the alarm.

Procedural

Training shall be provided to all persons about the meaning of alarm signals (Induction & Refresher Training).

Dependencies

Automatic F&G detection shall be provided to enable timely Emergency Response (ER) based on facility specific assessment in accordance with Ref. 61.

The detection arrangements shall take note of the type of incidents that can occur (fire, gas accumulation, toxic exposure, smoke, liquid, etc.), their potential for development and escalation.

Details of F&G requirements shall comply with:

ADNOC F&G Detection and FPS Philosophy (Ref. 61); and

F&G System Specification (Ref. 62).

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Table 6-2: Potential Communication Approaches - General Guidance

Satellite Phone

MF/HF Radio

Tropo- scatter LOS /Satcom Etc.

A1

A

N

N

N

A

A

A1

A

Communication from ICC (Ref. 47) to:

Hand Portable UHF Radios

PAGA

Tele- phone

Marine Band VHF Radio

Aeronautical Band VHF Radio

N

N

A

A

A1

Shipping

Aircraft

Pipeline Connected Platforms

A1

Gangway Connected Platforms

Primary Land base

Person to Person on Facility (e.g. IMT in ICC to TRT /or ER Team)

Personnel at Muster Stations

Secondary to Main TR

Personnel at Evacuation Points

Initiate Alarm Conditions

Notes:

A

A2

A2

N

A3

N

N

N

N

A3

A

A3

A

A3

A

N

N: Normal Facility Operations

1. Where feasible

A: Acceptable Alternative

2. Where fitted

3. Only where PAGA incorporates a talk-back facility

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Escape (/Evacuation) Routes

Table 6-3: Overview of Requirements – Escape, Evacuation & Rescue

Aspect

Description

Objectives

See Table 5-1, Item 2

Functionality Escape Routes shall:

Remain unobstructed:

i. To Muster Area (/TR);

ii. From Muster Area (/TR) to Evacuation points;

Provide diverse /alternate means of escape from an area if one is obstructed;

Have adequate emergency lighting;

Manual Call Points strategically located along Escape Route.

Be clearly identifiable (/marked as per Ref. 30);

Have suitable signs taking note of conditions during emergency (e.g. smoke), & showing:

i. Direction to muster;

ii. Evacuation point;

iii. Evacuation (primary, secondary & tertiary).

Dimensions (shall be verified as adequate by EERA in accordance with Ref. 57):

Buildings: Escape routes for Buildings shall comply with the UAE Fire & Life Safety Code (Ref. 45).

If the situation is not covered then they shall comply with NFPA 101 (Ref. 33).

Plant Areas (Onshore & Offshore): Unless otherwise specified, the minimum width and height of

Escape Routes shall be 1.2m and 2.3m (width and height can be reduced to 1.0m and 2.1m, subject to Group Company Approval, considering special cases such as unmanned wellhead tower, less populated /congested facility, etc.).

All means of escape shall allow easy passage of personnel wearing self-contained breathing

apparatus.

Adequate for the number of people using;

Reduced width may be justified if infrequent use by a small number of people;

Wider external routes if personnel escaping from more than one area;

Dead ends shall be avoided so far as practicable.

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Aspect

Description

Doors for Emergency:

Open in appropriate direction (or sliding);

Not locked, can be easily opened in an emergency.

Procedural:

Each person shall be assigned their Primary Muster location.

List of names for each Primary Muster location (up-to-date & displayed)

Lifts, where provided, should not be used as part of escape routes

Develop Procedures for:

Mustering,

Accounting for persons at Muster Areas (/TRs), and

Accounting for persons who had to immediately evacuate from the facility without reaching a Muster

Area /TR (e.g. Personnel Accounting System - PAS). )

Escape Route Plans:

On large or complex facilities, Escape Route Plans showing local routes and orientation to the full plan should be placed in prominent positions around the facility where necessary to assist personnel.

Availability

Designated Escape Routes shall not be taken out of use without appropriate /risk assessed alternative measures being taken (e.g. prevent access to affected areas, provide alternative routes, etc.).

Survivability Remain available in an emergency:

Safe by location or direct protection so that they remain passable, so far as reasonably practicable,

for the duration needed to effect safe escape to Muster Areas /TR

Note: Personal survival equipment (e.g. Escape Evacuation Breathing Apparatus - EEBA) may be deemed necessary to facilitate escape from certain locations);

If an Escape Route is impaired by a Major Accident, alternative means shall be provided against the same event.

Survivability shall be assessed and confirmed as per the ESSA Standard (Ref. 58).

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Muster Area & TR

Table 6-4: Overview of Requirements – Muster Area /TR

Aspect

Description

Objectives

Muster Area: See Table 5-1, item 3.

Temporary Refuge: See Table 5-1, item 4.

Functionality

Two designations are assigned for Muster Areas:

i. Primary Muster Areas

(location to be the first point of Assembly);

ii. Secondary Muster Areas

(alternative location, in case the emergency prevents the individuals from reaching the Primary Muster Area).

The Muster Area /TR (outdoor or indoor) shall provide a safe muster temporary refuge to

personnel from the effects of Major Accident scenarios established in the EERA study (e.g. fire, explosion, toxic, smoke, etc.).

The Muster Area /TR shall be located such that the time to travel from work areas shall not be

more than the protection provided by the selected RPE based on EERA (e.g. EEBA or SCBA, - wind direction may be considered in this assessment).

The safety of personnel shall be ensured for the duration established through EERA study.

Sufficient space shall be provided for mustering, donning appropriate PPE and making way to the

means of evacuation and treating casualties. The following guidelines shall apply:

i. Muster Area – outdoors (minimum):

• 0.35 m2 per Person (without PPE)

• 0.75 m2 per person (with PPE)

ii. Temporary Refuge - enclosed area:

• 0.8 m2 per person for less than 20 people;

• 1.25 m2 per person for 20 or more people.

The above areas do not include common space (e.g. escape walkway within the TR, cylinder /PPE storage, EER supporting items, etc), which shall be additional to the above mentioned areas.

The space provided may be reduced subject to Group Company Approval with justification, but shall not be less than 0.35m2 (/0.75m2 with PPE) per person if the TR endurance period is very short (<30mins) prior to evacuation and for less than 20 people.

The capacity of the Muster Areas /TRs shall be sufficient to protect the maximum number of the

people on the facility / site.

This includes providing time for the following activities:

i. Complete full mustering activities:

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Aspect

Description

• Account for personnel not reporting to their assigned Muster Areas;

• Evaluate the situation and make decisions;

• Initiate responses to minimise the consequences and control the emergency, if possible;

ii. Time to complete the evacuation (if required). This may be done in a phased manner, initially

evacuating non-essential personnel;

iii. Contingency Time to allow for unforeseen events.

The above times are not all necessarily additive, but the facility should be designed so that the

conditions which could impair the Muster Area /TR do not arise whilst people are still within these areas.

The conditions that can impair a Muster Area /TR are categorised as:

i.

Loss of life support (e.g. smoke /gas, excessive heat stress, oxygen deficiency, toxic gas accumulation);

ii. Loss of structure (e.g. collapse of supporting structure, impairment of exterior fabric of an

enclosed TR);

iii. Loss of essential command support (e.g. loss of essential communications within an enclosed TR and with third parties, ESD and F&G and monitoring /emergency power /lighting).

The facilities provided for ‘Life Support’, ‘Structural Protection’ and ‘Essential Command’ shall support Emergency Response Planning, which will need to comply the ADNOC Emergency Response and Crisis Management Standard (Ref. 47).

It will be essential to provide effective communications between the designated Incident Command Centre (ICC, Ref. 47) and all the Muster Areas /TR’s. The level of Emergency Controls (ESD, F&G and monitoring etc.) required at a TR should be considered in developing the EERS.

The Main Control Room shall provide the emergency functions (e.g. shutdown & blowdown, etc.)

required to manage the emergency.

The Emergency Radio Room shall provide communication with Emergency Staging Areas, all

personnel on facility and with relevant off-site parties.

The ICC shall be able communicate with the Main Control Room and the Emergency Radio

Room and to relevant off-site parties to perform the required emergency duties.

Availability & Reliability

If an emergency could prevent all personnel reaching their Primary Muster Area /TR a Secondary

(/alternative) Muster Area /TR may be required to allow safe evacuation of the affected personnel.

Where an Emergency Staging Area that is to be occupied in an emergency is not situated at a

Muster Area /TR, it shall be possible for the personnel involved to subsequently reach a Muster Area /TR. This may require a secondary TR to be provided.

Survivability

Survivability of the Muster Areas /TRs shall be demonstrated by an appropriate ESSA in

accordance with Ref. 58.

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Evacuation Point (Primary & Secondary)

Objectives:

i. Location from which Primary & Secondary means of controlled Evacuation can be boarded.

Other Requirements

i. Similar to Escape (/Evacuation) Routes (Section 6.2).

Evacuation Point (Tertiary)

Objectives:

i. Location from which Tertiary means of Escape can be carried out.

Other Requirements

i. Similar to Escape (/Evacuation) Routes (Section 6.2).

LSA - INSTALLED MAJOR ITEMS (OVERVIEW)

Evacuation - Primary & Secondary (Assisted & Controlled)

Table 7-1: Overview of Requirements – Evacuation (Primary & Secondary)

Aspect

Description

Objectives

Primary Evacuation: See Table 5-1, item 5.

Secondary Evacuation: See Table 5-1, item 6.

Functionality Arrangements shall be provided for ALL personnel on the facility such that they can:

Evacuation from the facility.

Be taken to a Place of Safety (POS)

Arrangements shall be based on a facility specific EERA study.

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Aspect

Description

Arrangements shall comprise:

Assisted & Controlled Evacuation:

Primary Means – Preferred (normal means of attending facility, e.g. Helicopter, Marine Vessel

(Boat), Bridge-link, Bus, walking etc.);

Secondary Means - Alternative (e.g. TEMPSC for offshore):

i.

If ‘Preferred’ means are not available (e.g. if approach is affected by major accident );

ii.

If capacity of the ‘Preferred’ means is not sufficient within time available.

Non-Assisted Evacuation

Tertiary Means (e.g. life raft) - Alternative if Primary & Secondary are not available.

Development of Arrangements shall consider factors such as, but not limited to:

Weather;

Nature & location of emergency;

Time available to evacuate;

Where personnel are likely to congregate in an emergency;

In case of offshore floating facility, if TEMPSC cannot be launched due to trim or list changes;

Need to evacuate stretcher casualties;

Impact on loading time due to large size /capacity.

Key features applicable to Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Means are:

Accessible to all people from Muster Area /TR;

Reliable to launch;

Get away quickly from facility;

Oriented away from facility on completion of launch /set off;

Easy to deploy.

Provision of Secondary means of Evacuation may not be justifiable if a facility has low man hour occupation or normally unmanned installations /offshore platforms (e.g. WHP/T) long as:

Primary /Preferred means are available (around) when personnel are at the facility; and

Tertiary (Non-Assisted) Means are also available:

i.

Life raft;

ii. Life Jacket / Life Buoys for direct sea entry.

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Aspect

Description

Minimum Capacity: The Evacuation arrangements shall satisfy the following minimum capacity criteria (after taking account of outages due to foreseeable circumstances, e.g. failure, maintenance, etc.):

% Persons at Facility

(PAF onshore /POB offshore)

Primary (preferred) Means of Evacuation

100%

Secondary (Alternative) Means of Evacuation

100% + 1 largest capacity Lifeboat

Offshore Complex: Additional lifeboat shall be provided at the process platform for personnel not able to reach the Main TR in an emergency (In- conjunction with EERA assessment).

Capacity shall be sufficient to accommodate 100% POB expected at the process platforms.

WHP/T and/or normally unmanned installations: May not be justifiable due to low manhour occupation (see Functionality above)

General: Total 100% tertiary in addition to lifeboats.

Unmanned (e.g. Wellhead) platforms: 2 x 100% tertiary where lifeboat is not provided.

Maximum Capacity of each life raft shall not be more than 25 persons per liferaft.

Tertiary Means of Evacuation (if Preferred & Alternative not available)

On offshore facilities (platforms, islands, etc.), Survival craft, life-rafts, life-buoys, life-jackets shall be:

Conspicuous in colour;

Suitably equipped;

Available for immediate use in sufficient numbers.

Procedural: Evacuation arrangements shall be documented.

All systems for evacuation to the sea should be supported by personnel training or familiarisation, based on the system requirements.

The decision to evacuate a facility will normally be made by the Incident Commander (IC).

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Aspect

Description

Availability

Availability of Secondary (100% POB) and Tertiary (100% POB) arrangements shall be ensured under all circumstances if the normal permanent facilities are degraded in a foreseeable manner, for example:

Breakdown maintenance;

Planned maintenance /testing /re-certification;

This shall require the following additional hardware:

One extra TEMPSC, bus, etc. (depending on offshore or onshore case);

Capacity of additional TEMPSC / bus to be equal to that of the largest such device.

Failure to provide such redundancy shall require an immediate reduction of POB at the facility,

Availability shall not be justified on the basis of extra seats on the same TEMPSC /Bus.

Survivability

The location of Evacuation Arrangements (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) shall be developed

taking note of their survivability against credible Major Accident Events as part of an overall EERS and assessed through a project ESSA in accordance with Ref. 58.

The assessment for Evacuation Arrangements shall, as a minimum, take account of vulnerability of:

i. Escape (/Evacuation) routes leading to the Evacuation Points;

ii. Evacuation points, etc.

Key inputs to such an assessment (ESSA) will be:

i.

Layout and structural design of facility

ii. Location of areas classified as safe Muster Areas /TRs;

iii. Prevailing wind direction relative to Muster Areas /TRs;

iv. General environmental conditions (e.g. wind speed, wave, tidal current, etc.);

v. Total number of TEMPSC /Buses;

vi. Other resources that could be utilised in Major Accident situations (e.g. SSRV, standby vessels,

etc.).

The available ‘Capacity’ of Evacuation arrangements in response to a Design Accident Events shall

continue to satisfy the Capacity criteria noted above.

Evacuation – Tertiary (non-assisted)

Table 7-2: Overview of Requirements – Evacuation (Tertiary)

Aspect

Description

Objectives

See Table 5-1, item 8.

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Aspect

Description

Functionality

Capacity sufficient to accommodate 100% of the POB.

Total life raft capacity shall be sufficient to accommodate 100% of POB. This capacity is in addition to the capacity of the lifeboats (note: certain type of Wellhead platforms – WHP may not be able to justify lifeboat based on low man-hours attendance, MAH impacting the lifeboat launch and life boat coxswain requirement. Such cases life raft to be provided with 100% standby capacity)

Protection against elements, so far as practicable

Avoid direct sea entry, so far as practicable.

Provide means of descent to sea (ladder, stairways, etc.).

Life rafts, lifebuoys, lifejackets and plant shall be:

i. Conspicuous colour;

ii. Suitably equipped;

iii. Available for immediate use in sufficient numbers.

Clothing: Must be compatible with means of Evacuation provided.

Life raft stations should have emergency lighting in place and over side floodlights to illuminate the

sea below.

Power shall be maintained (from emergency supply) for equipment required to operate during an

emergency, which shall be suitable for zone-1.

Availability

Tertiary Evacuation facilities shall be available to personnel near Primary and Secondary Muster

locations as a minimum, so that they can be used if the Primary and Secondary Methods of Evacuation fail.

Survivability

(no survivability criteria)

LSA - INSTALLED MAJOR ITEMS (HARDWARE DESCRIPTION)

Section 7 relates to major items of installed equipment for ‘Evacuation’ from a facility comprising ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ means. The aim of this Section is to summarise the type of arrangements that shall be used for the ADNOC facilities.

The information is provided in Table 8-1 and Table 8-2 for Offshore and Onshore, respectively.

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Table 8-1: Applicable EER Methods - Offshore.

Methods for Evacuation Rescue & Recovery

Details in Section

Primary

Preferred

Helicopter

Marine Vessel

Bridge Link

Secondary

Alternative

TEMPSC (life boat)

Tertiary

Evacuation to Sea

Life raft

Rescue

Fast Rescue Craft

Note-1

22.1

22.2

22.5

Recovery

Safety Standby & Rescue Vessel (SSRV)

Note-2

Search & Rescue Helicopter

Note-2

Others (Crew boat, supply vessels, etc.)

Notes:

1. Does not apply to Islands, mainly meant for offshore Complex

2. External support resource to be arranged /confirmed.

Table 8-2: Applicable EER Methods - Onshore.

Methods for Evacuation Rescue & Recovery

Details in Section

Primary

Preferred

Bus / Van

Walk

Secondary

Alternative

Note 4

Tertiary

Alternate escape – Direct exit through plant fence gate Escape Gates

Note-3

Rescue

Recovery

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Toxic Rescue Vehicles

Note 2

Bus / van

Helicopter / Ambulance

Note 1

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Methods for Evacuation Rescue & Recovery

Details in Section

Notes:

1. Only for medical evacuation of injured persons as applicable.

If facility handles toxic materials

3. Gate on boundary fence with provision to open from inside.

4. No specific requirement for Secondary Means onshore, alternative provided by extra capacity of primary

(e.g. extra bus /van).

LSA – OFF-SITE ARRANGEMENTS

Rescue & Recovery

Table 9-1: Overview of Requirements – Rescue & Recovery

Aspect

Description

Objectives

Rescue: See Table 5-1, item 9.

Recovery: See Table 5-1, item 10.

Functionality Arrangements required for Rescue & Recovery shall be established as part of the EERA, taking note of

any changing requirements depending on activities ongoing at the facility.

Arrangements for Rescue & Recovery shall be made by Company, but may include collaboration with other parties, such as:

External organisations

Other party in Combined Operations

Arrangements shall define ‘extreme weather’ condition, and describe what measures are to be taken in the event of extreme weather.

In developing the Arrangements, the following should be considered as a minimum:

Risk faced by persons once they have entered water;

Risk to those carrying out rescue & recovery;

Inherent risk in rescue & recovery activities;

No of persons to be rescued & recovered;

Capacity of rescue & recovery services;

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Aspect

Description

Realistic times;

Restrictions (Distance, Operating limits e.g. helicopters, vessels & FRC);

Sea states & weather conditions;

Time of day and duration of work carried out.

Safety Standby and Rescue Vessel (SSRV): If an SSRV is used then it shall have the following capabilities:

Highly manoeuvrable & able to maintain position.

Provide view from bridge of:

i. FRC launch area;

ii. Rescued persons landing area;

iii. Master should be able to approach person or object in water while retaining control of vessel.

360 degree search lights (remotely controlled).

Power driven FRCs ready for use.

FRCs shall have the following facilities:

i. VHF communication with vessel

ii. Portable search light

FRC shall have rapid launch and recovery capability.

