RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 1 OF 57
ADNOC GAS
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY Contract No.
4700022871
JV TJN RUWAIS Contract No
215122C
Document Class
Class 1
Document Category (for Class 1)
Category 2
OPERATING CENTER Contract No.
OPERATING CENTER Doc Ref.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
1
IFC – Issued for Construction
21-Mar-2025 D. Yokanathan
0B
ICR – Issued for Client Review
04-Feb-2025 D. Yokanathan
0A
ICR – Issued for Client Review
10-Dec-2024 D. Yokanathan
V. Evans / D. Shah / K. Nitta
S. Deilles / K. Fujii
V. Evans / D. Shah / K. Nitta
S. Deilles / K. Fujii
V. Evans / D. Shah / K. Nitta
S. Deilles / K. Fujii
0
ICR – Issued for Client Review
29-Apr-2024
S. Chang
V. Evans
A. De-Vandiere
Rev.
Revision Purpose
Date
Prepared by
Checked by
Approved by
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 2 OF 57
Contents
Page
Table of Contents
1.0
INTRODUCTION… 6 1.1 Project Objective and Location … 6 1.2 Scope of the Document … 6 1.3 Holds List … 7 1.4 References … 8 1.4.1 UAE Laws and Regulations … 8 1.4.2 Project Documents … 9 1.4.3 ADNOC Standards … 11 International Codes & Standards … 13 1.4.4 1.5 Definitions and Abbreviations … 16 2.0 OBJECTIVES … 18 2.1 HSE Objective … 18 2.2 Document Objective … 18 3.0 DESIGN PHILOSOPHY … 19 3.1 Principles of Inherent Safety … 19 3.2 Process Safety … 19 3.3 HSE Studies … 20 3.4 HSE Design Reviews / Workshops … 21 3.5 Safety Data Sheets (SDS) … 21 4.0 PLANT LAYOUTS … 22 4.1 Principles of General Plant Layout … 22 4.2 Layout Philosophy … 22 Layout to Minimize Risk … 22 Layout for Safety of Personnel … 23 Layout for Emergency Response … 23 4.3 Equipment Layout … 24 4.4 Onshore Facilities … 25 5.0 IGNITION CONTROL (HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION) … 25 6.0 HSE CRITICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS (HSECES) … 28 7.0 PROCESS SAFETY DESIGN … 28 7.1 Acoustic Induced Vibration … 29 7.2 Flow Induced Vibration … 29 8.0 EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY … 29 9.0 PROCESS ISOLATIONS … 30 10.0 EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN (ESD) … 30 11.0 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION (EDP) … 31
4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 3 OF 57
12.0 SURVIVABILITY STUDY … 32 13.0 FIRE ZONES, FIRE PROTECTION ZONES AND DEPRESSURISATION ZONES… 32 13.1 Fire Zone and Fire Protection Zone Definition … 32 13.2 ESDV Location … 34 13.3 BDV… 34 14.0 F&G SYSTEM … 34 15.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM … 35 15.1 Active Fire Protection System … 35 15.2 Passive Fire Protection System … 36 15.3 Fire Protection for Buildings … 36 16.0 CRYOGENIC SPILL PROTECTION … 36 17.0 EXPLOSION PROTECTION SYSTEM … 37 17.1 HSE Critical Element and Systems … 37 17.2 Flare line & support … 38 17.3 Safety Valves (ESDV, BDV, PSV) … 38 17.4 Fire Water Piping above 4 inches … 38 17.5 Major Hydrocarbon inventories … 38 17.6 Buildings … 38 18.0 PAVING, DRAINAGE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAINMENT & BUNDING … 39 18.1 Paving … 39 18.2 Drainage … 39 18.3 Bunding … 40 19.0 FLARING AND VENTING … 40 19.1 Atmospheric Vents … 40 19.2 Limiting criteria for flare release modelling … 41 20.0 ELECTRICAL SAFETY … 41 20.1 Emergency Power … 41 20.2 Electrical Substations … 42 20.3 Battery Rooms … 42 20.4 Transformers … 43 20.5 Lightning Protection … 43 20.6 Grounding System … 43 20.7 Earthing / Bonding … 44 21.0 HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) SYSTEMS … 44 22.0 HANDLING … 44 22.1 Handling and Storage of Hazardous Material … 45 23.0 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION … 45 24.0 EMERGENCY ESCAPE/ RESCUE … 46 24.1 Minimum Dimensions … 48 24.2 Emergency Doors, Exits and Gates in Perimeter Fencing … 48 24.3 Muster Area … 48
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 4 OF 57
24.4 Windsocks … 49 24.5 Emergency Lighting … 49 24.6 Emergency Communication … 50 24.7 Visual/Audible Aids … 50 24.8 Survival Vehicle … 50 24.9 Lifebuoy … 50 24.10 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) … 51 24.11 Smoke Hood … 51 25.0 HAZARD COMMUNICATION … 51 26.0 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH REQUIREMENTS … 51 26.1 Noise … 51 26.2 Vibrations … 52 26.3 Chemical Hazards … 52 27.0 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS… 53 28.0 PERSONNEL PROTECTION … 55 28.1 Hot Surface Protection … 55 28.2 Cryogenic Protection… 55 28.3 Machinery Guards … 55 28.4 Personal Protective Equipment … 55 28.5 Stairways, Ladders, Platforms and other Walking-working Surfaces … 56 28.6 Emergency Safety Showers and Eye Wash Stations … 56 29.0 HUMAN FACTOR ENGINEERING (HFE) … 56 30.0 HEAT STRESS … 57
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 5 OF 57
Table of Changes compared to previous revision
Paragraph
Modification description
Remarks / Origin
All
Updated based on COMPANY comment on previous revision
Design HSE Philosophy, RLNG-000-SE- RP-0001, Rev. 0B
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 6 OF 57
1.0
1.1
INTRODUCTION
Project Objective and Location
The ADNOC Ruwais LNG Project is a two train, near net-zero electrically driven LNG facility, targeting international markets. The feed gas for the project is supplied from the Habshan Gas Processing Plant via a new export gas pipeline. The plant will have two 4.8 MTPA (nominal capacity) electric driven LNG Trains with associated LNG storage/marine export facilities and utilities.
Figure 1 – Project Context
The ADNOC Ruwais LNG Project foresees the following main components at the facility:
• Onshore LNG Liquefaction facilities for 2 x 4.8 MTPA electrically driven LNG Trains (9.6MTPA
total)
• Common facilities including inlet receiving facilities, LNG storage, BOG handling, flare, refrigerant
storage and support buildings.
• Utilities to support the facilities including import power from the national grid.
• Marine facilities for LNG export and bunkering.
1.2
Scope of the Document
The scope of this document is to define the Health, Safety & Environmental Philosophy for ADNOC Ruwais LNG Project.
This document is to establish the HSE design philosophy that shall be applied to the facilities with regards to general safety engineering, health and environmental considerations.
This document provides the overall HSE requirements for the design and development of the PROJECT. It refers directly to a number of companion documents that forms as a part of this document
• RLNG-000-HS-PP-0101 Active Fire Protection Philosophy
• RLNG-000-HS-PP-4001 Environmental & Health Philosophy
• RLNG-000-HS-PP-0201 Fire & Gas Detection Philosophy
• RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501 Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy
• RLNG-000-HS-PP-0002 Process Building Safety Philosophy
• RLNG-085-HS-PP-8001 Industrial and non-industrial Building Safety Philosophy
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 7 OF 57
HSE inputs are also provided in selected relevant engineering design philosophy documents in addition, as required. HSE inputs to design and engineering philosophies are consistent with, and do not supersede, the direction provided in this main HSE document, and its main companion documents. Specific HSE input will also be provided within other philosophy/specification documents, including:
• RLNG-000-EL-DWG-6102 – Earthing & Lightning Protection Philosophy Diagram
• RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004 - Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy
• RLNG-000-PR-PP-0007 - Overpressure Protection, flare, relief and Venting Philosophy
• RLNG-000-PR-PP-0001 - Drainage Philosophy
• RLNG-000-PR-PP-0003 - Isolation Philosophy
• RLNG-000-ST-SP-0010 - Specification for Fire Proofing
• RLNG-000-HS-PID-5102 - Piping & Instrumentation Diagram - Firewater System - Main Firewater
Pumps
• RLNG-000-PI-BOD-0002 - Basis of Plant Layout
• RLNG-000-MT-SP-2201 - Specification for Thermal and Acoustic Insulation
• RLNG-000-MR-SP-2027 - Specification for Cryogenic Pumps
• RLNG-000-PI-SP-1002 - Specification for Valves (Cryogenic and Non-Cryogenic)
• RLNG-000-PI-SP-0004 - Mechanical Handling Philosophy
• RLNG-000-TE-PP-0002 - IT/Telecommunications and Security Systems Philosophy
• RLNG-000-EL-SP-5100 - Electrical Systems Design Philosophy
• RLNG-059-PA-SP-5101 - Specification for Flare
• RLNG-000-TE-SP-0101 - Process CCTV Specification
• RLNG-000-IC-SP-0101 - Specification for Integrated Control & Safety System
• RLNG-000-PM-PP-2501 Human Factors Engineering Specification
Scope of Work (SoW) for Safety studies and HSEIA Studies are included in HSEIA SOW (document No. RLNG-000-HS-SOW-1001).
1.3
Holds List
HOLD
DESCRIPTION
1
2
Section 16.5 - Deleted. Criteria for equipment and pipes handling major HC inventories headers to be protected against overpressure design accidental load updated as per clarification in Clarification #438 - Tender Bulletin N°15
Section 16.6.- Deleted. Reference is made to Blast CFD Safety Studies and BRA.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 8 OF 57
HOLD
DESCRIPTION
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Section 23. 0 – Deleted. Escape route requirement as per NFPA 101 and UAE Fire and Life Safety Code.
Section 23.3 – Deleted. Criteria of safe location of Muster Area updated as per EERA
Section 23.3 – Deleted. Building design shall be as per BFSR.
Section 23.3 – Deleted. No building is identified as Temporary Refuge.
Section 27.6 – Deleted. No alarm notification is required upon Eyewash & Shower activation.
All – Deleted - References for FEED documents are updated with references for EPC deliverables.
Section 19.1 - Deleted - COR-004 Bleed valve vents and drains design - Bleed and Vent in hydrocarbons services are to be connected to a closed drain system / Flare
1.4
References
1.4.1 UAE Laws and Regulations
Relevant UAE Legislations includes but not limited to:
• Law No. 1 (1988) Establishing the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC).
• Federal Law No. 8 (1980) UAE Labour Law and its Amendments Chapter V: Safety, Protection,
and the Health and Social Care of the Employees; Article (91).
• Federal Law No. 24 (1999): Protection and Development of the Environment.
• UAE Ministerial Order No. (32), 1982. Specifying Preventive Methods and Measures for Protecting
Workers against Work Hazards.
• UAE Ministerial Order No. (37/2), 1982. Establishing the level of medical attention the employer is
obliged to provide to his workers.
• FEA – Ambient Air Quality Standards.
• FEA Regulation – Protection of Maritime Environment.
• Federal Law No 24 Protection and Development of the Environment.
• Noise Allowable Limits.
• FEA UAE Federal Regulations List.
• Federal Law No. 21 of 2005 Waste Management.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 9 OF 57
• Council and Ministers Decree No. 12 of 2006 Regulation Concerning Protection of the Air from
Pollution.
• Soil Contamination User Guide, Environment Agency-Abu Dhabi, 2016.
• Federal Law No. 21 of 1981 for “General Authority for Water Resources Management.
• Federal Law No. 5 of 2016 Groundwater.
• Federal Law No. 12 of 2018 Integrated Waste Management.
• Federal Law No. 20 of 2006 Radioactive materials and their use.
• Conservation of aquatic life is regulated by the Federal Law No. 23 of 1999.
• UAE Fire and Life Safety Code of Practice 2018 (referred to in the specification as UAE Fire and
Life Safety Code)
1.4.2 Project Documents
Ref. No.
Document No.
Document Title
RLNG-000-TE-SP-0101
Process CCTV Specification
RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004
Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy
RLNG-000-PR-PP-0007
Overpressure protection, flare, relief and Venting Philosophy
RLNG-000-PR-PP-0001
Drainage Philosophy
RLNG-000-PR-PP-0003
Isolation Philosophy
RLNG-000-TE-PP-0002
IT/Telecommunications and Security Systems Philosophy
RLNG-000-EL-BOD-0001
Electrical Design Basis
RLNG-000-EL-SP-5100
Electrical Systems Design Philosophy
RLNG-000-EL-SP-5101
Philosophy for Earthing, Bonding, and Lightning Protection
RLNG-000-EL-DWG-6102
Earthing & Lightning Protection Philosophy Diagram
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1046
Air Dispersion Modelling
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1040
Performance Standard for Detailed Engineering
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1013
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1025
HSECES Identification – Systems Level Report
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1015
QRA Report (including Assumption Register)
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1047
Marine QRA (including ship collision Study)
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1022
Building Risk Assessment (BRA) Report
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 10 OF 57
Ref. No.
Document No.
Document Title
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1014
Escape Evacuation And Rescue Assessment (EERA)
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1016
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1018
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
RLNG-000-HS-RT-4001
Waste Management Study report
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1024
Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Report
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1028
Buildings Fire and Safety Review (BFSR)
RLNG-000-HS-NC-2002
LNG Spillage & Containment Study
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501
Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1033
Operation Noise Study Report
RLNG-000-PR-PP-0009
Methodology for AIV & FIV
RLNG-000-IC-SP-0002
Philosophy for Automation & Instrumentation Design
RLNG-000-IC-SP-0101
Specification for Integrated Control & Safety System
RLNG-000-PM-PP-2502
Human Factor Engineering Integration Plan
RLNG-000-HS-PID-5102
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram - Firewater System - Main Firewater Pumps
RLNG-082-HV-BOD-0001
Project HVAC Design Basis
RLNG-000-ST-BOD-0002
Structural Design Basis
RLNG-000-PI-BOD-0002
Basis of Plant Layout
RLNG-000-HS-PP-4001
Environmental & Health Philosophy
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0201
Fire & Gas Detection Philosophy
RLNG-000-HS-BOD-0201
F&G Design Basis
RLNG-000-HS-SOW-0201
Fire and Gas Mapping Study SOW
RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1029
Fire and Gas Mapping Study Report
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0101
Active Fire Protection Philosophy
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0002
Process Building Safety Philosophy
RLNG-085-HS-PP-8001
Industrial and non-industrial Building Safety Philosophy
RLNG-000-PI-SP-0004
Mechanical Handling Philosophy
RLNG-059-PA-SP-5101
Specification for Flare
RLNG-000-MR-SP-2027
Specification for Cryogenic Pumps
RLNG-000-PI-SP-1002
Specification for Valves (Cryogenic and Non-Cryogenic)
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 11 OF 57
Ref. No.
Document No.
Document Title
RLNG-000-MT-SP-2201
Specification for Thermal and Acoustic Insulation
RLNG-000-HS-SOW-1001 RLNG-000-HS-NM-0501
HSEIA SOW List of Potential Sources of Fire and cryogenic risk and item to be protected
RLNG-000-PM-PP-2501
Human Factors Engineering Specification
RLNG-000-HS-SP-0003
Safety Equipment Specification
1.4.3 ADNOC Standards
Ref. No. 52.
Document No.
Document Title
HSE-GA-ST02
ADNOC Integrated HSE Management System Manual
HSE-GA-ST07
ADNOC HSE Design Philosophy Standard
HSE-RM-ST01
ADNOC HSE Risk Management System Standard
HSE-RM-ST02
ADNOC HSE Impact Assessment (HSEIA) Standard
HSE-RM-ST03
ADNOC HAZID/ENVID/OHID Standard
HSE-RM-ST04
ADNOC HAZOP Standard
HSE-RM-ST05
ADNOC SIL Determination Standard
HSE-RM-ST06
ADNOC Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Standard
HSE-RM-ST07
HSE-RM-ST08
HSE-RM-ST09
ADNOC Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) Standard ADNOC Emergency Equipment Survivability Assessment (ESSA) Standard ADNOC Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Standard
HSE-RM-ST10
ADNOC Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Standard
HSE-RM-ST13
ADNOC Inherently Safer Design Standard
HSE-RM-ST14
ADNOC CFD Dispersion & Explosion Modelling
HSE-OH-ST02
ADNOC Occupational Health Hazard Standard
HSE-OH-ST03
ADNOC Occupational Health Risk Management Standard
HSE-OH-ST08
ADNOC Physical Health Hazards Standards
HSE-OH-ST09
ADNOC Chemical Hazards Standard
HSE-OH-ST11
ADNOC Ergonomics Hazards Standard
HSE-OS-ST06
ADNOC Simultaneous Operations Standard
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 12 OF 57
Ref. No. 72.
Document No.
Document Title
GP&E-GAIPS/STD-
ADNOC HSECES Management Standard
07
HSE-OS-ST09
ADNOC Electrical Safety
HSE-OS-ST12
ADNOC Explosives Standard
HSE-OS-ST13
ADNOC Hazardous Substances Standard
HSE-OS-ST20
ADNOC Personal Protective Equipment Standard
HSE-OS-ST21
ADNOC Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Standard
HSE-OS-ST27
ADNOC Hazard Communication Standard
HSE-OS-ST28
ADNOC Office Safety Standard
HSE-EN-ST01
ADNOC Environmental Impact Assessment Standard
HSE-EN-ST02
ADNOC Pollution Prevention and Control Standard
HSE-EN-ST03
ADNOC Energy Management Systems Standard
HSE-EN-ST04
ADNOC Waste Management Standard
HSE-EN-ST05
ADNOC Environmental Performance Monitoring
HSE-EN-ST06
ADNOC Biodiversity Protection
HSE-EN-ST07
ADNOC Air Dispersion Modelling Techniques Standard
AGES-GL-03-001
AGES-PH-03-002
ADNOC Standard on Facility Layout & Separation Distances Guidelines
ADNOC Standard on Fire & Gas Detection and Fire Protection System Philosophy
AGES-SP-03-002
ADNOC Standard on Active Fire Protection System
AGES-SP-03-001
ADNOC Standard on Escape, Evacuation, Rescue & Life Saving Appliances (EER & LSA) Specification
AGES-SP-03-003
ADNOC Standard on Building Fire and Life Safety Specification
AGES-SP-03-005
ADNOC Standard on Specification for Hazardous Area Classification (Supplement to EI 15)
AGES-PH-08-001
ADNOC Standard on Isolation Vent and Drain Philosophy
AGES-PH-03-001
ADNOC Standard on Emergency Shutdown & Depressurization System Philosophy
AGES-SP-03-004
ADNOC Standard on Human Factors Engineering
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 13 OF 57
1.4.4
International Codes & Standards
Ref. No. Document No.
Document Title
National Fire Protection Association
NFPA 30
NFPA 101
NFPA 400
NFPA 655
NFPA 780
NFPA 59A
NFPA 58
NFPA 72
NFPA 10
NFPA 11
NFPA 13
NFPA 14
NFPA 15 NFPA 17
NFPA 20
NFPA 22
NFPA 24
NFPA 25
NFPA 70
NFPA 497
NFPA 1961
NFPA 2001
NFPA 59
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code - 2024
Life Safety Code - 2024
Hazardous Materials Code - 2022
Standard for Prevention of Sulphur Fires and Explosions - 2017
Standard for the Installation of Lightning protection Systems, 2023
Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – 2023
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code – 2024
National Fire Alarm Code – 2021
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers – 2022
Standard for Low, Medium and High Expansion Foam – 2024
Installation of Sprinkler Systems – 2022
Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems – 2024
Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection –2020 Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems – 2023
Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection – 2022
Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection – 2023
Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances – 2021
Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water- 2025
National Electric Code – 2023
Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas – 2024
Standard on Fire Hose – 2020
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems – 2022
Utility LP-Gas Plant Code – 2024
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 14 OF 57
American Petroleum Institute
API 2030
API 2350
API 2610
API 2218
API RP 2030
API 2510
API 2510A
Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries - 2014 Overfill Protection of Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities - 2020
Design, Construction, Operation, Maintenance and Inspection of Terminal Tank Facilities - 2018
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants - Second Edition – 2020
Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries – 2014
Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations – 2020
Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage Facilities – 2015
API 521
Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems – 7th edition, 2020
API 520
API 537
API 610
API 617
API 618
API 620
API 2000
API 2216
Part II - Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries Part II - Installation – 7th edition, 2020
Flare Details for Petroleum, Petrochemical, and Natural Gas Industries – 3rd edition 2017
Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical, and Natural Gas
- 2021 Axial and Centrifugal Compressors and Expander-compressors - 2022 Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical, and Gas Industry Services - 2007
Annexure L for sloshing effects in large liquid containing tanks due to seismic activity - 12th edition 2021
Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks – 7th Edition, 2020
Ignition Risk of Hydrocarbon Vapors by Hot Surfaces in Open Air- 2015
British/EU/International Standards
BS 1635
Recommendations for Graphical Symbols and abbreviations for Fire Protection Drawings - 1990
BS EN3
Fire Extinguisher Color Code - 1996
BS EN 13463-Part 1
Non-electrical equipment for potentially explosive atmospheres
- 8
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 15 OF 57
EN/IEC 62305
Lightning Protection Standard, 2010
IEC 60079-10
Explosive atmospheres Classification of areas. Explosive gas atmospheres
IEC 61508
Functional Safety of Electrical/ Electronic/ Programmable Electronic Safety Related Systems, 2010
IEC 60079
Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres
EI-15
Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations: Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15, Institute of Petroleum, 4th Edition, June 2015
ISO 13702: 2015
Petroleum and natural gas industries - Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production installations
ISO 16852: 2016
Flame arresters. Performance requirements, test methods and limits for use
EEMUA No.160
ISO 17776: 2016
62.1-2016
Engineering Equipment and Materials Users’ Association (EEMUA) Safety Related Instrument Systems for Process Industries (including PES)
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore Production Installations Major Accident Hazard management during the design of new installations, 2016
ANSI/ASHRAE Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality Standard
International Safety Equipment Association (ISEA)
Z 358.1
Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment
International Society of Automation (ISA)
ISA TR84.00.07
Guidance on the Evaluation of Fire, Combustible Gas System Effectiveness
Federal Regulations
29 CFR 1910.106
OSHA Flammable Liquids
29 CFR 1910.165
OSHA Employee Alarm Systems
1910.23
1910.25
33 CFR 105
33 CFR 127
OSHA Rules and Regulations – for Ladders
OSHA Rules and Regulations – for Stairways
Maritime Security: Facilities
Waterfront Facilities handling Liquefied Natural Gas and Liquefied Hazardous Gas Hazardous Gas
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 16 OF 57
49 CFR 193
Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards
1.5
Definitions and Abbreviations
COMPANY
CONTRACTOR
EPC ADOC POC YOC ALARP BAT BDV BRA CCR CCTV CFD COMAH DAL DEL EDP EERA EIA ENVID ESDV ESSA F&G FEED FERA GHG GHS H2S HAZID HAZOP HFE HSE HSECES HSEIA HVAC
ABU DHABI NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (ADNOC) P.J.S.C. TJN Ruwais, Joint Venture of Technip Energies France-Abu Dhabi, JGC Corporation and National Marines Dredging Company (NMDC) Engineering Procurement Construction Abu Dhabi Operating center - National Marines Dredging Company Paris Operating Center - Technip Energies Yokohama Operating center - JGC Corporation As Low As Reasonably Practicable Best Available Technology Blow Down Valve Building Risk Assessment Central Control Room Closed Circuit Television Computational Fluid Dynamics Control of Major Accident Hazard Design Accidental Load Design Explosion Load Emergency Depressurization Escape Evacuation & Rescue Assessment Environmental Impact Assessment Environmental Impact Identification Emergency Shutdown Valve Emergency System Survivability Assessment Fire & Gas Front End Engineering & Design Services Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment Green House Gas Globally Harmonized System Hydrogen Sulphide Hazard Identification study Hazard and Operability Study Human Factor Engineering Health, Safety and Environmental Health, Safety and Environmental Critical Equipment Systems Health, Safety and Environment and Impact Assessment Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 17 OF 57
IES ISD LFL LNG LOPA MACs NFPA OHID PHSER PPE PSV PV QRA SDS SIL SIMOPS SPC SPL TWA UAE UPS
Instrument Equipment Station Inherent Safer Design Lower Flammability Limit Liquefied Natural Gas Layers of protection Analysis Manual Alarm Call Points National Fire Protection Association Occupational Health Hazard Identification Project Health Safety and Environment Personal Protective Equipment Pressure Safety Valve Pressure Valve Quantitative Risk Assessment Safety Data Sheets Safety Integrity Level Simultaneous Operations Supreme Petroleum Council Sound Pressure Level Time weighted Average United Arab Emirates Uninterruptible Power Supply
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 18 OF 57
2.0
OBJECTIVES
2.1
HSE Objective
Main HSE priorities for the PROJECT are as follows (HSE Design Philosophy Standard, HSE-GA-ST07):
• To ensure that a project is conceptualized, designed and constructed in compliance with UAE
Federal and Local Laws & Regulations, and ADNOC Standards & HSE Regulations.
• To ensure that the design of facility includes the principles of inherent safe design.
• To define the HSE objectives for the project to ensure a safe, risk-based approach to the design is achieved, thus minimizing the possibility of harm or injury to all personnel and the public from the consequences of an accidental event.
• To ensure the design achieves a demonstrated ‘ALARP’ condition with regard to Health & Safety,
Environment, Financial and Reputation.
• To control the environmental (including social) impacts of the project on wildlife, marine life habitat, air and groundwater quality based on the prevention of pollution or, where this is not possible or practical, the minimization of pollution using Best Available Technology (BAT).
• To assess and control the climatic change impacts due to projects and operations.
• To reduce the probability of an accidental event and loss of primary containment occurring. To minimize the damage caused to the plant, equipment and structures, or pollution to the environment, should an accidental event occur.
• To provide guidance in the selection of equipment and design of the projects to achieve its HSE
objectives.
• To preserve and optimize the usage of natural resources on a sustainable basis.
•
Identify interfaces and ensure consistency in HSE design between engineering disciplines.
• To implement/capture the actions/outcomes from FEED HSEIA studies.
The primary HSE objective, therefore, is to provide a safe and healthy working environment for all personnel present in the facility.
2.2
Document Objective
The objective of this document is to define the Design HSE Philosophy for the PROJECT. It describes design considerations to be applied in systems, equipment and procedures necessary to protect against the hazards which could lead to injury to personnel, damage to facilities, loss of production or pollution of the environment. It explains how health and safety aspects are addressed in design.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 19 OF 57
3.0
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
3.1
Principles of Inherent Safety
Hazard management will be divided into three primary principles:
• Prevention – Measures taken to eliminate or reduce hazards at source or to reduce the likelihood
of a hazard being realized.
• Control – Measures taken to keep hazards within the design envelope, be it through containment
or control systems or reactions to events that could result in an incident.