FRC shall be able to communicate with:

i. Support craft

ii. Facility

iii. Nearby vessels

iv. Helicopters

v. Shore

FRC shall have facilities to retrieve survivors from sea (including injured personnel) & be able to

provide immediate First Aid.

Staffing of SSRV & support craft to be with personnel competent for rescue & recovery duties, and

the individuals shall be medically fit.

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Aspect

Description

Location /position of SSRV to be such that it allows easy rescue & recovery and shall reach the

location of the emergency within 30mins as per Offshore marine guideline. (Ref. 60).

Availability

Rescue & Recovery arrangements shall be available at all times and shall be appropriate to the activities ongoing at any given time.

Survivability Rescue & Recovery arrangements shall be positioned such that they are not vulnerable to the accident

scenarios they are intended to respond to.

Place of Safety

Table 9-2: Overview of Requirements – Place of Safety

Aspect

Description

Objectives

See Table 5-1, item 11.

Functionality

See Table 5-1, item 11.

Availability

POS arrangements shall be available at all times and shall be appropriate to the activities ongoing at any given time.

Survivability

POS shall be positioned such that it is not vulnerable to the accident scenarios they are intended to be used for.

LSA - CATALOGUE SMALL ITEMS

Overview - LSA

All facilities with personnel attendance (onshore and offshore), shall be provided with life-saving appliances of an approved type in accordance with recognized standards approved by ADNOC.

All non-manned facilities and installations should have sufficient life-saving appliances for personnel for operations and maintenance visits.

The life-saving appliances considered are summarized under the following headings:

Personal Gas Detectors

Emergency Breathing Apparatus

Escape Aids

Survival Aids

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 Others

Their applicability to the various ADNOC facility types is summarized in Table 10-1.

Table 10-1: Summary of Life Saving Appliances for ADNOC Group

Ref. Requirement

Details

Personal Gas Detectors

1.1

Personal Gas Detector - H2S

See Ref. 50

1.2

Personal Gas Detector - Multi-Gas (Note 1)

See Ref. 50

1.3

Personal Gas - SO2 (Note 1)

See Ref. 50

Note 1- As applicable (normally H2S detector mandatory for H2S field).

Emergency Breathing Apparatus

2.2

Self-contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

See Ref. 50

2.4

EEBA (Hood)

2.5

EEBA (Mask)

Evacuation Aids

See Ref. 50

See Ref. 50

e r o h s n O













3.1 Windsock

See Section 22.8



3.3

Scramble Nets

See Section 22.3

3.6

Evacuation Ladder

Section 22.4

Survival Aids

4.1

Lifebuoy (Ring)

4.2

Life Jacket (Foam)

See Ref. 50

See Ref. 50

4.3

Life Jacket (Inflatable)

22.7 See Ref. 50

Other

AGES-SP-03-001

s g n d

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

















s d n a l s I















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







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Ref. Requirement

Details

5.1

Stretcher

Section 22.8

e r o h s n O



e r o h s f f

O

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s d n a l s I

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SECTION C – OTHER REQUIREMENTS

DETAILS OF SCOPE SUPPLY

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

QUALITY CONTROL AND ASSURANCE

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

SUB-CONTRACTORS, SUB-SUPPLERS

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

MATERIAL CERTIFICATION

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

SPARE PARTS

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

PAINTING, PRESERVATION AND SHIPMENT

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

COMMISSIONING

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

TRAINING

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

DOCUMENTATION / MANUFACTURER DATA RECORDS

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

GUARANTEES AND WARRANTY

(Project specific information - Not applicable to this Document)

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SECTION D (DATASHEETS & DRAWINGS REQUIRED)

DATASHEET TEMPLATES (& SPECIFICATIONS)

Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC)

Datasheet - TEMPSC

Client:

ADNOC

Location:

XXX

Revision:

0

xx-xxx-xx

1

Date:

Unit:

Tag No.

Sheet

Supplier:

Plant:

Client:

Service:

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)

Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC)

Manufacturer:

Model No.

Site:

Scope

2

Rev

of

XXX

YYY

Finish quantities specified for Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) designed in accordance with this, Data Sheet and Requirements specified by the UAE and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard for the xxx Offshore Platform.

Site Data

Location: XXXXXX

Meteorological: Site conditions and data shall be in accordance with Engineering Design Basis Doc No. XXNNN-NNN-X-NN-NNN.

General Design Requirements

No. of Units

Locations

To be specified (x) TEMPSC

Tag. No.

Platform

Deck

Elevation

Remarks

Capacity:

XX Passengers Each (Based on the scope)

Type:

Davit Launched

Dimensions:

Length (m)

Weight:

Empty

Beam (m)

With Eqpt. /Davit Load (kg)

Height (m)

Davit Weight (kg)

Hull Material:

GRP with Fire retarding additives

Buoyancy Material:

Polyurethane Foam or approved equivalent

Piping Material:

Copper Fuel Lines

TEMPSC Colour:

External International Orange / Interior *

Speed in Water:

• 6 knots minimum

Evacuation Foam:

Engine:

Type:

Diesel

Starter Type:

Electric

Battery Charging System:

As per xx

Lifting Hooks:

Hook Center:

m. Distance between hooks

m. From underside of Keel

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

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Datasheet - TEMPSC

Client:

ADNOC

Location:

XXX

Revision:

0

xx-xxx-xx

Date:

Unit:

Tag No.

Sheet

1

of

2

Rev

Water Spray Protection System:

Yes

Positive Pressure Air System:

Towing:

Localised Strengthening (e.g. at tow point):

Yes (minimum 10 minutes)

Yes

Yes

Controls (state all provided)

Radio /ERPB

As a minimum ERPB, SART, Fixed Radio Base Station and Handheld Portable Radio.

Survival & Lif Saving Equipment:

Hazardous Area Classification / Ingress Protection

Labelling /Marking:

Instruction:

See sheet 2 for minimum equipment requirements.

IEC Zone 2, Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T3

Stretcher Capacity

1

In accordance with The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Requirements

Provide Dual Language - Arabic and English

Reference Codes & Standards:

Ref. 1 & 2

Fuel Tank Capacity

24hrs continuous engine operation (As per SOLAS and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard )

Remarks

1. Asterisk (*) indicates information to be furnished by Supplier.

2. Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) furnished shall have UAE and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard Certificates of approval or Company approved equivalent. In the event of conflict, UAE and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard Requirements shall take precedence over all other Specifications

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

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Datasheet - TEMPSC

Client: Location: Revision: Date: Unit: Tag No.

ADNOC XXX 0 xx-xxx-xx AAA

Survival & Life Saving Equipment

Minimum Equipment & Quantities in Each TEMPSC

Sheet

2

of

2

Rev.

Quantity 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1

Description Oars Boat Hooks Buoyant Bailer Bucket with line Survival Manual Compass Sea Anchor (with tripping line) Painter (minimum 15 meters) Hatchet Rustproof Dipper with Lanyard

3 litres / person Water (0.5 litre bags)

Rustproof Graduated Drinking Vessel Food Rations Rocket Parachute Flares Hand Flares Buoyant Smoke Signals Waterproof Electric Signalling Torch Spare Batteries & Bulb in Watertight Box Daylight Signalling Mirror with Instructions Copy of Lifesaving Signals on Waterproof Card Whistle First Aid Kit in Waterproof Case Doses of Anti-Sickness Medicine Sea Sickness Bag Jack Knife with Lanyard Can Opener Buoyant Rescue Quoit with 30m Buoyant Line Manual Pump Set of Fishing Tackle Engine Tool Set Portable Fire Extinguisher Search Light Radar Reflector Rope Ladder Thermal Protective Aids

2 10,000 KJ / person 4 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 / person 1 / person 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 10% of total capacity on board (minimum 2 persons)

Remarks Vendor shall verify all equipment and quantities comply with the minimum requirements of IMO SOLAS 83, Regulation 41

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43

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Life rafts

General

Location

Offshore / Outdoor

Code Compliance

IMO SOLAS / LSA

Manufacturer

Model No.

Dimensions

In GRP Container: L - mm Dia - mm *

Weight

• kg *

Technical Requirements

Type

Capacity

Colour

Features

Throw Overboard Type

xx Persons (Consider 82.5 KG wt. per person)

Minimum number of Persons (6, 8, 12 or 25 ) and any other standard capacity as specified for the project based on agreement with COMPANY (Consider 82.5 KG wt per person)

Life raft color is Orange and storage container is white

Life raft shall be self-inflatable type, fitted with a painter line of 36 m length (to be defined based on the location of life raft). Each life raft shall be provided with a SOLAS Pack A emergency pack. Support cradles shall be supplied so as to enable single person deployment. Constructed from natural rubber coated nylon webbing. Shall be packed in a watertight cover which is able to withstand hard wear / harsh environment.

Inflatable life raft shall have a canopy to protect occupant from exposure, Life raft shall have two entrances and each entrance fitted with boarding ladder. Each life raft shall consist of two separate buoyancy tubes. The buoyancy of the tubes shall be ensured by dividing each into an even number of separate compartments with safety valve and check valve fitted on every separate compartment, a righting strap shall be fitted under side the bottom of the life raft can be up righted by one person if it inflated in an inverted position. Each life raft shall be fitted with sufficient strength towing arrangement.

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Accessories

Paddles, Sponges, Bellows, Painter line, Safety Knife, First Aid Kit, Repair Kit, Sea Sickness Tablet, Sea Anchor, Leak Stoppage and Guide rope of 36 m length Also ensure all accessories are as per SOLAS Pack A. Guide rope shall also be provided which will be connected to the boat landing area. Signboard instructions (English/Arabic), SS tags.

Solas Pack A should be suitable for occupancy and minimum should include following: Hand held flares, parachute flares, smoke signals, flashlight, flashlight bulb, extra batteries, signal mirror, signal whistle. Bail bucket, paddles, topping up air pump, sea anchor with SS swivel, spare sea anchor, sponges, repair kit, repair plugs, throwing quoit with 100 ft. line, survival instructions. First aid kit, fishing kit, can openers, floating knife, lock back knife, thermal protective aids, sea sickness tablets, sea sickness bags, drinking cups, 4.2 oz. water packs and 2400 calorie food bars

Telecommunication items

EPIRB / SART .In coordination with COMPANY for telecommunication system compliance.

Approved by

SOLAS/IMO

Material of Construction

Shall be suitable for offshore marine conditions.

Safe Working Load (SWL)

As per standard.

Notes

Asterisk (*) indicates information to be furnished by supplier.

Instruction and Marking (Life raft and Container) shall be in English and Arabic.

Marine and fire resistant white colored GRP container to be provided for storage. This container shall be stored on life raft cradle.

Identification & Marking shall be provided for the life raft compliant to SOLAS Requirements.

Manufacturer Test Certificate required Confirming to SOLAS Requirements.

Where possible, location of liferaft drop zone should be close to the boat landing so that personnel could board the liferaft using the ladder provided at boat landing.

Scramble Nets

22.3.1 Selection and Positioning of Scramble Nets

Scramble nets which require strength and dexterity to use are not considered as a controlled means of descent to the water. These should lead to the life rafts or other provisions to minimize likelihood of having to enter the

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water. To assist personnel in a controlled means of descent this will require adequate training, signage and emergency lighting.

There is an evident risk posed from injury / fall on training on scramble nets and a risk assessment shall be carried out.

22.3.2 Minimum Requirements of Manufacturer

Scramble nets shall be of rigid design constructed from robust material. Scramble nets shall be made of polypropylene rope and polyamide nylon ropes of 18 mm or 20 mm diameter (as approved). These nets shall be fabricated in tucked type with 10” x 10” mesh size. FRP cores of 50 mm outer diameter with PU floats shall be provided (as approved). One end of the net is provided with three spring hooks and Dee shackles. Scramble net shall withstand natural weathering for the environmental conditions stipulated in the Project Design Basis. The net shall be provided with distance wheels or similar to prevent net from touching the vertical surface.

Scramble net shall be approved by “EU marine directive/United states coast guard (USCG)/SOLAS / Abu Dhabi Coast Guard”. Scramble net shall be sourced from Company approved vendor list.

22.3.3 Maintenance and Storage of Scramble Nets

Scramble nets should be stored and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions on a regular basis.

Embarkation Ladder

Evacuation ladders shall meet following requirements as per the International Life Saving Appliance code:

Handholds shall be provided to ensure a safe passage from the deck to the head of the ladder and vice

versa.

The steps of the ladder shall be:

i. made of hardwood, free from knots or other irregularities, smoothly machined and free from sharp

edges and splinters, or of suitable material of equivalent properties;

ii. provided with an efficient nonslip surface either by longitudinal grooving or by the application of an

approved nonslip coating;

iii. not less than 480 mm long, 115 mm wide and 25 mm in depth, excluding any nonslip surface or

coating; and

iv. equally spaced not less than 300 mm or more than 380 mm apart and secured in such a manner that

they will remain horizontal.

The side ropes of the ladder shall consist of two uncovered manila ropes not less than 65 mm (as approved) in circumference on each side. Each rope shall be continuous with no joints below the top step. Other materials may be used provided the dimensions, breaking strain, weathering, stretching and gripping properties are at least equivalent to those of manila rope. All rope ends shall be secured to prevent unravelling.

Approval / Code: SOLAS

AGES-SP-03-001

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Fast Rescue Craft

Datasheet - Fast Rescue Craft (FRC)

Client:

Location:

Revision:

0

xx-xxx-xx

Date:

Unit:

Tag No.

1

2

Client:

Service:

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)

Fast Rescue Craft

3 Manufacturer:

Model No.

Supplier:

Plant:

Site:

XXX

YYY

Sheet

1

of

1

Rev.

4

5

6

7

8

9

Scope

Finish quantities specified for Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) designed in accordance with this Data Sheet, Specification and requirements specified by the UAE and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard for the xxx Offshore Platform.

Site Data

Location: XXXXXX

10 Meteorological: Site conditions and data shall be in accordance with Engineering Design Basis Doc No. XXNNN-NNN-X-NN-NNN.

11

12 General Design Requirements

13 No. of Units

15

16

17

18

19

Locations

Tag. No.

Platform

Deck

Elevation

Remarks

Accommodation

XX

NN.N m

TBC

(Note 3)

Capacity:

X Passengers (to be defined based on the requirement)

20 Dimensions:

Length (m)

21 Weight:

Empty

Beam (m)

With Eqpt. /Davit Load (kg)

Height (m)

Davit Weight (kg)

22 Hull Material:

GRP with Fire retarding additives – As Approved

23

24

25

26

27

28

Buoyancy Material:

Polyurethane Foam – As approved

Piping Material:

Copper Fuel Lines

TEMPSC Colour:

External International Orange / Interior *

Speed in Water:

• 20 knots minimum

Evacuation Foam:

Engine:

Type:

Diesel

Starter Type:

Electric

Battery Charging System:

As per Standard

m. Distance between hooks

m. From underside of Keel

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

29

Lifting Hooks:

30 Hook Center:

31 Water Spray

32

33

34

35

Protection System:

Positive Pressure Air System:

Towing:

Localised Strengthening (e.g. at tow point):

Controls (state all provided)

36

Radio /ERPB

As a minimum ERPB, SART, Fixed Radio Base Station and Handheld Portable Radio (in Consultation with COMPANY).

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Datasheet - Fast Rescue Craft (FRC)

Client:

Location:

Revision:

0

xx-xxx-xx

Date:

Unit:

Tag No.

Sheet

1

of

1

Rev.

37

Survival & Life Saving Equipment:

In accordance with requirements of Certifying Authority and SOLAS Regulations.

38 Hazardous Area

IEC Zone 2, Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T3

Classification / Ingress Protection

39

40

41

Labelling /Marking:

In accordance with The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Requirements

Instruction:

Provide Dual Language - Arabic and English

Reference Codes & Standards:

Ref. 1 & 2

42

Fuel Tank Capacity

The fuel tank shall be sized for range 100 nautical miles for minimum speed 20 knots (as per requirement).

43 Remarks

1. Asterisk (*) indicates information to be furnished by Supplier.

2. FRC furnished shall have UAE and Abu Dhabi Coast Guard Certificates of Approval or Company approved equivalent.

3. Final location to be agreed with Company

44

45

46

47

Lifebuoy (Ring)

Details of Lifebuoy specification are in Ref. 50.

22.6.1 Selection and Positioning of Lifebuoy

Lifebuoys shall be provided so that at least one is readily accessible from any area from which a person may fall into the water. The number and positioning of the lifebuoys should be assessed at the time of preparing the COMAH report or Safety case. Each lifebuoy should be stowed so that it can be readily cast loose and not permanently fixed.

At least 100% of lifebuoys should be fitted with self-igniting lights designed for use in water.

22.6.2 Minimum Requirements for Manufacture

Lifebuoys should be 30” Diameter SOLAS / Ships Wheel approved, of rugged manufacture able to withstand the drop to the waterline and a minimum of 30m. It shall be orange and in accordance with requirements of SOLAS & LSA Code and have Retro Reflective Tape. The grab line length should be a minimum as required by LSA Code and be at least 4x the diameter of the lifebuoy and sufficient to be easily held and securely held at 4 points to form 4 even loops.

The life (or heaving) line length shall be carefully selected length for the position of the lifebuoy and height of the position above the low tide waterline. It should be buoyant, non-kinking make with a minimum of 8mm dia. and a breaking strength of greater than 5kN.

Self-igniting lights shall meet the LSA Code Cl 2.1.2 requirements being designed that they cannot be extinguished in water, white in colour and luminous intensity of 2cd.

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22.6.3 Maintenance and Storage of Lifebuoys

Lifebuoys should be stored in a dedicated clearly marked lifebuoy housing to protect it from the elements. The housing should be securely attached to the deck or rail/wall/pole frame and easily accessible at all times.

All lifebuoys should be inspected and maintained in a regular basis in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.

Life Jackets

Details of Life Jacket Specification are in:

Lifejacket, Foam Specifications (see Ref. 50);

Lifejacket, Inflatable Specifications (see Ref. 50).

22.7.1 Selection and Positioning of Lifejackets

SOLAS approved self-righting type marine lifejackets shall be provided and the number of lifejackets available shall not be less than 150% of the total number of persons located on any offshore installation. Lifejackets shall meet the requirement of the Life Saving Code Ch. II, Section 2.2 and be suitable to wear, allow the person to swim a short distance to a rescue craft and allow the wearer to be safely lifted into a survival craft or helicopter.

Lifejackets except when worn shall be stowed in a suitable place and shall be readily available for use at all times.

22.7.2 Minimum Requirements for Manufacture

BS EN ISO 12402-2 2006, indicates that a 150 newton lifejacket is likely to be necessary.