• Mitigation – Measures taken to respond to a hazard once an incident has occurred either to bring
it back under control or limit its effects.
Inherent Safer Design (ISD) represents the primary method for the implementation of the prevention category of hazard management and is preferable to Control and Mitigation measures due to its status as an inherent safe component of the design and does not rely on other measures. In the Hierarchy of Controls, as shown in Figure 3, the most effective forms of protection are Elimination, Substitution and Isolation, all of which come under the remit of ISD.
Figure 3 – Hierarchy of Controls
3.2
Process Safety
Process Safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes handling hazardous substances by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy. Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire, or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production, environmental impact and reputation.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 20 OF 57
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis is a collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, environment and/or the reputation are consistently controlled within the organization’s risk tolerance. These will be addressed through HSEIA SOW (document No. RLNG-000-HS- SOW-1001).
3.3
HSE Studies
HSE studies shall be conducted to ensure that the risk at the facility is in tolerable region with ALARP demonstration.
All HSE studies shall be carried out in accordance with the following standards
• ADNOC HSE Risk Management System Standard, HSE-RM-ST01;
• ADNOC HSE Impact Assessment (HSEIA) Standard, HSE-RM-ST02;
• ADNOC Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Standard, HSE-RM-ST06.
The HSE studies are listed below but not limited to:
• Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)
• Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
• Building Risk Assessment (BRA)
• ALARP Demonstration Workshop and Report
• Escape Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA)
• Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
• CFD Studies Assumption Register
• CFD Flare/ Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study
• CFD Blast Overpressure Assessment
• Ventilation Design Study
• Dropped Object Study Assumption Register
• Dropped Object Study
• Ergonomics Study.
Any risk related to Marine and Jetty facilities, including the ship collision, shall be addressed in the marine QRA. These facilities consist of a fixed jetty with berths, mooring dolphins, breasting dolphins and suitable fenders. The overall risk associated with the marine facilities shall be quantified and assessed. This shall include the assessment of the risk to personnel onboard the LNG carriers, other vessels and in the nearby onshore facilities including the residential areas.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 21 OF 57
HSE Studies shall be conducted in compliance with ADNOC Standard HSE-RM-ST-02 and in particular the appendix 4, which defines the requirements at the various phases of the project (detailed design, construction, Pre-Commissioning, commissioning, operation).
Loss prevention deliverables (e.g. PFD, P&ID, layouts, datasheets and specifications) undertaken shall include design for Active Fire protection, Fire & Gas detection and fire / cryogenic envelope for PFP and CSP application will be developed in EPC. Refer to section 1.2 for details of the applicable Philosophies that shall be prepared.
Integrated risk profiles will be calculated as part of the QRA considering nearby existing facilities.
3.4
HSE Design Reviews / Workshops
The HSE design review shall document how the design fulfils regulations, standards and norms and to document the basis and assumptions for HSE. Further, the project documentation provides the basis and necessary information for safe operation, modifications and development of the facility.
The HSE design review are listed below but not limited to:
• HAZID/ENVID/OHID,
• Hazards & Operability (HAZOP) Study,
• Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Determination (LOPA) Study,
• Alarm Rationalization Review,
•
Inherently Safer Design (ISD) Review,
• Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) Review,
• Bow-Tie Review,
• PHSER Reviews,
• Layout (Plot Plan) Review,
• Design review,
• 3D Model Review,
• Constructability Review,
• ALARP Workshop,
• Human Factors Workshops
• Social Impact Screening workshop.
3.5
Safety Data Sheets (SDS)
SDS are documents that provide information on the physical properties, chemical properties, hazards, and precautions for safe handling and use of chemicals. They should help to ensure that those who use chemicals in the workplace do so safely without risk of harm to users or the environment. SDS will contain the information necessary to do a risk assessment and planning emergency response.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 22 OF 57
All hazardous chemicals shall be labelled and provided with SDS as per the requirements of Globally Harmonized System (GHS).
SDS requirements have been described in detail in Hazard Communication Standard (HSE-OS-ST27).
For other material management, refer to Explosive Standard (HSE-OS-ST12) and Hazardous Substances Standard (HSE-OS-ST13).
4.0
PLANT LAYOUTS
4.1
Principles of General Plant Layout
The layout of an installation shall reduce probability and the consequences of accidents through location, separation of operation areas, equipment and functions. The layout can amongst others contribute to:
• Minimize the possibility of hazardous substances accumulations and spread of both flammable/
toxic liquids and gaseous fluids;
• Minimize the probability of ignition;
• Separate designated areas are required for hazardous and non-hazardous processes and
substances;
• Minimize the consequences of fire and explosions and thereby reduce escalation risk;
• Facilitate effective emergency response; and
• Provide for adequate arrangements for escape and evacuations.
4.2
Layout Philosophy
The facilities shall be laid out in accordance with the requirements of applicable Project Specifications. The plant layout should minimize risks to personnel, equipment, or the environment from emergencies such as fire or toxic gas release. Layout should also maximize the safety of personnel and allow the maximization of the response to emergencies such as fire. The layout should also consider the overlapping of emissions from flares and vents. Particular attention shall be given to the following features:
4.2.1 Layout to Minimize Risk
• Units, which contain large quantities of flammable fluids, should be located so the prevailing wind
will blow any vapor from an accidental spill away from the units and plant.
• Control of potential LNG spills to prevent spreading between fire areas or into non-hazardous areas
or non-hazardous drains systems.
• Thermal radiation from ignited flares and unignited gas hazards from relief valves and vent stacks.
• Build-up of flammable gas from leaks into confined areas, local terrain low points or culverts/drains
not filled with sand or equivalent material.
• Control Rooms to be located in non-hazardous areas. Analyzer shelters to be located in a safe
distance from any structure.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 23 OF 57
• The layout shall also meet safety requirements for hazardous area classification for selection of electrical equipment. The buildings such as substations, IES, plant roads, maintenance shops shall be located in non-hazardous classified zones, as far as practicable. Also, the interior of the control room and the interior of electrical power equipment buildings should be classified as non- hazardous. Ventilation systems with air locks shall provide positive pressurization to buildings and equipment rooms located in hydrocarbon process areas in order to prevent migration of a gas release into non-hazardous areas that may contain multiple ignition sources. The plant roads and designated parking areas inside the process area security fence shall be in areas that are normally classified non-hazardous. A security fence with emergency egress doors shall be provided around the process plant area. There shall be at least one manned gate.
• The utilities shall be located between process units and administration buildings where it is possible to minimize escalation. It is common practice to have the utility area serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and areas that are required to be safe during an emergency such as administration buildings.
Refer to PROJECT document Basis of Plant Layout (document No. RLNG-000-PI-BOD-0002) for further details. Also refer to Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS- RPT-1013) and QRA Report (including Assumption Register) (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1015).
4.2.2 Layout for Safety of Personnel
• The primary personnel safety consideration of the plant layout is to provide an adequate number of safe exit routes. The roads should be located so personnel have two paths to safe areas from any point in the plant as a minimum. For details on escape route, refer to Section 24.
• Layout to consider noise hazard from equipment.
4.2.3 Layout for Emergency Response
• The roads should provide access to all sides of the process units for fire trucks or manual firefighting operations, portable foam equipment and equipment to supplement permanently installed fire monitors. The access should provide drive-through capability for fire vehicles.
• The plant fire-fighting equipment such as firewater tanks, firewater pumps and fire trucks should be located away from any units that have potential for large fire. This would allow the equipment to continue to function in the worst-case fire scenario.
• The units that contain substantial volumes of flammable liquids should be separated to minimize
the spread of burning liquids. These units have to be properly bunded and drained.
The plant layout should consider the following factors as a minimum:
• The geographical limitations of the site;
• Orientation with respect to the dominant wind direction to minimize the likelihood of a gas release or smoke drifting towards onsite occupied buildings, accommodations and primary evacuation means;
• Onsite occupied buildings, accommodation, evacuation means, escape routes and rescue facilities
locations where they are least affected from fires and explosions;
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 24 OF 57
• Distances for transfer of materials between plant/storage units to a minimum to reduce costs and
risks;
•
Interaction with existing or planned facilities on site such as existing roadways, drainage and utilities routings;
•
Interaction with other plants on site;
• Plant operability and maintainability;
• Location of hazardous materials facilities as far as possible from site boundaries and public living
in the local neighborhood;
• Access for emergency services;
• Working conditions for operators; and
• Control access of unauthorized personnel and vehicles.
4.3
Equipment Layout
Equipment shall be arranged with a view to provide:
• Safe escape from working areas;
• Efficient ventilation of hazardous areas;
• Minimal explosion overpressure in case of ignited gas release;
• Access for firefighting and emergency response;
• Equipment layout shall keep potential release sources as far from ignition sources as practical to
prevent hydrocarbon ignition and fire escalation;
• Maximum separation, as far as reasonably practicable, between emergency service system (such as fire water system, emergency power distribution system, communication system, escape, evacuation facilities etc.) and hydrocarbon/hazardous chemical containing equipment;
• Where flammable material could be released, and jet/pool or flash fires could occur, potential thermal radiation contours shall be developed and spaced as per ADNOC Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Standard requirements;
• The pig traps will be laid so that the trap door opening will be towards clear area. This is to ensure
that pig impact damage to the facility is minimized in case of failure of the trap door;
• Provide adequate space for safe access of personnel and equipment for drilling, construction,
operation and maintenance;
• Air intakes for buildings including substations, containing unclassified electrical equipment, and
boilers shall be located to prevent ingress of flammable gas/ vapours;
• Avoid locating HSECES within the footprint area of crane movement to prevent damage from dropped loads. Further to assess any dropped loads a dropped objects study shall be carried out, refer to the Dropped Object Study RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1023.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 25 OF 57
4.4
Onshore Facilities
• The design should minimize land disturbance and maximize use of all space within plant layout of the facility keeping the total footprint to the minimum necessary for operational requirements without compromising safety. To minimize the land usage, coastal and vegetation disturbance, consider utilizing existing roads or tracks;
• The plant location shall be in consideration with topographical survey to eliminate low laying areas
to avoid flooding;
•
Inter tank spacing and separation distances between tank and boundary line and tank and other facilities are of fundamental importance;
• Suitable roadways should be provided for approach to process facilities and tank sites by mobile
firefighting equipment and personnel;
• Tank farms should preferably not be located at higher levels than process units in the same
catchment area; and
• Storage tanks holding flammable liquids should be installed in such a way that any spill will not flow
towards a process area or any other source of ignition.
5.0
IGNITION CONTROL (HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION)
Hazardous area is a three-dimensional space in which a flammable atmosphere may be expected to be present at such frequencies as to require special precautions for the control of potential ignition sources.
The hazardous area classification process shall also define areas where ignition of gas/vapor could take place during the normal operation of facilities handling flammable liquids and vapors. The approach is to reduce to an acceptable level the probability of coincidence of a flammable atmosphere and an electrical or other source of ignition occurring. Equipment with the potential to produce an ignition source located within a hazardous area shall be suitably classified for that area.
Hazardous area criteria shall also be considered during selection of non-electrical equipment for use in hazardous areas, and hot surfaces (exhaust ducts, etc.) located in external areas with temperatures exceeding hazardous area temperature requirements (e.g. 200 °C for T3 Requirement) shall be avoided within the hazardous area.
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated with normal operations (well-maintained plant) and emergency conditions are not considered for the purpose of classification. Major events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of material weakness, design error, etc. shall not be regarded as giving rise to a higher classification.
The purpose of the Hazardous Area Classification schedule is to determine and define the extent of the hazardous areas around equipment handling or storing flammable fluids (liquids and vapors) at the process facilities and to classify the identified hazardous areas in accordance with the following references as applicable:
• EI Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 15: Area Classification for installations handling flammable
fluids (Energy Institute) latest edition.
•
•
International Electrotechnical Commission IEC 60079 part 10
Institution of Gas Engineers Safety Recommendations SR25, (2001)
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 26 OF 57
• EI of Safe Practice Part 15 with AGES-SP-03-005
Order of precedence of the above codes to be based on from top (highest) to bottom (lowest). If any design aspect of hazardous area classification is not covered in EI-15, then for the same IEC 600079 part 10 to be referred. If the same aspect is still not covered under IEC 600079 part 10 then “Institution of Gas Engineers Safety Recommendations SR25” to be referred and subsequently the reference to EI of Safe Practice Part 15 with AGES-SP-03-005. If other international standards are to be utilized, they shall be approved by ADNOC GC Corporate HSE prior to use.
The hazardous area classification thus identifies the sources of hazardous and a flammable source is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements to:
-
Determining the layout of processing equipment on the installation;
-
Location of combustion air inlets and exhausts outlets for internal combustion engines and fired
units;
-
Location and use of ignition sources;
-
Ventilation system requirements;
-
Select the location of clean air inlets for ventilation systems;
-
Classify access roads within the Plant;
-
Selection of Electrical equipment used in hazardous areas;
-
Location of emergency equipment;
-
Location of vent points;
-
Location and design of doors and other connections between areas;
-
Drainage connections between areas; and
-
Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas.
Hazardous areas are classified into zones as follows:
• Zone 0: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is continuously present
or present for long periods;
• Zone 1: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur in normal
operation; and
• Zone 2: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in
normal operation and, if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.
The hazardous area drawing(s) for the facility shall graphically show the extent of the classified zones emanating from the process equipment as defined by the EI15.
Permanent/fixed or temporary electrical equipment required to be located within hazardous areas must be rated for the appropriate zone.