Lifejacket design should be such that, when worn, the lifejacket will ensure adequate airway protection.

The features required to ensure adequate airway protection are:

Lifejacket chamber configuration/buoyancy such as to ensure the righting of an unconscious person

wearing any clothing expected for evacuation.

Neck support and buoyancy such as to ensure sufficient mouth-to-water distance (120mm) for an

unconscious person wearing the installation immersion suit.

A suitable lifejacket securing system (such as crotch or thigh straps) which prevents the lifejacket rising

up.

Features (1) and (2) depend on the lifejacket/suit compatibility, and provision of these features will need to be demonstrated.

Auto-inflating abandonment lifejackets shall be SOLAS compliant and shall have as a minimum 2 x auto/manual inflation mechanisms.

If the lifejackets include inherent buoyancy, then these shall not prevent the correct securing of persons in the offshore installation lifeboats. Care shall be taken with inherently buoyant life jackets to confirm jump height restrictions do not negate selection for the installation being considered. Buoyancy for lifejackets shall not depend on loose granular material and shall not be reduced by immersion in fresh water by more than 5% in 24hrs.

Various optional features are defined by SOLAS, and by BS EN ISO 12402. The lifejackets should include a buddy line; and a light which can withstand a jump into water from 4.5 metres, which comes on automatically on contact with water, and which can be relocated by the wearer to an optimum position.

If for persons with weight in excess of 140kg, less than 155cm in height or chest >175cm then this should be highlighted to on arrival at the departure terminal.

Maintenance and Storage of Lifejackets

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All inflatable lifejackets should be tested and certified every 12 months (as per SOLAS III/20.8.1.1). Lifejackets shall be stored carefully and inspected on a regular basis for any signs of damage or deterioration.

Lifejacket cabinets shall be typically IP56 rating appropriately fire rated for the location, sealed with and firmly secured to the deck. They should be clearly designated with lettering recognizable to all personnel of and bright orange in colour.

Windsock

Details of the Windsock shall comply with ICAO or FAA US Circular 50/5345-27D.

The general requirements are as follows:

Windsock shall be pole-mounted windsock and shall have bearings to allow the windsock to freely rotate.

All material shall be suitable for an offshore environment and direct sunlight.

Windsocks will be provided in strategic locations around the process facilities for visibility from all

locations of the plant.

Windsocks will be illuminated for night visibility as required.

Dimension: Long-2.5 m; Throat-1 0.5 m diameter; Tail-0.50.3 m (Dia. May vary based on the

specification/usage)

Windsock must be constructed to allow water drainage; Fabric for the windsock shall be Hypalon I Vinyl

coated nylon or equivalent.

The colour of the windsock shall be Fluorescent Orange.

The taper of the windsock from throat to the trailing end shall be designed so as to cause the windsock

to fully extend when exposed to a wind of 15 knots.

Windsock must move freely about the vertical shaft it is attached to and when subjected to wind of 3 knots

(5.6 km/h or 3.5 mph) or more and indicate the true wind direction within +/- 5 degrees.

Lighting should be provided with 1.5 hours battery back- up. Battery shall be suitable for installation in

zone-1, gas group IIB, temperature class T3, as a minimum – as applicable.

Rev

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Site Conditions

Data Sheet for Wind Sock

Ambient Temperature. :

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity. :

as per Site environmental condition

AGES-SP-03-001

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Rev

Data Sheet for Wind Sock

Atmosphere. :

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

General

Manufacturer

Model No.

Pole Dimensions

• Total Length – As per site condition (Vary based on the Project specification/usage)

Cone Dimensions

Length x m Cone Dia : x cm

Weight

STC

Technical Requirements

Type

Wind sock complete with pole, frame, base, support post, grommet, pivot bearing, Anchor base, etc.

Illuminated or Non-illuminated type (to be specified based on the requirement) without HAT. Windsock should be open at both ends. (Type may vary based on the Project specification/usage)

Approval

Material

Color

ICAO / Abudhabi Aviation

Nylon, High Contrast & Reflective Color

Aviation Orange

Pole Material

SS316 or approved equivalent

Wall Mounting Bracket

Gusset to allow bolting / welding to deck

Notes

STC - Supplier to Complete

Material shall be suitable for offshore marine environment.

Supplier shall provide test/compliance certificate

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First Aid Box

First aid boxes will be strategically provided within the manned buildings and plant areas. First Aid kit shall contain the items specified in data sheet as a minimum.

A waterproof GRP cabinet of sufficient size and space to contain all the equipment shall be provided. A holder shall be provided inside the cabinet that indicates the contents of the first aid box together with its validity and refill date.

See details of specification in Ref. 12.

Rev

                        Data Sheet For First Aid Kit

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Outdoor / Indoor

SITE CONDITIONS

Ambient Temperature. :

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity. :

as per Site environmental condition

Atmosphere. :

General

Manufacturer

Model No.

Dimensions

Weight

Technical Requirements

Type

Approval

AGES-SP-03-001

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

STC

STC

300mm H X 300mm W X 150mm D ( approx.. Cabinet Dimension)

STC

Industrial First Aid Kit

ANZI Z 308.1 / OSHA / Marine 400 USCG approved

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Rev

                        Data Sheet For First Aid Kit

Instructions

Contents

Required

As a minimum should include the following:

Eyewash Bottles – 2 nos

Clear Plastic Tape 2.5 cm x 5 m Box 12

Washproof Assorted 4 sizes – Box 20 - 40 nos

Saline Cleansing Wipes Bulk - Each – 4 nos

Non-Woven Adhesive Island Dressing – 10 nos

Instant Ice packs - 1 no

Wound Closures 3 x 75 mm x 5 / Card. 1 Card/Pouch -

Ammonia Inhalants- 2 nos

20 nos

Medium Dressing - 1 no

Eye Pads - 2 nos

Low- Adherent Pads - 5nos

Antiseptic Cream – 1 no

Tuffcut Scissors 7.5” x 190mm – 1 no each

Stainless Steel Tweezers– 1 no

2 nos. Vinyl Gloves Powdered

Non-Woven Triangular bandage - 1no

Yellow Self Seal Disposal Bag 200 x 310 mm - Each -

Non-Sterile Cotton Wool - 1 pack

2nos

Elastic Cotton Crepe Bandage - 1no.

First Aid Manual (A4) Complete with the latest

guidelines - EACH

Cabinet Details

Type

Material

Protection

Color

Notes

Portable with wall mounting capabilities with handle and bracket

Fire retardant with stainless steel fittings

Fully enclosed and protected to IP53 with UV resistant GRP

Green

STC - Supplier to Complete

Compliance with ANSI Z308.1 (Latest standard) Type III Mobile Outdoor First Aid Kit.

Cabinet will be stenciled with ‘FIRST AID KIT” (English & Arabic) and First Aid Kit Symbol.

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Stretcher

Details of Stretcher specification are in Ref. 21.

Stretchers will be provided in strategic locations within the manned buildings. Stretchers shall be of collapsible type with floor mounted GRP storage cabinet. Stretchers shall be permanently equipped with bridle in order to be attached to a hoisting gear and thus, suitable for air lift.

Rev

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Site Conditions

Datasheet For Stretcher

Onshore / Offshore / Indoor

Ambient Temperature. :

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity. :

as per Site environmental condition

Atmosphere. :

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

General

Manufacturer

Model No.

Dimensions

Weight

Technical Requirements

Type

Approval

Instructions

Features

AGES-SP-03-001

Collapsible

CE Marked / Approved

Required

Washable bed

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Rev

Datasheet For Stretcher

Foam mattress

Padded head rest

Padded leg rest

Sling points

Personnel securing straps

Plastic cover

Pillow

Blanket

Mounting brackets

Storage Cabinet for stretcher & all its accessories

Colour: Green

Notes

STC - Supplier to Complete

Four integral side carrying handles to be provided allowing two rescuers to carry the casualty.

Stretcher shall have neoprene coated nylon bottom and shall be easily washable.

Manufacturer’s test certificates/compliance certificate shall be furnished by Supplier.

Safety Sign shall be supplied as sticker to be pasted on indoor cabinets.

Safety Shower & Eye Wash

Details of the Safety Shower and Eye Wash specification are in Ref. 11.

Other general requirements are as follows:

The design of the water supply will limit the water supply temperature to 16-38°C (Ref. 20) at the safety

showers and eye-washes.

Self-supporting safety shower units with overhead water tank sized for 15 minutes flow of water at 75 lpm

(20 gpm) for safety shower.

Safety shower shall be pull rod type. The tank material shall be made of medium density polyethylene

with GRP jacket and polyurethane insulation.

The material of construction of all piping shall be brass or stainless steel (non-corrosive).

Chiller shall be provided (wherever required) for the maintenance of water temperature as per ANSI

Z358.1.

The shower head attachments shall be 60˚ and 120˚ spray angles.

Safety shower shall comply to ANSI Z358.1.

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 Safety signs in English and Arabic and/ or pictograms shall be provided in accordance with Ref. 30.

Zone 1 certified junction box (as per area classification) /housing with SS 316L material with suitable

glands and all other accessories.

Rev

Datasheet for Emergency Eyewash & Safety Shower – Self Contained

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Site Conditions

Ambient Temperature.:

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity.:

as per Site environmental condition

Atmosphere.:

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

General

Standard

Manufacturer

Model No.

Dimensions

Weight

ANSI/ISEA Z358.1

STC

STC

STC

STC

Technical Requirements

Type

Mobile Self-Contained

Tank capacity

TBA

Tank Material

GRP or other suitable for outdoor Installation

Insulation

Polyethylene Jacket or approved equivalent

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Rev

Datasheet for Emergency Eyewash & Safety Shower – Self Contained

Drain pan

Approval

NA

ANSI/ISEA Z358.1

Instructions

Required in Arabic & English.

Operating Pressure

2-6 barg (As per Project Specification )

Capacity

Eyewash

Safety shower flow rate: 76 lpm & Eye wash flow rate: 11.4 lpm

Required

Safety Shower Operation

Hand lever / Foot operated

Fluid handled

Potable water

Fluid Temperature

Tepid water as per ANSI Z358.1

Label

Standard signage

Material of construction

Acrylic Capped ABS / Piping -brass or stainless steel (Non corrosive)

Notes

STC - Supplier to Complete

Operating Instruction (in pictogram) shall be provided in Arabic & English.

Manufacturer’s test certificates/compliance certificate shall be furnished by Supplier

The Safety Shower is placed on the area which is exposed to direct sunlight. Hence Safety shower should be

insulated and require a cabinet.

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Rev

Datasheet For Eyewash & Safety Shower (Fixed Type)

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Site Conditions

Ambient Temperature.

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity

as per Site environmental condition

Atmosphere.

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

GENERAL

Manufacturer

ADNOC Approved

Compliance

ANSI Z358.1

Fluid Handled

Portable water

Flow rate

As per ANSI Z358.1.

Technical Requirements

Eye bath fitted with screen filter/strainer Eye bath basin including dust cap

Foot operated

Accessories

Hand operated (pull rod for overhead shower and push flag for eyewash

Approval

Type

ANSI/ISEA Z358.1 / EC Certificate

Plumbed

Inlet portable water connection size 1” (Existing Connection)

Instructions

Required ( Arabic & English)

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Rev

Datasheet For Eyewash & Safety Shower (Fixed Type)

Certification

CSA / ANSI

Notes

STC - Supplier to Complete

Manufacturer’s test certificates/compliance certificate shall be furnished by Supplier.

the combination of eye bath with shower shall be capable of operating both the units simultaneously

Requirement of overhead tanks, refrigeration, alarm and its activation, insulation for the inlet water supply, maximum

allowed temperature etc should be based on the site condition.

Chemical Kit

Chemical kit will be strategically located in plant area and shall contain the following items:

Chemical splash goggles

Chemical resistant gloves

Face shield

Chemical resistant aprons

Chemical resistant boots

Chemical kit cabinets shall be UV resistant and weatherproof. Safety signs (Ref. 30), operating instructions in English and Arabic and/ or pictograms shall be provided.

REV

Client

Plant Location

Location

Quantity

Site Conditions

DATASHEET FOR CHEMICAL HANDLING KIT

Ambient Temperature

as per Site environmental condition

Average Relative Humidity

as per Site environmental condition

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REV

DATASHEET FOR CHEMICAL HANDLING KIT

Atmosphere

Onshore / Offshore Environment (Salt laden and corrosive atmosphere).

General

Manufacturer

Model No.

Dimensions

Weight

Technical Requirements

Type

Approval

Contents

Cabinet Details

Type

Material

Protection

Color & Markings

Notes

STC

STC

STC

STC

STC

Standard compliance Conformity Certificate as relevant

2 nos. Chemical Resistant Glove

2 nos. of goggles (transparent glass)

2 nos. of Chemical suit

Vary based on the Project specific requirement

Lockable, GRP Cabinets, Suitable for wall, handrail & deck mounting, with drain holes

Fire retardant with stainless steel fittings

Fully enclosed and protected to IP53 with UV resistant GRP / equivalent

Green Colour. Cabinet shall be stenciled with “CHEMICAL HANDLING KIT” in Arabic & English.

STC - Supplier to Complete

Cabinets shall have a permanently fixed and durable nameplate listing the cabinet contents in Arabic & English.

Cabinet shall have an arrangement for wall mounting/deck & handrail mounting.

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REV

DATASHEET FOR CHEMICAL HANDLING KIT

Safety sign shall be supplied on 4mm PVC plate to be fixed on cabinet.

STANDARD DRAWINGS

(Not applicable to this Document)

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SECTION E (APPENDICES)

APPENDIX: A CHECKLIST: 1 – ALARM & COMMUNICATION

Ref.

Requirement

Alarm

e r o h s n O

e r o h s f f

O

s d n a l s I

s g n d

i

l i

u B

1.1

Warning of Emergency shall be provided to all persons on the facility, including the Incident Command Centre (ICC) using:









Fire & Gas Alarms (Audio & Visual), initiated automatically and

manually;

Public Address, General Alarm (PAGA) – to muster and possible

Evacuation of facility (Ref. 15), including:

i. Public Address:

 Voice messages;

 Automatic pre-recorded announcements triggered by F&G

system.

ii. General Alarm (plant wide alarm).

 High noise areas shall also have visual signals to alert

personnel of the need to muster.



For areas where direct audible or visual signals are not practicable, alternative arrangements shall be provided to alert personnel of an emergency.

1.2

Audible and Visual Alarms shall be consistent with ADNOC Fire & Gas Detection and Fire Protection Philosophy AGES-PH-03-002









Communication

2.1

Communication between: Incident Commander (IC) as leader of Incident Management Team (IMT), On-scene Commander (OSC) and Tactical Response Team (TRT) - Ref. 47:









IC to OSC/TRT: Intercom system and/or hand-held portable radios may be used.

Switched telephone system may provide a back-up means of

communication.

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Ref.

Requirement

e r o h s n O

e r o h s f f

O

s d n a l s I

s g n d

i

l i

u B

2.2

Communication: IC to external parties and personnel within facility:









Communication arrangements shall be available at the Muster point /TR.

IC shall be based at Incident Command Centre (ICC) during the emergency.

2.3

Onshore:





IC to Emergency Support Team (EST), Ref. 47.

Where EST is not applicable directly to CMT Ref. 47.

Telephone system (microwave link or cable)

2.4

Offshore:





IC to EST, onshore organisations, other offshore facilities & ships. Telephone system (microwave link or cable),

Ship to shore service,

Marine radio or satellite link (e.g. Inmarsat C – International Marine

/Maritime Satellite Organisation);

2.5

Offshore:

IC to Helicopters (Normally used aeronautical systems).

2.6

Offshore:

IC to survival craft:

i. Normally used marine band transceivers.

ii. Survival craft should also be equipped with radio beacon transmitters to assist search and rescue operations.









2.7

The EER Strategy shall describe how all personnel are kept informed of developments whether directly from the person in overall charge (IC) or via, for example, muster checkers at Emergency Stations.









Hardware

3.1

Telecommunication systems provided for normal operation should remain active, provided their continued operation does not create additional hazards.









3.2

Communication facilities shall be in accordance with UAE Telecom.









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Ref.

Requirement

e r o h s n O

e r o h s f f

O

s d n a l s I

s g n d

i

l i

u B

3.3

3.4

Provision of monitoring and control facilities shall be in accordance with Automation and Instrumentation Design Philosophy (Ref. 66).









Table 6-2 shows guidance on the general suitability of various communications system. Other systems may be used provided it can be clearly demonstrated that the functions are fulfilled, subject to Group Company Approval.









3.6

Survivability: The following should be considered to improve survivability following a major accident:









Separation /mechanical protection of communication equipment;

Selection of materials (e.g. fire-resistant cables).

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APPENDIX: B CHECKLIST: 2 – ESCAPE (/EVACUATION ROUTES)

B.1.

Provision of Escape Routes

Ref. Requirement

General

1.1

1.2

Escape routes for Buildings shall comply with the UAE Fire & Life Safety Code (Ref. 45). If the situation is not covered then they shall comply with NFPA 101 (Ref. 33).

Plant Areas (Onshore & Offshore): Unless otherwise specified, the minimum width and height of Escape Routes shall be minimum 1.2m and 2.3m (width and height can be reduced to 1.0m and 2.1m, subject to Group Company Approval, considering special cases such as unmanned wellhead tower, less populated / congested facility where manning is less, etc.)

All means of access shall allow easy passage of personnel wearing self- contained breathing apparatus.

These dimensions shall be verified as adequate by performing an EERA in accordance with Ref. 57.

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The most common significant toxic substance for personnel safety on ADNOC facilities is Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S). Concentrations at emergency levels can cause difficulty in vision and short-term blindness.

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If required, escape sets (EEBA) shall provide 10-15 minutes air and shall be selected in accordance with the ADNOC PPE Standard (Ref. 50) and the Management of H2S (Ref. 51).

1.4

1.5

Escape Routes should be the same as normal access routes to each area (designed for use in emergency without risk of injury to personnel), so far as practicable.

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Safe means of escape shall be provided from all enclosed spaces and open areas (e.g. pipe racks, storage areas, etc.) whether or not these are regularly manned. This shall include all work areas, accommodation, office, recreation areas and TRs.

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Minimum two exits with separate routes from any enclosed or open area of a facility to common Escape Routes.

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From all points on those common Escape Routes to all Muster Areas,

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Evacuation Points and means of Escape from facility (off site or to sea).

1.8

1.9

Escape Routes should form a ring on perimeter of enclosed area(s) to enable choice of routes and direction.

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Choice of stairways should be available between levels, to allow areas to be by-passed.

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Common Escape Routes should be located, wherever practicable external to modules and accommodation.