In addition to EI15, extent of LFL from reasonably worst-case leak of 25mm (Refer to HSE- RM-ST01 HSE Risk Management) or LFL contour for 1E-04/yr, whichever is higher, shall be used to define the extent of process area boundary in terms of Hazardous Area Classification.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 27 OF 57
In addition to the hazardous area classification defined as per EI15, electrical equipment within process areas shall comply with Zone 2 requirements as a minimum with the exception of all outdoor transformers and propane/MR compressor E-houses HVAC equipment which may be non-hazardous area rated when located in a non-hazardous area contour defined with EI15.
All external equipment on process facilities required to operate in emergency conditions (essential and vital) shall be suitable for Zone 1. In the event of an emergency (Confirmed fire and gas) all Zone 2 and unclassified equipment shall be de-energized (electrical power isolation) to avoid ignition potential.
Any facilities / equipment outside process area boundary can be provided with unclassified equipment, however in case of any emergency (gas release), unclassified equipment located within the extent of 0.5LFL consequence contour from reasonably worst-case leak scenario of 25mm leak shall be de- energized.
Hazardous area certification requirement for individual electrical equipment items will be defined on the associated data sheet for each item. Electrical equipment located within pressurized equipment buildings located in the process and utility areas will be non-certified as the internal space within the building is classified as a safe area with gas detection at the HVAC air intakes.
All fixed/permanent electrical bulks equipment, as defined in the below list, in outdoor locations used across process and utility areas shall be certified for minimum Zone 2 regardless of the hazardous area classification of their location. They can be non-certified when installed in Industrial and non-industrial buildings area and gate houses area.
• Lighting fixtures and accessories
•
Junction boxes
• Motor control stations
• Welding sockets / convenience outlets
• Cable glands and blanking plugs
• Local field distribution boards
All Instrument equipment and bulks located in process and utility areas outside of pressurized equipment buildings shall be Zone 1, Gas group IIB and Temperature class T3, as minimum.
All potential mechanical ignition sources located inside process area or classified area (based on EI15 or LFL contour) should carry IECEx and ECAS-Ex certification.
Other ignition control standards that shall be complied with in addition to Hazardous Area Classification are as follow:
• BS EN 13463-Part 1 to 8 Non-electrical equipment for potentially explosive atmospheres
•
ISO16852: Flame arresters. Performance requirements, test methods and limits for use
• API RP 2216 – Ignition Risk of Hydrocarbon Vapors by Hot Surfaces in Open Air.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 28 OF 57
6.0
HSE CRITICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS (HSECES)
A list of HSE equipment and systems is established in the HSECES Identification – Systems Level Report. Specific attention shall be given to design of those HSECES since they need to comply with specific requirement summarized in HSECES Performance Standard.
Note: Tag level HSECES will be done as part of the HSEIA Phase 3. Methodology for tag level HSECES will be as per HSECES Management Standard, HSE-OS-ST29. Both assurance and verification process of WSE and TIV by independent verification body.
HSECES are items that contribute to the management of risk associated to major accident in accordance with the principles of a risk management hierarchy. Those HSECES that contribute to risk reduction in the higher levels of the hierarchy are those which contribute most to the risk management process. The basic hierarchy is as follows:
a) Prevention – This includes equipment, systems or structure for:
i.
ii.
iii.
primary support of HSECES and/or facilities, for example: foundations and topside structures, etc.,
primary containment (pressure envelope) of inventories that have the potential for major accidents, for example, pressure vessels, tanks, pumps, piping systems, etc.; and
prevention/ control of ignition, example is hazardous and non-hazardous area ventilation, certified electrical equipment, earth bonding etc.
b) Detection – This includes equipment or systems to detect that the primary containment has failed,
for example flammable gas/ toxic gas/ fire/ smoke/ leak detection.
c) Control & Mitigation – This includes equipment or systems to provide protection i.e. prevent the event escalating and bring the plant operation to a safe state. For example, deluge systems, explosion protection, fire protection and suppression, NAVAIDs, collision avoidance systems, corrosion protection and monitoring systems, shutdown and isolation systems etc.
d) Emergency Response & Lifesaving – This includes equipment or systems to minimize the effects of consequence, for example, escape/ evacuation/ muster facilities, emergency power/ lighting/ communication, rescue facilities, etc.
For further details refer to PROJECT documents Performance Standard for Detailed Engineering (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1040), HSECES Identification – Systems Level Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1025) and Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Report (document No. RLNG- 000-HS-RPT-1024) and Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA) Report (document No. RLNG- 000-HS-RPT-1016).
7.0
PROCESS SAFETY DESIGN
The analysis and design of safety system shall be as per NFPA 59A or other approved equivalent international standard. The safety system shall provide two levels of protection to prevent or minimize the effects of an equipment failure within the process. In general, the two levels should be provided with functionally different types of safety devices for a wide spectrum of coverage. Two identical devices would have the same characteristic and might have the same inherent weakness.
Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points does not satisfy the requirement of two levels of protection.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 29 OF 57
7.1
Acoustic Induced Vibration
Valves passing high mass flows of gas with large pressure drops can generate high sound power levels in the downstream pipework. This can induce vibrations into the piping which lead to fatigue failure in relatively short duration.
Start-up or abnormal operation can also result in valves being used at more arduous duty than during normal operations.
Blowdown valves and large safety relief valves are potential sources of high sound power levels and the susceptibility of pipework to failure is a function of diameter to wall thickness ratio.
Flare piping is the main area where acoustically induced failure may be experienced.
The noise generated inside piping downstream of PSVs BDVs and PV to flare shall be checked to ensure that the noise induced fatigue does not occur in the system during venting.
Piping susceptible to Acoustic Induced Vibration must be screened using approved techniques.
If this screening shows that there is potential for acoustic fatigue damage the corrective action will involve one or more of the following:
•
Increasing the pipe-wall thickness downstream of valves,
• Specifying “quiet” valves or providing full bore valves plus downstream orifice plates; and
• Eliminating small bore connections from flare piping wherever possible and providing special piping
details to avoid stress raisers, which could initiate fatigue cracks.
For further details refer to the project document Methodology for AIV & FIV, RLNG-000-PR-PP-0009.
7.2
Flow Induced Vibration
Turbulence due to flow depends on the flow regime. The main sources of turbulence are flow discontinuities in the system. This in turn generates high levels of broad band kinetic energy which can propagate through the piping system. This leads to excitation of low frequency vibration modes of the pipe work causing vibrations of piping and in some cases pipe supports, which is generally referred to as Flow Induced Vibration. This can lead to fatigue failure at small bore branches. Detailed Flow Induced Vibration study shall be conducted, and the study recommendations shall be incorporated in the design of Piping Systems.
For further details refer to the project document Methodology for AIV & FIV, RLNG-000-PR-PP-0009.
8.0
EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY
The design of the facilities should minimize the number of sources for hydrocarbon release as far as reasonably practicable. Measures which may be used to achieve this include, but are not limited to:
• Minimizing the use of release-prone rotating and reciprocating equipment, or selection of high
integrity equipment where unavoidable.
• Using inherently corrosion resistant material, rather than ‘active’ corrosion inhibition systems.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 30 OF 57
• Using welded or high integrity joints and fittings on hydrocarbon equipment. Fuel gas pipe work shall be of all welded construction in non-hazardous areas, up to the single flanged fuel connection at each engine skid.
• Minimizing the number of connections and tappings. Non-intrusive instrumentation (such as
ultrasonic flow meters) should be considered where practicable.
In order to minimize the risk to personnel, remotely monitored equipment of high reliability should be selected where possible to minimize the presence of personnel in hazardous areas.
9.0
PROCESS ISOLATIONS
There are two main methods of isolation that may be used:
• Positive Isolation incorporated the use of spades/spectacle blind or removal spools and blind
flanges. This is the most secure form of isolation.
• Valve isolation to enable the installation and removal of positive isolation and for less critical duties
than those requiring positive isolation.
Refer to PROJECT documents Isolation Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0003), Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004) and sections 10.0 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) and 11.0 Emergency Depressurization (EDP) for more details.
10.0
EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN (ESD)
An emergency shutdown (ESD) system shall be provided which allows emergency shutdown of the process area and the auxiliary units. In general terms, the ESD system shall:
• Stop flow of materials from and to external sources;
•
Isolate electrical equipment to remove ignition sources;
• Segregate the facility into separate inventories; and
• Provide a means for the operator to shut down the facility during emergency conditions
The ESD system must be inherently fail-safe such that loss of power or key input signals shall not compromise its functionality. The system power shall be supplied by a dual redundant 240V AC Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) source, which is normally fed from the main or essential power supply systems. In case of complete loss of power, the ESD will instigate a full plant shutdown and provide permission for manual depressurization. The logic developed for manual depressurization shall take into consideration the flare design. The logic shall prevent depressurization of all valves in the same time to prevent both flare system and facilities from damage. For initiators of plant ESD levels, refer to the ESD Logic Diagram (RLNG-000-PR-DWG-0001).
Essential shutdown functions should be available during maintenance activities that affect the operation of the ESD system. All ESDVs will require testing on a regular basis. Where closure of an ESDV represents an unacceptable interruption of production, partial-stroking facilities should be provided to test and demonstrate the correct functioning of the valve in service. Facilities should also be provided to test the local solenoid valve without actuating the valve.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 31 OF 57
ESD system design regarding fire resistance and blast overpressure will be reviewed as part of FERA study and CFD Explosion Analysis study.
Refer to PROJECT document Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004), Specification for Control Valves (document No. RLNG-000-IC-SP-0411), Automation & Instrumentation Design (document No. RLNG-000-IC-SP-0002), Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report (RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1013) and Passive Fire Protection and Cryogenic Spill Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501) for more details.
11.0
EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION (EDP)
The principal objectives of emergency depressurization and blow down system will be to:
• Mitigate the consequences of a hydrocarbon release by reducing the pressure and inventory in the
process section and hence the potential leakage rate; and
• Avoid catastrophic rupture of the pressure vessels in a fire scenario, by reducing the internal
pressure to lower the stress.
The EDP (or blowdown) is one of the most effective risk reduction measures as the decay of system pressure results in shorter jet flames and reduces the duration of the release. This significantly reduces the escalation potential by reducing the probability of flame impingement onto other sections of process plant or key structures and buildings. In addition, by reducing the pressure, the stresses on a vessel under fire attack will reduce and will be less likely to reach dangerous levels and thus the probability of catastrophic vessel failure will be significantly reduced.
All PSVs released from hydrocarbon tanks (except LNG Tanks) and vessels shall be connected to the flare system. This shall take into account amount of gases to be vented, dispersion modelling/pattern and location of various receptors such as adjacent facilities, manned areas, etc. with respect to vent locations.
The flare network sizing shall be carried out considering “high-rate emergency” depressurization due to any event that may lead to severe consequences in a relatively short time frame which requires to meet the criteria for depressurization of the equipment (e.g. Depressurization for fire case for vessels / columns should be considered from equipment design pressure as initial conditions to a level equivalent to 50% of the vessel design pressure or 6.9 barg in 15 mins whichever is lower to find the restriction orifice).
Depressurization shall be initiated manually via CCR console mounted pushbuttons, based on a permissive from the ESD logic which shall enable activation.
Sequential blowdown of different fire zones or within a large fire zone may be considered to optimize the flare load and produce an economical flare system design. This is also referred to as staggered blowdown. If sequenced depressurization is adopted, the system design shall ensure that a failure cannot result in uncontrolled simultaneous depressurization of the whole facility. Design measures for preventing inadvertent opening of multiple BDVs among various fire zones shall be accommodated by design i.e. UPS back up power supply and secured instrument air system. Staggering calculations will be documented in Dry Flare and Depressurization Report ref RLNG-059-PR-NC-0005.
For details, refer to PROJECT documents Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004), Overpressure Protection, Flare, Relief and Venting Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0007) and Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1013).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 32 OF 57
12.0
SURVIVABILITY STUDY
A survivability study will be performed for all equipment with depressurization requirements. Survivability principle, as recommended by API STD 521 section A.3.5, shall ensure that vapor depressurizing system depressurizes the exposed equipment such that the reduced internal pressure keeps the stresses below the rupture stress or until the acceptance criteria for rupture are reached.
Blowdown flowrates have to be demonstrated sufficient regarding mechanical integrity of equipment to allow sufficient time for people to reach a safe area.
For those studies, the fire type and duration depending on the equipment location will be defined by the FERA.
It shall be noted that if the estimated rupture time is higher than the fire duration, it shall be considered that no rupture occurs.
The acceptance criterion for rupture is to allow sufficient time for personnel to reach safe area. In case this acceptance criteria is not respected, the provision of Passive Fire Protection will be studied to increase mechanical integrity of the equipment.
For more information regarding the survivability study, please refer to the Overpressure Protection, Flare, Relief and Venting Philosophy ref RLNG-000-PR-PP-0007.
The survivability of Health, Safety and Environmental Critical Elements and Systems (HSECES) to perform its design intent during major accident event, will be assessed as part of the Emergency Systems Survivability Assessment (ESSA) Study in line with ADNOC Standard HSE-RM-ST08 (ESSA - Emergency System Survivability Assessment).
13.0
FIRE ZONES, FIRE PROTECTION ZONES AND DEPRESSURISATION ZONES
13.1
Fire Zone and Fire Protection Zone Definition
The plant will be split up into fire zones which will be based on the expected extent fire and explosion hazard events within the plant. These areas will also be assessed by FERA and QRA where the Fire Zone segregation criteria are defined.
Refer to Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1013).
Fire zones are areas of the plant sub-divided based on the potential for fire & explosion hazard to cause escalation, as assessed by the consequence and risk modelling. Fire zones are areas within the installation where equipment is grouped by nature and/or by similar level of risk attached to them. Fire zone assists in managing:
• Separation distances between the units to prevent escalation,
• Depressurization rate,
• Firewater requirements for a Fire Protection Zone.
The partition into fire zones is such that the consequence of fire or an explosion corresponding to the reasonably worst event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk. The partition of the fire zone is intended to limit the consequence (escalation) of credible events but is not intended to avoid the occurrence of the credible events. A fire zone may be physically separated from other areas by space, fire barriers, diking, special
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 33 OF 57
drainage (e.g. impoundment basis) or by a combination of these so that fire is expected to be contained within that area. The escalation of the event is restricted to the affected fire zone and only a minor impact on adjacent fire zones.
Fire zone criteria is outlined below. Each below criteria is defined based on either potential cause an escalation of the Major Accident to adjacent unit or due to damage caused which can lead to secondary loss of containment and subsequent fire.
• Thermal Radiation - 32 kW/m2 (initial release rate, T=0 minute exposure of jet fire/pool fire scenarios from 25mm releases) OR 12.5 kW/m2 (T=5 minutes from initial release rate of jet fire/pool fire scenarios from 25mm releases) whichever is governing,
• Explosion Overpressure - 200 mbar at 1E-04/year arising from the unit
For thermal radiation at release duration of 5 minutes, engineering barriers such as emergency shutdown and emergency depressurization, pump shutdown, etc. should be considered. Fire zones should be optimized to increase safety; however, the number of fire zones should be kept reasonable in order to minimize the complexity of the ESD system and flare system.
Fire zones should not overlap inside the unit. If fire zone overlaps, no equipment should be installed within the overlap if the overlap is due to fire or explosion criteria. Only piping and pipe rack that shall be fireproofed (if necessary) can be installed in the overlapping areas.
Each Fire Zone can be split into several Fire Protection Zone considering safety distances of 15 m, drainage or active fire protection system to manage fire segregation. Fire Protection Zone extent will determine the maximum expected fire scenario within a Fire Zone. Firewater demand shall be calculated based on the maximum firewater demand among all Fire Protection Zone of the plant considering escalation to the adjacent ones.
As a general rule, steel equipment and structure should be cooled or protected by PFP following Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501). Such cooling may also be provided by fixed or mobile firefighting means (e.g. by portable monitors) based on the nature/ location of the facility.
Cooling should be provided at an early stage for steel exposed to heat radiations level above 32 kW/m 2, since unprotected steel will quickly exceed the critical metal temperature (above 400°C) which could result in the equipment losing its mechanical integrity and causing escalation of the fire emergency. As a minimum an emergency depressurization zone shall match with Fire Protection Zone, however :
• An emergency depressurization zone can encompass several Fire Protection zones;
• A fire protection zone shall not encompass several emergency depressurization zones.
Each emergency depressurization zone is segregated from the other sections by ESDV/SDV. Within a depressurization zone, all BDVs are open simultaneously, but within a fire zone, all depressurization zone (if several are provided) are depressurized sequentially based on the location of the emergency.
See relevant PROJECT documents for further details:
• Active Fire Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0101),
• Fire & Gas Detection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0201).
• Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-
PP-0501).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 34 OF 57
• Overall Fire Zone drawing (document No. RLNG-000-HS-DWG-0001).
• List of Potential Sources of Fire and Cryogenic Risk and Item to be Protected (document No.
(RLNG-000-HS-NM-0501).
13.2
ESDV Location
The following cases shall be considered:
• ESDV used to segregate Fire Zones shall be located at safe location: ESDV shall be located close to the fire zone it pertains to, but far enough from the closest hazardous equipment so that it shall always ensure its shut-off function (the ESDV shall not be exposed to a radiation level of more than 12.5 kW/m2 (T=5 minutes from initial release rate of jet/pool fire scenarios from 25mm releases) and/or an overpressure of more than 200 mbar at 1E-04/year in case of explosion in the fire zone it protects).
•
Interconnection between different fire zones: Ideally the criteria valid for ESDV at facility inlet/outlet shall apply and one single ESDV shall be installed on the interconnection at sufficient distance of both fire zones. However, to reduce distances, ESDV can be located protecting a fire zone at the limit of the adjacent fire zone and vice-versa, providing the interconnection between both fire zones is suitable and the interconnecting piping can be depressurized in case of an emergency. In case location of ESDV between Fire Zone is not practicable due to constraints, the requirement for ESDV inside Fire Zone shall be applied instead. Such requirements are described hereafter.
• ESDV used for Emergency Depressurization Zone segregation purpose (within a Fire Zone) shall be protected against Fire as stipulated in Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (Document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501) to allow proper functioning of ESDV in case of fire.
Refer to PROJECT documents Isolation Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0003) and Emergency Shutdown, Blowdown and Relief Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0004) for more details.
13.3 BDV
BDV shall be designed against fire and explosion as stipulated in Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (Document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501) to allow proper functioning of BDV in case of fire.
As mentioned in the section 17.3, BDV shall be designed also against explosion, according to the design accidental loads derived from the FEED/EPC FERA and CFD explosion studies.
For details, refer to Specification for ESD Valves (document No. 359665-0000-070-SP-1500-012).
14.0
F&G SYSTEM
A fire, gas and spill detection system, totally independent of the process control systems, shall continuously monitor areas of the plant for abnormal conditions. In the event of a hazardous situation being detected the system shall activate automatic the facility’s ESD and active fire protection system. It shall also activate
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 35 OF 57
appropriate visual and audio alarms to notify personnel of the area where the hazard occurred and also in the central control room. A distinction between the alarm tones for a fire or gas hazard shall be provided. Executive actions shall be specified on F&G Cause and Effects chart(s).
Fire and Gas Mapping Study shall be developed. The detector coverage should be verified based on Technical Report published by ISA (TR84.00.07-2010 Guidance on the Evaluation of Fire, Combustible Gas System Effectiveness) as defined in Fire and Gas Mapping Study SOW (document No. RLNG-000- HS-SOW-0201).
Detectors shall, as far as possible, be protected against environmental effects that could influence their operation.
An alarm system with an announcer in the galley and a push button in each refrigerating room shall be installed. The main purpose of this system is to provide an alarm in case personnel is trapped within refrigerated areas. This system shall be fed by emergency power (UPS). The alarm shall also be routed to CCR and F&G mimic panel.
Refer to PROJECT document Fire & Gas Detection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0201) for further details.
15.0
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
15.1 Active Fire Protection System
The primary objectives of the active fire protection systems is to provide exposure protection and cooling to prevent escalation of an incident and to protect the environment from pollution. Active fire protection, together with passive fire protection, will enhance the ability of personnel to safely evacuate from a fire area.
Secondary objectives are to prevent excessive damage to plant assets and reduce downtime following an incident so business continuity can be re-established.
The following systems shall be provided, based on the requirements and recommendations of applicable standards and design codes and the different fire hazards within the facilities:
• Firewater Hydrants,
• Firewater Monitors,
• Firewater Hose reels.
• Fixed Water Spray,
• Firewater Sprinkler,
• High Expansion Foam,
• Clean Agent,
• Fixed Dry Chemical,
• Portable & Mobile Fire Extinguishers,
• Wet Chemical.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 36 OF 57
Above systems shall be provided and designed in compliance with the requirement of AGES-SP-03-002 and NFPA standards, local codes and PROJECT specifications.
See PROJECT document Active Fire Protection Philosophy (document no. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0101) for further details.
15.2
Passive Fire Protection System
The broad principle of passive fire protection extends beyond the application of fire-resistant barriers. It encompasses the location, spacing and drainage of equipment to minimize the involvement in a fire event. It will also improve the capacity of the equipment and its support structure to maintain the structural integrity during fire event.
In general, passive fire protection shall be applied in accordance with the principles defined in API 2218, Second Edition and FERA study outcome.
In areas where there is a risk of LNG spillage (ex. from flange leaks or small bore (<2”nb) piping in areas vulnerable to mechanical damage), any fireproofing material used to protect process vessels/ equipment and structural steel shall be able to sustain cold temperature induced by splashes of LNG followed by a fire without losing its fireproofing integrity.
Also see PROJECT documents Specification for Cryogenic Pumps (document No. RLNG-000-MR-SP- 2027), Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS- PP-0501) and Specification for Valves (Cryogenic and Non-Cryogenic) (document No. RLNG-000-PI-SP- 1002).
15.3
Fire Protection for Buildings
As a minimum, the design, construction, and fire detection and protection for buildings shall conform to the NFPA and UAE Fire and Life Safety code requirements.
Also refer to Process Building Safety Philosophy (document no. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0002), Industrial and non-industrial Building Safety Philosophy (document no. RLNG-085-HS-PP-8001), Buildings Fire and Safety Review (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1028) and Building Risk Assessment (BRA) Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1022) and Active Fire Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG- 000-HS-PP-0101).
16.0 CRYOGENIC SPILL PROTECTION
Cryogenic releases exert an intense cooling effect when escaping to atmosphere, which may expose unprotected steelwork to brittle fractural failure. Brittle fracture of carbon steel is the primary hazard arising from a cold spill.
In particular, the main objectives of the cold spill protection of steel structures are to:
• Reduce the risk of collapse of piperacks and equipment structures impacted by a cryogenic liquid spill/spray and potential escalation arising from cryogenic liquid spill/spray for a limited period of time,
• Ensure the integrity of system that contribute to plant and operators’ safety;
• Limit potential escalation by providing cryogenic protection of above impacted items.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 37 OF 57
The decision to install a passive protection, and the specification of the type of protection to be implemented shall be made after a fire and explosion risk analysis of major hazards and their consequences has been carried-out to determine the degree of protection required for the duration of the hazard.
See relevant PROJECT documents Specification Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Protection Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-0501) and List of Potential Sources of Fire & Structures and Equipment to be Fire Proofed (document No. RLNG-000-HS-NM-0501).
17.0
EXPLOSION PROTECTION SYSTEM
As a general design principle, all process areas shall be designed to be as open as possible in order to minimize the potential for vapor cloud explosions by promoting ventilation hence accumulation of flammable gas in the units and congestion in which a flame could accelerate in case of ignition. Upper floor areas should use open grating in preference to plating to improve explosion relief. General congestion from site- run equipment (small bore piping, instrument tubing, cable trays, ductwork, etc.) can have a significant effect on the magnitude of explosion overpressure and should be minimized. In addition, ignition sources shall be limited as far as practical and electrical shall comply with the Hazardous Area Classification requirements.
The explosion risk in case of accidental leakage needs to be taken into consideration in the design of HSE Critical Element and systems.
As part of the Safety Studies that shall be developed for RUWAIS Project development, a study to model sources for flammable gas cloud formation from potential leak accidents and subsequent explosion event in case of ignition (FERA study, CFD Explosion Analysis study) shall be performed. The Explosion Design Accidental Loads that HSE Critical Elements need to survive shall be derived from this probabilistic risk assessment. The Design Accidental Loads are defined as magnitude of accidental event associated with a return period of 10-4/yr.
During EPC phase, these Design Accidental Loads will be detailed for each HSE Critical Element in the Design Explosion Load (DEL) Verification sheets, providing the engineering disciplines and equipment vendors with the necessary data for the verification against blast, taking into account its actual location, geometrical shape and size. The accepted level of damage will be also indicated. All these sheets will be compiled in the DEL Calculation Note for verification. Refer to Document No. RLNG-000-HS-NC-2001.
17.1 HSE Critical Element and Systems
As per section 6.0 of HSE Critical Equipment and Systems (HSECES) are items that contribute to the management of risk associated to major accident in accordance with the principles of a risk management hierarchy.
Among all HSECES, some of them shall be capable of withstanding the predicted design explosion loads.
These are the HSECES that minimize the potential for escalation of a major accidental event.
For RUWAIS Project, HSECES that shall be design according to respective Design Accidental Load (DAL) are :
• Flare line & supports,
• Safety valves: ESDV, BDV, PSV,
• Fire water piping above 4 inches,
• Equipment support structure that handles Hydrocarbon,
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 38 OF 57
• Hydrocarbon piping support including blowdown pipe above 4 inches,
• Critical Buildings,
• LNG Tanks support.
Design of the supports for these items should give due consideration to both overpressure and drag load.
Refer to PROJECT document Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) Report (document No. RLNG- 000-HS-RPT-1013), CFD Explosion Risk Analysis Study report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1017) and Building Risk Assessment (BRA) report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1022 ).
The following sections are detailing or clarifying design requirement associated with some specific HSECES.
Design Accidental Load datasheet will be prepared based on HSECES list and CFD study results and combined in the DEL Calculation Note for verification. Refer to Document No. RLNG-000-HS-NC-2001.
17.2
Flare line & support
Flare lines header (above 4 inches) and support shall be protected against overpressure blast event including related PSV, as Flare relief system is a critical system in case of emergency event.
17.3
Safety Valves (ESDV, BDV, PSV)
Different types of Safety Valves are implemented in the Design i.e., ESDV, BDV, PSV. These are by nature HSECES that prevent escalation by limiting the inventory involved in an accidental release. They shall then be designed against blast and their supporting structures.
17.4
Fire Water Piping above 4 inches
Above ground wet firewater line supports shall be protected against blast events. It is emphasized that, as per ESSA report AI 7.0 (WATER/FOAM) DELUGE SYSTEM and AI13.0 MANUAL FIREFIGHTING, deluge valve skid, piping, nozzle (dry part of firewater piping system), and manual fire fighting equipment (hydrants, fire hoses, monitors, mobile means) will not be designed to withstand blast loading, as it is considered as acceptable due to redundancy of others Firefighting means (monitors, hydrants, mobile means).
17.5 Major Hydrocarbon inventories
Structure and support that are required to ensure stability of equipment and pipes above 4 inches handling major HC inventories shall be design against blast.