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Escape Routes from regularly manned areas shall comprise only walkways and stairs.

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1.12

Escape Routes should remain passable by position so far as practicable, and not require special protection (i.e. common Escape Routes should be separated from hazards including explosion panels, sacrificial walls and open hazardous modules as applicable).

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1.13

Escape Routes should not be vulnerable to common mode failure, so far as practicable.

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Design of Escape Route walkways, stairs, handrails, grating etc. (including material of construction) shall be in accordance with Piping Basis of Design (Ref. 63).

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1.15

Offshore Platforms: All corridors that are more than 7 m long as per SOLAS, all accommodation areas and, where practicable, all work areas shall have at least two exits, located as far apart as is practicable, that lead to escape routes)

1.16

Removal/access hatches on deck or any area designated as a laydown area must not be traversed by Escape Routes or Muster Areas.

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All walkways likely to be used as Escape Routes should be level and free of tripping hazards.

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1.18 Where access platforms at different levels and around different items of

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equipment exist, interconnecting walkways, stairways or ladders should be included in order to provide more than one means of Escape from the access platforms in an emergency.

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Escape Route Systems

2.1

2.2

2.3

Escape Routes from all areas should lead personnel to common Escape Routes and then Muster /Evacuation Points as directly as practicable, without presenting them with increased hazard. This shall be considered by reference to identified Major Accident scenarios, as well as under Normal Conditions.

All Escape Routes must permit the transfer of personnel who may be injured including those who may require to be moved by stretcher.

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For common Escape Routes designed for use by personnel who may be transferring to/from different locations of the facility, the effect of any restrictions and cross flows must be considered and eliminated or reduced as necessary. There should be no opposing flows of personnel on any Escape Routes during movement of personnel to Muster Areas or Evacuation Points.

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2.4

All the Escape Routes should allow for the maximum flow of personnel required by the EER strategy during identified Major Accident scenarios.

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Temporary Escape Route Changes

3.1

All Escape Routes must be fully available without obstruction and exit doors along them readily operable at all times.

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Temporary or partial restrictions on Escape Routes to carry out maintenance work (including e.g. use of radiography) are permissible only with the following special precautions.

All personnel must be made aware of any temporary restriction by

announcement and temporary signs.

If the temporary arrangement is considered to cause any significant increased risk to personnel e.g. through reduced number of routes, or increased exposure to potential hazards, then restricted access must be exercised. It is necessary to ensure that the minimum facilities are still available to provide Escape for the identified Major Accident scenarios.

All restrictions (also in combination with other hazards) are monitored centrally and controlled by means of the Permit to Work system.

3.2

Changes in availability of Escape Routes may also occur due to presence or absence of another associated facilities (e.g. offshore flotel or jack-up rig). In such cases alternative arrangements must also be considered to ensure Escape Routes are acceptable.

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3.3

The EERA shall contain sufficient information to enable minimum Escape Route requirements to be identified for the conditions, manning levels and identified Major Accident scenarios, such that any temporary change can be supported

Corridors and Internal Walkways

4.1

Corridors and internal walkways designated as means of access and Escape in process and working areas:

Should be as direct as possible and unobstructed;

Shall comply with UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (for

Buildings, Ref. 45).

Dimensions shall be verified to be adequate by EERA in accordance with Ref. 57.

4.2

4.3

Buildings: Dead end, Travel distance, Common path shall comply with NFPA / UAE Fire & Life Safety Code (Ref. 45)

Requirement for corridors to be subdivided by fire-resisting doors to prevent free travel of smoke along the corridor shall be in accordance with UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (for Buildings, Ref. 45).

External Walkways

5.1

Walkways external to modules and bounded areas, which are common Escape Routes from more than one area or are Evacuation Routes need to consider carrying capacity (e.g. large numbers needing to use an Evacuation Route from the TR in the minimum time).

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Doors and Doorways

6.1

6.2

Every door and doorway along Escape routes from enclosed spaces shall be in accordance with UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (for Buildings, Ref. 45).

Doorway clear opening width shall be in accordance with UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (Ref. 45), or as needed to achieve the required egress capacity, whichever is higher.

6.3

Any access control devices that holds doors in closed position shall be deactivated to open position upon detection of a hazardous situation that

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requires escape.

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6.5

The forces required to fully open any door leaf manually for egress shall not exceed levels defined in the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (Ref. 45).

Any door, which needs to be held open, when fully open, in a means of egress shall not project more than 180 mm into the required width of an aisle, a corridor, a passageway, or a landing, unless the door leaf is equipped with an approved self-closing device and is not required to swing in the direction of egress travel (Ref. 33 & 45).

Emergency Exits

7.1

All emergency exits shall be in accordance with UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice (for Buildings, Ref. 45).

Stairways (external & internal - process and working areas)

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8.4

Escape Routes leading to an upper or lower levels shall be provided in the form of stairways, which shall be maintained free from obstruction.

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Stairway landing areas shall be suitable for handling a stretcher in an emergency.

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Design of stairway landing areas shall ensure railings prevent toppling over the side when changing direction.

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Stairways shall be provided for main access between various levels and for access to platforms that require attendance for operation.

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Fixed Ladders

9.1

9.2

9.3

Ladders shall only be provided as a local Escape Route from an area, which is not regularly manned, or as a means of Escape to the sea.

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Where offering an Escape Route from an area there must be at least one other route comprising walkway /stairs.

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Intermediate landings should be fitted with partial caging permitting side entry.

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9.5

All down ladders at each platform level shall be provided with safety bars to prevent personnel falling through the opening by accident.

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Where access to or from a ladder is from the side or front, the ladder itself shall be extended above the platform level for a distance of not less than 1m. Handholds shall be provided. Side access to ladders shall be provided where possible.

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B.2.

Marking & Lighting of Escape Routes

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General

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Markings and lighting for buildings shall comply with the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code (Ref. 45).

Escape Route markings should consider the effects of dense smoke along with the activity and number of personnel normally occupying an area.

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Accommodation: Smoke logging of cabin access corridors could disorientate awakening personnel. Escape Route markings should be readily identifiable to avoid disorientation. This may require different consideration to that of a process area that is only manned occasionally during operational duties.

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Platform Legs: Areas between legs, which may only have one Escape Route and where smoke hazard is foreseeable, there shall be a high integrity lighting system.

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Escape Route plans showing local routes and orientation to the full plan should be placed in prominent positions around the Installation Escape Routes to assist personnel.

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Escape Route Marking

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2.1

Signs must be available at the start of and at junctions along Escape Routes to indicate the direction of Muster Areas, Evacuation points and Means of Escape to the sea. All signs must be in accordance with the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code (Ref. 45) and ISO 7010 (Ref. 30), and must incorporate diagrammatic demonstrations.

2.2

Signs should be located as follows:

All emergency exit doors should be provided with EMERGENCY EXIT signs of either luminescent or photoluminescent type.

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Arrows to indicate direction of travel of sliding doors or PUSH/PULL signs should be fitted to all normally opening doors and emergency exit doors.

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Arrows (luminescent/photoluminescent) on the handrails of external walkways showing:

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2.2.2

2.2.3

2.2.4

Route to Escape stairs (also at head and foot of stairs)

2.2.5

Changes of direction

2.2.6

Intersection of Escape Routes

2.2.7

Continuity of Escape Routes

2.2.8

Directions to Muster Areas and Evacuation points.

2.2.9

Luminescent/photoluminescent markers showing the position of door handles on:

2.2.10

Emergency exit doors

2.2.11

Doors of rooms having frequent usage by large number of personnel (e.g. dining room, locker room, cinema etc.)

2.2.12

Accommodation cabin doors

2.2.13

Toilet doors.

2.2.14

Electro-luminescent markers or high intensity LED signs at low level in corridors and in enclosed areas to show Escape Routes (in case of

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smoke).

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2.2.15

The outer limits of any obstruction on any Escape Route.

2.3

Where Escape Routes pass through areas of a facility where the route is not clearly defined by walls or other boundaries this should be clearly marked by tramlines, indicating the width of the Escape Route, on the deck /floor.

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Methods of Marking

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3.1

Only approved methods of Escape Route markings are to be utilised. Recommended applications are as follows.

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3.2

Buildings (Offices, Control Rooms, Accommodation, etc.).

3.2.1

Corridors

Electroluminescent Escape Route Lighting strip or High Intensity Light Emitting Diode (LED) Escape Route Lighting strip on lower bulkhead to indicate Escape Routes with arrows, indicating direction of travel. Electroluminescent or High Intensity LED EXIT signs on or adjacent to doors.

3.2.2

Cabin /Toilet Doors

Luminescent /photoluminescent marker dots at door handles.

3.2.3

Major Usage Doors, e.g. Cinema, Mess

Electroluminescent EXIT signs or High Intensity LED EXIT signs on or adjacent to door.

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External Areas

3.3.1

Escape Stairs

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Luminescent/photoluminescent signs at top and foot of stairs and to direct personnel to the stairs.

3.3.2

Escape Routes

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Luminescent/photoluminescent signs at changes of direction and intersections.

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3.3.3

Muster Areas

Luminescent/photoluminescent signs giving directions to Muster Areas.

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Evacuation points

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Electroluminescent or high intensity LED signs giving directions to TEMPSC /Helideck.

3.4

Process Areas

3.4.1

Escape Routes (General)

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Photoluminescent painted `tramlines’ to EXIT doors, with arrows indicating direction of travel. Luminescent or photoluminescent signs at changes of direction and intersections. Luminescent or photoluminescent EXIT signs on Module doors.

3.4.2

Escape Routes (within Platform Legs)

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Electroluminescent Escape Route Lighting strip or High Intensity LED Signs or direction markers at changes of direction on Escape Route.

3.4.3

Escape Stairs

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Luminescent/photoluminescent signs at top and foot of stairs and to direct personnel to the stairs

Escape Route Lighting

4.1

4.2

Sufficient lighting shall be provided to ensure the safety of personnel in areas of operational control, Escape Routes and Evacuation points, covering normal and emergency conditions.

When both main and emergency power sources have been lost minimum lighting sufficient to enable controlled movement of personnel (average 10.8 lux) should be provided from an independent system for 90 minutes (NFPA 101, Ref. 33), or based on EERA, whichever is higher.

This shall be done by using integral batteries rated to maintain the lighting levels as defined in Ref. 65.

The minimum period shall be verified by EERA and increased if required.

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B.3.

Protection of Escape Routes

Table 23-1: Detailed Requirements – Protection of Escape Routes

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The following Escape Routes must remain passable for the required time

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during a Major Accident scenario:

i. Each area of the Installation to the TR(s) or

ii. The TR(s) to each readily accessible Evacuation point,

If this is not possible (as assessed in EERA), then this must be dealt with in one of two ways (in order of preference):

i. Make modifications to remove the scenario or reduce its consequences to ensure its integrity remains intact;

ii. Modify the Escape Route to ensure its integrity remains intact.

1.2

Ventilation systems should be designed to maintain any enclosed Escape Routes at a higher pressure relative to adjacent areas to help control the flow of smoke, gas and other airborne contaminants.

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This feature of ventilation arrangements shall be treated as critical for safety and managed in accordance with Ref. 53, as part of the relevant HSCES.

Note: These should not be relied upon in EER strategies since they could be shut-down in certain circumstances.

B.4.

Special Cases

Table 23-2: Detailed Requirements – Special Cases

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Special cases must be considered where constraints cannot be readily designed out. The aim in special cases is that the overall risk to personnel in these areas is generally equivalent to other areas.

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1.2

Where basic structural design prevents diversity and the requirement for personnel attendance is infrequent e.g. periodic maintenance access within platform legs, distillation columns, etc.

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In these situations, one fixed route, which may involve ladders in place of stairs/walkways, may be acceptable, but only with additional special measures such as:

Access restricted to suitably trained and experienced personnel

Procedural control including access and contingencies

Special contingency plans (e.g. use of breathing apparatus).

Such deviations from the Piping Design Basis (Ref. 63) shall be supported by appropriate justification and Risk Assessment.

1.3

Increased numbers of personnel (e.g. an accommodation area). Here the number of routes may need to be increased in order to provide an acceptable transfer time or to permit Escape to the required destinations.

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UAE Fire & Life Safety Code (Ref. 45) covers the size and adequacy of Escape routes for the number of persons involved for buildings.

The default limit for those areas considered to be small may be taken as less than 12 m² in area or for corridors less than 7m in length.

Escape Routes to sea level: From the last level of normal personnel use, ladders and/or other devices may be used in place of stairs/walkways. This is allowed here on the basis that for Evacuation and Escape systems in compliance with the rest of this Specification, these facilities will be very rarely used.

Helideck Escape Routes: There shall be a minimum of two routes of access /Escape approximately equidistant around the helideck (Ref. 42). The purpose is to always permit Escape upwind in the event of a helicopter incident on the helideck.

Any local control rooms within modules should be located adjacent to the external wall with direct access to the outside of the module.

In the case of a galley, at least one of the exits should be to the outside and directly onto a common Escape Route.

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

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Office and Administration buildings shall comply with the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code (Ref. 45) with respect to people determination.

Escape from Inside Platform Legs

2.1

Normal means of Escape from internally accessible platform legs shall be by the stairs or fixed ladders. Lifts, where installed, shall not be used for Escape purposes though they may be used to move injured personnel. Such lifts shall meet the design requirements set out in ‘Lifts and Hoists’ below, of this Specification except that they shall be powered from the Emergency Services Switchboard.

2.2

In addition:

Sufficient lighting, including emergency lighting shall be provided

throughout normally accessible areas of the legs;

Telephone communication shall be provided between the leg entry point

and the different working levels in the leg;

Handrails on landings shall be fitted with directional arrows towards the

direction of Escape.

2.3

To cover those situations where lifts may be inoperable, or where the condition of the injured personnel makes lift access impractical, other means of Escape shall be provided.

If required based on the EERA, some of the following options may be explored: Portable air driven winches suitable for man riding and equipped with an air reservoir are recommended for this purpose.

Permanent lifting points (pad eyes) should be fitted at identified locations

to allow fast rigging of winch wires.

2.4

A sufficient number of suitable stretchers should be positioned at selected locations for use in conjunction with the air driven winches, based on likely requirements to move injured personnel. Where practicable tensioned guide wires should be available within the legs to facilitate vertical lifting of stretchers.

Lifts and Hoists

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Lifts and hoists shall not be used as a planned means of Escape, but the design of lifts and lift shafts shall take into account the possibility of lifts being

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in use if an emergency occurs.

3.2

Lifts within the accommodation shall be contained in a lift shaft (lift well enclosure), which shall be of fire resisting construction and have suitable fire rated access doors.

Construction of lift shaft will depend upon its location and the classification of adjacent space and may be required to be more than A0 Fire Rating - refer to IMO SOLAS, Chapter II-2 Regulation 26, 2.2(2) (Ref. 1). UAE Fire & Life Safety Code (Ref. 45).

3.3

The design of lifts shall incorporate the following features:

Accommodation module lifts shall have override controls to allow the

transport of injured personnel to or from the sick bay and to the helideck;

Emergency Escape hatches shall be fitted in the ceiling of each lift,

together with suitable access.

3.4

Lift shafts shall have a means of Escape provided by:

Fixed vertical ladders at the side to provide possible Escape Routes

should all other Escape Routes fail, and to allow persons trapped in a lift to Escape, and/or

Kick out panels onto surrounding stairs.

3.5

This shall be considered in conjunction with the likely Escape situations identified.

Preparation of Escape Route Plans

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4.1

The Escape Route Plans shall be available at strategic locations to guide personnel in an emergency.

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APPENDIX: C CHECKLIST: 3 – MUSTER AREAS (COMMON REQUIREMENTS)

Table 23-3 contains detailed requirements that are common for all muster areas (outdoors and enclosed TRs). Additional requirements specific to an enclosed muster space provided by a TR are covered in APPENDIX: D .

Table 23-3: Detailed Requirements – Muster Areas (Common Requirements)

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Basis of Design & Functional Requirements

• General & Primary Muster Areas

All Muster Areas should be at safe location, either by distance from the potential major accident or at a designated enclosure (/TR) designed to give appropriate protection.

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1.2

Two designations are assigned for Muster Areas:

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Primary Muster Areas (location to be the first point of Assembly);

Secondary Muster Areas (alternative location, in case the emergency prevents the individuals from reaching the Primary Muster Area).

1.3

1.4

1.5

Multiple Muster Areas (Primary & Secondary) may be required at a facility to allow them to be assigned to individuals considering their place of work relative to the hazards, the size of the facility, seasonal changes in prevailing wind direction, etc.

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Emergency Stations: These are locations where personnel with emergency duties will go in response to an emergency alarm, as included in the Station Bill.

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Where an Emergency Station is not situated at a Muster Area /TR, it must also be possible for these individuals with emergency duties to subsequently reach their Primary or Secondary Muster Area /TR from the Emergency Station they are attending.

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1.6

The siting of all Muster Areas and size of muster groups should be compatible with likely subsequent Escape and Evacuation processes.

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For example, muster groups should correspond to TEMPSC /evacuation vehicle complements and the muster locations should be selected to facilitate movement of people out of the Muster Area to their designated TEMPSC /vehicle.

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Requirement

1.7

The available floor space at Muster Areas must make allowance for the maximum number of personnel under realistic emergency conditions and allow for any necessary movement through the area (e.g. donning appropriate PPE, treating casualties, etc.). The following guidelines shall apply:

Muster Area – outdoors (minimum):

i.

0.35m2 per Person (without PPE)

ii. 0.75m2 per person (with PPE)

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Where analysis of scenarios shows that personnel may not be able to reach the Primary Muster Area and the level of risk is unacceptable then a design change shall be required.

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The following options should be considered, and the risk demonstrated to be ALARP.

Eliminate the potential hazard leading to the Major Accident scenario.

Implement measures to reduce the hazard effects (/consequences) such that reaching the Muster Area is achievable.

Provide fixed means of protection to enable the Primary Muster Area to

be reached during the scenario.

Provide a Secondary Muster Area(s) with its associated means of

communication with the ICC and the Primary Muster Area.

1.9

Third party interface areas such as product loading facilities, should have their own Muster Areas and separate from plant Muster Areas. Accordingly, this shall be included in the planning of overall Evacuation.

1.10

Impairment criteria for Escape Routes, Muster areas /TR and Evacuation measures are presented in the EERA Standard (Ref. 57).

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2.1

Basis of Design & Functional Requirements (Secondary /alternative Muster Areas)

The purpose of Secondary Muster Areas is to provide an independent alternative should a Major Accident affect the Primary Muster Area(s) or access to it.

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2.2

Accident scenarios that prevent muster at the Primary Muster Area shall be identified.

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Requirement

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2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

The Secondary Muster Areas should be completely separate from the Primary Muster Areas.