This shall ensure stability of major HC inventories and thus limit the potential for escalation by limit the amount of HC that could be release after an explosion.
Hence, structure and support of equipment that could cause potential escalation to adjacent fire zone in case of failure (rupture or burst) is to be identified as critical equipment and to be designed for explosion design accidental load.
17.6 Buildings
All buildings within the Plant shall as a minimum be designed to withstand a reflected overpressure of 30 mbarg. Impulse duration and wave shape to be confirmed by Blast CFD Studies and Building Risk Assessment (BRA) Report
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 39 OF 57
In addition, critical manned buildings and buildings having critical equipment (Substation, Instrument Equipment Shelter and E- House) shall withstand the Design Explosion Loads derived from the EPC FERA, BRA and CFD Explosion Analysis studies.
Blast design requirements for buildings will be presented in the BRA study report.
18.0
PAVING, DRAINAGE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAINMENT & BUNDING
18.1
Paving
Plant areas where hydrocarbon leakage may occur in normal or accidental situations shall be paved and provided with adequate slope for effective draining of flammable liquid.
The process unit shall be graded to segregate adjacent processing areas from each other by varying the slope of the drained areas to the catch basins. The paved area shall have a sufficient slope to avoid accumulation of flammable liquid or vapour adjacent to or beneath equipment and pipe ways. If sloping is not practical, low kerbs may be used, provided that access is not impaired.
18.2 Drainage
A system of open and closed drains, connecting to appropriate containment or disposal facilities shall be provided, to minimize and control the spread of process leakage and spills, and for the disposal of both clean and contaminated surface water. It shall be designed in accordance with the PROJECT document Drainage Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0001).
Liquids that need to be considered in the design of the drainage systems include:
• Cold hydrocarbon liquid, i.e., LNG, cold liquid propane or cold mixed refrigerant liquid,
• Sources of oily contaminants, e.g., the hot oil system, spent or used operational and maintenance
fluids, lube oils, diesel, gasoline, etc.,
• Waste water from utility water / potable water generation Surface run-off (rainwater),
• Firewater,
• Wash down water,
• Sanitary effluent,
• Process wastewater with hydrocarbon chemical contaminants.
Areas with the potential for a leak of cold hydrocarbon liquid shall be identified. In areas where cold hydrocarbon leaks could lead to significant hydrocarbon liquid pools drainage shall be provided in such areas to direct spillages to a remote impounding basin as defined in NFPA 59A.
Impounding basin shall be located considering fire safety distances defined in the following document.
Refer to PROJECT document Drainage Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0001) and LNG Spillage & Containment Study (document No. RLNG-000-HS-NC-2002).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 40 OF 57
18.3 Bunding
Bund capacity for Class I, II & III flammable liquids shall be 110% volume of the largest tank plus 0.3m (1 foot) freeboard as per (NFPA 30).
Under normal conditions, it is unlikely that the capacity of an entire dike volume will be used or needed. Consequentially a dike area drainage mechanism should normally be kept closed until an incident warrants their opening. Dikes should be arranged so liquids will flow (with minimum exposure to pipe ways) to a low point within the enclosure remote from the equipment producing the spillage. Accumulated liquid can then be easily drained or pumped into a liquid removal system. Drainage slopes within tank areas should ensure that any spills are drained away from tanks, manifolds or piping. Dike walls should not hinder firefighting efforts.
19.0
FLARING AND VENTING
The flare and vent system, as a minimum, should meet all the design requirements as stated in API 521 and recommendations stated in NFPA 59A. In addition, the noise generated in the piping from relief and vents shall be checked for noise-induced fatigued.
19.1 Atmospheric Vents
Designs shall ensure that any combustion motor exhaust should not be a source of ignition for any hydrocarbon gas leak scenario. Exhaust ducts shall be designed to be gas tight and heat insulated if necessary.
Vents shall not be located adjacent to any potential sources of ignition or hot surfaces, i.e., exhaust pipes or any potential manned area. Flame arresters shall be considered for the hydrocarbon vents.
Consider any potential for liquid carry-over spills in vents and surrounding ignition sources, see results of HAZOP studies.
The individual vent/exhaust shall not be terminated within building/shed/enclosure. The vent shall always be taken to safe location which means, a minimum height of 3.5 m from highest platform/roof level/ground level whichever is higher; the height of the individual vent shall be verified through dispersion analysis.
Venting during normal operations and emergency releases from vents of hydrocarbons and toxic streams to atmosphere are not allowed, except for hydrocarbon storage tanks designed in accordance with API 2000.
Venting of sour gas more than 5 ppm directly open to atmosphere for any reasons is not permitted. Such gases shall be routed through a suitable acid gas recovery system or flare.
Vent from double block and bleed in hydrocarbons services cannot be open to atmosphere, they shall be connected to Flare as per AGES-PH-08-001 – Isolation Vent and drain Philosophy.
The height of atmospheric vents shall be verified through dispersion modelling.
See PROJECT document Overpressure Protection, Flare, Relief and Venting Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0007 ) for further details.
Also refer to Flare Dispersion and Radiation Studies (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1018).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 41 OF 57
19.2
Limiting criteria for flare release modelling
• Radiation (excluding solar radiation) shall not exceed 1.58 kW/m2 at any location at which
personnel may be continuously exposed, including proximity of plant property lines.
• The noise levels arising from flaring, at 1m from wind fence shall not exceed 85 dB (A) during
normal purge case;
• Dispersion of the maximum emergency relief rate of flammable streams shall be at a safe distance from work areas and elevations (e.g. platforms, tank roofs, etc.) that are likely to be manned. Thus, the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) contour shall be located within the sterile area and shall not pose any risk of possible ignition/explosion to personnel present outside the sterile area;
• The ground level concentration of H2S & SO2 at 2 m height from grade level shall be less than 10 ppm & 2 ppm respectively, outside the sterile area. All other toxic gases shall also be assessed for the corresponding TWA 8 hours concentration limit;
• The general philosophy is to operate plants with pilot burners continuous lit and no routine flaring during normal process operating conditions, including purge and blanket gases. High energy ignition system shall be available in case of loss of pilot flame to ignite from remote/control room by operations. Additionally, flame front generator (FFG) shall be provided as a backup. Blanket gas must be recovered during normal operations as an integral part of the plant design. Nitrogen from a reliable source will be continuously introduced as a purge into the vapor disposal systems.
The design must consider options to prevent the occurrence of non-routine and emergency flaring (e.g., use of high integrity blow down compressors) with safety requirements.
Also refer to Specification for Flare (document No. RLNG-059-PA-SP-5101), Flare Dispersion and Radiation Studies (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1018) and Air Dispersion Modelling (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1046).
20.0
ELECTRICAL SAFETY
The electrical system requires special consideration with regard to plant safety including equipment grounding and area classification.
See PROJECT document Electrical Systems Design Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-EL-SP-5100) for further details.
20.1
Emergency Power
Critical systems requiring electrical power shall be provided with a power supply of sufficient capacity and duration while main power generation is unavailable, to fulfil functions needed to control a hazardous event and/or to allow an installation to be safely shutdown and evacuated. The emergency power source shall be composed in whole or in part of the following:
• Diesel generator set; and
• AC and DC uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems with battery set.
The design philosophy for provision of emergency power shall be stated including electrical power supply, emergency diesel generator(s) and the un-interrupted (UPS) supply as a minimum for the following:
• Emergency process control,
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 42 OF 57
• Safe Shutdown and Safeguarding,
• Emergency lighting and escape lighting,
• F & G, Firefighting and fire alarm,
• Telecommunication and Radio System,
• Aviation warning lights on tall structures 150 m above ground level; and
• Building HVAC Emergency Consumer (where required).
The required voltage and duration of supply shall be indicated together with the units and services that are to be supplied by the system.
Emergency power supply generation and distribution shall be separated from normal power generation and distribution to the extent that a local fire shall not put both systems out of operation.
The capacity of the emergency power supplies shall be calculated, following an analysis of all systems necessary to ensure that the facility can be safely shut down and evacuated.
Emergency power supplies shall allow for maintenance of the system, without significantly reducing the functioning of the system. Suitable provisions shall be provided to allow the status of the emergency power system to be monitored in the Control Room.
The emergency generator system shall be equipped with a diesel day tank sized in line with project philosophy - PROJECT document Electrical Systems Design Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-EL- SP-5100).
Diesel Firewater Pump controller shall be provided with battery backup. Even in case of power failure, the pump should start. The battery should be automatically charged while pump is running. Diesel day tank shall be sized based on minimum requirement of NFPA, however longer duration shall be considered based on the firefighting strategy of the facility.
20.2
Electrical Substations
The electrical substations shall be normally located in non-hazardous area as defined by the EI15. Electrical rooms or working areas shall meet the following requirements:
• Notices shall be fitted on doors and access ways to remind of the hazard and the prohibition of
entry of non-authorized persons;
• Rooms containing high voltage (132 kV) equipment shall be Installed in dedicated electrical rooms
with restricted access, but shall allow easy escape from indoors;
• Working areas surrounding the electrical equipment shall be of sufficient dimensions to allow easy
and safe works; it shall never be used as a normal passageway or a storage area.
Flammable gas detectors shall be located in the substation HVAC intake duct and air lock to prevent ingress of hazardous gases.
20.3 Battery Rooms
The battery rooms (Recirculating type battery which associated hydrogen formation) shall be installed with fire & gas detection system on an intrinsically safe circuit, with an external Manual Alarm Call Point. During charging, where batteries produce hydrogen gas; hydrogen gas detection shall be provided in the battery rooms.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 43 OF 57
All electrical and instrumentation equipment inside battery room (lighting, power, HVAC equipment) shall be suitable for Zone 1 hazardous area with apparatus Group IIC, Temperature class T3.
Two exhaust fans shall be installed on separate circuits to remove all gases (one duty + one standby) to provide a minimum of 12 (twelve) air changes per hour which is considered additional safeguard.
HVAC for the battery room shall only discharge all air outside and no air is recirculated. The damper shall be motorized.
Failure of duty exhaust fan unit shall initiate an alarm in the control room and start-up the standby exhaust fan unit via the HVAC control panel of the building.
In case of hydrogen gas detection inside battery room, standby exhaust fan will be started from HVAC control panel and run along with duty fan.
Eyewash unit shall be provided at battery room in an accessible location with proper drainage for outlet water from eye wash unit to avoid flooding of battery room. Portable self-contained eye wash station may be considered where provision of potable water /drainage facilities is not convenient.
Electrical equipment and battery room for emergency power supply shall be located in separate rooms with separate exhaust facilities.
20.4
Transformers
Transformers shall be installed in unclassified areas as defined by the EI15. Transformer oil pits shall be sized to contain a minimum of 110% of the transformers oil capacity. Firewall shall be provided for the separation of transformers; fire wall shall extend above the conservator oil tank.
Transformer cooling medium (i.e. oil or equivalent) shall be of low combustibility or air cooled.
Active fire protection shall be provided based on oil capacity as per the Active Fire Protection Philosophy.
20.5
Lightning Protection
Lightning tends to strike the tallest object on the ground in the path of its discharge. Parts of structures most likely to be struck are those that project above surrounding parts, vents, edge of roof, wind sock, etc. The lightning bolt generally follows a conductive path to ground.
Proper lightning protection provides a controlled path for the current to follow back to earth and minimizes the development of hazardous potential differences. It may not be possible to completely eliminate the possibility of damaging accidents caused by lightning, however, a low impedance path (e.g., lightning rod to ground) should be offered to prevent the lightning current from taking other possible destructive routes. This path must be continuous from the ground terminal to the air terminal (lightning rod). This requires that metal parts be interconnected or bonded so that they maintain the same electrical potential.
See PROJECT document Philosophy for Earthing, Bonding, and Lightning Protection (document No. RLNG-000-EL-SP-5101) for further details.
20.6 Grounding System
Grounding system for electrical equipment shall be provided as defined in PROJECT document Electrical Design Basis (document No. RLNG-000-EL-BOD-0001).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 44 OF 57
20.7
Earthing / Bonding
All mechanical static and rotating equipment with the potential to generate static electricity shall be provided with suitable bonding straps. The loading/ unloading hoses and couplings shall be suitably earthed. All process piping and pipelines containing Class#1 flammable liquids shall be bonded along the piping flanges to avoid potential differential and be electrically grounded to the equipment grounding system.
All fire protection systems discharge pipe work shall be bonded to earth.
It is not necessary to bond across flanges of piping joints, or earth pipes separately, as adequate earthing is provided via vessels and other equipment to which pipes are connected.
See PROJECT document Philosophy for Earthing, Bonding, and Lightning Protection (document No. RLNG-000-EL-SP-5101).
21.0 HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) SYSTEMS
Ventilation systems shall provide positive pressurization to buildings and equipment rooms located in hydrocarbon process areas in order to prevent migration of a gas release into non-hazardous areas that may contain multiple ignition sources. Each normal entrance to pressurized rooms and buildings shall be via pressurized air locks provided with gas detectors. In the event of a loss of pressure (in airlock or room) for a period exceeding 30 seconds an alarm shall be activated in the control room. External doors which are designated emergency exits only and are normally closed need not be provided with airlocks. Where practicable, doors should be positioned so that they do not face a hazard.
Fresh air inlets for HVAC or inlet air of rooms and enclosures must be located in a safe area at least 3 meters from any hazardous area boundaries, and positioned to take advantage of prevailing winds as far as is practicable. Air inlets and outlets shall be equipped with fire and gas dampers with the same fire rating as the walls in which they are installed. Fire dampers shall be operated from the Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP) / FGS and shall close automatically in the event of either gas or smoke being detected at the inlet. Easy access shall be provided to facilitate manual re-set, maintenance and testing of dampers.
In case of gas detection inside enclosure containing flammable gases, air exhausts damper shall remain open and ventilation fans shall still operate.
Ventilation air intakes for equipment rooms shall be of sufficient duct length to ensure that the air transit time through the duct allows the gas detectors to shut the inlet damper prior to the gas reaching the enclosure, thereby avoiding the need for electrical isolation of the room.
See PROJECT document HVAC Design Basis (document No. RLNG-082-HV-BOD-0001 ) for further details. Also refer to Escape Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) (document No. RLNG-000-HS- RPT-1014).
22.0 HANDLING
Wherever possible, the design shall eliminate the requirement for manual handling of loads, materials and equipment during operations and maintenance. Where elimination is not achievable, manual handling shall be strictly minimized and shall comply with relevant national and international guidelines.
See PROJECT document Mechanical Handling Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PI-SP-0004) for further details.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 45 OF 57
22.1 Handling and Storage of Hazardous Material
Suitable and safe location for the handling and storage of hazardous materials shall be provided during layout review for permanent location during operation and temporary location during construction. Secondary containment systems are to be considered along with spill prevention and recovery measures.
The chemical hazard information (SDS, warning sign, PPE) shall be available at the hazardous chemical storages – see section 24.0 Hazard Communication. The chemical storage shall be segregated as per the compatibility class.
Hazardous waste storage areas shall be provided with adequate paving and kerbing. Evaluate alternate design options to either replace or minimize use of production / process chemicals. There should be a formal process of evaluation of alternatives (i.e. no chemical requirement or less toxic chemicals).
Manual handling of chemicals shall be avoided or minimized as much as practicable, use of automatic equipment is preferred.
Appropriate fire detection and compatible fire suppression systems shall be provided in accordance with NFPA standards. The safety showers and eye wash stations with shade and proper drainage of wastewater shall be provided near the chemical storage area.
In addition, safety or environmental related notices associated with hazardous material storage and handling shall be adhered.
Also consider storage and disposal arrangements for other types of hazardous waste such as medical, batteries etc.
Radioactive waste resulting from project activities are managed in full compliance with the requirements of FANR (Federal Authority for Nuclear regulation).
Explosive waste shall be stored and handled with appropriate procedures, as per UAE federal law and ADNOC Explosives Standard.
Also refer to Waste Management Study report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-4001).
23.0
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION
In an emergency situation the following telecommunication system shall be available and in operation:
• Public address and general alarm (PAGA),
• Telephone System,
• UHF radio System with Handheld Radios,
• CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) monitored in the CCR.
The communication systems for internal plan shall consist of public address and general alarm, Telephone system and CCTV System. External communication between operations or other plants during normal operation and emergency condition and civil authorities shall rely on the telephone system. The communications systems shall be reliable and shall be operable under all foreseeable emergency conditions.
An alarm system shall be provided so that personnel in any part of the facility are made aware of the existence of an emergency and can be advised of its location and any special instructions for escape and mustering. The system shall include audible alarms and verbal announcements through Public Address (PA) system and visual alarms in high noise areas.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 46 OF 57
The Public address & general alarm system shall also permit to alert personnel of the presence of dangerous conditions such as:
• Confirmed Gas Alarm;
• Confirmed Fire Alarm; and
• General Emergency Alarm.
In areas where the ambient noise level can be higher than 85 dB(A), a visual alarm (Flashing Alarm Beacons) should be provided to supplement the audible general alarm in order to alert persons in the area that an alarm is being sounded and to enable them to take appropriate action.
Intelligibility and signal to noise ratio of 15 dB shall be considered for indoor areas up to 85dB ambient noise. Outdoor signal to noise ratio of 6 dB shall be considered. Intelligibility shall not be considered outdoors.
Coverage performance of the PAGA system with regard to audible alarm and voice announcements under normal operation will be validated by the PAGA coverage study.
Process Closed Circuit Video cameras and monitors shall be provided for process monitoring. Process Cameras shall be supplied with a certified flame/explosion proof housing.
Security CCTV cameras shall be provided at the RLNG site boundaries perimeter fence. These perimeter fence security CCTV cameras, not related to process monitoring, will be powered off in case of SIS / F&G event and therefore do not require Ex proof housing.
CCTV system will be installed within the plant as per the following a PROJECT documents, Specification for Process CCTV (document No. RLNG-000-TE-SP-0101) and Telecommunications Process CCTV System Block Diagram (document No. RLNG-000-TE-DWG-0101).
An UHF local radio network shall provide radio communication between hand-portable radios and base stations and should be used within the facility for operations, maintenance and safety.
See PROJECT document IT/Telecommunications and Security Systems Philosophy (document No. RLNG- 000-TE-PP-0002) and other PROJECT relevant documents for further details.
24.0
EMERGENCY ESCAPE/ RESCUE
Escape routes shall be in line with Escape Evacuation and Rescue Assessment and shall be incorporated in 3D models for verification during design stage.
Also refer to Escape Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT- 1014).
• The process of successful escape from a major fire or gas event will require provision of the
following systems:
• Fire and gas detection (see section 13.0 F&G System).
• Alarms located in open and enclosed areas of the plant plus visual alarms in those areas of the
plant where background noise levels may mask an audible alarm.
• PAGA and personal radio systems: to provide personnel with the necessary information relating to
emergencies.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 47 OF 57
• Escape routes: to provide personnel with at least one guaranteed clear route to a place of relative
safety under emergency conditions.
Impairment criteria for the escape routes shall be as follows.
Major Accident Impacts
Impairment Criteria
Thermal Radiation
6.3kW/m2 at 1E-04 and with ALARP demonstration at 1E-05
Explosion
Smoke (Note 1)
0.35mbar at 1E-04 and with ALARP demonstration at 1E-05
10m visibility, 1500ppm CO, 2.3% smoke concentration, 100ppm SO2
Toxic Release (Note 1)
IDLH (100 ppm for H2S)
Flammable gas
LFL
Notes:
- Regarding the nature of the hazard identified, toxic hazards were not considered as there is no H2S in the streams and smoke hazards were not considered as LNG fire does not evolve smoke.
Escape route design requirements to be considered include:
• Escape route, exit doors, travel distance, dead ends, common paths etc. shall comply with NFPA
101 and UAE fire and life safety code;
• Two diverse means of escape shall be provided from all process areas so that access is always
possible should anyone be cut off by fire & gas or other emergency;
• Escape routes shall not be obstructed in any way. No single accident should be capable of blocking
both alternate escape routes;
• Escape routes shall allow easy transit of a stretcher team carrying a victim;
• All escape routes shall be clearly designated, marked by directional arrows and lit so they are
readily identifiable by personnel in an emergency;
• Escape route drawings will be shown on emergency lighting drawings;
• Valve levers, handrail and toe board shall not protrude into clear escape routes, pipes shall not become trip or head striking hazards on the escape route, nearby doors shall be hinged to swing in the direction of escape and likewise not protrude into escape routes;
• As far as possible, escape routes shall not direct escaping personnel through hazardous areas or
to higher levels from where they start; and
• Escape route should avoid passing through laydown area.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 48 OF 57
Also, refer to Basis of Plant Layout (document No. RLNG-000-PI-BOD-0002).
24.1 Minimum Dimensions
Unless otherwise specified, the minimum width and height of escape routes shall be 1.2 m and 2.3 m respectively. All means of access shall allow easy passage of personnel wearing self-contained breathing apparatus.
24.2
Emergency Doors, Exits and Gates in Perimeter Fencing
Emergency exit passage, door, corridors etc. shall be designed to comply with requirements of NFPA 101. All doors opening onto designated escape routes shall open in the direction of escape. Emergency exit doors shall if normally closed or locked shall be equipped with ‘Push bar to open’ fixtures.
Emergency escape gates are required in perimeter fencing, e.g., in flare areas, which shall be equipped internally with ‘Push bar to open’ locks/fixtures. The frames of escape gates shall be painted RAL 1004 Golden Yellow and illuminated for easy identification in an emergency.
Sufficient emergency exit gates shall be provided in the boundary fence to enable personnel to readily evacuate from the site during all Major Accident Hazard events.
Where vehicle gate is provided, personnel gate shall be provided separately adjacent to it to enable escape during emergency.
For more information, refer to the following:
• UAE Fire & Life Safety Code
• NFPA 101: Life Safety Code
24.3 Muster Area
Where possible, assembly points shall be located adjacent to parking areas to enable quick evacuation from the facility.
Muster area shall be sized in order to accommodate maximum headcount anticipated in the area, with a minimum of 0.35m2 per person or 0.75m² per person where PPE is required.
Muster Area shall be located at safe location. Impairment criteria (fire radiation and/or overpressure blast and/or LFL) of muster area are as follows [Ref. Escape Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1014).
Major Accident Impacts
Impairment Criteria
Thermal Radiation
1.6kW/m2 at 1E-04 and with ALARP demonstration at 1E-05
Explosion
0.35mbar at 1E-04 and with ALARP demonstration at 1E-05
Smoke (Note 1)
400ppm CO, 55000ppm CO2, 2ppm SO2
Toxic Release (Note 1)
27ppm for 60minutes exposure of H2S, Corresponding AEGL 2 values for longer duration of endurance time
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 49 OF 57
Major Accident Impacts
Impairment Criteria
Flammable gas
0.5 LFL
Notes:
- Regarding the nature of the hazard identified, toxic hazards were not considered as there is no H2S in the streams and smoke hazards were not considered as LNG fire does not evolve smoke.
Muster area shall be provided with emergency telecommunication systems.
If some buildings have to be kept occupied in case of emergency (CCB, Jetty Control Building), it shall be confirmed if specific Safety requirements have to be considered in the design (HVAC, Detection, Blast design, Fire rating, etc.). See PROJECT document Building List Summary (Document No. RLNG-000-CV- NM-0001) and Functional Specification for Substations, IES & Control Buildings (document No. RLNG-000- CV-SP-0011).
24.4 Windsocks
Windsocks shall be fluorescent orange color and located throughout the plant in highly visible locations. Their purpose is to indicate wind direction, advising escaping personnel to quickly identify the path of potential gas or toxic gas releases.
Windsocks shall be installed at strategic locations where they are always visible and along the escape route to guide personnel. The minimum height of the mast shall be 6m and reviewed during 3D model review based on height of nearby structures.
For specification of windsock, refer to Safety Equipment Specification (document No. RLNG-000-HS-SP- 0003).
24.5
Emergency Lighting
Emergency lighting is the same as normal lighting except that it is powered from emergency generator.
Emergency lights and junction boxes shall be suitable for Zone 1.
Emergency lighting shall be considered for below areas:
• Escape lighting for escape routes, muster point, passage ways and stairways leading to such
places;
• All control rooms;
• All emergency switching off appliances for the generator sets;
• All storage positions for firemen’s outfits;
• Fire pump area and their operating positions;
• All stations and rooms where firefighting equipment are to be installed; and
• All communication and emergency equipment spaces.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 50 OF 57
The minimum number of emergency luminaires in relation to the total number of luminaires is defined within the Electrical Design Basis (document No. RLNG-000-EL-BOD-0001).
Escape lighting shall be supplied from emergency generator with integral battery backup for 90 minutes. As a minimum, 30% of the total Emergency (Escape) lighting in any area shall be battery backed-up.
All Exit sign light fixtures used for escape during emergency situations shall be LED type with integral battery backup suitable for maintaining a lux level of 1 lux.
See PROJECT document Electrical Design Basis (document No. RLNG-000-EL-BOD-0001) and Electrical Systems Design Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-EL-SP-5100) for further details.
24.6
Emergency Communication
In an emergency situation the following telecommunication system shall be available and in operation:
• Public address and general alarm,
• Telephone System,
• UHF radio System with Handheld Radios,
• CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) monitored in the CCR.
See section 23.0 Emergency Communication for further details.
24.7
Visual/Audible Aids
- Visual/Audible Navigational Aids
Visual and audible navigational aids shall be provided for facilities to alert nearby sea and airborne traffic to the presence of the installation. The navigational aids provided for offshore shall comply with the following codes and standards:
o
o
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) Recommendations for Marking of Offshore Structures
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation.
- Aviation Warning Lights
Aviation warning lights will be installed as per ICAO requirements.
24.8
Survival Vehicle
For onshore facilities where survival vehicles are utilized, they shall be available to evacuate the maximum anticipated number of personnel at the facility.
24.9
Lifebuoy
Lifebuoys shall be provided so that at least one is readily accessible from any area from which a person may fall into the water.
Each lifebuoy should be stowed so that it can be readily cast loose and not permanently fixed.
At least 100% of lifebuoys should be fitted with self-igniting lights designed for use in water. Lifebuoys should be stored in a dedicated clearly marked lifebuoy housing to protect it from the element.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 51 OF 57
For specification of lifebuoy, refer to Safety Equipment Specification (document No. RLNG-000-HS-SP- 0003).
24.10 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to be provided outside the rooms protected by clean agent system at the dedicated room entrances.
For specification of self-contained breathing apparatus, refer to Safety Equipment Specification (document No. RLNG-000-HS-SP-0003).
24.11 Smoke Hood
Smoke hoods to be provided in CCB and JCB.
For specification of smoke hood, refer to Safety Equipment Specification (document No. RLNG-000-HS- SP-0003).
25.0 HAZARD COMMUNICATION
All chemical labels and SDS shall follow Globally Harmonized System (GHS) guidelines.