Any potential hazards and Major Accidents that can affect Secondary Muster Areas shall be identified.

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If Secondary Muster Areas are away from the Primary Muster Area, they need not provide the same level of facilities as the Primary Muster Area but shall be able to protect personnel for the duration required, either to bring the incident under control or to allow controlled evacuation to be carried out.

Considering the above, Evacuation Points may provide suitable locations for Secondary Muster Areas.

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A description of how to use the Secondary Muster Areas shall be included in the EER Strategy (EERS).

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For a fully controlled Evacuation, the decision to utilise the Secondary Muster Areas should normally be made by the person in overall charge (Incident Commander – IC)

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Basis of Design & Functional Requirements (Low POB Facilities)

3.1

On low POB facilities where the accommodation / TR are on the same platform, a rapid evacuation philosophy may be adopted.

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The EERA shall demonstrate that the protection provided by the TR exceeds the time required to safely evacuate the facility

Command Support (Control & Communication)

4.1

Essential Functions - Incident Command Centre (ICC)

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The following essential functions shall be provided at the Incident Command Centre (ICC):

4.1.1

Ability to communicate with all personnel at all Muster Areas and Evacuation Points.

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4.1.2

Two-way voice communications with Emergency Stations at the Primary and Secondary Muster Areas, for the endurance period of these areas.

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Requirement

4.1.3

Ability to request third party assistance.

4.1.4

Ability to communicate with Main Control Room to make Public Address announcements and initiate Fire & Gas /General Alarms.

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4.1.5

Ability to monitor fire, smoke and accidentally released toxic and flammable gases which may affect the functionality of Muster Areas, Escape Routes leading to Evacuation Points and the Evacuation Points themselves.

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4.1.6

Provision of (emergency) power e.g. from batteries, for those systems necessary to fulfil essential and Installation specific command support functions.

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4.1.7

The provision of (emergency) lighting to carry out all the functions required at the ICC (note that the loss of individual luminaries will not necessarily result in loss of integrity).

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4.2

Essential Functions - Primary and Secondary Muster

4.2.1

Two-way communication from the Emergency Station at each Muster Area (Primary and Secondary) with the ICC, and between Muster Areas.

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4.2.2

Provision of (emergency) power e.g. from batteries, for those systems necessary to fulfil essential and Installation specific command support functions at the Muster Areas.

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4.2.3

Provision of (emergency) lighting at Muster Areas.

4.2.4

Ability to determine physical condition of Escape Routes leading to Evacuation Points and the condition of Evacuation Points themselves.

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4.3

Communication, Monitoring & Control Functions

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Requirement

4.3.1 Offshore Islands and Onshore:

The means adopted for the fulfilment of each function will vary depending on the Installation location, operational mode, etc.

It may be possible to fulfil certain of the essential and additional communications, monitoring and control functions using more than one means.

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The means adopted for the fulfilment of each function will vary depending on the Installation location, operational mode, etc.

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It may be possible to fulfil certain of the essential and additional communications, monitoring and control functions using more than one means.

4.3.3

The provision of additional communications, monitoring and control functions, which are beneficial to effective management of major incident scenarios should be considered. These include:

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4.3.4

Person to person communications at the facility;

4.3.5 Communication between the ICC and the primary land base;

4.3.6 Communication between ICC and adjacent pipeline connected facilities;

4.3.7 Communication with gangway connected facilities;

4.3.8

The ability to determine the physical condition of the Evacuation Point.

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APPENDIX: D CHECKLIST: 4 – TEMPORARY REFUGE (TR)

D.1.

Summary of Key Design Requirements

Table 23-4 is a summary of key aspects that require attention for the design of a TR. They are summarised to tie- in with the main focus areas of the EERA Standard (Ref. 57):

Life Support

Structural Protection

Essential Command.

Detailed Requirements are presented in Sections D.2 to D.12.

Table 23-4: Summary of Key TR Design Requirements

Aspect

Description

Life Support

Basis of Design & Functional Requirements

Toxic Gas Ingress (H2S): <5ppmv;

Ref.

Section D.3

TR duration (based on the outcomes of HSE Studies, for e.g.- EERA Study )

Toxic Gas Ingress (other): AEGL 2 (for required endurance time, 60mins minimum);

Oxygen Concentration: 21% and should not drop below17%;

Carbon dioxide accumulation: < 2% v;

Heat Exhaustion: Temperature maintained at 23-25ºC;

Ventilation rate for occupants: 1.4m3/hr per person;

The design leakage rate for new TRs shall not exceed 0.1 air changes per hour. The

measured leakage rate shall not exceed the design rate by 20 %.

Pressure: 50Pa (in TR), 25Pa (inside airlock);

Compliance with latest edition of the Life Safety Code, NFPA 101;

TR footprint requirements (based on no of people to muster):

i.

0.8 m2 per person for less than 20 people;

ii. 1.25 m2 per person for 20 or more people.

The above areas do not include common space (e.g. escape walkway within the TR, cylinder / PPE storage, EER supporting items, etc.), which shall be additional to the above mentioned areas.

The space provided may be reduced subject to Group Company Approval with justification, but shall not be less than 0.35 m2 (/0.75 m2 with PPE) per person if the TR endurance period is very short (<30 mins) prior to evacuation and for less than 20 people..

Minimum volume shall be 1.4 m3 (50 ft3) of air per person per hour of TR endurance;

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Description

Ref.

Toxic or other related Hazard – Breathing Air System consist of Pressurised

Breathing air cylinder system for TR pressurisation and breathing Cylinder capacity – 1x 100% with 100% Redundancy.

20% contingency in compressed air cylinders (if provided for toxic hazard);

Flammable gas ingress (<1000 ppm).

Smart airlocks;

Air purging inside airlocks;

Gas sealed / Air Tight building;

Pressure relief dampers at TR and airlock.

If a secondary TR it required, the following shall be provided:

i. Communication with the IMT;

ii. Communication with the primary TR;

iii. Monitoring conditions on the designated evacuation route

Life Support

Air Supply & HVAC

Secure source of Breathing Air supply (may require pressurised Breathing air

cylinders in case of Toxic hazard, manage as an HSCES (LS-05), see Ref. 53);

Design Margin for selection of HVAC equipment shall be 10% for Sensible Heat, 10% for Latent Heat and 10% for Heating (if required) and two units shall be considered of 100% capacity each;

Ventilation rate for occupants shall be considered as 1.4 m3/hr per person;

HVAC units, motorized doors, door locks

Gas/ Fire dampers.

HVAC design shall comply HVAC design standard such as ASHRAE and NFPA.

Special TR HVAC requirement shall meet all the emergency operation requirement with pressurised breathing air system as applicable.

HVAC unit (If located outdoor) Hazardous area classification as per outcomes of HSE Studies (e.g.- emergency dispersion modelling study)..

HVAC system reliable operation with redundancy shall be ensured on the relevant

operation scenarios.

Life Support

Health & Welfare

Adequate food and drinking water for all the personnel;

Toilets / Washrooms;

Capability of accommodating personnel on a stretcher. Number to be finalized during

Project Stage;

First aid kit suitable for the rated capacity;

Section D.7

Section D.8

Section D.12

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Description

Ref.

Maintain comfortable room temperature (23-25ºC) and humidity (50%); As per HVAC

Design Basis.

Acceptable noise level as per ADNOC Standard;

Portable fire extinguishers;

Portable automatic oxygen resuscitator;

Section D.10

Section D.10

Section D.5

Additional escape sets for the personnel to secure means for a complete evacuation

Structural Protection

from the TR.

Civil, Structural & Architectural

EERA (supported by FERA, QRA, ESSA), to define:

i. TR Endurance Time;

ii. Blast Overpressure;

iii. Fire Rating.

iv. Toxic and flammable gas protection requirements.

Gas/ Airtight construction; for e.g. - all the Multi Cable Transit (MCT) blocks shall be fire/ blast rated (outcomes of Safety Studies), Gas Tight/ Air tight for the TR building.

Over-pressurization protection i.e., able to safely discharge excess air from TR;

Signage requirements for the means of access and egress.

Hazardous Area

Hazardous Areas

Essential Command

All the TR related outdoor equipment that may be impacted by a gas release and required to operate during an emergency shall be certified for Zone 1.

Monitoring & Emergency Control Systems:

The Main Control Room shall provide the emergency functions (e.g. shutdown &

blowdown, etc.) required to manage the emergency.

If the main Incident Command Centre (ICC) is not part of the primary TR, then the Primary TR shall further assessed to have the functions of ICC, for e.g.- Emergency Control Point (including shutdown & blowdown), Emergency Communication system etc. based on the outcomes of HSE Studies etc.

For the emergency functions of TR (for e.g. -communication facilities required to be

maintained in the TR), it shall be noted that the corresponding main system equipment/ cabinets (electrical, instrumentation, telecom etc.) if installed and located outside the TR, shall remain unaffected and fully functional (gas/ air tight, fire/ explosion rated) during a plant emergency scenario. The study shall include verification of this aspect and appropriate upgrade/ protection/ modification of these buildings shall be engineered and implemented

The Emergency Radio Room shall provide communication for the IC to coordinate with Emergency Staging Areas, all personnel on facility and with relevant off-site parties.

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Description

Ref.

The ICC shall be able communicate with the Main Control Room and the Emergency

Radio Room and to relevant off-site parties to perform the required emergency duties.

Positive pressure detection;

Multi-sensor portable gas detector (gas detected: H2S, HC, O2, CO2, CO, SO2 etc.)

inside TR room;

Fixed Toxic and Flammable detection inside each airlock room & HVAC air

intake;(including smoke detection, e.g –point Optical)

Smoke, fire and gas (hydrocarbon & toxic) detection as applicable;

Portable gas detectors inside the TR;

Monitoring Requirements;

i.

Internal and external concentrations of O2, CO, CO2, H2S, SO2 & flammable gases;

ii. Monitor and close TR boundary HVAC fire dampers.

iii.

Internal and external atmospheric temperature;

iv.

Internal positive pressure;

v. Operating hours / Time remaining;

vi. TR utility support equipment status;

vii. Communication system.

Telecoms:

Communication system, including:

i. Emergency Radio Point;

ii. Public Address / General Alarm (PAGA)

iii. Telephone

Back up communication systems.

Electrical:

Emergency lighting (self-contained power backup)

Interior lighting to access equipment

Emergency (generator backed) power -TR / HVAC;

Section D.6

Section D.7

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) for control & critical loads of TR panel;

Power backup for emergency communication and Emergency lighting.

Toxic Gas refuge, if supplied as package unit should be provided with standalone system and all the necessary utilities for its independent operation. Power to be ensured during TR endurance time.

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Description

Ref.

Equipment

100% standby shall be considered for all the safety critical application equipment.

Spare

D.2.

Introduction

D.2.1.

Purpose

The purpose of this Appendix is to provide minimum requirements and guidelines for the design of a Temporary Refuge (TR), taking note of hazard types that may affect the enclosure (fire, smoke, heat, explosion, toxic, flammable etc.). It should be noted that a TR also includes protection against toxic exposure if this hazard is present (sometimes also known as Toxic Gas Refuge – TGR).

The requirements for a TR shall be based on EERA assessment, which shall be implemented in accordance with details in this Appendix and other relevant standards and procedures. Any deviation from codes and standards shall be brought to the attention of COMPANY and shall require formal approval to deviate.

The guidance in this Appendix is written for new buildings as well as conversions of existing buildings, where minimising the impact on existing facilities is important. The Specification is also applicable to a standalone containerised TR system where all the relevant Life support systems shall be ensured.

The required Endurance Period of a TR shall be established and confirmed by an EERA study in accordance with Ref. 57.

Impairment criteria for the TR are presented in the EERA Standard (Ref. 57) and are therefore not included in this Appendix.

D.2.2.

Scope

This guidance is applicable to all ADNOC operation (Onshore, Offshore, Islands) and covers the following main elements of an enclosure to be used as a TR:

Basis of Design;

Functional Requirements;

Air Supply;

HVAC requirements;

Control System;

Telecommunications;

Electrical;

Civil, Structural and Architectural;

Hazardous Area Classification;

Health, Safety & Welfare.

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TR Basis of Design

Ref.

Requirement

All facilities shall provide a TR designated as the Primary TR.

A Secondary TR shall be provided in case personnel are not able to reach the Primary TR during a Major Emergency.

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Key factors affecting the design of a TR are:

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No. of persons in TR;

Endurance Period of TR (to be established and confirmed by EERA, Ref.

57).

i. EERA shall be used to assess the adequacy of:

ii. Loss of Life Support

iii. Loss of Structure

iv. Loss of Essential Command Support

v. Loss of Escape Routes (not covered in this Appendix, see Section 6.2

& APPENDIX: B .

Based on the EERA assessment, TR criteria and protection requirement

such as - Hydrocarbon (HC), Smoke, Fire, Blast and Toxic to be considered

Secure source of Breathable Air (e.g. compressed air cylinders if required

for toxic hazard);

Dependencies & interactions:

i. Power & Emergency power;

ii. UPS;

iii. HVAC;

iv.

Integrated Control & Safety System (ICSS, includes ESD System, F&G System).

Constraints of existing facilities to be noted.

Space requirement:

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Based on maximum persons expected to be protected (or max POB);

Adequate space for maximum headcount anticipated:

TR footprint requirements (based on no of people to muster):

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0.8 m2 per person for less than 20 people;

ii. 1.25 m2 per person for 20 or more people.

The above areas do not include common space (e.g escape walkway within the TR, cylinder /PPE storage, EER supporting items, etc), which shall be additional to the above mentioned areas.

The space provided may be reduced subject to Group Company Approval with justification but shall not be less than 0.35m2 (/0.75m2 with PPE) per person if the TR endurance period is very short (<30mins) prior to evacuation and for less than 20 people.

Based on oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide build-up, the minimum volume of an enclosed TR shall be 1.4 m3 (50 ft3) of air per person per hour of TR endurance.

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D.4.

TR Functional Requirements

Ref.

Requirement

TR Design Objectives

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1.1

A TR shall be designed to provide a safe location where personnel can muster for a defined period of time and have access to:

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Communications;

Monitoring and emergency control equipment for personal safety;

Protection from hazardous effects (endurance period sufficient to

evacuate facility, or to bring the emergency under control).

1.2

If there is a significant of toxic hazard affecting the TR, then secure Breathing Air facilities shall be provided (and maintained through regular testing). This shall be managed as an HSCES (LS-05), as described in Ref. 53.

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Key Design Functions

Key functions in response to Major Accident (fire, smoke, heat, explosion, toxic / flammable exposure, etc.) are to provide:

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Place where personnel can muster,

In case of toxic hazard, be capable of continuing to support life for the required endurance period;

Place where key operational people can take safe shutdown action of entire plant /facilities (unless there is a separate Control Room at another safe location);

Structural integrity against fire, heat, blast overpressure, and smoke /gas

ingress;

All essential incident emergency command and communication support;

Smoke, fire and gas (hydrocarbon & toxic) detection;

Emergency lighting and power backup for equipment essential for the

TR operation;

HVAC units, motorized doors, door locks, etc.

Sufficient space inside TR for stretchers, first aid equipment, portable

automatic oxygen resuscitator, drinking water, toilet, etc.

TR Key Facilities

The following facilities shall be provided in the TR as a minimum, but not limited to these.

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Air Supply

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Secure Breathing Air supply (e.g. from a safe area, or compressed breathing air cylinders);

If protection is required against a toxic hazard, Breathing Air supply to the TR shall comply with requirements stated in Ref 51 (ADNOC ‘Management of Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) Standard, HSE-OS-ST21). This covers the following main elements:

Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus;

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus;

Breathing Air-Line Apparatus

Face fit testing.

If compressed Breathing Air cylinders are required, 20% spare capacity of breathing air cylinder storage shall be provided in excess of actual requirement. 100% standby shall be considered for all critical application equipment including breathing air cylinders.

Breathing air production compressor air quality standard shall be ensured and shall meet EN12021 (Ref. 23) or Company approved standard.

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Requirement

3.2

Main Building Features_

TR occupancy shall be as per design basis;

Smart airlocks;

Air purging inside airlocks;

Gas sealed / Air tight, Blast / Fire rated building;

( e.g.- All the Multi Cable Transit (MCT) blocks shall be fire/ blast rated, Gas Tight/ Air tight for the TR building as per impact safety assessment)

Pressure relief dampers at TR and airlock.

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The design leakage rate for new TRs shall not exceed 0.1 air changes per hour. Achieving this target will be assisted by the use of dampers complying with ISO 15138 (Ref. 25) and EN 1751 Class 3 Class B (Ref. 32).

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3.4

The measured leakage rate shall not exceed the design rate by 20 %.

Heat stress, oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide build-up also affect the space requirement for TRs, see (EERA Standard, Ref. 57). These aspects shall be checked and ensured in combination with spacing & HVAC design requirements.

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The resulting volume of the TR should be checked to confirm that there are no unintended consequences resulting from thermal stress under external thermal loads.

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The EER assessment should determine the space required for casualty handling and stretchers.

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3.5

3.6

3.7

HVAC

4.1

The TR is categorized as an HSECES (ER01) in Ref. 53.

In order for it to remain un-impaired for the Endurance Period, the TR must also be protected against smoke and gas ingress. Two protection measures are available for an enclosed TR:

Sealing of the TR enclosure;

Pressurisation of the TR enclosure.

In almost all cases, a well-sealed TR can provide some protection against smoke ingress without HVAC pressurization and this approach is recommended since it avoids reliance on ‘active’ systems.

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4.2

For a well-sealed TR, smoke ingress via the HVAC systems should be

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prevented by closure of HVAC dampers of the HVAC system immediately upon detection of a fire to prevent risk of smoke ingress inside the TR.

4.3

Positive pressurization shall be maintained even after gas detection.

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Upon gas detection at HVAC air intake / air lock, HVAC dampers shall be shut off and the HVAC should be switched to recirculation mode.

The TR HVAC system shall be capable of running in re-circulation mode to provide comfort to personnel within the TR. As the HVAC unit is expected to operate during emergency, it shall be installed inside the TR building /shelter with gas tight dampers or shall be Zone 1, IIB, T3* rated if the unit is to be installed outside (* if impacted by a Hydrocarbon / H2S (LEL if applicable) release scenario engulfing the TR).

4.4

The alarm and control facilities should enable the location of any TR damper that has failed to close to be readily identified so that it may be closed manually.

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4.5

Toxic Gas Refuge (TGR):

HVAC system, breathing air system (emergency pressurization system and breathing air), standalone electric system (UPS+batteries), Control system, support facilities (medical kit, water and toilet) and accessories as relevant to ensure the TGR integrity for the endurance period.

Existing building or Modularised Container (standalone Package) shall meet all the impact scenarios and outdoor emergency hazardous area classification.

The fresh air intake to be 100% redundant and is to be designed to prevent ingress of gas using F&G detection close the dampers.

Indoor air quality is to be ensured during recirculation mode by HVAC with necessary filtration as applicable.

4.6

Measures must be taken against heat stress following HVAC shutdown.

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In case of Gas detection at HVAC inlet or near to the TR, HVAC will go into recirculation mode with Breathing Air cylinder system operational. Power and UPS requirement shall be ensured as part of TR integrity.

4.7

4.8

Provision must be made to manually restart and shutdown the HVAC from the TR by authorised personnel.

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The TR should also be well sealed for protection against gas ingress. However, in addition, it should be practicable to maintain pressurization until gas is detected at the HVAC inlet provided that:

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A detailed assessment has been made to establish a suitable location

for the HVAC inlet

The alarm levels for the gas detectors at the HVAC inlet are set to

provide a fast response.

4.9

Fire dampers in the ductwork associated with the air conditioning unit;

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Gas shut-off dampers in the fresh air inlet and outlet ducting;

Blast resistant / fire rated dampers at TR and airlock;

All TR dampers shall provide warning and be identifiable if they do not

shut when required.

Emergency Control & Instrumentation

5.1

The Main Control Room shall provide the emergency functions (e.g. shutdown & blowdown, etc.) required to manage the emergency.

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If the main Incident Command Centre (ICC) is not part of the primary TR, then the Primary TR shall further assessed to have the functions of ICC

For the emergency functions of TR (for e.g. -communication facilities required to be maintained in the TR), it shall be noted that the corresponding main system equipment/ cabinets (electrical, instrumentation, telecom etc.) if installed and located outside the TR, shall remain unaffected and fully functional (gas/ air tight, fire/ explosion rated) during a plant emergency scenario. The study shall include verification of this aspect and appropriate upgrade/ protection/ modification of these buildings shall be engineered and implemented.

The Emergency Radio Room shall work in conjunction with the ICC to provide communication with Emergency Staging Areas, all personnel at the facility and with relevant off-site parties.

The ICC shall be able communicate with the Main Control Room and the Emergency Radio Room and to relevant off-site parties to perform the required emergency duties

5.2

5.3

5.4

Differential Pressure transmitters inside the TR and Air locks shall be sufficient in number to provide reliable detection and appropriate redundancy;

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Multi-sensor portable gas detector (gas detected: H2S, O2, CO2, CO, SO2 etc.,) inside TR room;

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Fixed smoke detectors and, if toxic/flammable hazard is present, H2S detectors at airlocks and at air intake (Including smoke detectors);

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Requirement

5.5

TR Activation Alarm (Visual & Audible Alarms):

Manual pushbutton

F&G Detection (e.g. HVAC inlet, air locks, within TR, etc.).

Electrical Power

6.1

Emergency Generator-backed power for air conditioning equipment;

6.2

Redundant UPS power supply for the control section and critical loads of the TR panel;

6.3

Power backup for communication, Emergency lighting.

Health, Safety & Welfare

7.1

First aid kit;

7.2

Portable automatic oxygen resuscitator;

7.3

Additional escape sets for the personnel to secure means for a complete evacuation from the TR;

7.4

Stretchers;

7.4

Drinking water;

7.5

Toilets / Washrooms

7.6

Safety Signs (location & type) shall be suitable for smoke and instantly distinguishable from all other escape signs (Ref. 30).

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TR Control System

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Requirement

Key Systems

1.1

See above, Section D.4, Item 0.

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1.3

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2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

The Incident Command Centre (ICC) and the ‘Emergency Radio Point’ should normally be adjacent to each other, to facilitate effective management of incidents.

The command support functions within the ‘Emergency Control Point’ /’Emergency Radio Point’ should be secured against unauthorised use.

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Key Hardware Requirements

All TR Instrument signals and F&G devices shall be hardwired to TR Control Panel

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F&G functions and TR control function shall be segregated meeting IEC 61508 (Ref. 43) /61511 (Ref. 44) requirements.

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Separate I/O cards shall be used for connecting TR signals and F&G signals with segregation for associated hardware components.

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The TR Control panel shall be microprocessor-based architecture and shall be provided with CPU, interface modules for analogue-digital inputs/outputs, power supply modules, communication modules, cables and connection between components etc.

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The logic solver shall be certified for SIL-3, and where possible should be part of the ICSS.

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Redundancy shall be provided for the following items to ensure the ICSS architecture achieves SIL-3:

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Power supply,

CPU,

Communication modules,

I/O modules etc

2.7

Interfacing of new TR Control Panel shall be as follows:

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TR Control Panel shall be part of the ICSS and shall be interfaced with any new and existing F&G system, HVAC Panels, and other items that are required to perform TR functions.

The PLC shall include all the required hardware and software to perform

all the logic and control functions for the TR.

Interfaces between the TR Control Panel and the any existing FACP shall be hardwired.

All the TR status and monitoring signals shall be transmitted to the F&G

operator workstations, which should be via F&G HMI network.

If the TR Control Panel requires interface to an ICSS, then this shall be via a F&G Network.

The TR graphics, alarms and MOS shall be configured in an appropriate

Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) system.

Flammable Gas (hydrocarbon) Detection

3.1

The HC detectors shall be point type (Ref. 61, Part 2).

3.2

The set point for HC gas detector shall comply with Ref. 61, Part 2.

HC gas detectors shall be provided inside the airlock to monitor the space and take appropriate actions (i.e. 2oo3 HC gas detection shall close motorised inlet duct dampers and initiate flammable gas audio and visual alarms).

3.3

3.4

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Fixed HC gas detectors shall be provided at the air intakes to monitor for flammable gas ingress and to take appropriate actions (i.e. 2oo3 HC gas detection shall close dampers, etc.).

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H2S Detection (if toxic hazard present)

4.1

If H2S workspace exposure limit shall comply with Ref. 61, Part 2.

4.2

Fixed H2S detectors shall be provided inside the airlock to monitor the H2S level and take required actions, i.e. 2oo3 H2S detection at airlock triggers additional air purging cycles to be performed until an H2S free environment is ensured before personnel are allowed to enter inside TR. Fixed Toxic detectors shall be provided at the air intakes to monitor for the H2S gas ingress and take appropriate action.( i.e 2oo3 H2S detectors shall close the inlet dampers, etc.).

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Portable Gas Detector

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Requirement

5.1

Multi-sensor portable gas detector which shall be capable of detecting, testing and measuring concentration in air of Hydrogen sulphide, Oxygen, Carbon dioxide, Carbon monoxide, Sulphur dioxide etc., shall be provided inside each TR room.

Smoke Detectors, MCP & Alarms

6.1

Smoke detectors, Manual Call Point (MCP), Alarms shall be provided in the TR. These shall be integrated into the overall F&G system and Fire alarm control panels.

Manual Activation of TR

7.1

A selector switch for manual activation of TR shall be provided in the TR and at other appropriate locations (e.g. Main Control Room, etc.).

D.6.

Telecommunication

Ref.

Requirement

Broadcasting Emergency

1.1

Following Telecommunication systems should be used for broadcasting emergency instructions during evacuation and to communicate with the emergency management team.

Public Address & General Alarms (PAGA) system;

Hotline Telephone system and normal Telephone;

Portable UHF Radio system.

Command Support

2.1

Survival of communication arrangements during an emergency between the TR and the IMT is an essential requirement. This enables the installation to maintain an effective installation command structure (organisation).

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2.2

The equipment providing the essential command support functions shall work for the duration of the protection during conditions that could prevail, e.g., elevated temperatures.

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2.3

If a secondary TR it required, the following shall be provided:

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Communication with the IMT;

Communication with the primary TR;

Monitoring conditions on the designated evacuation route.

2.4

The following essential command support functions shall work for the defined endurance period.

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Ability to initiate general alarm conditions;

Ability to communicate with all personnel at muster areas and

evacuation points;

Ability to request outside assistance;

Two-way voice communications with a secondary TR (if applicable) for

the endurance period of the secondary TR;

Ability to monitor fire, smoke, toxic and flammable gases which might

occur, and to monitor their propagation in the following areas:

i.

In the TR;

ii. On evacuation routes;

iii. At evacuation points;

iv.

In modules and areas adjacent to the TR, evacuation routes and evacuation points;

The ability to visually determine the physical condition of the following:

i. Evacuation routes leading to evacuation points;

ii. Evacuation points;

The provision of emergency lighting though the loss of individual

luminaires will not necessarily result in loss of integrity;

The provision of (emergency) power, e.g., from batteries, for those systems necessary for the fulfilment of essential command support functions.

2.5

The following additional command support functions should be available on a manned facility:

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Person-to-person installation communications;

Communication with land base;

Communication with pipeline-connected facility;

Communication with gangway-connected facility;

The ability to monitor fire in the major process areas, e.g., wellheads,

gas compression;

The ability to determine the physical condition of the helideck and to

detect fire, smoke and gas in its immediate vicinity;

The ability to monitor and close TR boundary HVAC fire dampers;

The ability to initiate process / emergency shutdown;

The ability to close pipeline emergency shutdown (ESD) valves (if not

integral with process / emergency shutdown);

The ability to activate process blowdown;

The ability to monitor the running of the fire water pumps.

2.6

Fixed Toxic detectors / Flammable, smoke detectors (point Optical) shall be provided at the air intakes to monitor potential Gas / Smoke ingress and take appropriate action (e.g. 2oo3 H2S / flammable detectors close the inlet dampers, etc.and also HVAC inlet smoke detector also to take action)

D.7.

Air Supply

Ref.

Requirement

Design Objective

1.1

Breathing air supply is required for duration of the TR endurance period to:

1.2

Maintain positive pressure inside TR and Air lock;

1.3

Provide breathing air for occupants – sufficient to maintain desired oxygen level:

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1.4

Purge airlocks during personnel entry (time-based system) to:

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Eliminate toxic gas ingress from doors opening;

Residuals toxic gas on clothes when personnel enter TR.

Supply of Breathing Air

2.1

A secure supply of Breathing Air for the TR shall be established through appropriate study of the options available. Compressed Breathing Air in cylinders is a common way if there is a toxic hazard present to provide such supply.

Below is guidance on how this should be done if Compressed Breathing Air cylinders are provided (100% redundancy to be ensured in design).

2.2

Clean breathing air should be stored in cylinders under pressure.

2.3

The air supply shall cater for:

Pressurization and breathing air,

Period in excess of the required TR endurance period.

Pressurization and purging of airlock for required endurance time of TR, taking note of the number of times the doors are likely to be opened considering the number of people accommodated.

2.4

Pipes shall be connected to the cylinders to supply the fresh air.

TR pressure shall be maintained higher than the airlock to ensure outward air flow is maintained.

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Air supply shall be provided to airlock for purging during the period of personnel entry into air lock.

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Pressurized air cylinders shall be constructed of seamless steel. Each cylinder shall have shut off valve along with pressure gauge and safety valve.

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The compressed Breathing Air cylinders shall be located such that they are not vulnerable to external hazardous effects (e.g. fire, blast overpressure, etc.).

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2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

Fire and blast over pressure protection requirements at the TR location shall be established through appropriate HSE studies such as FERA & QRA.

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Breathing Air-Line Apparatus

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3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

Airline fed positive pressure breathing apparatus is required to be used in all cases when equipment is being opened, if the equipment contains, or has a reasonable chance of containing, H2S. (Use of SCBA is allowed for very short operations, such as taking of a single sample).

Filter masks are not considered to provide adequate protection for use.

Air shall be provided in compressed air bottles and cascaded to the breathing apparatus through a manifold. There shall be an alarm set to warn of low air supply pressure and it shall be monitored at all times whilst the system is in use.

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Airline sets shall be provided with their own independent self-contained air supply, either full cylinder or escape cylinder to allow the wearer to disconnect from the airline supply and escape the risk without dependency on the main airline.

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The cylinders shall be refilled by a dedicated compressor located at a location free of H2S or other contaminant and shall not have cross connection to any other air or gas system

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Air for piped breathable air supplies shall be taken from a safe place. Requirements are as follows:

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The breathable air system shall be completely separate from any other air, gas or nitrogen piping;

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3.7

There shall be an alarm for low air supply pressure;

3.8

Often the air will be supplied from trolley mounted cylinders. If this is the case, the compressor for cylinder filling shall be located remotely at a safe place where the air intake is from a clean atmosphere location. The compressor shall be dedicated to cylinder filling;

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3.9

The air supply shall be provided with a low-pressure alarm audible to those using the air;

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3.10

No cross connections to gas or nitrogen piping, or to process air supplies, shall ever be installed.

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3.11

3.12

3.13

3.14

3.15

The air intake shall be located at safe distance from the discharge of diesel or petrol engine exhausts, including from portable compressor drives to ensure no ingress within the system. Where feasible two air intake in opposite direction sufficiently away from these system shall be provided, this shall also take into account potential for release from adjacent facilities;

A multi gas alarm shall be provided at the air intake, and the air intake shutdown following detection of contamination. The capacity of the air reservoir shall be sufficient to allow the people under air to safely stop work and to evacuate to a safe location;

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Compressors filling the air cylinders shall be provided with sensors and monitors to meet the quality of the breathing air system (standalone system). Quality measurement and its integrity shall be ensured by the manufacture with appropriate selection of equipment and monitoring devices. Breathing air compressor shall be listed for the usage and be in compliance with EN 12021 or equivalent. Relevant certification shall be submitted to Company for approval.

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If a portable compressor is used, there shall be an accumulator and the compressor shall be continuously monitored to allow timely intervention in the event of failure or an emergency;

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Breathable air supplies shall be tested at least once every six months, or just prior to use if they are used only occasionally. Testing shall include functioning through the actual air supply points, pressure, and possible contamination.

Note: The requirements of this section apply to both new and existing facilities.

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D.8.

Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning (HVAC)

Ref.

Requirement

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Design Objectives

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HVAC system should maintain life support conditions in an emergency and provide the integrity of TR by:

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Maintaining re-circulation of air inside the TR by running the air conditioning units to prevent heat build-up so that the TR indoor temperature is maintained;

Preventing smoke and toxic gas ingress into the TR by pressurizing TR

and Air lock;

Providing necessary controls and interfaces to maintain the TR

functionality for the required endurance period.

1.2

The HVAC system shall shut down automatically and isolate the TR in the event of smoke or gas detection at the air inlets.

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Inlet and outlet high integrity dampers shall close.

The TR HVAC system shall be capable of running in recirculation mode to provide comfort to personnel within the TR. The system shall be installed inside the TR or shall have zone-1 rating if installed outside.

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

Provisions should be made to manually shut down and restart the HVAC system from the TR itself.

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Design of the TR HVAC system should include provisions for each of the following:

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Minimise of leakage through penetrations in the event that pressurization

is lost, e.g., due to smoke or gas being present at the air intakes;

Prevention / minimise smoke spread within the TR;

Boundary fire-damper position indication;

Air cooling to reduce heat stress;

Availability of power sources to drive the HVAC system during the

incidents.

Ventilation ducts and penetrations shall not compromise the fire and blast rating / gas and air tightness of the bulkhead through which they penetrate.

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Fire dampers shall maintain the integrity of designated fire-rated / blast rated (as relevant, based on the impact) barriers when penetrated by HVAC ducts.

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Fire damper installations shall have a fire / blast rating at least equal to that of the barrier they penetrate.

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1.8

1.9

In the case of upgrading existing buildings, design should allow the operation of any existing as well as new HVAC equipment during an emergency.

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Manual activation at TR control panel shall cause the air conditioning system and air supply to operate. This shall maintain positive pressure, comfort temperatures and sufficient oxygen within the TR for breathing.

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1.10

Design Margin for selection of HVAC equipment shall be 10% for Sensible Heat, 10% for Latent Heat and 10% for Heating (if required) and two units shall be considered of 100% capacity each.

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Pressurisation & Ventilation Rates

Pressurization criteria of 50 Pa for TR and 25 Pa for Air lock shall be considered as per NFPA 496 (Ref. 36).

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For any positive pressure air system a minimum over pressure of at least 25 Pa shall be maintained.

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Since, air lock is the point of entry and directly connected to outside, 25 Pa positive pressure is considered for air lock.

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TR should be maintained at a higher pressure than air lock to allow movement of air from TR to air lock and air lock to outside. To maintain the higher positive pressure and air flow, 50 Pa positive pressure shall be considered for TR

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Ventilation rate for occupants shall be considered as 1.4 m3/hr per person. This ventilation criterion is intended to ensure 2% carbon dioxide threshold limit is not exceeding.

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Desired Temperature Inside TR

Desired temperature inside TR shall be 23-25°C as per ISO 15138 Standard (Ref. 28) and as per HVAC design.

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Relative Humidity shall be maintained at 50% or as per HVAC design standard.

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Heat Loads per Occupant

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2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

3.1

3.2

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Requirement

4.1

Heat loads shall be considered as per the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Fundamentals, Chapter 18 based on Sedentary Work Activity

Sensible Heat per person – 80 Watts

Latent Heat per person – 80 Watts

Air-Lock

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5.2

5.3

5.4

5.7

5.8

5.9

In order to maintain the TR pressurization, and safeguard against smoke and toxic gas entry to TR, the following approach should be used:

Interlock shall be implemented between external and internal doors of airlock to avoid simultaneous opening of both doors.

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Airlocks shall be sized to ensure that only one door requires to be opened at any one time.

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Personnel shall assemble outside and enter airlock space in a group through external door (internal door will be interlock-closed).

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5.5

Personnel assemble inside the airlock space and close the external door.

5.6

Purging will start once external door is closed from the inside.

On completion of the purging cycle (i.e. entire purged air released through over pressure dampers to ensure no smoke or H2S is present), internal door should be opened to allow personnel to enter TR.

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This operation of the airlock doors should be controlled from the TR control panel.

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The design of entrances, exits and airlocks shall take account of the requirements of stretcher access.

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Operation of TR Arrangements

6.1

The following operations are applicable once TR condition is triggered by activating a manual push button in control room or TR system cabinet:

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6.2

Duty air conditioning unit (selected from TR control panel) shall start and

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cater for TR rooms.

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6.4

6.5

6.6

6.7

6.8

Fresh air supply to the TR and air lock shall be activated from secure source (e.g. cylinders) via TR control panel.

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Purging of air inside airlock shall be initiated once the personnel start entering through airlock.

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The purging will occur while the personnel enter the airlock and close the external door. They will then open the internal door to enter the TR.

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The purged air for each cycle shall be released outside through a pressure relief damper.

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The number of purging cycles shall be determined based on the purging duration and the number of personnel entering air lock at a time.