All safety signs shall display a pictograph in addition to text. Signs shall be luminous and reflective, language in dual English and Arabic. The size required and method of affixing, i.e., post, board, decals attached to equipment or painted lettering (i.e., hose reel cabinets) shall be clearly specified.
Appropriate environmental sign boards (information and hazard warning) indicating rare and endangered species, environmentally sensitive area etc. with precautions to be taken shall be provided.
Consideration shall be given to the high temperature and sand blasting desert environment in selecting the design of the sign display medium.
26.0 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH REQUIREMENTS
The management of health hazards will be ongoing throughout the duration of the project in line with HSE- OH-ST02 ADNOC Occupational Health hazard Manual. The approach adopted is to eliminate the hazard, substitute less hazardous alternatives or introduce engineering measures for controlling exposure at a time when changes can be made with ease and before exposure takes place. In this way reliance on administrative controls or personal protective equipment in the operations phase can be minimized.
Plant shall be designed, constructed and equipped in a manner that ensures the physical safety of employees, staff and visitors and full compliance with ADNOC HSE-OH-ST08 Physical Hazard Standards requirements and the industry best practices.
26.1 Noise
ADNOC noise exposure limits are 85 dB (A) for 8 hours TWA exposure and 140 dB (C) for impulse sound pressure level exposure shall be considered in the design (ADNOC Physical Hazards Standards, HSE-OH- ST08 and HSE Design Philosophy Standard, HSE-GA-ST07).
Noise Study Report shall be prepared as part of HSEIA considering the actual vendor data. After commissioning, a noise survey should be conducted for the actual noise levels to verify and update the Noise Study Report.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 52 OF 57
The PA system, telephone or radio communication and alarm signaling devices SPL shall be at least 15 dB above the ambient noise level, or 5 dB above the maximum SPL having duration of 60 seconds to allow reliable speech as per NFPA 72.
Acoustic insulation requirements within enclosed spaces shall be specified whenever the sound pressure level (SPL) exceeds the acceptable noise exposure limits, also in plant areas where (PPE) hearing protection is necessary.
Noise contours shall be developed for the entire project areas and handed over to operations for implementation of hearing conservation program. Once operation steady state has been achieved, a noise survey shall be conducted to verify the predicted noise levels.
Noise levels throughout the facility shall be minimized in order to minimize the risk of hearing damage to personnel, and to provide acceptable working conditions in terms of communications and concentration.
The individual equipment noise limits shall be incorporated in equipment purchase orders and the engineering contractor shall:
• Ensure that purchased equipment is within its specified noise limits.
• Obtain documentation
to substantiate vendors’ compliance with acoustic performance
requirements.
• Obtain guarantees from vendors that noise limits will not be exceeded in normal operation.
Where equipment data provided by vendors show that the noise level will exceed the specified noise limit, the vendor shall be asked to propose noise control measures. Selection of any such measure shall be at the discretion of the contractor.
For details, refer to Noise Control Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-3001).
26.2
Vibrations
Potential sources of vibrations need to be reviewed and identified during the design to ensure structural integrity and occupational hazards are minimized in line with ADNOC Physical Hazards Standards, HSE- OH- ST08.68
Small, lower power equipment can generally be excluded. Rotating or reciprocating equipment rated at more than 30 kW shall be reviewed. Where required, anti-vibration mountings shall be provided.
Vibration shall not exceed the limit prescribed in API 617 for centrifugal compressors, API 610 for centrifugal pumps and API 618 for reciprocating machines respectively.
26.3 Chemical Hazards
Hazardous materials may pose a range of hazards either by skin or eye contact, ingestion or inhalation. Also, atmospheric contamination may arise from a range of sources such as exhaust gas components, process/utility fluids and services, maintenance products, insulation and surface coatings.
Hazardous materials intended for use during construction, commissioning, start up, operations or maintenance shall be assessed for potential health hazards prior to selection and/ or inclusion in specifications. This assessment shall include life-cycle considerations, such as expected service life e.g. catalysts, surface coatings etc.
For Chemical HSE assessment details see Chemical Hazards Standard (HSE-OH-ST09).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 53 OF 57
Safety Data Sheets (SDS) shall be obtained for all hazardous materials intended for use during construction, commissioning, start up, operations and maintenance. See section 3.5 Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for further details. These shall be compiled in a SDS Register in detail design phase.
Process vessels and piping containing materials having a high hazard potential shall be identified and appropriate controls shall be put in place to minimize potential exposure, e.g. by setting valve and flange specifications to minimize leakage, by design and layout of equipment to ensure that personnel are adequately protected from potential leaks and sprays of harmful substances (e.g. due to pump seal failure).
The need for fixed and portable gas monitors in process areas shall be assessed.
Emissions from exhaust stacks shall be designed such that they do not adversely impact personnel either in terms of atmospheric contamination or additional heat load.
For safety signs details see section 24.0 Hazard Communication and for handling of hazardous materials see section 21.1. Handling and Storage of Hazardous Material.
27.0
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
ADNOC generic environmental design requirements shall be adequately address and incorporate into the design based on pollution prevention or, where this is not practical, the minimization of pollution using Best Available Techniques with the following goals:
• Minimize emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) by:
-
Minimizing plant outages,
-
Minimizing leakage across valves to prevent gas being routed to flare and vent (fugitive
emissions),
-
Optimize flare gas purge rates,
-
Optimize energy efficiency of plant and equipment,
-
Use of electrical drivers rather than steam or gas turbine drivers,
-
No purchase of systems using CFCs, HCFCs, Halons or any other substances which has
potential impact on global warming and ozone depletion,
- No routine flaring (Pilot burners of flare are kept lit continuously to ensure combustion of
hydrocarbons to flare),
-
Minimize occurrence of non-routine and emergency flaring / venting,
-
Minimize fugitive emissions using best available technology,
-
Usage of clean energy,
-
Usage of sustainable raw materials,
• No discharge of off-spec water to land and sea,
• No discharge of oil and chemicals to land and sea,
• Optimization of facilities footprint to reduce environmental impacts,
• Minimization of nuisance for visible impacts, noise, dust, light and odor,
• No interference with other primary/competent users of the environment,
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 54 OF 57
• Hazardous and non-hazardous wastes shall be identified, segregated, appropriately stored and
managed according to following framework,
• Reduce waste streams at source,
• Minimize waste streams through design,
• Reuse waste streams; and
• Ultimate disposal without negative impact on the environment.
Following (not limited to) environmental studies shall be performed:
• Environmental Base Line Study,
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA),
• GHG Assessment,
• Air Emission Dispersion Assessment,
• Biodiversity Management Plan,
• Marine Habitat and Ecological Survey,
• Terrestrial Ecological Survey,
• Noise Study and contour reports,
• Underwater noise modeling study
• Energy Review,
See below PROJECT relevant documents for further details:
• FEED Waste Management Plan (Operation Phase) (document No. 359665-0000-070-RP-1900-
• Air Dispersion Modelling (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1046).
• Environment and health (document No. RLNG-000-HS-PP-4001)
• Energy review (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1039)
• Waste Management Study Report (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-4001)
• Operation Noise study (document No. RLNG-000-HS-RPT-1033)
• Environmental monitoring (operation) specification (document No. RLNG-000-HS-SP-4003)
• Drainage Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-PR-PP-0001).
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 55 OF 57
28.0
PERSONNEL PROTECTION
28.1 Hot Surface Protection
Appropriate design measures shall be provided to protect against injury from hot equipment with external metal or conducting parts (including piping) having a surface temperature that may be hotter than 60°C in normal operations and there is risk or being touched by personnel.
In general, vessels, exchangers, pumps, miscellaneous equipment, valves, flanges shall not be insulated for personnel protection. If however, a possible hazard is evident, personnel protection shall be provided in the form of thermal insulation or preferably guard barriers with warning signs to prevent personnel from coming in direct contact with hot surfaces.
Extent of personnel protection insulation shall be as follows:
Insulated to a height of 2.5m vertically above the floor or platform level
- within 1m horizontally beyond the access way, ladder and platform edges.
The design should not rely on personnel wearing gloves or other PPE, except for items such as handrails, which may exceed 60°C due to solar radiation, and where the use of insulation would be impractical.
See PROJECT document Specification for Thermal and Acoustic Insulation (document No. RLNG-000-MT- SP-2201) for further details.
28.2 Cryogenic Protection
A severe hazard is created when bare skin contacts a cold surface. Moisture on the skin freezes, bonding the skin to the surface. The skin and underlying frozen flesh are then easily torn off leaving an open wound. Direct contact with a cryogenic liquid generally produces rapid freezing of tissue because of the high rate of heat transfer.
Equipment and piping which normally operates at a temperature of 14°F (-10°C) or below, and which can be contacted by personnel in normal conditions, shall be provided with barriers or insulation.
Protection against falling ice from pipework shall also be considered. Consideration shall be given to holding in place, until they thaw large pieces of ice that could present a falling hazard.
See relevant PROJECT documents Specification for Thermal & Acoustic Insulation (document No. RLNG- 000-MT-SP-2201), Passive Fire Protection & Cryogenic Spills Philosophy (document No. RLNG-000-HS- PP-0501). Also see PROJECT documents Specification for Cryogenic Pumps (RLNG-000-MR-SP-2027) and Specification for Valves (Cryogenic and Non-Cryogenic) (RLNG-000-PI-SP-1002).
28.3 Machinery Guards
All exposed moving parts on all machinery shall be suitably guarded to protect personnel from injury. Guards and safety devices provided shall be kept in position whilst machinery is running.
An emergency trip button shall be provided, as applicable.
28.4
Personal Protective Equipment
The PPE requirements for normal and emergency operations are to be identified and provided as required based on operational requirement and risk assessment.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 56 OF 57
Operators and maintenance crews attending pipe fittings, valves, etc. on LNG duty shall wear gloves, face shields and suitable clothing to protect them from frost bite and cold splash of LNG. These personnel protection devices shall resist the LNG temperature for at least 10 minutes.
28.5
Stairways, Ladders, Platforms and other Walking-working Surfaces
Structural Steel Standards for Stair, Ladder and Safety Cage Details are defined in the PROJECT document Construction Standards – Steel Structures - General (document No. RLNG-000-ST-DWG-0001).
Width of stairs to be considered shall be 900mm for normal access and 1200mm for use of stretcher or escape way.
See PROJECT document Human Factor Engineering Specification (document No. RLNG-000-PM-PP- 2501) for further details.
28.6
Emergency Safety Showers and Eye Wash Stations
Emergency safety showers and eye wash stations shall be installed upwind or crosswind of the most prevailing wind direction at all locations, wherever personnel are likely to be exposed to any injury from contact with harmful chemicals/vapors.
Risk areas include, but are not limited to, chemical loading/off loading facilities, chemical injection points, chemical pumping areas, chemical valve manifolds, chemical storage and battery rooms etc.
All permanently installed units within plant areas will be in high temperature desert conditions; hence the unit shall be associated with a chiller to maintain the temperature of the water. In addition an overhead tank of 1200L shall be provided for each combined Safety Showers and Eye Wash Stations.
Emergency Safety Showers and Eye Wash Stations temperature, pressure and flowrate requirements shall be in accordance with ANSI Z358.1.
The minimum distance of the eyewash & shower from hazard shall be no closer than 3 m (10 ft) and no more than 15 m (50 feet), for equipment located outdoor.
29.0 HUMAN FACTOR ENGINEERING (HFE)
HFE involves the study and application of human capabilities, limitations and needs to the design and development of human machine/system interfaces (HMI) with the aim of protecting safety and health and optimising human performance. A major objective of HFE is to minimize the risk of design-induced human error.
The key focus areas for HFE in design include:
• Operability: To ensure that all operable components, including valves, instruments, controls and displays, can be viewed, reached, and operated effectively and safely by the expected working population.
• Maintainability: To ensure that the requirements for safe and efficient maintenance tasks have been
incorporated into the design.
• Access and Egress: To ensure that all areas of the facilities, including equipment packages, can be accessed and evacuated safely and efficiently under normal, adverse and emergency conditions.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
RUWAIS LNG PROJECT
Design HSE Philosophy
COMPANY DOCUMENT REF.
RLNG-000-HS-PP-0001
CONTRACTOR DOC. REF.
215122C-000-JSD-1900-0001
REVISION: 1
PAGE 57 OF 57
• Materials Handling: To ensure that requirements for lifting/lowering, holding and moving of equipment manually and mechanically have been addressed with due consideration for the health, safety and capabilities of the expected working population.
• Communication / Information Presentation: To ensure that methods of equipment identification and presentation / communication of operational information and the design of HMI have been matched to the end user population with the objectives of assisting human performance and reducing human error.
• Environmental Factors: To ensure environmental requirements applicable to human health, safety and performance including noise, lighting, vibration, climatic conditions and proximity to hot, cold, hazardous and contaminated equipment or areas have been addressed.
• Constructability: To ensure the safety and efficiency of construction, commissioning and
completions operations.
Refer to Human Factor Specification (RLNG-000-PM-PP-2501).
30.0 HEAT STRESS
Exposure to heat can cause illness and death. The most serious heat illness is heat stroke. Other heat illnesses, such as heat exhaustion, heat cramps and heat rash, should also be avoided. There are precautions that can be taken any time temperatures are high and the job involves physical work.
Operator cabins or rest shelters shall be considered where operators are expected to remain for pro-longed periods of time in the sun.
Heat stress management shall be in compliance to OSHAD-SF CoP 11.0 and ADNOC Physical Hazards Standards HSE-OH-ST08.
The terms of Contract / Agreement No: CON22-146 shall apply for any disclosure of this document to any third party.
Project: Q-32859 - NMDC - Ruwais Folder: RFQ Files