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Duration of each purging cycle shall be a minimum of 1min for entire airlock volume and shall be determined based on volume of the airlock and the No. of people entering.

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6.9

Differential Pressure transmitters (integrity and redundancy) shall be provided to maintain positive pressure inside the TR and in the airlock.

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6.10

2ooN voting of smoke and H2S gas detection shall be provided inside the airlock. The signal should be used to continue additional air purge cycles until the air lock is free of smoke and H2S gas.

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Calculation of total Breathing Air cylinder storage capacity shall be based on required TR endurance time, purging requirements etc.

D.9.

Electrical

Ref.

Requirement

General

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1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

Power & Control Panel shall be provided to cater for all essential/critical equipment required for the TR (HVAC, Fire Alarm Control Panel, Communication system, lighting and small power etc.).

The power section of TR panel shall be powered from an essential power source to ensure there is no loss of power to the distribution board.

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Control Supply for the TR Panel shall from a UPS source able to provide sufficient autonomy time to match the required TR endurance time.

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Sufficient power shall be provided to ensure adequate lighting to access all essential facilities like toilets, first Aid Kit, stretchers, drinking water etc. during the TR endurance period.

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All evacuation routes including airlock shall be provided with sufficient lighting.

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In additional to the above requirements, the main control room shall be provided with adequate lighting such the operations personnel can perform the plant shut down safely during the TR emergency.

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D.10. Civil, Structural & Architectural

Ref.

Requirement

General

1.1

The Civil, Structural and Architectural requirements of TR shall include but not limited to:

Structural Integrity;

Gas / Air Tight System;

Doors & Windows.

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Structural Integrity

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2.1

Building external walls and any glass shall be capable of resisting against blast loads. This shall be demonstrated by FERA / QRA Study.

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Gas Tight System

3.1

The main areas of air leakage into buildings are generally:

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Structural joints;

Door and window joints;

Roof connections;

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

Penetrations for pipes and cables through external walls or walls between sections of the building (e.g. HVAC openings for fresh air inlets, and toilet exhaust fans etc.).

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Drainage pipes of toilets and washbasins (require U-trap to withstand overpressure and maintain liquid seal).

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If TR external walls have openings to facilitate penetration of cables and ducts, fresh air inlet and toilet exhaust, these openings shall be properly closed or equipped with blast /over pressure dampers.

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For design of penetration through a blast or fire wall, refer to API RP 2FB (Ref. 13).

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If required, penetration should be arranged to pass through the wall at the top or bottom of the wall.

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Penetration (piping and cable runs) through blast or fire walls should be avoided.

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Structural analysis shall be used to confirm compliance with strength required by the applicable design codes.

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Doors & Windows

4.1

4.2

Doors, windows, penetrations and connections shall not decrease the strength of the structural support system.

The use of windows should be minimised since fire and blast rated windows can add substantially to weight and therefore cost.

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4.3

Windows should not be installed facing the process equipment.

Reflection and negative blast wave effects shall be included in the design assessment of windows on the side and back faces of any permanent TR structure.

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An airlock at the entrance to TR prevents hazardous atmosphere entering main TR room.

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The TR building, including external doors and windows shall be rated to withstand the maximum blast overpressure as predicted by the FERA.

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All External Gas-tight doors, windows and other openings shall comply with Class-4 of BS EN 12207 (Ref. 18) and internal doors shall comply with Class-D of BS EN 12207.

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Unless otherwise specified, a minimum fire protection time of 120 minutes shall be provided for all doors, windows or other openings in compliance with Table 715.4 of IBC 2009 (Ref. 45).

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When converting an existing building/rooms to TR any damaged doors or doors which are not possible to convert as gas tight doors shall be replaced with gas tight blast/over pressure resistant type.

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4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.10

All gas tight doors shall be suitable for both normal operation and TR scenario.

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D.11. Hazardous Area Classification

Ref.

Requirement

General

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1.1

Any equipment required to continue operation during an emergency shall be suitable for Zone 1 it can be impacted by a Major Accident gas cloud.

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Ref.

Requirement

Health & Welfare

1.1

Drinking Water (sufficient number of water bottles inside TR room).

1.2

Toilet facilities.

Safety

2.1

First Aid kit;

2.2

Packs of eye wash;

2.3

Stretchers;

2.4

Portable automatic oxygen resuscitator(s);

2.5

Portable extinguishers

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APPENDIX: E CHECKLIST: 7 – EVACUATION (PRIMARY & SECONDARY, ASSISTED)

Table 23-5: Detailed Requirements – Evacuation (Primary & Secondary)

Ref.

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General

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1.1

1.2

1.3

Escape Evacuation & Rescue Assessment (EERA): The EERA must describe how EER will be actioned for both a fully controlled Evacuation and un-assisted Evacuation.

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The EER Strategy shall be based on the likely availability and capacity of the modes of transport (e.g. vehicles, helicopters, boats), whether in the field or otherwise, and the time required for the vehicle /helicopter/boat to reach the facility.

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Primary Evacuation should be achievable during at least Normal Conditions. Any conditions resulting in unavailability of the Primary Method (for Evacuation) must be identified (e.g. maintenance of a helideck preventing its use for Evacuation / boat due to weather condition or due to major accident hazard impact).

These conditions must be taken account of in the EER Strategy.

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1.4

Any special measures needed to provide acceptable EER contingencies must be recorded in the EER Strategy (EERS).

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Primary Method for Evacuation

2.1

The default Primary Method for Evacuation should be the normal way of attending the facility, e.g.

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Onshore: Bus /vehicular transport/Walk

Offshore: Helicopters / boats or bridge links to other Installations.

2.2

Offshore: In addition to use of the normal helideck, Evacuation may be by nomination of alternative landing or winching areas. Where this is the case, these should be defined in the EER Strategy.

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Secondary Method for Evacuation

3.1

General

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3.1.1

In many circumstances the Primary method may not be available and there is a need to provide a Secondary method to allow a fully controlled Evacuation independent of external assistance.

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3.1.2

The Secondary Method of Evacuation shall be designed to remain operational during the identified Emergency conditions.

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3.1.3

Combined Primary /Secondary Method: In some cases the Secondary method may be the same as the Primary method providing it is always available and has sufficient capacity so that it is capable of dealing with the full complement of the facility in a controlled manner without undue delay.

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Examples:

Onshore: Bus /vehicular transport of personnel to and from site.

Offshore: Short duration visits to a normally unmanned facility, where the Primary means of Evacuation remains with personnel at the facility. The main provision is that it should remain capable of operating in the identified emergency conditions.

3.1.4

Secondary Method (Offshore): In offshore locations the optimum approach to provide Secondary method of Evacuation will likely be using a lifeboat, e.g. Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC).

• Island based on EERA outcome.

3.1.5

3.1.6

Full consideration shall be given to the type, and design of the lifeboats, their location, their ability to be safely launched and the conditions they will experience once launched (e.g. weather conditions, fires on the sea, smoke and radiation from topsides fires).

Full consideration shall be given to the type, and design of the vehicles, their location, their ability to be safely drive off and the conditions they will experience during evacuation (e.g. weather conditions, fires, smoke and radiation from fires, toxic gas, etc.).

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3.1.7

All lifeboats shall comply with IMO / SOLAS and other acceptable standards.

3.1.8

Note shall taken of historical experience of lifeboat accidents in selecting the lifeboat and its release mechanism shall be as per:

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IMO MSC.1/Circ.1206 (Ref. 4);

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1205 (Ref. 5);

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IMO MSC.1/Circ.1327 (Ref. 6);

MSC.1/Circ.1392 (Ref. 7).

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3.1.9

The lifeboat /evacuation vehicle shall be readily accessible from the main Muster /TR area.

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3.1.10 The EERA may identify the need for additional lifeboats so that the minimum capacity can be successfully reached and used for evacuation considering all credible accident scenarios and conditions.

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3.2

Capacity

3.2.1

3.2.2

The minimum capacity of secondary method of Evacuation shall be sufficient to accommodate all personnel at the facility (i.e. 100% PAF / POB), at all times. + 1 redundancy in largest capacity

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Provision of secondary method of evacuation facilities shall take note of outages for foreseeable circumstances (e.g. unplanned outage, maintenance, severe weather, etc.) and ensure the capacity required in item 3.2.1 is always available.

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3.2.3

Sufficient lifeboats /vehicles shall be readily accessible from the main Muster /TR to accommodate the overall Secondary Evacuation capacity required in item 3.2.1.

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3.2.4

The Secondary Evacuation lifeboat /vehicle should be orientated away from the facility on completion of the launch /drive off.

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3.2.5

Seating capacity of each Secondary Evacuation Method (e.g. lifeboat, vehicle) shall take account of equipment that might be required during boarding; for example, Emergency Breathing Device (EBD), lifejackets and average occupant size/weight.

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3.3

Redundancy

3.3.1 General Note: Redundancy of lifeboats / vehicles requires consideration of

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factors such as:

Un-planned outage; i.e. breakdown;

Planned outage; i.e. preventive maintenance, testing, re-certification;

Potential vulnerabilities of Muster / TR and evacuation points;

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Typical layout (/structural) design of facilities;

Potential wind directions (process hazards vs main Muster /TR and

evacuation points);

Other relevant environmental conditions (e.g. wind direction /speed,

wave and tidal current, etc.);

Alternative muster location shall be provided with Lifeoat / Vehicle for

evacuation if MAH prevents access to the Primary muster /TR

These considerations have led to the following requirements for redundancy:

3.3.2

Redundancy should be provided in terms of additional lifeboat / vehicle rather than in terms of additional seats.

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3.3.3

The spare lifeboat /vehicle shall have a minimum seating capacity of the largest lifeboat /vehicle for the installation.

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3.3.4.

In case redundant lifeboat /vehicle is not available in any of the existing facilities, risk assessment shall be carried out and mitigation measures shall be put in place until the redundant lifeboat /vehicles are installed.

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3.3.5

3.3.6

3.3.7

The vehicles /lifeboat provided must also take account of Major Accident scenarios involving use of any alternative muster points or where breakdown in the fully controlled Evacuation system may occur.

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For offshore complex, additional lifeboat to be provided at the process platform, for the evacuation of personnel who are not able to reach the Main Muster /TR in case of emergency. Capacity shall be sufficient to accommodate 100% of POB expected in the process platforms

For offshore super-complex where multiple platforms are connected via bridge, lifeboat shall also be provided on the process platform for the evacuation of personnel that are not able to reach the accommodation platform.

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3.4

Lifeboat Positioning and Orientation

3.4.1 Offshore: When positioning and orienting lifeboat it is necessary to consider:

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How personnel access them,

The effects of identified Major Accident scenarios,

The distance from the structure (during lowering and launching),

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The likely weather directions and

The distance between lifeboats.

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3.4.2 Offshore: The lifeboat and life rafts shall be stowed as close to

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accommodation and living/ work areas as possible. Muster areas shall be demonstrably close to the evacuation stations. Launching stations shall be in such positions as to ensure safe launching having particular regard to clearance.

3.4.3 Offshore: Lifeboat shall point away from the facility (i.e. be positioned such that the angular clearances in plan between direction pointed and jacket or legs are maximised as far as reasonably practicable).

3.4.4 Offshore: The clearance from the structure during lowering and the ability to provide a successful launch during adverse weather must also be considered.

3.4.5

Each lifeboat shall be capable of being launched without interfering with other adjacent lifeboats. If necessary, suitable fenders shall be provided for the boat launch /repositioning purposes.

For existing Installation with less than 5m between lifeboat, the emergency response procedures should include sequencing launches of lifeboat to minimise likelihood of interaction.

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3.4.6 Offshore: For existing lifeboat with a minimum clearance of less than 5m, the

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EERA should include or summarise calculations to determine the limits of use of that lifeboat. As well as the geometry of the lifeboat and the Installation, these calculations shall take account of the wind and sea conditions and the power and acceleration of the lifeboat.

If required, computer aids may be used to assist in performing these calculations.

3.4.7 Offshore: Lifeboat should be located at the lowest level reasonably

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practicable whilst retaining easy access from the TR and considering other engineering and technical constraints.

3.4.8 Offshore: Lifeboat should not be located inside a Hazardous Areas.

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3.5

Evacuation points

3.5.1

Evacuation points shall be of sufficient area to allow assembly of the full

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complement of the survival craft.

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3.5.2 Offshore: The EER Strategy should state where personnel don lifejackets.

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Where the strategy includes the possibility of this taking place at the Evacuation points, the area provided shall be a minimum of 0.35m² (and 0.75m² with PPE) clear floor area per person based upon the full survival craft complement.

3.5.3 Offshore: Walkways should be provided along each side of the survival craft to allow boarding from both sides. The area of the walkways shall be additional to the area calculated as above.

3.5.5 Offshore: Walkways shall incorporate non-slip surface.

3.5.6 Offshore: Guard rails shall be provided to prevent hazard of falling

overboard.

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3.5.7 Offshore: Gates shall be provided to give an opening in the handrail adjacent

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to survival craft boarding hatches.

3.5.8 Onshore: The Evacuation Point shall have sufficient area to allow the full



complement of each vehicle to board the Evacuation vehicle in a safe manner without any additional hazards (e.g. being hit by other vehicles involved in Evacuation).

3.6

Operation & Maintenance

3.6.1

Crew: There shall be sufficient number of crew available for operating survival craft (lifeboats) and the launching for all the POB. Each lifeboat shall be allocated a certified coxswain and deputy who shall be trained to operate the engine and carry out minor adjustments.

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3.6.2 Maintenance: A maintenance plan shall be developed for lifeboats taking

note of historical experience on safety issues, for example:

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1206 (Ref. 4);

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1205 (Ref. 5);

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1327 (Ref. 6);

MSC.1/Circ.1392 (Ref. 7).

3.6.3 Maintenance: All lifeboat related inspection and maintenance tasks shall be carried out in a systematic manner; i.e. registered and carried out according

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to a comprehensive preventive maintenance program.

This shall include davit inspection, load testing, winch, wire ropes replacement, etc.

3.6.4

3.6.5

Each lifeboat shall be provided with an appliance which is capable of launching and recovering the lifeboat. ln addition there shall be provision for hanging-off the lifeboat to free the release gear for maintenance.

Lifeboats, launching appliances and release gear are required by SOLAS regulation III/20 (Ref. 1) to be inspected weekly and monthly according to the instructions for on-board maintenance complying with the requirements of SOLAS regulation III/36

3.6.6

All lifeboats shall be turned out from their stowed position monthly, without any persons on board, if weather conditions so allow.

3.6.7

3.6.8

Lifeboats shall be subjected to annual inspection and certification of lifeboat and launching appliance by in accordance with SOLAS Consolidated Edition, 1 Ch III, Regulation 20-11, Operational readiness, maintenance and inspections.

Additionally, the lifeboat re-certification test shall be carried out every 5 years by an approved 3rd party in accordance with SOLAS Consolidated Edition, 1 Ch III, Regulation 20-11, Operational readiness, maintenance and inspections.

3.6.9

Batteries not marked with an expiration date may be used if they are replaced annually, or in the case of a secondary battery (accumulator), if the condition of the electrolyte can be readily checked

3.7

Not Normally Manned Platforms

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3.7.1

Not Normally Attended Facilities (e.g. Wellhead Platforms): For some normally unmanned facilities, it may be possible to justify not providing a means of Secondary means of Evacuation.

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The criteria for determining this are very low man-hours occupation of the Installation. This is likely to apply to very simple Installations.

To justify the absence of lifeboat, the EERA shall demonstrate that there is an:

Overall reduction in the level of safety due to extra attendance at the facility for testing, checking, inspecting and maintaining the lifeboat.

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At least one Primary Method for Evacuation together with Tertiary

Methods for Evacuation to sea must still exist.

Small size of facility means a significant potential exists for large

proportion of the platform to be impacted by a MAH event. Alternate Evacuation methods are therefore adopted.

3.8

Other Details

3.8.1

The manufacture and contents of the lifeboat shall confirm to the requirements of the LSA code.

3.8.2

The lifeboat shall be designed to be provided with electrical short-circuit protection to prevent damage and injury.

3.8.3

Consumables: Consumables shall be provided in compliance with LSA Code (Ref. 2).

3.8.4

3.8.5

Information Signs: Self-illuminating directional signboards indicating the lifeboat position and number shall be located at strategic locations on the installation.

Information Signs: Each lifeboat shall be numbered, and the maximum number of persons allowed abroad painted on the top hatches. It shall also show manufacturers details, lifeboat type model etc.

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APPENDIX: F CHECKLIST: 8 – EVACUATION (TERTIARY, NON-ASSISTED)

Table 23-6: Detailed Requirements – Evacuation (Tertiary)

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Requirement

General

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1.1

1.2

1.3

Tertiary Methods of Evacuation are intended for use only in circumstances where evacuation by Primary or Secondary Methods (/Evacuation) is not possible.

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It is not acceptable to rely on Tertiary Methods to abandon a facility other than when Primary and Secondary Methods (of Evacuation) cannot be used.

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



Offshore: The use of a tertiary method is likely to introduce additional problems due to immersion of personnel in the sea and the requirement for subsequent rescue. Notwithstanding these problems, tertiary methods should be provided as a last resort measure.

In order to improve their chances of survival, personnel entering the sea should be provided lifejackets.





1.4

Onshore: Personnel leaving the site through escape gates without reporting to the designated Muster locations will be exposed to the elements and any potential escalation of the emergency incident.





This could require walking long distances (especially on toxic facilities) before they can be sure of being safe. Rescue & Recovery facilities will be important for such persons.

1.5

The general principles in the provision of Tertiary Methods are:







They should take account of the likely scenarios;

Tertiary Evacuation should be possible from several locations on the

facility;

Offshore:

Life rafts which are capable of being easily launched should be provided

to protect personnel who enter the sea if the EER assessment demonstrates these may be of benefit;

Systems should be designed such that personnel who enter the sea can

realistically use any available life rafts;

Effective training and procedures should be provided for the use of

tertiary methods for Evacuation to the sea.

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1.6

1.7

1.8

In selecting the types, numbers and locations of Tertiary Methods, the likely demands from scenarios and the maximum personnel distribution should be considered. It is important that enough diversity and choice is available to enable personnel in a variety of situations to use them.

Offshore: All personnel onboard should be provided with the equipment found necessary in developing the EERS.

Additional lifejackets should be available for personnel at places which may be used for access to the sea, such as TEMPSC evacuation points and at locations which may be used for tertiary Evacuation.

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Means of Evacuation to Sea

2.1

General

2.1.1 Where a failure in the fully controlled Evacuation System occurs further





2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

facilities are required as a final contingency. This includes where a Major Accident scenario escalates rapidly such as to result in serious injury or loss of life should personnel remain on the facility.

In this situation personnel may have to go directly to TEMPSC Evacuation points and use these facilities without a complete crew or, possibly Evacuation to the sea using Tertiary Methods. These methods are intended for use only in circumstances where Evacuation by Primary or Secondary Methods (for Evacuation) are not possible.

All personnel must be aware of the locations, capabilities and limitations of the Tertiary Methods available. This is necessary so that, as far as reasonably practicable they can be effectively utilised in the conditions that exist, should this become necessary. Installation EER Strategies must therefore recognise these possibilities.

Strategies should, wherever practicable, provide contingencies to cover for likely sources of breakdown in the fully controlled system. A typical example is where communication is lost between the person in overall charge and a muster group. Such contingencies, for example the action to be taken by the person in charge of the muster group, must be described in the EERA Report or ERP.

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2.1.5

The use of Tertiary Methods (for Evacuation to the Sea) is likely to introduce additional problems due to immersion of personnel in the sea and the requirement for subsequent Rescue. Wherever possible personnel should

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don lifejackets prior to using such systems.

2.1.6

Life raft(s) shall also be available for boarding form the boat landing position or life raft entry point.

2.1.7

The location of all Tertiary Methods shall be shown on the Installation Escape Route Plans and appropriate Operations and Emergency Procedures Manuals drawings.

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2.2

Provision of Tertiary Methods

2.2.1

Tertiary Methods must be provided on each facility to permit access to the sea (e.g. life rafts, scramble nets, life jackets, etc.).





2.3

Selection of Methods

2.3.1

The chosen methods should be selected from stairways, ladders, and equivalent systems, which offer a good prospect of, people safely reaching sea level and entering life rafts. Wherever reasonably practicable, fixed stairways and ladders should be included as one of the options.

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2.3.2

The only currently approved methods, which are capable of allowing direct access to life rafts, are scramble nets, wooden ladder, etc.

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

2.3.3 One (or more) of the Tertiary devices shall be selected as part of the Tertiary





Methods (for Evacuation to the Sea).

2.4

Ladders for Evacuation to the Sea

2.4.1

Intermediate landings and cages shall be provided as detailed in Piping Basis of Design (Ref. 63).

2.4.2

The ladders and landings shall be capable of withstanding wind and waves.

2.5

Life rafts

2.5.1 Minimum total life raft capacity shall be enough to accommodate 100% of

maximum POB as follows:

General: Total 100% tertiary in addition to life boats.

Unmanned (e.g. Wellhead) platforms: 2 x 100% tertiary where life boat is

not provided.

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Maximum Capacity of each life raft shall not be more than 25 persons

per life raft

2.5.2

These are to be provided for personnel who use Tertiary Methods to access the sea and to protect them from sea exposure.

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The facilities also provide an easy target for rescue and recovery services to locate survivors, since they keep survivors together.

2.5.3

The life rafts must be positioned on the facility considering the likely situations leading to their use. Life rafts should be of the simple capsule type, cradle mounted and fitted to the lowest practicable level of the Installation. Davit launched life rafts are not recommended.





2.5.4

The EERA Report shall describe how inflatable life raft launch procedures are covered in musters and drills. All shall be part of ERP arrangements.





2.6

Personal Survival and Escape Equipment

2.6.1

The EER Strategy should specify the types, numbers and locations of personal survival and escape equipment. This should include survival suits, lifejackets, smoke hoods, torches and fireproof gloves.





2.6.2

All personnel onboard shall be provided with:





An automatic inflatable lifejacket;

A smoke hood or Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus (EEBA) as

per EERA;

A torch and gloves.

2.6.3 Where carbon monoxide contamination or low oxygen levels pose a hazard





to the Temporary Refuge or evacuation routes from the TR protection should be provided by respiratory protective equipment. Simple filter type smoke hoods should be provided for escape through smoke, which has low carbon monoxide, levels.

This requirement shall be supported by EERA.

2.6.4

It is preferred that all of the personal survival equipment for each person is contained in one grab bag which should be stored at the Muster Points. However, where space limitations preclude grab bags, alternative arrangements should be developed for example by providing pouches containing the torch, hand gloves and respiratory aids at muster point. EEBA and lifejackets may be stored separately.

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2.6.5

2.6.6

2.6.7

2.6.8

Flotel residents (accommodation vessel – if applicable) should not be issued with a personal survival pack, as their normal action in an emergency situation is to cross the gangway. In the event that they cannot access the gangway, their needs for personal survival equipment should be catered for by the additional equipment at the lifeboat stations or from the cache of equipment at the muster point retained for short time shuttling visits.

Day visitors and short time shuttling personnel (on manned Installations) should be provided with personal survival packs at Admin. on arrival. This should be placed on a storage rack adjacent to their Muster Point.

Visitors to normally unmanned Installations should take their personal protective equipment with them and place it at their muster point to be collected when needed or immediately prior to departure.

Additional lifejackets for at least 50% of the maximum personnel onboard shall be available for personnel at TEMPSC Evacuation points or other locations compatible with the EER Strategy such as life raft stations. The maximum number of personnel is defined as all those persons who will muster on the Installation. This will not include persons who will muster on flotels (accommodation vessel – if applicable), which are bridge linked to the Installation.

e r o h s n O

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2.6.9

Personal Survival Equipment must be selected to be compatible with the Tertiary Method.





2.6.10 Lifebuoys must be sited along the external walkways of the Installation





considering places where personnel could fall from and, from where they may be seen and lifebuoys deployed.

2.6.11 The locations of the lifebuoys shall be included in the EERA report.

2.6.12 Any procedures covering use of personal survival escape equipment shall be

described or referenced in the EERA Report.

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2.6.13 For further requirements on personal survival equipment refer to Section 10.





2.7

Life raft Specification

2.7.1 Minimum Requirements for Manufacture: refer to SOLAS Chapter III (Ref. 1)





and the IMO LSA Code (Ref. 2).

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2.7.2

The life rafts shall be manufactured to the highest quality standards. It shall be designed to be dropped into the sea from a height of the deck. The painter shall be of length of 10m plus the height of the stowed deck to the waterline (to be defined based on location of life raft).

2.7.3

Every life raft shall be provided with equipment and provisions in accordance with the IMO LSA Code (Ref. 2), Section 4.1.5.1.

2.7.4

Life raft cradles can be either deck mounted, with inclined launching rack options and lashing assemblies for throw-over (free fall type).

2.7.5

The stowage canister/container shall be corrosion and abrasion resistant to ensure maximum durability.

2.7.6

They shall include:

Fully enclosed double-skinned high-visibility canopy complete with retro-

reflective tape;

Non-inflatable easy access boarding ramp;

High volume water pockets to ensure maximum stability when inflating;

Canopy can be fitted with LED light ensuring maximum visibility (not

mandatory);

Fully insulated floor to ensure maximum thermal protection.

2.8

Maintenance and Storage of Life Rafts

2.8.1

Life rafts including the launching cradle or davit shall be externally inspected every month by a suitably trained and certified competent person.

2.8.2

Every inflatable life raft shall be serviced and re-certified in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations at intervals not exceeding 12 months, provided where in any case this is impractical; the administration may extend this period to 17 months case to case (Inspection to be planned as per SOLAS compliance).

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2.8.3

Recertification outage to be compensated with additional life raft and to be managed during maintenance. Availability shall be consistent with requirements stated in Section 7.1 at all times.

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APPENDIX: G CHECKLIST: 9 & 10 – RESCUE & RECOVERY

Table 23-7: Detailed Requirements – Rescue & Recovery

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1.1

The goal of the rescue and recovery arrangements is to ensure prompt recovery of all personnel to a Place of Safety (POS).

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

The following scenarios are typical:

Installation Evacuation (Secondary or Tertiary Evacuation);

Helicopter ditching;

Man Overboard incident;

Others identified in the EERA.

Rescue and recovery normally require arrangements to be made with ‘local’ search and rescue (SAR) helicopters and Safety Standby and Rescue Vessels (SSRV).

The arrangements provided shall be specified by the installation’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

1.2

1.3

1.4

The evacuation process is only complete when all personnel reach a place, offering a level of safety no less than that existing before the event leading to the need for EER, and providing suitable medical facilities.



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

The rescue & recovery arrangements should provide good prospect of reaching a POS following Evacuation (secondary or tertiary), or personnel falling into the sea accidentally.

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

The emphasis of rescue and recovery is to rescue casualties from the sea which is an immediately life-threatening situation.

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There is more time available to recover persons in TEMPSC or life raft to a place of safety - the performance standard contains no time criteria for this.

In some circumstances, such as severe weather, it may be the safest option to initially leave people in the TEMPSC rather than to attempt to transfer them immediately to their place of safety.

1.5

The following process should be applied to develop rescue & recovery arrangements:

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

Identify influencing factors at the location.

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Identify potential arrangements for rescue & recovery.

Select most reasonably practicable means that satisfy the performance

standards.

Define supporting operational restrictions (where necessary).

Consult workforce.

Integrate rescue & recovery arrangements within the facility EERA and summarise.

Monitor performance.

1.6

The arrangements should take account for the following factors:







Number of persons requiring rescue and recovery;

Capacity of services;

Restrictions

i. Distance to travel;

ii. Operating limits of helicopters, SSRV and FRC;

iii. Sea states and weather conditions; and

iv. Consequential limitations on operational activities;

Cover all stages of the rescue and recovery;

Nature, duration and time of day of work activities being carried out.

Risk faced by those carrying out the rescue & recovery.

1.7

Critical factors affecting time taken to rescue people from the sea / area surrounding the plant (vs survival time in the prevailing conditions) using SAR helicopter and SSRV:

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

Location / distance;

Response /launch times;

Speed;

Capacity.

1.8

Rescue & Recovery arrangements shall be provided for cases identified in item 1.1 above.

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

These arrangements may be provided by the facility operator (e.g. SSRV), or resources provided by other operators and national resources (e.g. search and rescue helicopters, passing marine vessels).

The availability and suitability of such resources should be considered

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when developing the EER strategy.

1.9

1.10

The needs of any special categories of personnel (e.g. injured personnel, divers in saturation etc.) shall be considered when developing the Arrangements.

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An Adverse Weather Policy shall be implemented to restricts activities (e.g. over the side working) with a high potential for personnel in the sea when rescue and recovery performance cannot be ensured.

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Rescue & Recovery Scenarios

2.1

Installation Evacuation

2.1.1

A Rescue Boat should be:

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

Launched as soon as possible (typically within 2 minutes) of the alarm

being raised and,

Of sufficient capacity and in a position to have located and rescued all personnel from the helicopter ditching area within their survival time, in accordance General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) Guidelines.

2.1.2

2.1.3

A 2hrs criterion is proposed based on typical industry standards. A demonstration is required if the search and rescue time exceeds this period to confirm it will be less than the survival time of personnel in water.

SSRV to Installation Distance: Time has to be allowed for the Rescue Boat to transit to the rescue site and to locate and rescue each casualty. Both time allowances are dependent on the prevailing environmental conditions - sea state, visibility, and wind.

2.1.4

SSRV should be notified at the start of the incident and move towards the facility during the muster /evaluation period thereby increasing the available time to locate and rescue each casualty.

The additional time also increases the chance that other recovery and rescue resources can be made available.

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2.1.5

A Search And Rescue (SAR) helicopter could also be used to satisfy part of this requirement.

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2.2

Helicopter Ditching

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2.2.1

A Rescue Boat should be:

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Launched as soon as possible (typically within 2 minutes) of the alarm

being raised and,

Of sufficient capacity and in a position to have located and rescued all personnel from ‘near the facility’ within 2 hours (unless demonstrated survival for longer period).

2.2.2

A 2hrs criterion is proposed based on typical industry standards. A demonstration is required if the search and rescue time exceeds this period to confirm it will be less than the survival time of personnel in water.

2.2.3

‘Near the facility’ excludes a helicopter ditching that occurs in mid-flight.

2.2.4

2.2.5

The maximum number of persons on board the helicopter shall be taken into account when selecting the arrangements.

The 2 minutes launch time matches the man overboard performance standard and may in certain circumstances, e.g. during nightshift, be harder for a Standby Vessel’s crew to achieve.

2.2.6

SSRV to Installation Distance:

Time has to be allowed for the Rescue Boat to transit to the rescue site and to locate and rescue each casualty. Both time allowances are dependent on the prevailing environmental conditions - sea state, visibility, and wind.

2.2.7

SSRV should be notified at the start of the incident and move towards the incident area thereby increasing the available time to locate and rescue each casualty. The additional time also increases the chance that other recovery and rescue resources can be made available.

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2.2.8

A Search And Rescue (SAR) helicopter could also be used to satisfy part of this requirement.

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Rescue & Recovery Facilities

3.1

Safety Standby and Rescue Vessel (SSRV)

3.1.1

Use of an SSRV for rescue & recovery can be dedicated or shared between Installations providing this does not compromise the objective of a good prospect of rescue and recovery, i.e. that the specified performance standards for each incident type can be met.

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Any deviation from the performance standards, to accommodate Installation specific situations, should be evaluated and justified in the normal manner.

3.1.2

In some cases where a Standby Vessel is shared between Installations a more robust Rescue Boat, that can operate for longer periods remote from the SSRV, may be specified to provide close standby cover for over the side working. This is sometimes referred to as mother/daughter concept.

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3.1.3

The SSRV can be used to dock at the boat landing to take on passengers or stand off and launch FRC to the installation.

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

It may also be used for fire-fighting purposes or as a command center and first aid center.

The SSRV shall also be equipped to rescue personnel from lifeboats, life rafts or direct from the water.

The SSRV should meet the following minimum criteria in all but exceptional weather and sea conditions:

3.1.4

3.1.5

3.1.6

It should be highly manoeuvrable and able to maintain its position.

3.1.7

The areas where survivors are brought on board (i.e. the rescue areas) and the FRC launch area should be in full view from the bridge.

3.1.8

3.1.9

3.1.9

The ships master should be able to approach a person or object in the water (within the vessel’s direct rescue capability) while retaining control of the vessel.

It should have at least two 360° searchlights capable of being remotely controlled.

It should have suitable number of power-driven FRCs kept ready for immediate use.

3.1.10

The FRCs should be equipped with adequate means of communicating with the vessel by VHF radio and carry an adequate portable searchlight.

3.1.11

It should have the means of rapidly and safely launching and recovering the FRCs.

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3.1.12

It should have adequate means of communication by radio with its support craft, the installation, nearby vessels, helicopters and the shore.

3.1.13

It should have at least two effective methods of retrieving survivors from the sea, including those who may be incapacitated, and medical facilities for the immediate care of survivors.

3.1.14

It (and its support craft) should be staffed by an adequate number of competent, medically fit crew. The crew should be competent in recovery and rescue activities and first aid. Work patterns should ensure they are ready to carry out their full range of duties whenever required.

3.1.15

In addition to dedicated SSRVs this section also applies to offshore supply and support vessels which may be close to the installation in the event of a major accident.

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3.1.16

In addition, to the role in rescue and recovery discussed above, SSRV may also have a role to:





Act as a reserve radio station able to communicate with the Installation, other vessels, Installations, and helicopters in the vicinity and coast station(s) in emergency situations; and

Monitor the safety zone when required and to warn approaching vessels of risk of collision.

3.1.17

Both these roles should be considered in developing the EER Strategy.

3.1.18

The specification (including speed, sea capability and accommodation), location and functions of the SSRV and other vessels available for the rescue of personnel should be included within the EERA Report.

3.1.20

The SSRV should participate in regular drills with the Installation concerned.

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3.1.21

SSRV shall be able to reach the incident location within 30mins

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3.2

Fast Rescue Craft Requirement

3.2.1

Every manned offshore installation should evaluate the need for one or more of Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) with diesel engine on-board the facility for immediate use in case of an emergency that requires rescue.

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3.2.2

3.2.3

The decision to acquire a FRC shall be based on a comprehensive risk assessment (risk based approach) - taking into account all the contributing factors. The FRC can be launched from the facility, an adjacent facility or an SSRV.

For each FRC there shall be at least two crews who are drilled and trained in compliance with STCW (Seafarers Training, certification and watchkeeping) Code and recommendations adopted by the organisation including all aspects of rescue, handling, maneuvering, operating these craft in various conditions, and righting them after capsize.

3.3

Search and Rescue Helicopter

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3.3.1

Search and rescue helicopters shall be fitted with hoists to retrieve personnel from platforms, survival craft, rescue vessels and water including immobile stretcher patients.

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APPENDIX: H CHECKLIST: 11 – PLACE OF SAFETY

Table 23-8: Detailed Requirements – Place of Safety

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Place of Safety

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1.1

The POS, whether offshore or onshore, must provide any medical or other facilities required by personnel to maintain a safe and stable condition.

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1.2

The following may be considered as options for offshore POS:





SSRV;

Adjacent facility;

Accommodation vessel (connected or separate);

Onshore location;

1.3

The following may be considered as options for offshore POS:





Hospital;

Nearby hall with medical facilities;

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APPENDIX: I

CHECKLIST: 12 – LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES

Table 23-9: Detailed Requirements – Life Saving Appliances (LSA)

Ref.

Requirement

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9

Life-saving appliances shall be fit for purpose and designed for satisfactory performance, taking due consideration of the climate and marine exposure conditions where applicable.

They shall be clearly marked with approval information, name of approving body, permanent expiry dates and any operational restrictions.

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LSA shall be constructed to an acceptable quality standard and of acceptable materials.

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They should be able to withstand the following temperatures ranges (Ref. 2):

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Stowage throughout the air temperature range -30°C to +65°C and, in

the case of personal life-saving appliances, unless otherwise specified, remain operational throughout the air temperature range -15°C to +50°C;

If they are likely to be immersed in seawater during their use, operate throughout the seawater temperature range -1°C to +30°C.

Where applicable they are to be fabricated to a demonstrable robust manufacture for the lifetime of the appliance being resistant to UV light, rot, corrosion, seawater, fungal and bacterial attacks.

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All life-saving appliances shall be available for immediate use and positioned with regard to the number of persons likely to be present in different parts of the facility.

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The inspection of life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using a checklist to ensure that they are complete and in good order. This shall be reported in the maintenance records.

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The maintenance department should keep the manufacturers recommended spare parts at the facility.

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Spares and repair equipment shall be provided for life-saving appliances and their components which are subject to excessive wear or consumption and need to be replaced regularly.

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10

Records of maintenance, testing, and certificates shall be maintained

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AGES-SP-03-001

Rev. No: 1 Page 141 of 141

All parties consent to this document being signed electronically -PT&CS/GP/INT/2021/3344

Project: Q-32855 - Saipem Hail & Ghasha Folder: Reference documents